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THE    REVIVAL 
OF     SCHOLASTIC    PHILOSOPHY 


THE  REVIVAL 
OF    SCHOLASTIC    PHILOSOPHY 

IN    THE 

NINETEENTH  CENTURY 


JOSEPH  LOUIS  PERRIER,  Ph.D. 


Submitted  in  Partial  Fulfilment    of  the  Requirf.ments  for 

the  Degree  of  Doctor  of  Philosophy,  in  the  Faculty 

of  Philosophy,  Columbia  University 


■ 

^     «F  THfc 


^** 


UNIVERSITY 


NEW  YORK 

1909 


Copyright,   1909 
By  The  Columbia  University  Press 

Printed  from  type  March,  1909 


press  of 

Thi  New  era  printing  Company 

Lancaster.  Pa 


PEEFACE 

The  present  work  consists  of  two  parts,  the  first  of  which  may 
be  described  as  definitional;  the  second,  as  historical. 

The  first  part  (Chapters  I  to  VIII)  is  not  intended  to  be  a 
complete  course  of  Scholastic  philosophy.  I  limit  myself  to  an 
exposition  and  a  discussion  of  those  principles  of  Scholasticism, 
a  knowledge  of  which  is  indispensable  to  an  understanding  of 
the  Scholastic  revival.  For  an  adequate  knowledge  of  Scholas- 
tic philosophy,  I  would  refer  my  readers  to  the  masterly  exposi- 
tions of  Urraburu,  Merrier,  and  the  Jesuits  of  Stonyhurst.  The 
shorter  treatises  of  Ginebra  and  Pecsi  are  also  excellent. 

In  the  historical  part,  I  have  divided  the  speculative  world 
into  races  rather  than  into  political  divisions.  I  have  thus  in- 
cluded German  Austria  in  the  chapter  on  Germany  and  devoted 
a  separate  section  to  Hungary.  I  have  likewise  studied  South 
American  republics  in  connection  with  the  neo-Scholastic  move- 
ment in  Spain.  It  is  into  races,  rather  than  into  arbitrary 
tracts  of  land,  that  the  world  is  divided.  In  spite  of  the  ridicu- 
lous principle  we  call  the  Monroe  doctrine,  South  American 
nations  are  and  will  always  be  essentially  Spanish.  With  Spain 
they  speak,  they  think  and  they  pray.  They  regard  us  as  stran- 
gers, sometimes  as  barbarians.  They  emphatically  refuse  to 
accept  the  protection  we  would  force  upon  them. 

In  completing  this  second  part,  I  have  derived  considerable 
help  from  the  following  works : 

Gonzalez's  Historic!  dc  la  Filosof'ui. 

Blanc's  Histoire  de  la  Philosophic  ei  pariiaUieremeni  de  la 

Philosophic  content poraine, 
Besse's  Deux  centres  dn  mouvement  thomiste, 
Gomez  [zquierdo'e  Historia  de  In  FUosofia  del  siglo  XIX, 

v 


VI 

Ferreira-Deusdado'e  La  Philosophic  thomiste  en  Portugal, 
van  Becelaere'a  La  Philosophie  en  Am&rique, 
Garcia V  Tomismo  y  Neoiotnis?no, 
Valverde  Telle//?  historical  works. 
I  tender  my  sincere  thanks  to  the  friends  who  have  assisted 
me  in  the  preparation  of  this  book.     In  particular,  I  acknowl- 
edge my   obligation    to    Professor   John   Dewey,   of   Columbia 
University. 

New  York,  April,  1908. 


CONTENTS 


INTRODUCTION 


CHAPTER    I 
What  is   Scholastic   Philosophy? 

Sect.   1 :    Scholastic   Philosophy    14 

Sect.  2 :    Neo-Scholastic   Philosophy    34 


CHAPTER    II 


Scholastic   Logic 


41 


CHAPTER    III 

Scholastic  Metaphysics 

Sect.   1 :    Existence  of  Metaphysics    46 

Sect.  2 :    Scholastic  Theory  of  Act  and  Potency   49 

Sect.  3 :    Scholastic  Theory  of  Substance   52 

Sect.  4:    Scholastic  Theory  of  Cause    68 

CHAPTER    IV 
Scholastic  Cosmoi-ogy 

Sect.  1 :    Chief  Hypotheses  as  to  the  Constitution  of  Matter 82 

Sect.  2 :    Nature  and  Properties  of  Primordial  Matter   86 

Sect.  3 :    Nature  and  Properties  of  the  Substantial  Form   95 

Sect.  4:    Modern  Science  and  the  Constitution  of  Matter   100 

CHAPTER    V 
Scholastic  Psychology 

Sect.  1 :    Theory   of  Abstraction    110 

Sect.  2:    Nature  of  the  Human   Soul    115 

Sect.  3:    Locus   of  the   Human   Soul    121 

CHAPTER    VI 

Scholastic   N'atikal  Theology 

Natural  and  Revealed  Theology    126 

Proofs  of  God's  Existence    127 

Attributes  of   God    131 


Sect.  1 
Sect.  2 
Sect.  3 


CHAPTER    VII 
Scholastic  Moral  Philosophy  136 

CHAPTER    VIII 

FOBEBUNXEBS    OF    THE    NEO-SCHOLASTIC    RlYIVAI 153 

vii 


Vlll 

I  KAPTER    IX 

Tin     Xi:<>  Scholastic    Revival   in    Italy    158 

CHAPTER    X 

The  Neo-Scholastic  Revival   in    Spain,    Pobtugax  and 

Spanish  America 


Sect.  1 

Sect.  2 

Sect.  3 

Sect.  4 


The  Neo-Scholastic  Revival  in  Spain   174 

The  Neo-Scholastic  Revival   in  Portugal    183 

The  Neo-Scholastic  Revival  in  Mexico   185 

The  Neo-Scholastic  Revival  in  South  America    191 


CHAPTER    XI 
The  Neo-Scholastic  Revival  in  (Jermaxy  and  Aimria   196 

CHAPTER    XII 
The  Neo-Scholastic  Revival  in  France   203 

CHAPTER    XIII 
The  Neo-Scholastic  Revival  in   Belgium    215 

CHAPTER    XIV 
The  Neo-Scholastic  Revival  in  otheb  European  Countries 
Sect.   1 :    The    Neo-Scholastic    Revival    in    Hungary,    Bohemia   and 

the  Netherlands 224 

Sect.  2:    The  Neo-Scholastic  Revival  in  England   228 

CHAPTER    XV 

The  Neo-Scholastic  Bevival  in  the  United  States 
and  Canada 

Sect.  1:    The  Neo-Scholastic  Revival  in  the  United  States    232 

Sect.  2:    The  Neo-Scholastic  Revival  in  Canada    '_M4 

BIBLIOGRAPHY  OF  THE   NEO-SCHOLASTIC    LITERATURE  .  .    249 


INTRODUCTION" 

One  of  the  movements  that  have  excited  the  interest  of  the 
world  of  thought  in  the  nineteenth  century  has  been  the  revival 
of  Scholasticism.  The  philosophy  of  the  Middle  Ages  had  been, 
for  centuries  past,  buried  in  deepest  oblivion.  It  had  been  con- 
sidered inconsistent  with  the  development  of  natural  science; 
and  all,  philosophers  as  well  as  scientists,  deemed  it  dead — a 
most  fitting  end.  It  appeared  to  us,  in  the  dim  light  of  history, 
as  an  ill-shapen  monster,  which  had  wandered  in  the  darkness 
of  night,  amid  philters  and  mysterious  juices,  during  the  ages 
in  which  men  seriously  considered  alchemy  and  the  philosopher's 
stone.  But  the  monster,  thought  we,  had  disappeared  forever 
at  the  light  of  modern  discoveries,  like  the  ill-omened  bird  of 
night,  which  cannot  abide  the  rays  of  the  morning  sun. 

Suddenly,  to  the  astonishment  of  all,  Scholasticism  has 
awaked  from  its  slumber.  It  has  appeared  again  in  the  face  of 
the  world,  has  been  accepted  by  great  minds,  has  been  expounded 
and  defended  by  powerful  writers,  and  has  given  rise  to  a  great 
number  of  interesting  philosophical  works.  Its  admirers  have 
even  tried,  not  only  to  prove  its  congruity  with  modern  scien- 
tific results,  but  to  show  that  it  is  the  only  system  capable  of 
explaining  them. 

As  was  to  be  expected,  such  a  revival  has  met  with  the  most 
severe  criticism.  Fricdrich  Paulsen,  in  the  introduction  to  his 
work  Immarwel  Kant,  comparing  Scholasticism  with  the  Kant- 
ian system,  expresses  himself  thus: 

"If  Scholastic  philosophy  is  at  preseni  experiencing  a  kind 
of  revival  in  the  school  of  Catholicism,  this  is  due,  not  so  much 
to  its  own  inner  vitality  as  to  its  supposed  fitness  to  serve  an 
ecclesiastical  political  system,  which,  through  the  favor  of  cir- 
cumstances,— patientia  I><i  et  stultitia  hominum,  an  old  Luth- 
2  1 


eran  would  Bay, — has  attained  again  in  our  time  to  unexpected 
power.  Moreover,  there  still  remains  the  question  whether  con- 
imuanee  of  existence  is  in  general  something  of  which  a  philoso- 
phy can  boast.  Perhaps  fruitfulness  is  a  better  characteristic 
and  this  the  Kantian  philosophy  shows;  it  still  gives  rise  to  new 
systems  of  thought.  Thomism,  on  the  contrary,  though  of 
course  a  great  achievement  for  its  own  time,  yields  to-day  noth- 
ing except  unfruitful  repetitions.  It  does  not  set  free  the  spirit, 
it  enslaves  it,  which  of  course  is  just  its  intention."1 

In  close  connection  with  Paulsen's  view  stands  the  thesis 
recently  defended  by  Mr.  Picavet  in  his  famous  Esquisse  d'une 
histoire  generate  et  comparee  des  civilisations  medievales.  For 
him,  Scholastic  philosophy  and  the  body  of  Christian  dogmas 
are  identical;  the  existence  of  God  and  the  immortality  of  the 
soul  are  the  essential  Scholastic  doctrines.  Accordingly,  he 
seems  disposed  to  widen  the  field  of  Scholasticism,  and  to  in- 
clude within  its  limits  a  certain  number  of  men  whom  neo- 
Scholastics  will  probably  be  loath  to  welcome  as  brethren.  Not 
only  does  he  admit  Descartes  and  Locke,2  but  also  Rousseau  and 
Voltaire.8  He  even  feels  inclined  to  add  to  his  heterogeneous 
list  the  name  of  Robespierre.4  But  the  man  to  whom  he  directs 
our  attention  with  the  greatest  insistence,  whom  he  regards  as 
a  direct  offspring  of  the  Middle  Ages,  as  a  man  "  in  the  theo- 
logical period  still,  a  Christian,  a  Lutheran,  a  pietist,  a  Scholas- 
tic," is  Immanuel  Kant.6 

Why  not?  Kant  quotes  the  Bible;  he  develops  the  proof  of 
the  existence  of  God  from  final  causes,  and  he  is  fond  of  repeat- 
ing the  Hebrew  meaning — God  with  us — of  his  name  Im- 
manuel.0 In  religion,  Kant  is  a  supporter  of  the  Christian 
doctrine;  he  advocates  the  existence  of  free-will;  when  he  under- 

1  Immanuel   Kant,  p.  11. 

5  Ks(|iiissc  d'une  histoire  gen€ralc  et  comparee  des  civilisations  medie- 
vales, p.  '2.'$!). 
3  Ibid.,  p.  240. 
'Ibid.,  p.   247. 
'Ibid.,  p.  241. 
"Ibid.,  p.  242. 


takes  his  Critique  of  Pure  Reason,  he  is  morally  certain  of  the 
existence  of  God  and  of  another  life.7  It  is  in  Christian  terms 
that  he  expresses  the  final  conclusion  he  reaches,  denouncing,  as 
believers  do,  the  insufficiency  of  speculative  reason  and  ending 
with  an  act  of  faith. s  In  one  word,  Kant's  work  is  an  apolo- 
getic and  may  be  compared  to  St.  Thomas's  Summa  contra 
Gentiles.  "  Son  ceuvre  rappelle  celle  des  apologistes,  en  par- 
ticulier  de  saint  Thomas  qui,  dans  la  Somme  contre  les  Gentils, 
veut  amener  au  catholicisme,  avec  le  seul  appui  de  la  raisori, 
les  mahometans,  les  juifs,  les  heretiques  de  toutes  les  nuances. 
De  meme  Kant  s'adresse  aux  athees  et  aux  materialistes,  aux 
pantheistes  et  aux  fatalistes,  aux  incredules  et  aux  esprits  forts."9 

The  impulse  given  to  neo-Thomism  by  Leo  XIII  is  for  Picavet 
as  well  as  for  Paulsen,  primarily  and  essentially  a  political 
affair.  In  his  survey  of  the  progress  of  neo- Scholasticism  in  the 
different  countries  of  Europe  and  in  America,  it  is  not  a  specu- 
lative, but  a  political  point  of  view  that  is  invariably  taken. 
The  acceptance  of  Thomistic  speculation  in  Belgium  is  given  as 
one  of  the  causes  of  the  political  successes  obtained  by  Catholics 
since  1884.  The  strength  of  the  Catholic  party  in  Germany  is 
also  insisted  upon.  In  connection  with  the  Thomistic  revival, 
Picavet  quotes  the  fact  that  Prince  Bismarck  was  constrained  to 
abandon  the  Kulturkampf,  that  the  Catholic  minority,  giving 
toasts  to  the  pope  and  to  the  emperor,  becomes  more  powerful 
every  day.10 

Finally,  a  propos  of  neo-Scholasticism  in  the  United  States, 
Picavet  limits  himself  to  considerations  about  the  growing  polit- 
ical and  social  influence  of  Catholics  in  this  country,  and  speaks 
of  Bishop  Ireland,  and  of  the  condemnation  of  the  propositions 
known  as  Americanism  and  contained  in  the  "Life  of  Father 
Hecker." 

mid.,  p.  242. 
'Ibid.,  p.  246. 
'  Ibid.,  p.  246. 
"Ibid.,  p.  286. 
"  Ibid.,  pp.  290-292. 


In  short,  Picavet  and  Paulsen  are  unanimous  in  regarding 
Scholasticism  as  a  religious  and  political  affair;  but,  whereas 
Paulsen  restricts  the  denotation  of  the  word  to  Roman  Catholi- 
cism, Pita  vet  seems  ready  to  enlarge  its  usual  acceptation,  so  as 
to  make  it  embrace  all  Christian  denominations.  Picavet,  how- 
ever, would  probably  distinguish  between  Protestant  and  Catho- 
lic Scholasticism,  so  that  his  views  as  to  the  revival  of  Thorn  ism 
would  closely  resemble  Paulsen's  own  views. 

There  are  two  points  which  both  authors  clearly  distinguish 
and  strongly  insist  upon: 

1.  The  essential  agreement  of  the  Thomistic  philosophical 
doctrine  with  the  body  of  Catholic  dogmas. 

2.  The  political  significance  of  the  Scholastic  revival. 

We  will  presently  examine  each  of  these  points  separately. 

With  regard  to  the  first,  we  may  readily  admit  that  there  is 
a  great  deal  of  truth  in  the  foregoing  theories.  That  the  imme- 
diate cause  of  the  revival  of  Thomism  is  its  real  or  apparent 
harmony  with  the  body  of  theological  doctrines  of  the  Catholic 
Church,  it  would  be  vain  to  deny.  The  following  considerations 
will  dispel  any  doubt  that  might  exist  on  this  point: 

1.  The  greater  number  of  modern  philosophical  systems  have 
been  condemned  by  Catholic  theologians  as  opposed  to  revealed 
truth,  and  many  among  the  leaders  of  modern  thought  have  seen 
their  works  placed  on  the  Index  Librorum  Prohibitorum.  We 
find  in  the  Index  the  names  of  Descartes,  Malebranche,  Locke, 
Condillac,  1 1  nine,  Kant,  Rosmini,  etc. 

2.  The  neo-Scholastic  movement  has  been  encouraged,  since 
its  very  birth,  by  the  visible  head  of  the  Catholic  Church,  Pope 
Leo  XIII.  In  the  encyclical  Inscrutabile  Dei  Consilio,  pub- 
lished in  1878,  in  the  encyclical  J'Jferni  J'alris  (1879),  in  briefs 
relating  to  the  Foundation  of  the  Roman  Academy  of  St.  Thomas 
and  of  the  fnsliliil  Sn/ifrii'iir  de  PJiilosophie  of  Louvain,  as  well 
as  in  many  other  writings,  Leo  XIII  has  promoted  the  study  of 
the  great  mediseva]  philosophers,  and  in  particular  of  St.  Thomas 
Aquinas. 


3.  As  will  be  seen  in  the  part  of  this  work  dealing  with  the 
history  of  neo- Scholasticism,  all  the  great  writers  of  this  school 
belong  to  the  Eoman  Catholic  faith;  most  of  them,  in  fact,  are 
Catholic  priests. 

4.  Moreover,  St.  Thomas  Aquinas,  who  has  always  been  re- 
garded by  Catholics  as  the  greatest  theologian,  whose  Summa 
Theologica  is,  and  has  always  been,  widely  studied  in  ecclesias- 
tical institutions,  is  the  very  philosopher  to  whom  the  new  move- 
ment unanimously  adheres.  It  is  his  doctrine  that  is  expounded 
and  commented  upon  in  all  neo-Scholastic  treatises  of  philoso- 
phy. The  two  words  Thomism  and  Scholasticism  have  become 
synonymous;  periodicals  founded  to  foster  the  revival  of  medi- 
aeval thought  have  been  called  Divvs  Thomas  and  Revue  Thom- 
iste;  and,  in  countries  in  which  neo-Scholasticism  has  been  most 
flourishing,  St.  Thomas  is  considered  as  the  patron  saint  of 
philosophers. 

The  element  of  truth  we  are  actually  considering  ought  not, 
however,  to  make  us  suppose  that  the  Catholic  faith  and  the 
Thomistic  principles  are  necessarily  bound  together.  The  phi- 
losophy of  Plato  and  St.  Augustine  has  been  the  official  philoso- 
phy of  the  Church  for  more  than  eight  hundred  years.  And, 
at  the  appearance  of  St.  Thomas's  works,  a  strong  current  of 
opposition  to  his  teaching  arose  within  the  Church,  nay  within 
his  own  order,  and  gave  birth  to  Duns  Scotus's  philosophy, 
which  differs  so  widely  from  Thomism  that  it  has  been  said  that 
there  is  not  a  single  proposition  in  the  works  of  the  Angelic 
Doctor  which  has  not  been  controverted  by  his  subtle  rival. 
And  despite  this  fact,  Scotists  profess  to  be  as  decidedly  ortho- 
dox as  their  opponents,  and,  quite  recently,  Secretan  has  even 
gone  so  far  as  to  defend  the  thesis  that  the  philosophy  of  Duns 
Scotus  is  more  in  harmony  with  the  spirit  of  Christianity  than 
the  traditional  Thomistic  philosophy.12  This  seems  to  be  also 
the  view  of  Mr.  John  Dewey.13 

11  Cf.  Secretan,  La  llestauration  du  Thoniisme,  Bevue  PhtlOMOpkique, 
Vol.  18,  p.  (J4  ff. 

■Cf.  the  article:    Belief  and  Realities,  Philot.  Rev.,  March,    1906. 


6 

In  modern  times,  Catholic  writer?  have  repeatedly  formulated 
systems  of  thought  which  can  be  harmonized  without  too  much 
difficulty  with  Catholic  dogmas.  Descartes,  Malebranche,  Ros- 
mini,  Cousin,  Lamennais,  I)e  Bonald,  have  had  within  the 
Church  itself  numerous  and  illustrious  disciples.  Cousin's 
eclecticism  has  been  for  many  years  the  official  philosophy  of  a 
great  number  of  Catholic  institutions.  Finally,  in  our  own  day, 
despite  the  revival  of  Thomism  and  the  encyclical  of  Leo  XIII, 
many  of  the  orthodox,  many  ecclesiastics,  do  not  think  it  amiss 
to  adhere  to  philosophical  systems  which,  in  their  principles  and 
in  their  methods,  are  widely  divergent  from  the  Thomistic  doc- 
trine. Suffice  it  to  mention  the  adherence  of  so  many  members 
of  the  French  clergy  to  the  revival  of  Kantism,  and  the  enthu- 
siasm with  which  some  eminent  Catholics  of  the  same  country 
have  welcomed  the  appearance  of  Pragmatism. 

Passing  now  to  the  political  significance  of  the  Scholastic 
revival,  we  will  certainly  concede  that  all  the  beliefs  of  a  nation 
have  a  more  or  less  direct  influence  upon  its  political  institu- 
tions. A  nation  is  a  great  whole,  a  great  social  unit,  whose 
spirit  is  gradually  formed  by  the  conjoint  influence  of  all  the 
elements  at  work  among  the  race,  is  at  the  same  time  the  effect 
and  the  cause  of  the  educational  system,  of  the  philosophy,  of 
the  literature  of  the  nation,  of  all  and  each  one  of  the  channels 
through  which  her  very  blood  and  life  flows. 

The  political  influence  of  the  philosopher  should  not,  how- 
ever, be  exaggerated.  It  is  at  once  obvious  that  a  man  who 
pretends  to  rise  above  mediocrity  in  any  special  field  must  con- 
centrate thereto  the  energies  of  his  whole  life.  He  who  wants 
to  become  a  great  philosopher  must  not  be  anything  else.  A 
few  nco-Scholastics  have  entered  the  political  arena;  but,  in  so 
doing,  they  have  so  little  obeyed  the  spirit  of  neo-Scholasticism 
thai  their  course  of  action  has  been  deplored  by  the  Scholastics 
themselves.  A  man  who  has  Keen  second  to  none  in  his  perfecl 
grasping   of   the    intentions   of    Leo    XIII,    Cardinal   Gonzalez, 


expressed  his  sincere  regret  when  Orti  y  Lara  abandoned  the 
field  of  philosophy  to  devote  his  talent  to  public  affairs.14 

The  fitness  of  Scholasticism  to  serve  the  Catholic  ecclesiastical 
political  system,  which — patientia  Dei  et  stultitia  hominum — 
Paulsen  regards  as  the  only  cause  of  the  revival  of  Mediaeval 
philosophy,  cannot  thus  be  its  only  cause,  nor  that  which  pos- 
sesses the  greatest  significance  in  the  history  of  human  thought. 
Besides  the  fact  that  the  Church  can  accommodate  itself  to  all 
forms  of  government,  and  that  there  is  therefore  no  Catholic 
ecclesiastical  political  system — as  was  pointed  out  by  Mr.  Domet 
de  Vorges  in  answer  to  Picavet15 — it  must  be  borne  in  mind  that 
Scholasticism  is,  above  all,  a  philosophy  and  must  be  character- 
ized as  a  philosophy. 

The  question  of  the  cause  of  the  neo-Scholastic  revival  leads 
at  once  to  the  remark  that  it  is  not  always  possible  to  find  in 
the  general  conditions  of  any  given  period  a  definite  and  neces- 
sary cause  for  all  the  events  which  form  its  history.  Historical 
facts  are  often  connected  with  unimportant,  even  trivial  occur- 
rences, so  that  it  sometimes  seems  to  the  thoughtful  man  that 
chance  governs  the  world.  Would  Charles  I  have  been  executed 
if  young  Oliver  Cromwell  had  not  been  prevented  from  embark- 
ing for  America?  Would  our  civil  war  have  taken  place  if 
Henry  Clay  had  defeated  Polk  in  the  elections  of  1844?  Would 
there  have  been  a  neo-Scholastic  revival  if  Sanseverino  had  died 
when  a  young  man  and  Leo  XIII  had  not  been  elected  to  suc- 
ceed Pius  IX  in  the  papal  see?  These  are  questions  to  which 
I  would  not  dare  give  an  answer. 

The  conditions  of  the  possibility  of  an  event  must  undoubt- 
edly exist  at  the  moment,  in  which  the  event  occurs;  but  there 
must  also  be  found  an  occasional  cause  which  may  fail  to  appear, 
in  which  case  the  conditions  of  possibility  may  remain  indefi- 
nitely in  the  same  state,  without  any  actual  occurrence  of  the 
event. 

"  Cf.  Gonzalez,  Historia  de  la  Filosoffa,  Vol.  4.  p.  462. 
15  In    La    philosophie    medi^valo   d'apres   M.    Picavet,    Rev.   de   I'hilos., 
1906. 


8 

If  we  thus  understand  by  the  cause  of  the  revival  of  Scholas- 
ticism the  conditions  which  made  it  possible,  we  will  find  it 
bound  with  a  principle  which  is  essential  to  the  Catholic  beliefs, 
and,  more  distinctly  than  any  other,  separates  the  Roman  Church 
from  all  Protestant  sects:  the  principle  of  the  unity  and  immu- 
tability of  truth.  A  brief  exposition  of  St.  Thomas's  doctrine 
on  this  point  will  not  be  out  of  place  here. 

Truth,  St.  Thomas  teaches,  may  be  considered  with  regard  to 
our  mind  or  with  regard  to  things.  With  regard  to  our  mind, 
truth  is  in  one  sense  multiple,  because  it  consists  in  the  con- 
formity of  our  knowledge  with  the  object,  and  there  are  as  many 
conformities  as  there  are  objects.  With  regard  to  things,  truth 
is  also  in  one  sense  multiple,  because  the  truth  of  a  thing  is  the 
very  essence  of  the  thing,  and  there  are  as  many  essences  as  there 
are  things.  But  truth  is  also  one,  in  so  far  as  the  essence  of  a 
tiling  is  eternal  and  necessary,  so  that  of  one  thing  there  can 
be  but  one  truth. 

As  regards  the  other  property  of  truth,  its  immutability, 
St.  Thomas  teaches  that  truth  considered  in  things  is  immutable 
in  so  far  as  the  essential  characteristics  are  concerned,  and 
mutable  only  in  the  accidental  elements.  Truth,  considered 
with  regard  to  our  mind,  is  essentially  immutable  and  acci- 
dentally mutable.  It  is  mutable  only  in  the  sense  that  our  mind 
may  pass  from  error  to  truth.  It  is  essentially  immutable, 
because  it  is  regulated  by  the  truth  of  things,  which  is  immu- 
table With  regard  to  the  Divine  Mind,  truth  is  essentially  one 
and  immutable.10 

This  theory  as  to  the  nature  of  truth  has  been  always  strongly 
defended  by  Catholic  writers.  They  have  been  unanimous  in 
regarding  internal  change  in  a  body  of  doctrine  as  an  infallible 
sign  of  error.  It  is  upon  the  variations  that  had  taken  place 
in  Protestant  creeds  that  Bossuet  based  his  immortal  Ilistoire 
des  Variations.  You  change,  said  he  to  Protestants,  therefore 
you  err. 

uCf.  Thomas  Aquinas,  Suniina  Theol.,  Q.    Hi,  art.  5-8. 


9 

Now,  this  fundamental  principle  of  the  Catholic  Church  is 
essentially  opposed  to  the  individualism  which  has  inspired  mod- 
ern philosophy.  Since  Descartes  to  our  day,  philosophy  has  not 
been  considered  as  a  stereotyped  body  of  truths.  Each  philoso- 
pher has  been  the  author  of  a  particular  system  of  thought,  and 
there  have  thus  arisen  innumerable  doctrines,  often  opposed, 
sometimes  contradictory  to  one  another.  This  result  is  essen- 
tially antipathetic  to  a  Catholic  mind  and  incompatible  with  the 
principle  of  the  unity  of  truth.  A  Catholic  will  no  doubt  admit 
that  the  principle  of  authority  in  philosophy  is  of  secondary 
importance.  He  will  emphatically  assert  as  well  as  any  one 
else,  that  every  man  must  think  with  his  own  head;  but,  as  he 
maintains  truth  to  be  one  and  all  human  minds  to  be  endowed 
with  a  faculty  of  reasoning  which  works  in  the  same  way  in  all 
of  us,  he  will  assert  that  we  must  necessarily  reach  identical 
conclusions  in  our  philosophical  investigations. 

We  need  but  to  open  the  works  of  the  early  neo-Thomists  to 
be  convinced  that  they  regard  the  ephemeral  character  of  modern 
S3'stems  as  the  strongest  argument  in  favor  of  Scholasticism. 
Cornoldi's  Lectures  on  Scholastic  Philosophy  are  especially 
interesting. 

"  There  is  such  a  variety  and  contradiction  in  the  doctrines 
taught  (in  modern  philosophy),"  says  he,  "that  one  cannot  ad- 
here to  one  system  without  openly  denying  the  others.  The 
diversity  which  reigns  in  modern  schools  is  so  general  that  two 
professors  can  hardly  be  found,  even  in  the  same  college,  agree- 
ing, I  will  not  say  upon  the  whole  field  of  philosophy,  but  simply 
upon  its  fundamental  principles.  Moreover,  it  becomes  impos- 
sible to  teach  the  same  doctrine  for  ten  years.  There  is  a  con- 
tinuous change  and  contradiction.  From  the  center  of  the 
circle,  which  is  one  and  indivisible,  an  infinite  number  of  radii 
may  proceed  and  extend  in  all  directions.  In  all  fields  of  human 
speculation,  innumerable  errors  may  likewise  In'  found  to  diverge 
more  and  more  from  the  one  and  indivisible  truth."17 

And  after  having  shown  the  diversity  which  reigns  among 
"Comoldi,  Lemons  de  Philosophic  Bcolaatique,  p.  3. 


10 

modern  system.-,  Comoldi  appeals  to  the  twenty  centuries  during 
which  Scholasticism  was  taught,  to  prove  that  this  system,  and 
this  Bystem  alone,  can  give  an  adequate  explanation  of  scientific 
discoveries.18 

Now,  truth  being  one  and  immutable,  philosophy,  which  may 
be  described  as  a  rational  expression  of  the  truth  of  things,  will 
also  be  one  and  immutable.  And  if  there  arise  several  philo- 
sophical systems,  one  of  them  at  most  will  be  true. 

The  difficulty  now  will  evidently  lie  in  finding  out  the  true 
philosophy.  Why  should  the  Catholic  Church  favor  Scholasti- 
cism rather  than  any  other  system?  To  this  question  again, 
the  principle  of  the  unity  of  truth  will  furnish  a  satisfactory 
answer. 

As  will  be  seen  in  one  of  the  chapters  of  this  work,  Catholics 
admit  philosophy  and  theology  to  be  distinct  sciences,  having 
different  objects  and  different  principles.  They  have  different 
objects  in  so  far  as  philosophy  is  simply  concerned  with  the 
truths  accessible  to  the  light  of  human  reason,  whereas  theology 
is  chiefly  concerned  with  truths  of  a  supernatural  order.  They 
have  different  principles,  in  so  far  as  philosophy  is  guided  by 
human  reason,  and  theology  by  the  authority  of  God. 

Although  philosophy  and  theology  are  distinct  sciences,  they 
often  tread  on  a  common  ground.  Many  principles  of  faith, 
many  truths  known  from  revelation  are  also  accessible  to  rea- 
son. The  immortality  of  the  soul  and  the  existence  of  God  may 
be  discussed  by  the  philosopher  as  well  as  by  the  theologian. 

The  principle  of  the  unity  of  truth  being  admitted,  we  must 
also  admit  that,  whenever  philosophy  and  theology  tread  on  a 
common  ground,  they  must  be  in  perfect  agreement.  As  truth 
i-  essentially  one,  a  conclusion  of  human  reason  cannot  contra- 
dict a  truth  revealed  by  God.  Whenever  there  is  disagreement, 
there  is  error  on  one  side.  Hut,  as  the  error  cannot  lie  in  the 
revealed  truth,  inasmuch  as  the  authority  of  revelation  rests 
upon   the   infinite  science  and   veracity   of  God,   it    follows   that. 

M  Ibid.,  ]>.  ">. 


11 

in  all  cases  of  disagreement  between  a  philosophical  principle 
and  a  theological  dogma,  the  philosophical  principle  must  be 
rejected. 

The  only  true  system  of  philosophy  will,  therefore,  be  in  per- 
fect harmony  with  the  body  of  revealed  truths.  That  Scholastic 
philosophy  is  not  the  only  system  capable  of  being  harmonized 
with  religious  dogmas,  we  have  already  shown.  This  is  why, 
after  the  speculative  principles  of  the  Middle  Ages  were  judged 
inadequate  to  meet  the  requirements  of  modern  science,  most 
Catholics  embraced  other  systems.  But  these  systems  have 
not  possessed  the  character  of  immutability  which,  in  the  mind 
of  Catholics,  necessarily  belongs  to  truth.  Not  only  this.  The 
philosophical  systems  which  have  been  successively  accepted  in 
European  speculation  have  departed — or  have  been  believed  to 
depart,  which,  for  the  point  we  are  now  discussing,  amounts  to 
the  same — more  and  more  from  the  essential  principles  of 
Christianity.  At  the  beginning  of  the  nineteenth  century,  the 
materialism  of  the  encyclopedists  was  the  only  philosophy  still 
remaining  in  France.  It  was  openly  professed  by  Cabanis, 
Broussais,  Pinel  and  Bichat.  It  had  displaced  Cartesianism 
itself,  though  a  very  limited  number  of  ecclesiastics  still  adhered 
to  that  system.  At  the  same  time,  some  of  the  emigrants  whom 
the  ferocity  of  the  Revolution  had  compelled  to  seek  a  refuge 
abroad,  were  coming  in  contact  with  new-born  Kantism,  which 
they  were  destined  to  introduce  into  their  native  land. 

It  seems,  at  first  blush,  that  the  philosophy  thus  growing  in 
Germany  was  more  in  harmony  with  the  great  truths  of  Chris- 
tianity than  the  impious  materialism  of  the  eighteenth  century. 
Whether  the  philosophical  systems  of  Kant  and  his  successor 
may  be  interpreted  from  a  Christian  standpoint  is  a  question 
which  has  been  frequently  discussed  and  does  not  admit  of  an 
easy  solution.  It  is  well  known  that  the  modern  defenders  of 
Hegelian  philosophy  in  America  invoke  St.  Thomas's  authority 
in  support  of  their  principles.19     For  my  part.  I   feel  inclined 

"  C'f.  Koyoe.  The  ( '<>nrr|>t ion  of  (iod.  p.  40;  Harris,  Hegel's  Logic,  p.  ix. 


12 

to  admit  thai  their  claim  is  not  altogether  devoid  of  foundation. 
Although  St.  Thomas  and  Hegel  present  evident  points  of  con- 
trast, it  may  he  seriously  questioned  whether  there  exists  between 
the  systems  they  have  built  that  abyss  which  neo-Scholastics  are 
wont  to  point  out.  Whatever  the  truth  may  be,  there  is  no 
doubt  that  Kant  and  Hegel  have  been  invariably  regarded  by 
Catholics  as  the  most  dangerous  opponents  of  the  fundamental 
Christian  principles.  "  More  than  any  other  philosophical  sys- 
tem, says  Jules  Didiot,  Kantism  has  been  a  serious  menace  to 
faith  and  natural  virtues  in  Catholic  countries."20  Didiot  is 
more  severe  still  with  regard  to  Hegelianism : 

"If  he  (Hegel)  has  not  intended  to  mock  at  his  pupils,  at 
his  readers,  at  his  predecessors  in  subjectivism  and  monism,  we 
must  admit  that  his  mind  was  at  times  in  a  state  of  delirium. 
It  is  a  shame  for  the  nineteenth  century  not  to  have  rejected 
such  a  philosophy  with  indignation.  .  .  .  That  Protestant  min- 
isters in  Germany  may  have  endeavored  to  harmonize  the  doc- 
trines of  Hegel  and  Schelling,  of  Fichte  and  Kant,  with  the 
dogmas  and  laws  of  Christianity,  can  perhaps  be  conceived;  but 
that  Catholic  priests,  such  as  Hermes,  Baader,  Gunther,  may 
have  dared  imitate  them,  even  from  afar  and  with  a  certain 
moderation,  is  indeed  hard  to  understand."21 

This  influence  of  Hegel  among  German  Catholics,  so  vividly 
deplored  by  Didiot,  was  indeed  a  fact  in  the  first  half  of  the 
nineteenth  century.  The  Holy  See  was  obliged  to  interfere. 
Hermes's  doctrines  were  condemned  in  1835  and  1836,  Giinth- 
er's  in  1857  and  1860,  Frohschammer's  in  1862,  pantheism  and 
all  forms  of  rationalism  by  the  Syllabus  of  1864. 

Meanwhile,  some  distinguished  French  writers  had  endeavored 
to  oppose  the  anti-religious  tendency  of  the  day,  and  to  build 
systems  of  thought  in  harmony  with  the  spiritualistic  doctrines 
of  the  Catholic  Church.  Joseph  de  Maistre,  Victor  de  Bonald 
and  Felicite  de  Lamennais  sincerely  sought  a  new  method  by 
which  Christian  beliefs  might  be  saved  and   impiety  checked. 

"  in  Bifecle,  p.  :*77. 
■  Ibid.,  p.  389. 


13 

Unhappily,  they  endeavored  to  build  a  monument  to  faith  upon 
the  ruins  of  reason.  The  ultimate  criterion  of  certitude  they 
sought  in  a  primitive  revelation.  But  as  the  truth  of  this  reve- 
lation could  not  rest  upon  our  mental  faculties,  which  had  been 
proclaimed  impotent,  it  had  no  sure  basis  and  the  brave  effort 
of  the  traditionalists  was  doomed  to  become  in  the  end  a  lament- 
able failure.  Traditionalism  was  finally  condemned  by  the 
Church,  and,  in  1855,  its  last  great  representative,  Bonnetty, 
was  compelled  to  subscribe  to  four  propositions  opposed  to  the 
errors  he  had  maintained. 

It  is  in  such  circumstances  that  the  Catholic  Church  seriously 
thought  of  returning  to  the  old  Scholastic  doctrine.  An  honest 
endeavor  to  seek  the  true  philosophy  in  modern  systems  had  been 
made  for  several  centuries.  But,  from  a  Catholic  standpoint, 
this  endeavor  had  completely  failed.  The  systems  which  had 
arisen  in  the  course  of  time  had  been  gradually  abandoned  and 
replaced  by  others,  so  that,  as  pointed  out  by  Cornoldi,  there 
had  been  a  continuous  change  in  the  speculative  world.  The 
most  recent  systems,  Materialism,  Kantism,  Hegelianism,  Posi- 
tivism, were  opposed  to  the  Catholic  faith.  The  influence  of 
these  systems  had  led  many  Catholics  to  advance  dangerous 
theories.  A  system  born  of  the  laudable  intention  to  protect 
the  religious  ideals  had  been  a  decided  failure.  Such  being  the 
case,  was  it  not  better  to  return  frankly  to  the  philosophy  which 
had  reigned  for  centuries  in  the  schools,  to  endeavor  to  reconcile 
it  with  modern  discoveries,  to  find  out  whether  the  old  Scholas- 
tic philosophy  was  not  the  true  system  which,  for  so  long  a 
time,  had  been  sought  in  vain?  Such  is.  in  my  judgment,  the 
fundamental  idea  which  inspired  the  neo-Thomists. 


CHAPTER   I 

WHAT    IS    SCHOLASTIC    PHILOSOPHY? 

Section  I. — Scholastic  Philosophy 

The  word  o-^oXacrTt/co?  was  already  in  use  among  the  Greeks 
to  denote  a  man  devoted  to  study.  Ueberweg  notes  it  in  a  letter 
of  Theophrastus  to  Phanias.1  Petronius  seems  to  have  intro- 
duced it  among  the  Eomans.  Under  Quintilian  it  meant  a 
rhetor  or  professor  of  eloquence,  and  we  read  in  St.  Jerome  that 
it  was  granted  as  a  title  of  distinction  to  Serapio  for  his  unusual 
talent.  At  the  opening  of  the  Mediaeval  schools,  the  term  was 
soon  restricted  to  a  purely  didactic  meaning.  The  scholasticus 
became  the  instructor,  and  the  system  of  thought  expounded  in 
the  cathedra,  the  Scholastic  philosophy. 

A  distinguished  French  scholar,  Barthelemy  Haureau,  based 
upon  this  etymology  a  definition  of  Scholastic  philosophy  which 
has  been  generally  accepted;  and,  on  the  whole,  is  the  best  we 
now  possess:  Scholastic  philosophy  is  the  philosophy  professed 
in  the  schools  of  the  Middle  Ages,  from  the  establishment  of 
these  schools  to  the  day  in  which  the  outside  philosophy,  the 
spirit  of  novelty  disengaged  from  the  bonds  of  tradition,  came 
to  dispute  with  it,  and  withdraw  from  its  control  the  minds  of 
men.  "  La  philosophic  scolastique  est  la  philosophic  professee 
dane  les  ecoles  du  moyen  age  depuis  Petablissement  jusqu'au 
<l('(  lin  de  ces  ecoles,  e'est-a-dire  jusqu'au  jour  ou  la  philosophic 
du  dehors,  1'esprit  nouvcau,  l'esprit  moderne,  se  degageant  des 
liens  de  la  tradition,  viendront  lui  disputer  ct  lui  ravir  la  con- 
duite  (]{■<  intelligences."2 

1  Ueberwpfr,  History  of  Philosophy,  Vol.  1,  p.  366. 
''  llium'iiu,  Histoire  <!<•  la  philoBophie  scolafltique,  tome  1,  p.  .'>0. 

14 


15 

Before  we  proceed  to  examine  the  difficulties  to  which  this 
definition  gives  rise,  it  will  not  be  amiss  to  make  a  few  observa- 
tions, in  order  to  dispel  all  possible  misunderstandings. 

First  of  all,  it  seems  that  the  etymological  considerations 
which  lead  us  to  identify  Scholasticism  with  Mediaeval  thought, 
ought  to  make  us  step  beyond  the  limits  of  the  Middle  Ages, 
and  extend  our  definition  to  modern  schools  as  well.  If  it  is 
the  meaning  of  the  words  that  guides  us,  there  is  no  reason  why 
the  philosophy  taught  from  the  cathedra  of  Koenigsberg  by  the 
author  of  the  Critique  of  Pure  Reason  should  be  any  less  scho- 
lastic than  the  systems  of  Duns  Scotus  or  Thomas  Aquinas. 
And,  indeed,  some  writers,  following  this  conception,  speak  of 
an  Hegelian,  a  Cousinian,  a  Schopenhauerian  Scholasticism. 
The  ridiculous  outcome  of  this  view  is  obvious  to  every  eye.  It 
transforms  into  Scholastics  all  our  university  teachers.  It 
makes  Scholastic  philosophy  co-extensive,  not  only  with  the  doc- 
trines of  Kant,  Hegel,  Cousin  and  Schopenhauer,  but  with  all 
modern  idealistic  systems;  nay,  with  the  whole  field  of  philo- 
sophical thought.  What  system  has  not  been  expounded  from 
a  professor's  chair?  What  philosopher  has  not  seen  his  doc- 
trines espoused  in  some  center  of  learning?  And  we  would 
thus  be  compelled  to  enlarge  without  limit  the  field  of  Scholas- 
ticism, to  open  its  gate,  not  only  to  Hegel  or  to  William  James, 
but  also,  and  with  equal  right,  to  Descartes  and  to  Berkeley. 

And  yet,  were  etymology  our  sole  guide,  we  should  accept  this 
view,  strange  though  it  appear.  But  the  original  significance 
of  a  word  does  not  suffice  to  give  us  the  key  to  its  actual  mean- 
ing. According  to  John  Locke,  men  seem  to  have  been  guided 
by  wit  rather  than  by  judgment  in  the  formation  of  names;  and 
a  great  discrepance  has  thus  often  come  to  exist  between  the 
connotation  of  a  term  and  its  etymology.  The  Greek  word 
irpoftaTov.  which  signifies  sheep,  is  derived  from  the  verb  7r/>o/9atW, 
to  walk  forward.  Still,  no  one  would  think  of  applying  the 
word  sheep  to  all  beings  walking  forward,  to  include  under  that 
name,  not  only  all  our  domestic  animals,  all   denizens  of  the 


la 

water  ii Ti *1  the  ;iir.  save  crabs  and  crawfishes,  but  our  own  Belves. 

Scholastic  philosophy  was  originally  the  philosophy  of  the 
schools;  and.  as  the  name  was  given  during  the  Middle  Ages,  it 
was  applied  to  all  Mediaeval  schools.  When,  at  the  beginning 
of  the  modern  era,  thought  was  suddenly  engaged  in  another 
direction,  and  controlled  by  men  who  did  not  expound  their 
principles  from  a  professor's  chair,  a  new  philosophy  arose, 
which  was  not  scholastic,  and  which,  after  having  controlled  the 
minds  of  the  new  generation,  took  possession  of  the  schools 
themselves,  and  dethroned  the  old  philosophy,  which,  for  cen- 
turies past,  had  exercised  an  undisputed  sovereignty  upon  the 
intelligences.  The  philosophy  of  the  schools  thus  ceased  to  be 
Scholastic,  and  the  term  acquired  a  definite  meaning,  and  was 
henceforward  exclusively  applied  to  denote  Mediaeval  specu- 
lation. 

Scholastic  philosophy,  thus  confined  to  a  definite  time,  must 
also  be  limited  with  regard  to  space.  It  would  be  absurd  to 
extend  it  to  all  the  systems  which  arose  in  any  point  of  our 
globe  between  the  sixth  and  the  fifteenth  century,  to  make  it 
embrace,  not  only  the  philosophical  systems  of  the  Arabs  and 
the  Jews,  but  also  those  of  the  Hindoos  and  of  the  Chinese.  It 
must  be  limited  to  the  speculation  of  the  western  world,  which, 
in  spite  of  numerous  internal  divergences,  of  many  distinct  and 
definite  currents,  formed  a  single  whole,  of  which  Paris  was  the 
center,  which  soon  found  in  Aristotle  an  inspirer  and  a  prophet, 
and  in  the  dogmas  of  the  Church  a  cynosure  to  direct  the  human 
mind  in  the  perilous  and  unexplored  regions  it  had  so  resolutely 
entered. 

Our  definition  may  be  objected  to  upon  the  ground  that  it 
leaves  us  in  total  ignorance  as  to  the  import  of  the  system 
we  define.  1 1  does  not  throw  any  light  upon  its  essential  charac- 
ter, and  may  even  be  regarded  as  simply  tautological,  as  equiva- 
lent to  the  statement  that  the  Mediaeval  philosophy  is  the  phi- 
losophy of  the  Middle  Ages.  We  readily  admit  that,  in  defining 
Scholastic  philosophy  as  the  philosophy  of  the  Middle  Ages,  we 


17 

do  not  pretend  to  give  what  logicians  would  call  an  essential 
definition.  But,  is  it  possible  to  give  an  essential  definition  of 
a  system  of  thought?  Can  we  enclose  within  the  narrow  com- 
pass of  a  definition  the  essential  characteristics  of  a  philosophy  ? 
It  is  related  that  Hegel,  having  been  asked  to  give  a  brief  exposi- 
tion of  his  system,  answered  that  it  was  not  a  thing  that  could 
be  said  in  a  few  words.  An  essential  definition  of  a  philosophy 
is  bound  to  be  incomplete,  and,  in  so  far,  erroneous.  Mr. 
Maurice  de  Wulf  who,  in  his  remarkable  work  on  neo-Scholas- 
ticism,  has  objected  to  Haureau's  definition  on  account  of  its 
failure  to  give  an  insight  into  the  Scholastic  doctrine,  has  not 
been  able  to  give  the  essential  definition  which  the  first  chapters 
of  his  book  had  led  us  to  expect.  In  point  of  fact,  he  has  given 
no  definition  at  all.  He  has  exposed,  in  64  octavo  pages,  what 
he  considers  the  essential  characteristics  of  Scholastic  philoso- 
phy, has  summed  up  his  exposition  in  a  description  which  con- 
tains no  less  than  242  words,  telling  us  that  such  a  definition 
is  still  incomplete,  that  it  contains  only  a  few  of  the  characters 
of  Scholastic  philosophy,  and  that  an  integral  definition  should 
comprise  them  all.3 

An  attempt  at  a  more  acceptable  essential  definition  has  been 
made  quite  recently  by  Mr.  Elie  Blanc.  He  has  defined  Scho- 
lastic philosophy  as  a  spirit,  a  method  and  a  system: 

"  II  peut  done  sembler  que  la  philosophic  scolastique  est 
d'abord  un  esprit :  elle  est  nee  chez  les  Peres  de  l'Eglise  et  leurs 
successeurs  du  juste  souci  d'accorder  la  raison  et  la  foi.  Elle 
est  ensuite  une  methode  rigoureuse,  empruntee  surtout  a  Aris- 
tote,  telle  qu'il  la  fallait  pour  realiser  cet  accord.  Enfin  elle 
aboutit  a  un  systeme  toujours  perfectible,  dont  los  bases  se  trou- 
vent  surtout  dans  l'ceuvre  de  saint  Thomas."4 

Concerning  this  definition,  I  shall  make  the  following  re- 
marks : 

*  Cf .  De  Wulf,  Introduction  a  la  philosophic  neo-scolastique,  pp.  191- 
192. 

4  Blanc,  Dictionnaire  de  philosophic  anciennc,  nioderne  et  contem- 
poraine,  art.  Scolastique. 

3 


/ 


18 

If,  for  the  sake  of  brevity,  we  limit  ourselves  to  saying  that 
Scholastic  philosophy  is  a  spirit,  a  method  and  a  system,  our 
definition  is  not  essential,  because  it  leaves  us  in  a  complete 
ignorance  as  to  what  that  spirit,  that  method  and  that  system 
are;  and  is  also  worthless,  because  it  can  be  applied  to  all  phi- 
losophies, inasmuch  as  they  all  possess  a  spirit,  follow  a  method, 
and  constitute  a  definite  system.  It  is  true  that  Mr.  Blanc 
explains  what  the  spirit,  the  method  and  the  system  are.  But 
the  method  is  an  extrinsic  and  unessential  character.  The 
spirit,  consisting  in  a  just  endeavor  to  harmonize  reason  and 
faith,  is  extrinsic  also.  It  simply  refers  to  the  relation  Scholas- 
tic philosophy  bears  to  another  science,  and  ignores  the  funda- 
mental principles  of  Scholasticism  as  a  philosophy.  Finally, 
the  description  of  the  Scholastic  system  as  a  perfectible  system, 
whose  bases  are  found  chiefly  in  St.  Thomas,  equally  fails  to 
give  us  an  insight  into  the  contents  of  Scholastic  philosophy. 
It  does  not  tell  us  what  the  system  is,  what  distinguishes  it  from 
modern  thought,  what  constitutes  it  as  a  philosophy.  Mr. 
Blanc's  definition  is  no  essential  definition  at  all. 

Moreover,  does  Mediaeval  philosophy  possess  any  distinctive 
eharacter,  any  idiosyncrasy  which  sets  it  apart  from  ancient  as 
well  as  from  modern  thought?  We  fully  realize  that  we  here 
approach  a  difficult  question,  which  has  been  already  studied 
from  different  points  of  view,  and  not  yet  been  satisfactorily 
answered. 

Some  writers  have  thought  they  could  solve  the  difficulty  by 
simply  saying  that  Scholastic  philosophy  is  no  philosophy  at 
all.  This  view  was  professed  by  the  French  encyclopedists  of 
the  eighteenth  century,  who  no  doubt  had  powerful  personal 
motives  of  dislike  for  Mediawal  speculation.  They  pitied  all 
who  lose  their  time  in  the  study  of  such  vain  subtleties,  and 
Diderol  went  so  Ear  as  to  say  of  Duns  Scotus  that  a  man  who 
would  know  all  that  he  has  written  would  know  nothing. 

This  kind  of  shallow  contempt  soon  spread  over  all  Europe. 
It  became  a   point    of   fashion   to  deride  the   cloisters  and   the 


19 

monks.  The  ass  gloried  in  the  kick  he  could  give  to  the  dying 
lion.  In  the  second  half  of  the  eighteenth  century,  Briicker 
spoke  of  the  introduction  of  Aristotle's  philosophy  into  Europe 
as  the  signal  of  the  most  complete  intellectual  degeneration. 
More  recently,  Taine  has  given  the  epoch  of  the  great  masters 
of  the  thirteenth  century  as  an  age  of  stupidity :  "  Three  cen- 
turies at  the  bottom  of  this  black  pit  did  not  add  a  single  idea 
to  the  human  mind."5  Mr.  Penjon  has  described  the  period 
which  elapsed  between  the  edict  of  Justinian  (529)  and  the 
Renaissance  as  a  sort  of  entr'acte  during  which  there  was  no 
philosophy.6  Hegel  himself,  whose  system  presents  so  striking 
a  resemblance  with  those  of  the  Scholastics  that  one  might  be 
tempted  to  believe  he  has  borrowed  directly  from  them,  does 
not  hesitate  to  profess  the  same  contempt.  Speaking  of  Scho- 
lastic philosophy,  he  says :  "  It  is  not  interesting  by  reason  of 
its  matter,  for  we  cannot  remain  at  the  consideration  of  this; 
it  is  not  a  philosophy."7 

After  modern  erudition  has  had  the  courage  to  go  back  to  the 
much-despised  era,  and  to  remove  the  dense  veil  of  ignorance 
which  covered  the  works  of  its  thinkers;  after  such  men  as 
Cousin,  Haureau  and  Picavet  have  displayed  to  the  world  the 
treasures  of  philosophical  learning  which  lay  concealed  in  those 
dusty  folios,  the  superficial  disdain  of  the  preceding  generation 
has  disappeared,  covered  with  shame.  Men  have  repudiated  the 
idea  of  a  Mediaeval  entr'acte,  and  have  understood  that  the 
"  dark  ages  "  are  not  dark  in  themselves,  but  are  dark  simply 
for  us  on  account  of  our  ignorance. 

There  being  thus  nowadays  no  possibility  of  abiding  by  what 
the  Germans  have  called:  dcr  Sprung  iibcr  dan  Mittelait&r,  and 
Scholastic  philosophy  being  evidently  something,  the  necessity 
of  determining  precisely  what  it  is  imposes  itself  upon  us.  And 
here  the  difficulty  lies. 

•Taine,  Histoire  de  la  litterature  anglaise,  t.   1,  pp.  223-225. 
8  Penjon,  Precis  d'histoire  de   la   philosophic,  pp.    166.     Of.   De  Wulf, 
op.  cit.,  pp.  1 1  ir. 

'  Hegel,  Lectures  on  the  History  of  Philosophy,  Vol.  3,  p.  38. 


20 

It  is  unnecessary  to  say  that  Mediaeval  philosophy  is  not  a 
single  system.  Embracing,  as  it  does,  several  centuries  of 
incredible  intellectual  activity,  it  must  needs  present  that  variety 
of  opinions  which  is  the  invariable  concomitant  of  all  human 
speculation.  A  rapid  glance  at  the  whole  field  of  Mediaeval 
thought  will  not  be  out  of  place  here,  and  will  furnish  us  with 
an  insight  into  the  essential  characteristics  of  Scholastic  philoso- 
phy. We  shall  first  examine  the  problem  which  has  often  been 
regarded  as  comprising  within  its  limits  the  whole  drift  of 
Scholastic  discussions :  the  problem  of  universals.  Mr.  de  Wulf 
has  recently  blamed  Haureau  for  regarding  it  as  the  sole  Scho- 
lastic problem.  And  indeed  we  agree  with  the  distinguished 
professor  of  Louvain  in  admitting  that  the  Mediaeval  thinkers 
did  not  confine  their  investigations  to  a  single  particular  ques- 
tion, but  embraced  the  whole  field  of  philosophy.  The  problem 
of  universals  should  not,  however,  be  undervalued,  as  it  contains 
in  germ,  not  only  the  Mediaeval  systems  of  thought,  but  likewise 
the  answers  which,  in  modern  times,  have  been  given  to  all  great 
problems  of  philosophy. 

If  we  start  from  nominalistic  principles,  if  we  admit  with 
Roscelin  that  the  universal  is  a  mere  name,  a  mere  flatus  vods, 
and  that  nothing  but  the  individual  is  real,  the  outcome  of  our 
philosophy  will  be  materialism  and  phenomenalism.  We  will  at 
first  admit  with  John  Stuart  Mill  that  "a  class,  a  universal,  a 
genus  or  a  species  is  neither  more  nor  less  than  the  individual 
substances  themselves  which  are  placed  in  the  class;  and  that 
there  is  nothing  real  in  the  matter  except  those  objects,  a  com- 
mon name  given  to  them,  and  common  attributes  indicated  by 
the  name."8  We  shall  next  be  bound  to  extend  our  theory  to 
the  relation  of  the  whole  and  its  parts;  and — inasmuch  as  the 
whole  bears  to  the  parts  the  relation  of  a  universal  to  a  particu- 
lar—we  shall  have  to  maintain  that  the  parts  alone  possess 
reality  and  are  themselves  wholes.  When  Abelard,  in  his  letter 
to  the  bishop  of  Paris,  accused  Roscelin  of  implicitly  holding 

•J.  S.  Mill.  System  of  Logic,  Bk.  2,  chap.  2,  sect.  2. 


21 

that  Jesus,  instead  of  eating,  as  the  Gospel  says,  a  part  of  a 
fish,  ate  a  part  of  a  word,  he  was  undoubtedly  wrong.  Rosce- 
lin's  assertion  that  the  universal  was  a  mere  word  did  not  bind 
him  to  admit  that  the  fish  was  a  mere  word.  But  it  compelled 
him  to  profess  that  the  fish  as  such  had  no  reality;  that  it  was 
nothing  but  a  complex  of  ultimate  beings,  or  molecules;  and 
that  Jesus  ate  a  certain  number  of  those  molecules,  which  could 
be  called  parts  of  a  fish  only  in  virtue  of  our  mental  propensity 
to  build  those  universals  which  are  absolutely  devoid  of  reality. 

Nominalism  thus  leads  us  to  materialism.  It  is  radically 
opposed  to  the  belief  that  the  universe  is  a  whole,  and  cannot 
admit  any  other  absolute  than  the  molecules,  the  atoms,  the 
ultimate  divisions  of  matter,  by  whatever  name  we  may  choose 
to  call  them. 

And  if,  from  the  objective,  we  pass  to  the  subjective  field,  we 
shall  see  that  nominalism  is  likewise  the  ancestor  of  empiricism 
and  phenomenalism.  In  the  realm  of  mind,  as  well  as  in  the 
realm  of  matter,  the  individual  will  be  the  ultimate  reality. 
There  will  be  no  soul-substance  lying  beyond  our  mental  states, 
but  fugitive  impressions,  each  of  which  will  possess  its  own  inde- 
pendent existence.  Experiences  of  memory  themselves  will 
have  no  validity  apart  from  the  present  instant,  and  we  shall 
be  bound  to  admit  what  Mr.  Josiah  Royce  has  described  under 
the  name  of  Mysticism. 

As  Roscelin  applied  his  doctrine  to  the  mystery  of  the  Holy 
Trinity;  and,  in  agreement  with  his  principles,  concluded  that 
the  oneness  of  the  three  divine  persons  is  not  real;  that  the 
Father,  the  Son  and  the  Holy  Ghost  are  not  one  God,  but  three 
Gods,  he  was  formally  condemned  at  the  Council  of  Soissons,  in 
1092,  and  Nominalism  was  thus  killed  for  more  than  two  cen- 
turies, and  did  not  reappear  till  the  days  of  Ockam. 

Realism,  in  its  most  extreme  form,  had  been  professed  by 
Plato;  and,  as  the  first  period  of  Mediaeval  speculation  was 
decidedly  Platonic,  extreme  Realism,  in  Bpite  of  its  pantheistic 
tendencies,   became  the  orthodox  belief.     It   must  be  observed 


22 

here  that  Mediaeval  realism  has  nothing  in  common  with  what 
we  call  nalism  to-day.  It  is  the  doctrine  that  the  universal  is 
not  merely  a  mental  construction,  but  possesses  an  objective 
reality:  is,  in  point  of  fact,  the  only  reality.  Plato,  as  is  well 
known,  had  taught  that  the  real  world  is  the  world  of  ideas,  and 
that  the  phenomenal  world,  our  own  world,  possesses  reality  only 
in  so  far  as  it  participates  in  the  truth  of  the  ideal  world.  This 
view,  if  logically  followed  out,  will  lead  us  to  the  conclusion 
that  reality  is  of  a  mental  nature.  We  shall  be  bound  to  admit 
with  Hegel  that  "  What  is  reasonable  is  actual,  and  wdiat  is 
actual  is  reasonable."  We  shall  be  incapable  of  avoiding  mon- 
ism in  its  most  extreme  form.  If  the  universal  possesses  an 
objective  reality,  then  being  is  real;  and,  as  the  universal  term 
being  can  be  applied  to  all  things  whatsoever,  we  shall  have  to 
admit  that  a  being  exists  which  contains  all  reality  within  itself. 
It  is  to  realism  therefore  that  most  of  the  pantheistic  systems  of 
the  Middle  Ages  must  be  traced  back. 

Prior  to  the  formulation  of  the  problem  of  universale,  Scotus 
Erigena  had  already  maintained  that  God  is  more  than  a  creator, 
that  he  is  in  all  things  as  their  sole  substance :  "  Cum  ergo 
audimus  Deum  omnia  facere,  nihil  aliud  debemus  intelligere 
quam  Deum  in  omnibus  esse,  hoc  est,  essentiam  omnium  subsis- 
tere.  Ipse  enim  solus  per  se  vere  est,  et  omne  quod  vere  in  his 
quae  sunt  dicitur  esse  ipse  solus  est."9 

In  spite  of  the  incongruity  of  this  view  with  the  teaching  of 
the  Church — an  incongruity  which  eventually  led  to  the  condem- 
nation of  Erigena's  work  in  1225,  Pantheism  again  developed 
under  the  shadow  of  the  traditional  realistic  doctrine,  the  an- 
tiijua  ilnclrina,  as  Abelard  had  called  it,  displayed  itself  more 
01  less  timidly,  according  to  the  propitiousness  of  the  times  and 
the  boldness  of  its  supporters,  and  reached  a  definite  form  and 
expression  in  the  teachings  of  the  great  Pantheistic  school, 
which  nourished  al  the  end  of  the  twelfth  century,  and  counted 

•Scotus  Erigena,  !)<■  Divisione  Nature,  cap.  72. 


23 

as  distinguished  members  as  Bernard  of  Tours,  Amaury  of  Bene 
and  David  of  Dinant. 

Closely  connected  with  Platonic  realism  are  also  the  Mediaeval 
mystics.  Mysticism,  or  the  doctrine  that  the  real  is  the  imme- 
diately felt,  is,  as  we  have  seen,  the  logical  outcome  of  nominal- 
ism. It  is  interesting  to  notice  that  Mediaeval  mysticism  was 
reached  by  the  opposite  way.  If  we  start  from  the  assumption 
that  the  universal  alone  is  real,  we  will  be  led  to  the  conclusion 
that  God  alone  possesses  reality,  and  that  everything  else  is  mere 
worthless  appearance.  In  what  will  man's  perfection  and  final 
end  then  consist?  Simply  in  the  immediate  union  with  the 
One,  the  Being,  in  whom  all  reality  is  centered;  in  a  supreme 
contempt  for  all  terrestrial  things;  in  the  rejection  of  all  pro- 
fane learning,  of  philosophy  itself.  And  we  have  thus,  in  a  nut- 
shell, the  line  of  reasoning  followed  by  Mediaeval  mystics. 

It  was  out  of  the  teaching  of  William  of  Champeaux  at  the 
abbey  of  St.  Victor  that  the  mystic  movement  grew.  Strength- 
ened by  the  condemnation  of  Abelard  (1121),  openly  protected 
by  St.  Bernard,  Mysticism  found  remarkable  adherents  in  the 
whole  Victorine  school.  Human  reason  was  mercilessly  con- 
demned, dialectic  was  characterized  as  the  devil's  art,  and  Abe- 
lard, Peter  Lombardus,  Gilbert  de  la  Porree  and  Peter  of  Poi- 
tiers were  denounced  as  "the  four  labyrinths  of  France,"10 
because  "  they  had  treated  with  scholastic  levity  of  the  ineffable 
Trinity  and  the  Incarnation." 

Pantheistic  doctrines  having  been  repeatedly  anathematized 
by  the  Church — as  in  the  Council  of  Paris,  in  1210,  in  which 
the  teachings  of  David  and  Amaury  were  condemned  and  their 
works  proscribed — and  Aristotle  having  supplanted  Plato  as  the 
inspirer  and  the  guide  of  Mediaeval  thinking,  there  appeared  a 
modified  form  of  realism,  which  had  been  already  foreshadowed 
by  St.  Anselm,  and  probably  also  by  Abelard,  and  which  has 
remained  since  then  the  otlieial  Scholastic  doctrine.     Albert  of 

,0  In  Walter  of  St.  Victor's  In  Quatuor  Labyrinthos  Franciae.  Cf. 
Turner,  History  of  Philosophy,  pp.  302  ff. 


24 

Bollstadt,  usually  known  as  Albert  the  Great,  must  be  credited 
with  its  firsl  satisfactory  formulation.  He  distinguished  three 
kinds  of  aniversals:  First,  the  universale  ante  rem,  existing  in 
the  mind  of  God;  second,  the  universale  in  re,  existing  in  the 
external  object;  third,  the  universale  post  rem.  existing  in  the 
known  subject. 

This  new  form  of  realism,  which  escapes  the  extravagant 
issues  of  nominalism  and  extreme  realism,  has  been  too  often 
ignored  by  modern  writers,  who  have  represented  Scholastics  as 
adhering  en  ?nasse  to  the  tenets  of  Plato  and  William  of  Cham- 
peaux.  The  new  theory  denies  the  existence  of  the  universal  as 
such  outside  the  mind;  but  it  admits  in  the  object  a  potential 
universal,  which  may  be  regarded  as  the  foundation,  fun  da  men - 
\  turn  in  re,  of  the  universal  concept  of  the  mind.  There  does 
not  exist,  as  Plato  maintained,  an  ideal  man  which  contains  the 
reality  shared  in  a  greater  or  less  degree  by  all  individual  nun  : 
there  exist  only  Peter,  James  and  John;  but  there  is  in  Peter, 
as  well  as  in  John  and  James,  a  peculiar  nature,  an  essence  by 
which  they  are  individuals  of  their  own — not  of  another — spe- 
cies. The  universal  ceases  to  be  a  word  devoid  of  meaning;  it 
designates  the  very  essence  of  the  thing  itself. 

The  ideal  world  of  Plato  did  not,  however,  completely  vanish. 
It  appeared  in  a  new  form  which  it  had  already  assumed  at  the 
beginning  of  the  Christian  era.  The  world  of  ideas  became  the 
Divine  Mind;  and  the  essences  of  all  things  were  regarded  as 
!  preexisting  in  the  essence  of  God,  as  reflecting  more  or  less 
exactly  the  divine  perfections.  God's  essence  was  thus  described 
as  the  causa  exemplaris,  the  infinite  prototype  of  all  reality. 
This  is  the  meaning  of  Albert's  universale  ante  rem. 

Besides  moderate  realism,  there  arose  between  Platonic  real- 
ism and  nominalism  another  intermediate  theory,  known  as  con- 
ceptual ism.  The  conceptualists  were  at  one  with  the  nominal  - 
ists  in  denying  all  objective  reality  to  the  universal ;  but,  whereas 
the  nominalists  saw  nothing  in  the  universal  hut  a  meaningless 
name,   the  conceptualists  recognized   its  validity   as  a   concept. 


25 

They  admitted  that  the  universal  is  real  and  has  a  meaning, 
but  only  in  the  mind.  Abelard  has  been  regarded  for  a  long 
time  as  the  promoter  of  this  view.  The  works  of  Kemusat  and 
Cousin  would  rather  lead  us  to  regard  him  as  a  moderate  realist. 
At  all  events,  conceptualism  presents  a  striking  historical  inter- 
est on  account  of  its  resemblance  with  the  Kantian  philosophy. 
It  dissociates  the  mental  concepts  from  the  outside  reality.  It 
shows  that  the  synthetical  unity  of  apperception  is  the  product 
of  the  mental  categories,  and  does  not  agree  with  the  thing-in- 
itself,  which  remains  unknown  and  unknowable. 

The  problem  of  universals  has  thus  led  us  through  all  Medi- 
aeval systems  of  thought,  and  might  likewise  lead  us  through 
the  whole  field  of  modern  speculation.  There  are,  however,  in 
the  Middle  Ages,  as  well  as  in  modern  philosophy,  some  ques- 
tions which  do  not  present  so  close  a  connection  with  the  nom- 
inalistic  and  realistic  principles.  Prominent  among  them  is  the 
dispute  as  to  the  superiority  of  the  intellect  or  of  the  will. 
Thomas  Aquinas  was  an  intellectualist ;  Duns  Scotus  was  a 
voluntarist.  His  philosophy  bears  to  that  of  the  Angelic  Doctor 
the  relation  that  Kant's  system  bears  to  the  system  of  Hegel. 

The  rapid  survey  of  Mediaeval  thought  we  have  just  made, 
however  incomplete  it  may  be,  is  more  than  sufficient  to  prove 
that  Scholastic  philosophy  is  not  properly  a  system.  Most  of 
modern  systems,  as  we  have  seen,  are  either  openly  professed  by 
some  Mediaeval  philosopher  or  implicitly  contained  in  his  prin- 
ciples. What  is  Scholastic  philosophy  then?  Does  it  present 
any  character  by  which  it  may  be  distinguished  from  modern 
thought?  To  this  question  various  answers  have  been  made,  all 
containing  a  certain  amount  of  truth,  most  of  them  being  never- 
theless incomplete. 

Some  authors  have  defined  Scholastic  philosophy  in  terms  of 
its  language  and  methods.  They  have  claimed  that  the  syllog- 
ism was  the  favorite  instrument  of  Mediaeval  thought;  vain 
subtleties  and  endless  distinctions  its  chief  characteristics.  Ac- 
cording to  Mr.  John  Dewey,  one  definition  of  Scholasticism  is: 


26 

"any  mode  of  thought  characterized  by  excessive  refinement  and 

subtlety;  the  making  of  formal  distinctions  without  end  and 
without  special  point."" 

These  views  are  true  to  a  certain  extent.  Syllogism  was 
regarded  hy  Mediaeval  philosophers,  and  is  still  regarded  by 
some  of  their  contemporary  followers,  as  the  most  efficient  form 
of  argumentation.  The  syllogistic  form,  however,  is  simply  a 
garb  with  which  the  schoolmen  chose  to  clothe  their  ideas,  and 
which  they  might  have  discarded  without  any  essential  change 
in  their  philosophy.  It  is  a  garb  which  is  not  peculiar  to  them 
alone.  Besides  the  fact  that  all  modern  systems  of  philosophy 
could  be  presented  in  the  syllogistic  form  without  becoming 
scholastic,  it  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  Leibniz  not  only  praised 
the  syllogism,  but  used  it  in  his  discussions;  that  Spinoza  ex- 
pounded his  philosophy  in  a  form  surpassing  in  strictly  syllogis- 
tic, mathematical  character,  all  that  had  been  written  during 
the  Middle  Ages.  As  for  vain  subtlety,  it  is  certainly  a  most 
common  blemish  in  the  works  of  the  schoolmen,  a  real  defect, 
which  often  mars  their  most  beautiful  pages.  But  the  student 
of  post-Kantian  idealism,  who  has  been  compelled  to  go  over 
the  works  of  Fichte,  Hegel  and  Bradley,  is  little  tempted  to 
regard  vain  subtlety  as  a  character  peculiar  to  Scholasticism. 
He  who  has  tried  to  clear  the  Fichtean  statement  that 

"the  reciprocal  activity  and  passivity  determines  the  independ- 
ent activity  and  the  independent  activity  determines  the  recipro- 
cal activity  and  passivity  " ; 

its  immediate  consequence,  namely  that 

"  the  independent  activities  of  the  Ego  and  Non-Ego  do  aol 
reciprocally  determine  each  other  directly,  hut  only  indirectly, 
through  their  reciprocally  determined  activity  and   passivity"; 

and  that 

11  In  Baldwin's  Diet,  of  Philosophy  and  Psychology;  art.  Scholasticism. 
Another  definition  of  -Mr.  Dewey's  will  be  discussed  in  this  chapter. 


27 

"  the  law  of  reciprocal  determination  is  valid  only  in  so  far  as 
related  to  the  reciprocal  activity  and  passivity  and  independent 
activity;  but  is  not  valid  as  related  to  the  independent  activity 
alone  " ; 

who  has  followed  the  author  in  the  intricate  applications  of  his 
principles  under  the  conceptions  of  causality  and  substantiality; 
who  has  lost  himself  in  that  baffling  labyrinth  of  distinctions 
and  sub-distinctions  which  cover  more  than  sixty  pages  of  the 
Wissenschaftslehre;  who  has  finally  got  the  conviction  that  this 
eccentric  and  repulsive  show  of  analysis  amounts  to  little  more 
than  nothing,  can  hardly  accuse  the  Scholastics  of  monopolizing 
subtlety.  Applying  to  Fichte  a  word  which  Diderot  said  of 
Duns  Scotus,  he  will  assert  with  no  more  hesitation  and  with 
more  justice  than  the  French  encyclopedist,  that  he  who  would 
know  the  whole  Wissenschaftslehre  would  know  nothing. 

Another  theory,  more  widely  accepted,  has  defined  Scholastic 
philosophy  by  its  relation  to  theology.  A  formula,  current  dur- 
ing the  Middle  Ages,  and  regarding  philosophy  as  ancilla  theo- 
logian, has  been  produced;  and  Scholastic  philosophy  has  been 
either  identified  with  theology  or  characterized  by  its  professed 
agreement  with  the  dogmas  of  the  Church. 

The  complete-identification-theory  has  been  openly  professed 
by  Hegel.  "  The  Scholastic  philosophy,  says  he,  is  thus  really 
theology,  and  this  theology  is  nothing  but  philosophy."12  The 
same  view  has  been  adopted,  in  a  slightly  modified  form,  by 
Victor  Cousin  in  his  Histoire  generale  de  la  philosophie,  and  the 
fact  that  it  has  been  recently  maintained  by  men  professing  so 
divergent  philosophical  beliefs  as  Alfred  Weber  in  Germany, 
George  Tyrrell  in  England,  and  John  Dewey  in  this  country, 
shows  that  it  is  far  from  being  as  yet  completely  dead : 

"The  Church,"'  says  Weber,  "  is  the  predominant  power  of  the 
Middle  Ages.  Outside  of  the  Church,  there  can  be  no  salvation 
and  no  science.  The  dogmas  formulated  by  her  represent  the 
truth.     From  the  mediaeval  point  of  view,  to  philosophize  means 

12 Hegel,  Lectures  on  the  History  of  Philosophy,  VoL  ">.  p.  39. 


28 

to  explain  the  dogma,  to  deduce  its  consequences  and  to  demon- 
strate its  truth.  Hence  philosophy  is  identical  with  positive 
theology;  when  it  fails  to  be  that,  it  becomes  heretical."13 

"  By  Scholasticism,"  says  Tyrrell,  "  we  understand  the  applica- 
tion of  Aristotle  to  theology,  or  the  expression  of  the  facts  and 
realities  of  revelation  in  the  mind-language  of  the  peripatetics."14 

Finally,  in  Baldwin's  Dictionary  of  Philosophy  and  Psychol- 
ogy, Mr.  Dewey  defines  Scholasticism  as 

"  the  period  of  Mediaeval  thought  in  which  philosophy  was  pur- 
sued under  the  domination  of  theology,  having  for  its  aim  the 
exposition  of  Christian  dogma  in  its  relation  to  reason."15 

In  order  to  understand  what  amount  of  truth  this  theory  con- 
tains, it  is  necessary  to  examine  briefly  the  exact  meaning  given 
to  the  word  philosophy  in  ancient  times,  and  the  way  in  which 
the  particular  sciences  have  appeared  and  have  been  assigned  a 
definite  field. 

Philosophy  busied  itself  at  first  with  the  whole  extent  of 
human  knowledge.  In  ancient  Greece,  Thales,  Anaximander 
and  Anaximenes  were  primarily  scientists.  Shunning  the 
mythological  explanations  of  the  universe  given  in  previous 
time,  they  directed  their  efforts  towards  a  cosmical  theory  more 
in  harmony  with  the  facts  of  experience.  It  is  by  an  observa- 
tion of  the  phenomena  of  nature — as  Aristotle  points  out — that 
Thales  was  led  to  the  assumption  that  all  things  are  made  out 
of  water.  Anaximenes  explained  the  generation  of  fire,  winds, 
clouds,  water  and  earth  as  due  to  a  condensation  of  the  first 
ground  of  all  things,  air.  Anaximander  formulated  a  theory 
of  evolution  which  bears  a  striking  similarity  to  the  conceptions 
of  our  contemporary  naturalists.  Aristotle  himself  did  not 
regard  any  branch  of  human  knowledge  as  lying  beyond  his 
jurisdiction.     His  philosophy  covers  not  only  logic,  metaphysics, 

"Weber,  History  of  Philosophy,  New  York.  1004,  pp.  201-202. 

"Tyrrell,  The   Faith  of  the  -Millions,   1st  Scries-,  p.  224. 

''-  Baldwin's   Diet,  of  Philosophy  and  Psycholo^-,  art.  Scholastici-m. 


29 

ethics  and  psychology,  but  also  physics,  cosmology,  zoology,  poli- 
tics and  rhetoric. 

When,  in  the  course  of  human  history,  the  field  of  knowledge 
was  gradually  extended ;  when  it  became  impossible  for  a  single 
man  to  apply  himself  to  all  branches  of  learning,  particular 
sciences  gradually  acquired  a  technique,  and  thus  became  inde- 
pendent. This  movement  towards  specification  was,  however, 
very  slow.  Even  in  modern  times,  Bacon  has  held  that  the 
objects  of  philosophy  are  God,  man  and  nature,  and  has  included 
within  its  scope  logic,  physics  and  astronomy,  anthropology, 
ethics  and  politics ;  and  Herbert  Spencer  has  defined  philosophy 
as  a  completely  unified  knowledge,  and  has  published  a  series 
of  works,  of  which  the  titles:  Principles  of  Psychology,  Princi- 
ples of  Biology,  Principles  of  Sociology,  etc.,  are  sufficient  to 
show  that  the  philosophy  of  their  author  is  in  keeping  with  his 
definition. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  Christian  era,  the  respective  bound- 
aries of  theology  and  philosophy  were  not  distinctly  drawn. 
The  two  sciences  were  even  generally  identified.  St.  Augustine 
had  said: 

"  Non  aliam  esse  philosophiam,  id  est  sapient  ia?  studium,  et 
aliam  religionem,  cum  ii  quorum  doctrinam  non  approbamus 
nee  sacramenta  nobiscum  communicant."10 

Tertullian,  it  is  true,  had  regarded  philosophy  as  the  mother 
of  heresies,  and  had  not  feared  to  formulate  his  famous:  Credo, 
quia  absurd  urn.  There  is,  however,  every  reason  to  believe  that 
he  limited  his  condemnation  to  pagan  learning;  for  he  himself 
did  not  fear  to  philosophize,  and  he  gave  a  system  of  ontology 
of  which  an  idea  may  he  had  from  the  following  quotations: 

"  Nihil  enim,  si  non  corpus.  Omne  quod  est,  corpus  est  sui 
generis;  nihil  est  incorporate,  nisi  quod  non  est."17     "  Quis  enim 

18  De  vera  religione,  cap.  .r>.     (f.  Turner,  op.  cit.,  p.  248. 
"De  Aiiimn.  7;  De  Carne  Chr..  2. 


30 

negayerU  ileum  esse  corpus,  etsi  deus  spiritus  est?  spiritus  enim 
corpus  sui  generis  in  sua  eiiigie."18 

The  first  period  of  Scholastic  philosophy  was  a  direct  off- 
spring of  the  patristic  era  and  inherited  its  beliefs.  Scotus 
Erigena  regarded  philosophy  and  theology  as  completely 
identical : 

"  Quid  est  alius  de  philosophia  tractare  nisi  verae  religionis, 
qua  summa  et  principalis  omnium  rerum  causa,  Deus,  et  humili- 
ter  colitur,  et  rationabiliter  investigatur,  regulas  exponere? 
Conficitur  inde  veram  esse  philosophiam  veram  religionem,  con- 
versimque  veram  religionem  esse  veram  philosophiam."19 

We  have  seen  that  Roscelin  did  not  hesitate  to  apply  his  specu- 
lative theories  to  the  mystery  of  the  Blessed  Trinity.  For 
Abelard,  as  well  as  for  Erigena,  philosophy  and  theology  were 
one  and  the  same.  Jt  must  be  remarked,  however,  that,  in 
Abelard's  case,  theology  was  not  properly  identified  with,  but 
reduced  to  philosophy.  In  other  words,  theology  simply  disap- 
peared. Abelard's  position  was  very  much  similar  to  that  of 
the  modern  Hegelian  school.  Religious  mysteries,  if  not  prov- 
able by  human  reason,  were  mercilessly  discarded.  The  words: 
"  Nee  quia  Deus  id  dixerat  creditur,  sed  quia  hoc  sic  esse  cou- 
rt nc  it  ur  accipitur,"20  which  so  deeply  offended  St.  Bernard's 
orthodoxy,  may  be  taken  as  a  perfect  expression  of  Abelard's 
view. 

The  respective  boundaries  of  philosophy  and  theology  were 
soon,  however,  definitely  fixed.  The  system  of  principles  attain- 
able by  reason  alone  was  clearly  discriminated  from  the  body  of 
revealed  truths.  In  Anselm's  writings,  although  faith  and  rea- 
son are  held  in  close  connection,  they  are  no  longer  identified. 
He  Bays : 

"  Rectus  ordo  exigit  ut  profunda  Christianae  fidei  credamus 
prrusquam    en    praestunamua    ratione   discutere.      Xegligentiae 

18  Adv.  1'rax.,  7. 

"Migne,  Vol.  caadi,  col.  557. 

20  Introdud  i<>  ad  Theologiam;  Migne,  Vol.  clxxviii.  col.  10.">0. 


31 

mihi  esse  videtur  si  postquam  confirmati  sumus  in  fide,  non 
studemus  quod  credimus  intelligere."21 

The  great  philosophers  of  the  thirteenth  century  were  at  the 
same  time  theologians ;  and,  in  their  most  important  works,  they 
treated  theological  as  well  as  philosophical  questions.  This  fact 
may  account  for  the  erroneous  conception  which  regards  them 
as  identifying  the  two  sciences.  The  truth,  however,  is  that 
they  carefully  distinguished  them,  and  gave  an  account  of  their 
differences  and  relations  which  would  not  be  surpassed  by  any 
theologian  in  our  own  day. 

Philosophy  differs  from  theology  in  its  object  and  in  its 
means:  in  its  object,  because,  whereas  philosophy  is  limited  to 
the  truths  human  reason  can  grasp,  theology  also  embraces  those 
which  lie  beyond  the  roach  of  our  natural  faculties;  in  its 
means,  in  so  far  as  the  instrument  of  philosophical  researches 
is  human  reason,  whereas  theology  is  guided  by  the  light  of 
divine  revelation. 

These  principles  were  recognized  by  all  great  masters  of  Medi- 
aeval thought,  and  have  been  so  clearly  expounded  by  St.  Thomas 
in  the  first  chapters  of  his  Summa  Theologica,  that  it  is  surpris- 
ing they  have  been  so  often  overlooked.  In  the  very  words  by 
which  the  Summa  opens,  the  respective  boundaries  of  philosophy 
and  theology  are  distinctly  fixed.  St.  Thomas  proposes  the  fol- 
lowing objection: 

"  Videtur  quod  non  sit  necessarium  praeter  philosophicas  dis- 
ciplinas  aliam  doctrinam  haberi.  Ad  ea  enim  qua?  supra  ra- 
tionem  sunt,  homo  non  debet  conari,  secundum  illud  Ecclesiast. 
3:  Altiora  te  ne  quaesieris.  Sed  ca  qua?  rationi  subduntur  suf- 
ficienter  traduntur  in  philosophicis  disciplinis:  superfluum 
igitur  videtur  praeter  philosophicas  disciplinas  aliam  doctrinam 
haberi." 

To  which  he  gives  the  following  answer: 

"Licet  ea  quae  sunt  altiora  hominis  cognitione  non  sint  ab 
homine  per  rationem  inquirenda :  sunt   tameo  a   IV<>  revelata 

25  Cur  Deus  Homo?  1,  1-2. 


32 

suscipienda  per  fidem.  TJnde  et  ibidem  subditur:  Plurima 
supra  Benson)  hominum  ostensa  sunt  tibi.  Et  in  hujusmodi 
sacra  doctrina  consistit."" 

With  a  far  stronger  foundation,  some  philosophers  have 
thought  that,  although  Scholastics  clearly  distinguished  philoso- 
phy from  theology  and  granted  to  the  former  a  proper  field  of 
action,  it  is  in  the  peculiar  relation  in  which  they  regarded  those 
two  sciences  that  the  idiosyncratic  note  of  their  philosophy  must 
be  found.  The  general  acceptance  this  view  has  received  from 
adherents  as  well  as  from  opponents  of  Scholasticism,  cannot 
but  lead  us  to  believe  that  it  contains  a  good  deal  of  truth.  It 
has  been  accepted,  among  others,  by  Zeller,  Ueberweg,  Carra  de 
Vaux,  Elie  Blanc,  Zeferino  Gonzalez  in  Europe,  and  by  William 
Turner  in  this  country. 

"  Scholasticism,"  says  Ueberweg,  "  was  philosophy  in  the  ser- 
vice of  established  and  accepted  theological  doctrines,  or,  at  least, 
in  such  subordination  to  them  that,  where  philosophy  and  theology 
trod  on  common  ground,  the  latter  was  received  as  the  absolute 
norm  and  criterion  of  truth.  More  particularly,  Scholasticism 
was  the  reproduction  of  ancient  philosophy  under  the  control  of 
ecclesiastical  doctrine,  with  an  accommodation,  in  case  of  dis- 
crepancy between  them,  of  the  former  to  the  latter."-3 

And  William  Turner,  in  his  History  of  Philosophy,  regards 
the  effort  on  the  part  of  the  schoolmen  to  unify  philosophy  and 
theology  as  the  most  distinctive  trait  of  the  philosophy  of  the 
schools.  Therein  he  places  the  difference  which  divides  Scho- 
lasticism from  modern  thought: 

"  Modern  philosophy,"  Bays  be — "  post-Reformation  philosophy, 

as  it  may  be  called — was  born  of  the  revolt  of  philosophy  against 
theology,  of  reason  against  faith.  It  adopted  at  the  very  outset 
the  Avcrroistic  principle  that  what  is  true  in  theology  may  be 

a  Summa  Theologica,  Para  1,  Q.  1,  art.  1.  ad.  1.  C'f.  also:  Art.  2, 
3  and  f),  in  which  the  nature  and  the  relations  of  tin'  two  sciences  arc 
accurately  discussed. 

I  eberweg,   History  of  Philosophy,  Vol.  1.  p.  .'!•">.">. 


33 

false  in  philosophy — a  principle  diametrically  opposed   to   the 
thought  which  inspired  Scholasticism."24 

One  of  the  characteristic  notes  of  Mediaeval  philosophers  is 
no  doubt  their  constant  endeavor  to  harmonize  their  philosoph- 
ical doctrines  with  the  revealed  truths.  It  would  not  be  fair, 
however,  to  fail  to  recognize  a  similar  endeavor  in  some  modern 
thinkers.  One  cannot  without  injustice  absolutely  assert  that 
modern  philosophers  have  adhered  en  masse  to  the  Averrhoistic 
principle  that  what  is  true  in  theology  may  be  false  in  philoso- 
phy. Malebranche,  De  Bonald,  Gratry,  Berkeley  himself,  have 
professed  the  same  theological  beliefs  as  Thomas  Aquinas,  and 
have  tried,  with  as  much  earnestness  as  he,  to  harmonize  their 
philosophy  with  their  religious  faith.  It  may  be  claimed  that 
they  have  not  succeeded  so  well;  but  the  question  now  is  not  of 
success,  but  of  professed  endeavor,  and,  in  this  respect,  they  are 
not  essentially  inferior  to  the  Angelic  Doctor. 

On  the  whole,  Scholastic  philosophy  is  primarily  and  essen- 
tially the  philosophy  of  the  Middle  Ages,  and  reflects  the  essen- 
tial characters  of  that  time.  The  greatest  power  in  the  western 
world,  from  the  ninth  to  the  fifteenth  century,  was  doubtless  the 
Roman  Church.  The  Middle  Ages  were  above  all  an  age  of 
faith.  It  is  faith  that  directed  the  European  armies  to  unknown 
countries.  It  is  faith  that  led  myriads  of  young  men  to  the 
cloisters  where,  separated  from  the  world,  they  devoted  their 
lives  to  prayer  and  to  study.  Under  the  shadow  of  faith,  they 
thought  of  the  great  problems  of  the  world.  Under  the  shadow 
of  faith  they  formulated  their  systems  of  philosophy.  It  is  for 
this  reason  that  the  dogmas  of  the  Church  were  for  them  a 
guide;  that  freedom  of  thought  was  assigned  certain  limits  it 
could  not  overstep.  For  this  reason  also  the  harmony  between 
philosophy  and  theology,  although  not  peculiar  to  Scholasticism. 
is  certainly  its  most  distinctive  trail. 

Scholastic   philosophy   reached    its   mosi    perl'ed    form   in   the 

■'  Turner.   History  of  Philosophy,  pp.  417  IV. 
4 


34 

thirteenth  century;  and,  in  the  hands  of  Thomas  Aquinas, 
became  a  definite  system  which  might  he  described  as  Scholastic 
more  properly  than  all  previous  attempts.  It  is  to  this  system 
ili.it  neo-Scholasticism  universally  adheres. 

Section  2. — Neo-Sciiolastic  Philosophy 

The  word  neo-Scholastic  has  been  opposed  on  many  grounds. 

Some  men,  to  whom  Scholastic  philosophy  appears  as  a  bug- 
bear, have  been  unable  to  reconcile  themselves  to  the  idea  that 
such  a  philosophy  might  be  revived.  Behind  the  peaceful  pro- 
fessor, who  discusses  the  theory  of  Matter  and  Form,  they  have 
seen  the  papal  power  restored,  the  Church  of  Rome  dethroning 
sovereigns  and  imposing  her  will  upon  nations,  funeral  piles 
erected  anew,  heterodox  thinkers  burned  at  the  stake.  As  we 
have  already  spoken  in  our  Introduction,  of  the  relation  of  Scho- 
lastic philosophy  to  the  dogmas  of  the  Church  and  of  the  politi- 
cal influence  of  the  Thomistic  revival,  this  form  of  opposition  to 
neo-Scholasticism  shall  not  detain  us  any  longer. 

Other  writers,  believing  that  Scholastic  philosophy  is  essen- 
tially a  thing  of  the  past,  have  asserted  that  the  word  neo- 
Scholasticism  itself  involves  a  contradiction.  They  have  derided 
the  idea  of  covering  old  theories  with  a  new  garb,  of  giving  a 
modern  form  to  antiquated  doctrines.  Their  objection  to  the 
Thomistic  revival  would  be  perfectly  well  grounded,  if  the  his- 
torical evolution  of  the  world  were  such  as  many  writers  on 
philosophy  seem  to  profess.  But  a  critical  study  of  the  various 
systems  of  thought  which  have  appeared  on  our  planet  during 
the  course  of  centuries  will  most  likely  render  us  distrustful  in 
this  respect.  As  pointed  out  by  Mr.  Woodbridge,  "  Aristotle 
reads  so  much  like  a  modern  that  we  can  conceive  his  writing 
after  Hegel  with  no  great  change  in  his  system."25  Neo- 
Scholastics  believe  that,  amid  some  antiquated  doctrines  which 
must  be  discarded,  Mediaeval  philosophy  contains  perennial  ele- 

■P,  .1.  E.  Woodbridge,  The  Problem  of  Metaphysics,  Philos.  Rev., 
1903,  p.  3C8. 


35 

ments  of  truth ;  that  the  fundamental  principles  of  the  Peripa- 
tetic and  Thomistic  philosophy  can  be  fully  harmonized  with 
modern  scientific  results. 

Even  among  the  sympathizers  of  Scholastic  thought,  the  word 
neo-Scholastic  has  found  opponents.  Some  have  thought  that 
the  modern  defenders  of  the  philosophy  of  St.  Thomas  should 
not  call  themselves  neo-Scholastics,  but  simply  Scholastics,  as 
the  prefix  neo  implies  some  modifications  in  a  system  which 
should  remain  intact.  St.  Thomas's  philosophy,  have  they 
maintained,  should  be  accepted  in  its  entirety  or  not  be  accepted 
at  all.  This  thesis  was  defended  by  C.  M.  Schneider  in  the 
review  Saint-ThomasbVdtter.  It  has  been  defended  more  re- 
cently by  Father  Janvier,  who  would  adopt,  not  only  the  teach- 
ings, but  the  very  method  and  style  of  St.  Thomas : 

"  Les  mieux  inspires,"  says  he,  "  prirent  l'Encyclique  de  Leon 
XIII  a  la  lettre  et  s'efforcerent  d'expliquer  toutes  les  parties  de 
la  doctrine  de  saint  Thomas  en  usant  de  sa  methode  et  en 
adopt  ant  son  style."26 

As  was  to  be  expected,  such  views  have  not  met  with  a  wel- 
come acceptance.  Some  parts  of  St.  Thomas's  teaching  are  so 
evidently  obsolete  that  it  would  be  ridiculous  to  revive  them 
to-day.  His  doctrine  of  the  four  elements,  his  belief  in  the 
influence  of  heavenly  bodies  upon  generation,  and  many  similar 
theories,  cannot  become  again  the  object  of  philosophical  dis- 
cussion. The  method  and  language  of  the  Scholastics  must  also 
be  modified.  If  the  defenders  of  St.  Thomas's  philosophy  want 
to  come  in  contact  with  modern  thought,  if  they  want  to  see 
their  doctrines  discussed  in  philosophical  circles,  they  must  needs 
adopt  modern  methods  and  modern  forms  of  expression.  An 
opposite  course  of  action  would  ostracize  them  from  the  think- 
ing world,  and  thereby  render  their  work  null. 

It  has  been  finally  claimed  that  the  new  Scholastic  movement, 
being  essentially  a  revival  of  St.  Thomas's  philosophy,  ought  to 

-"Janvier,  L'action  tntellectuelle  et  politique  de  Leon  X 1 11,  p.  49. 


rr 
v 


36 

take  the  Dame  of  neo-Thomism.  To  this  objection  also  have 
neo- Scholastics  successfully  replied.  The  Scholastic  revival  fol- 
lows chiefly  St.  Thomas  because  .St.  Thomas  has  brought  Scho- 
lastic philosophy  to  its  perfection.  He  has  built  a  concrete 
system  of  thought  which  surpasses  in  coherence  and  grandeur 
all  other  Mediaeval  systems.  The  adherence  to  St.  Thomas  is, 
however,  neither  servile  nor  exclusive.  The  tenets  of  the  other 
Scholastics  are  carefully  studied  and  given  the  preference  when- 
ever they  prove  more  satisfactory  to  human  reason.  In  point 
of  fact,  the  words  neo-Thomism  and  neo-Scholasticism  are  often 
regarded  as  convertible  terms,  although,  strictly  speaking,  neo- 
Scholasticism  is  more  proper. 

The  first  task  neo-Scholastics  have  assumed  has  naturally 
been  an  adequate  and  critical  study  of  the  Mediaeval  philoso- 
phers. The  works  of  St.  Thomas  have  been  edited  anew  and 
carefully  studied.  The  same  has  been  done  with  regard  to  all 
great  Mediaeval  writers.  Let  us  mention  the  Leonine  edition 
of  the  works  of  Thomas  Aquinas,  begun  at  the  order  and  under 
the  protection  of  Pope  Leo  XIII,  and  published  in  Rome  in 
1882;  the  edition  of  Duns  Scotus's  works,  published  in  1891, 
and  comprising  twenty-six  volumes  quarto;  the  edition  of  St. 
Bonaventure's  works,  published  since  1882  by  the  Franciscans 
of  Quaracchi,  near  Florence,  and  completed  a  few  years  ago;  the 
collection:  Beitrage  zur  Geschichte  der  Philosophie  des  Mittcl- 
alters,  published  in  Miinster,  since  1891,  under  the  direction  of 
Mr.  Baeumker;  the  collection:  Les  Philosophes  du  Moyen  Age. 
begun  quite  recently  at  the  University  of  Louvain. 

These  historical  works  are  not,  however,  the  most  essential 
element  of  the  nco-Scholastic  program.  The  dearest  aim  of  the 
neo- Scholastics  is  not  to  study  Mediaeval  systems  in  themselves, 
to  dissect  them  and  present  them  to  the  curious,  as  stuffed  birds 
in  a  museum.  It  is  to  give  them  a  new  life,  to  make  them  meet 
the  requirements  of  our  day,  to  render  them  actual.  In  order 
to  be  successful  in  this  task,  they  study  the  intrinsic  value  of 
the  solutions   proposed  by  the   Mediaeval   thinkers  to  the  great 


37 

problems  of  the  world,  they  reject  those  which  the  progress  of 
modern  science  has  shown  to  be  erroneous,  they  discard  useless 
questions,  they  accommodate  Scholastic  philosophy  to  the  mod- 
ern spirit.  In  so  doing,  they  act  in  complete  harmony  with  the 
instructions  given  by  Leo  XIII  in  the  encyclical  /Eterni  Patris, 
whose  contents  might  be  summed  up  in  the  formula  universally 
adopted  by  neo-Scholastics  as  the  motto  of  their  school :  vetera 
novis  auger -e. 

The  modifications  introduced  by  neo-Scholastics  on  the  phi- 
losophy of  the  Middle  Ages  may  be  classified  under  three  heads : 

The  first  bears  upon  language  and  method.  Distinguished 
neo-Scholastics,  it  is  true,  cling  to  the  Latin  language  and  to 
the  Thomistic  method  of  argumentation.  Some  of  the  most 
important  contributions  to  the  Thomistic  revival  are  written  in 
Latin  and  do  not  greatly  depart  from  St.  Thomas's  method. 
Let  us  mention  the  collection  Philosophia  Laccnsis  and  the 
works  of  the  celebrated  Spanish  Jesuit  Urraburu.  Like  St. 
Thomas  in  the  Summa  Theologica,  the  authors  of  these  works 
begin  with  an  exposition  of  the  various  opinions  about  each  ques- 
tion, give  their  own  solution  as  the  body  of  the  chapter,  and 
end  with  a  resolution  of  the  objections  proposed  by  the  antagon- 
istic schools.  The  greater  number  of  neo-Scholastics,  however, 
depart  from  this  strictly  Scholastic  method.  They  discard  the 
syllogistic  form  of  argumentation  and  write  their  works  in  mod- 
ern languages.  The  fact  that  the  authors  who  have  thus  modi- 
fied the  Scholastic  method  have  succeeded  in  attracting  the 
attention  of  the  non-Scholastic  world,  whereas  the  learned  treat- 
ises written  in  Latin  have  been  comparatively  neglected,  shows 
that  modern  languages  and  methods  are  nowadays  more  effica- 
cious instruments  than  Latin  for  philosophical  discussion. 
Latin  is  not  known  to-day;  and,  as  the  years  go  on,  its  impor- 
tance will  still  decrease.  This  is  an  evil  no  doubt,  but  an  evil 
we  must  accept.  If  we  present  to  the  world  philosophical  doc- 
trines expressed  in  a  Language  which  the  world  ignores,  our 
efforts  will  be  vain,  our  labor  useless. 


38 

With  regard  to  history.  neo-Scholastica  have  also  somewhat 
departed  from  the  attitude  of  their  Mediaeval  ]>iv<l<>cessors.  His- 
torical investigations  were  not  neglected  during  the  Middle 
Ages.  They  were,  however,  made  from  a  point  of  view  totally 
different  from  our  own.  When  the  old  Scholastics  studied  the 
philosophical  opinions  of  their  predecessors,  their  aim  was  not 
so  much  the  knowledge  of  the  views  of  such  or  such  a  man  as 
the  knowledge  of  truth.  They  had  not  the  idea  that  a  man 
could  study  history  for  history's  sake,  could  devote  his  time  to 
an  understanding  of  antagonistic  philosophical  systems,  and 
expound  opposite  theories  without  professing  any  opinion  of  his 
own.  The  study  of  the  tenets  of  the  great  thinkers  of  the  past 
is  no  douht  a  most  powerful  means  of  getting  definite  philosoph- 
ical convictions.  A  philosophical  problem  can  hardly  be  solved 
in  a  satisfactory  manner,  when  the  solutions  given  to  the  same 
question  in  previous  time  are  ignored.  The  aim  of  the  Scho- 
lastics in  their  study  of  history  was  thus  most  laudable,  and, 
to  a  certain  extent,  must  become  our  own  aim. 

Historical  studies  have,  however,  acquired  in  our  day  an 
importance  which  the  Mediaeval  philosophers  did  not  imagine. 
The  doctrines  of  a  thinker  are  now  studied  in  and  for  them- 
selves. We  try  to  understand  and  to  imbibe  the  very  spirit  of 
the  philosophers.  We  are  scrupulously  careful  not  to  attribute 
to  them  opinions  which  they  did.  not  profess. 

Some  of  the  early  neo-Thomists  have  been  loath  to  enter  into 
this  modern  current.  The  late  Spanish  professor  Orti  y  Lara 
regarded  historical  studies  as  a  vain  bibliomania.27  This  inex- 
cusable indifference  has  now  wholly  disappeared.  Mr.  de  Wulf, 
in  a  recent  work:  Introduction  a  la  Philosophie  neo-Scolastique, 
in  which  the  program  of  the  neo-Scholastic  movement  is  most 
definitely  traced,  strongly  insists  upon  the  importance  of  his- 
torical  investigations.  A  similar  insistence  is  found  in  the 
numerous  articles,  pamphlets,  etc.,  published  by  Mgr.  Mercier 
during  ili«'  last  twenty  years.     The  important  historical  studies 

n  Cf .  Lutofflawski,  Kant  in  Spanien,  Kantstttdien,  1897,  pp.  217  ir. 


39 

published  by  neo-Scholastics,  and  of  which  we  have  already 
spoken,  show  that,  on  this  point,  they  act  in  perfect  conformity 
with  their  principles.  Not  only  have  they  studied  the  Middle 
Ages,  but  they  have  made  important  contributions  to  the  study 
of  modern  philosophical  literature.  Suffice  to  mention  the 
works  of  Mercier  and  Sentroul  on  Kant,  Halleux's  Evolution- 
isms en  morale,  which  contains  a  remarkable  criticism  on  Spen- 
cer's System  of  Ethics,  Janssens's  treatise  on  Renouvier's  neo- 
criticism,  Rickaby's  recent  study  on  Hobbes,  Locke,  Hume  and 
Mill. 

Neo-Scholasticism  finally  strives  to  keep  abreast  with  modern 
scientific  progress.  In  so  doing,  it  does  not  precisely  depart 
from  the  attitude  of  the  Mediaeval  philosophers.  For  too  long 
a  time  it  has  been  believed  that  the  monks  of  the  Middle  Ages 
were  unconcerned  with  science,  and,  regardless  of  the  data  of 
experience,  built  their  systems  a  priori.  This  view  cannot  be 
held  to-day.  It  is  well  known  that  the  great  Scholastic  philoso- 
phers were  enthusiastic  investigators  of  nature;  that  Thomas 
Aquinas,  Albert  the  Great,  Roger  Bacon,  etc.,  were  true  scien- 
tists. The  prodigious  development  of  science  in  modern  times 
has  made  it  difficult  for  the  philosopher  to  possess  a  deep  scien- 
tific knowledge.  Albert  the  Great  and  Roger  Bacon  could  boast 
of  having  mastered  all  sciences.  Not  only  would  the  same  be 
impossible  to-day,  but  philosophers  are  often  apt  to  build  their 
speculative  systems  without  taking  scientific  data  into  account. 
And  there  thus  result  those  strange  philosophical  theories  which 
provoke  the  laughter  of  scientists  and  bring  discredit  upon 
philosophy  itself. 

Neo-Scholastics  have  not  always  escaped  tin's  danger.  As  we 
shall  see  in  our  chapter  dealing  with  neo-Schola-iieisni  in  Italy. 
the  early  Roman  Thomists  regarded  scientific  investigations 
with  the  utmost  contempt.  Their  ignorance  of  science  often 
led  them  to  ridiculous  assertions.  Thus,  Cardinal  Mazella, 
defending  in  his  De  Deo  Crratilc,  the  view  that  the  days  of 
Creation  are  days  of  twenty-fonr  hours,  and  Bomewhal  perplexed 


40 

by  the  fossils,  which  geology  proves  to  have  existed  in  the  strata 
of  the  earth  for  long  periods  of  time,  does  not  hesitate  to  helieve 
that  God  created  them  vn  statu  perfecto,  just  as  they  are  found 
to-day  by  the  geologist.28  It  is  hardly  necessary  to  say  that 
snch  is  not  the  position  of  the  neo-Scholastics  of  the  present 
day.  The  works  of  Farges,  Urraburu,  Pesch,  Xys,  Mercier, 
etc.,  evince  a  profound  knowledge  of  all  modern  scientific  dis- 
coveries. The  Institute  of  Philosophy  of  the  University  of 
Louvain  in  particular  is  worthy  of  praise  in  this  respect.  As 
we  shall  see  in  one  of  the  following  chapters  of  this  treat Lse,  its 
scientific  department,  as  regards  equipment  and  results,  has  got 
the  start  of  some  of  the  most  famous  European  institutions. 

Scholasticism  is  not  thus  a  dead  system  studied  only  for  its 
historical  interest.  It  is  a  system  endowed  with  as  vivid  a  life 
as  any  modern  current  of  thought,  a  system  which  must  be 
studied  in  connection  with  modern  theories,  and  whose  answers 
to  the  great  problems  of  philosophy  can  no  longer  be  ignored. 
The  following  chapters  will  be  devoted  to  an  exposition  and  a 
discussion  of  its  essential  principles. 

"Mazella,  De  Deo  C'reantc,  pp.  156  ff. 


CHAPTER    II 
SCHOLASTIC    LOGIC 

Whereas  all  other  sciences  needed  long  periods  of  time  to 
acquire  the  definite,  systematic  form  they  now  possess,  nay,  in 
many  cases,  to  find  their  right  path,  logic  has  hit  at  once  its 
legitimate  procedure,  and  has  been  able  to  reach  without  delay 
its  complete  development.  If  it  has  not  advanced  a  single  step 
since  Aristotle's  time,  if  our  modern  university  text-books  do 
not  give  us  any  more  nor  less  than  the  doctrine  of  the  Stagirite, 
it  is  because  logic  had  become  in  his  hands  a  complete  system, 
had  grasped  and  accomplished  its  purpose.  The  reason  of  this 
advantage  is  obvious.  Fnlike  all  other  sciences,  logic  has  to 
deal  with  the  form,  not  with  the  content,  of  thought.  It  does 
not  examine  the  immediate  assumptions  from  which  we  start; 
it  is  not  concerned  with  the  conclusions  we  derive  from  them; 
it  deals  only  with  the  manner  in  which  they  are  derived.  It  is 
merely  the  art  or  the  science  of  reasoning. 

Xow,  all  men  are  endowed  with  similar  faculties  and  reason 
in  a  similar  way.  The  causes  of  the  divergences  of  speculative 
conclusions,  of  the  incompatibility  of  contradictory  systems,  are 
not  to  be  found  in  the  methods  according  to  which  these  systems 
are  built,  but  in  the  fundamental  principles  which  lie  at  their 
basis. 

In  modern  times,  however,  the  Aristotelian  logic  has  been 
severely  criticized.  Eminent  authors  have  condemned  its  course 
of  action,  declaring  its  direction  unnatural,  its  methods  barren. 
It  has  been  contended  that  upon  tbe  ruins  of  the  effete  Medieval 
dialectic,  a  new  science  of  logic  had  to  be  built.  Induction  has 
been  produced  and  acclaimed  as  the  sovereign  guide  of  human 
speculation,  while  deductive  methods  have  been  regarded  as 
useless  and  relegated  to  the  background. 

41 


42 

This  view.  i]\\o  in  great  part  to  the  progress  of  physical 
science,  has  found  an  able  representative  and  defender  in  John 
Stuart  Mill.  The  great  significance  of  his  System  of  Logic  lies 
in  the  endeavor  to  reverse  the  process  which  considered  the 
syllogistic  logic  as  fundamental,  and  to  subordinate  the  syllogism 
to  the  induction.  This  superiority  assigned  to  the  induction  is 
a  natural  consequence  of  the  nominalistic  principles.  If  we 
start  from  the  assumption  that  the  individual  is  the  only  reality, 
and  that  the  universal  is  a  mere  meaningless  name,  the  syllogism 
loses  its  force  and  becomes  a  mere  tautology. 

The  syllogism,  in  its  most  perfect  form,  starts  from  a  uni- 
versal, subsumes  a  particular  under  that  universal,  and  reaches 
the  conclusion  that  the  attribute  which  belongs  to  the  universal 
belongs  to  the  particular  also.  Now,  as  the  universal  does  not 
possess  any  validity  for  the  nominalists,  they  must  regard  the 
major  premise  as  containing  the  conclusion  not  only  formally, 
but  materially,  and  hence  the  syllogism  as  devoid  of  all  logical 
value. 

In  the  example : 

Man  is  mortal. 
Socrates  is  a  man, 
therefore,    Socrates    is   mortal, 
the  major  premise:  Man  is  mortal,  is  not,  from  a  nominalist ic 
point  of  view,  a  universal  proposition.     The  term  man  is  only 
a  shorthand  register  of  individual  cases.     It  means  John,  Peter, 
Thomas,  etc.,  and  the  proposition :  Man  is  mortal,  may  be  re- 
solved into  particular  propositions,  and  formulated  as : 
John,  Peter,  Thomas,  etc.,  are  mortal. 

Now,  the  subject  Socrates  of  our  conclusion  cither  is  or  is 
not  contained  in  the  universal  term  man.  If  it  is,  then  our 
reasoning  is  tautological,  is  even  guilty  of  the  fallacy  called 
petitio  principii.  inasmuch  as  it  implicitly  assumes  the  conclu- 
sion it  pretends  to  prove.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  term 
Socrates  is  not  contained  in  the  term  man,  it  is  by  a  process  of 
induction   that    we  extend   the  meaning  of  the  term  man,  which 


43 

included  John,  Peter  and  Thomas,  to  Socrates ;  and  the  induc- 
tion becomes  the  foundation  of  all  truthful  investigation,  the 
basal  stone  of  the  syllogism  itself. 

That  this  depreciation  of  all  syllogistic  argumentation  is 
openly  professed  by  Mill,  is  well  known  to  all  who  have  read 
his  System  of  Logic: 

"  It  must  be  granted,"  says  he,  "  that  in  every  syllogism,  consid- 
ered as  an  argument  to  prove  the  conclusion,  there  is  a  petitio 
principii.     When  we  say, 

All  men  are  mortal 

Socrates  is  a  man 
therefore 

Socrates  is  mortal; 
it  is  unanswerably  urged  by  the  adversaries  of  the  syllogistic 
theory,  that  the  proposition,  Socrates  is  mortal,  is  presupposed 
in  the  more  general  assumption,  All  men  are  mortal:  that  we 
cannot  be  assured  of  the  mortality  of  all  men,  unless  we  were 
previously  certain  of  the  mortality  of  every  individual  man ; 
that  if  it  be  still  doubtful  whether  Socrates,  or  any  other  indi- 
vidual you  choose  to  name,  be  mortal  or  not,  the  same  degree 
of  uncertainty  must  hang  over  the  assertion,  All  men  are  mor- 
tal: that  the  general  principle,  instead  of  being  given  as  evi- 
dence of  the  particular  case,  cannot  itself  be  taken  for  true  with- 
out exception,  until  every  shadow  of  doubt  which  could  affect 
any  case  comprised  with  it,  is  dispelled  by  evidence  aliunde; 
and  then  what  remains  for  the  syllogism  to  prove  ?  that,  in  short, 
no  reasoning  from  generals  to  particulars  can,  as  such,  prove 
anything;  since  from  a  general  principle  you  cannot  infer  any 
particulars,  but  those  which  the  principle  itself  assumes  as 
foreknown."1 

This  view,  perfectly  conclusive  for  the  adherents  of  nominal- 
ism, loses  its  value  if,  with  the  great  Scholastic  masters,  we 
admit  the  validity  of  the  universal:  if  we  regard  the  word  man 
as  meaning,  not  simply  John,  Peter  and  Thomas,  but  a  univer- 
sal essence  common  to  all  possible  men.  The  error  of  the  nom- 
inalists lies  in  the  confusing  the  denotation  of  a  term  with  it< 

*J.  S.  Mill,  System  of  Logic,  Bk.  2,  chap.  3,  sect.  2. 


44 

connotation;  and,  if  Mill  tries  to  clear  himself  from  such  an 
accusation,  it  is  on  account  of  an  inconsistency  which  runs 
through  the  whole  of  his  System  of  Logic,  and  appears  as  a  con- 
tinual puzzle  to  the  uninitiated  reader. 

The  conclusion  of  a  syllogism  is  contained  formally  in  the 
major  premise,  but  not  materially.  As  the  universal  tenn  man 
denotes  the  essence  common  to  all  human  beings,  it  also  denotes 
the  essence  of  the  individual  Socrates;  and,  if  mortality  is  one 
of  the  characteristics  of  the  human  essence,  it  will  undoubtedly 
be  a  characteristic  of  Socrates.  The  conclusion,  Socrates  is 
mortal,  is.  however,  contained  in  the  major  premise  implicitly 
only.  We  may  be  convinced  of  the  truth  of  the  assertion:  Man 
is  mortal,  because  we  know  that  human  nature  as  such  involves 
the  element  of  mortality  (the  human  body  being  an  organism, 
and  all  organic  beings  being  subject  to  growth,  decay,  and  disso- 
lution) ;  and  not  have  realized  that  the  individual  Socrates  is 
mortal  also.  The  logical  value  of  the  syllogistic  reasoning  con- 
sists then  in  making  explicitly  known  what  was  known  implic- 
itly, in  enlarging  indefinitely  the  field  of  our  a  priori  knowledge. 
Under  its  dominion  lie  all  a  priori  sciences,  pure  mathematics 
as  well  as  philosophy. 

The  inductive  process  was  not  unknown  to  the  Mediaeval  phi- 
losophers. Without  mentioning  Roger  Bacon,  who  not  only  in- 
sisted upon  the  use  of  observation  and  experience,  but  condemned 
all  deductive  reasoning,  we  find  well  conducted  examples  of 
induction  in  Thomas  Aquinas,  Puns  Scotus  and  Albert  the 
Great.  A  remarkable  passage  of  the  work  De  motibus  (mwiai- 
111111,'-  in  which  Albert  the  Greai  maintains  the  thesis  that  the 
Origin  of  all  motions  of  animals  is  on  the  hack  of  the  head, 
might  have  been  written  after  Mill's  System  of  Logic  without 
any  essential  change.3 

These  examples  of  induction   in  the  modem  sense  were,  bow- 

•  I. ili.    1.   tract.   '_',  cap.    1.   -1.  .!. 

"<f.  Mansion,  [/induction  chez  Albert  Le  Grand,  Rev.  Sfeo-Scol.,  1000, 
pp.  246  II. 


45 

ever,  exceptional.  Their  authors  themselves  considered  them 
as  of  little  importance :  "  The  science  of  nature,  said  Albert  the 
Great,  must  not  simply  gather  facts,  it  must  look  for  the  causes 
of  the  natural  phenomena."4 

This  undervaluation  of  inductive  reasoning  was  due  to  the 
fact  that  the  particular  sciences  had  not  yet  acquired  a  field  of 
their  own,  and  were  regarded  as  forming  part  of  philosophy. 
Positive  sciences,  concerned  with  facts  and  laws,  were  as  yet 
unknown. 

The  case  being  very  different  nowadays,  neo-Scholastic  logic 
is  not  satisfied  with  a  repetition  of  the  logical  doctrines  of  the 
Middle  Ages.  In  harmony  with  Leo  Kill's  formula :  Vetera 
novis  augere,  it  makes  a  thorough  study  of  the  inductive  process. 

Deductive  reasoning,  however,  does  not  thereby  disappear. 
It  possesses  a  field  of  its  own,  in  which  induction  has  nothing 
to  do.  Enjoying  an  undisputed  sovereignty  in  the  science  of 
nature,  induction  is  absolutely  powerless  in  the  field  of  the 
a  priori  sciences,  such  as  mathematics;  in  the  field  of  all  those 
sciences  which  our  mind  in  a  certain  sense  creates. 

4  De  mineralibus,  lib.  2,  tract.  2,  cap.   1. 


CHAPTER    III 
SCHOLASTIC    METAPHYSICS 

Section  1. — Existence  of  Metaphysics 

The  word  Metaphysics  was  unknown  to  Aristotle.  It  is  prob- 
ably due  to  Andronicus  of  Rhodes,  a  compiler  of  Aristotle's 
works,  who  was  unable  to  reduce  the  fourteen  books  actually 
known  as  Metaphysics  either  to  ethics,  logic  or  physics.  The 
word  had  therefore  originally  no  intended  meaning  beyond  a 
classificatory  purpose.  Very  soon,  however,  its  connotation 
underwent  a  change  and  was  taken  to  be,  not  what  merely  comes 
after,  but  what  is  essentially  above  physics.  St.  Thomas  brings 
the  two  meanings  together  in  the  following  words :  "  This  sci- 
ence is  called  metaphysics  because  its  study  follows  the  study 
of  physics,  as  we  are  naturally  inclined  to  pass  from  sensible  to 
supersensible  things."1 

General  Metaphysics,  also  called  Ontology,  has  often  been 
defined  by  neo-Scholastics  as:  the  science  of  Being  in  general, 
or  of  Being  as  Being.  This  definition  has  been  opposed  by 
Mgr.  Mercier  on  the  ground  that  the  notion  of  being  in  general 
is  analogical,  and  covers  a  multitude  of  things  with  which 
ontology  has  nothing  to  do.  It  embraces  objects  of  totally 
diverse  natures,  such  as  substances  and  accidents.  It  even 
extends  to  the  logical  being.  Now,  the  logical  being  has  its 
proper  place  in  logic.  As  for  accident,  it  is  not  studied  in 
metaphysics  except  in  so  far  as  it  is  related  to  substance.  The 
proper  object  of  metaphysics,  according  to  Mercier,  is  thus  real 
being  or  substance.  Metaphysics  is  not  concerned  with  what 
Hegel  calls  "-  Pure  Being,"  and  shows  to  be  equal  to  nothing. 

'Thomas  Aquinas,  In  lib.  Boetii  de  Trinitate,  q.  6,  a.  1.  Cf.  Mercier, 
Ontologie,  pp.  5-6. 

4(1 


47 

Its  vital  problem,  as  Mr.  Woodbridge  points  out,  is  the  nature 
or  character  of  reality,2  and  accident  and  logical  being  come 
within  its  field  only  in  so  far  as  they  are  regarded  as  real. 

Scholastic  metaphysics  has  met,  in  modern  times,  with  power- 
ful adversaries  who  have  tried,  not  only  to  deprive  her  of  the 
sovereignty  which,  as  queen  of  the  sciences,  she  had  so  long 
exercised,  but  to  banish  her  altogether  from  the  world  of 
thought.  She  who,  for  centuries,  had  seen  the  most  powerful 
geniuses  prostrate  at  her  feet,  has  been  driven  out,  without 
mercy,  from  the  field  of  human  speculation.  She  has  lingered 
for  a  long  time,  as  an  outlaw,  in  some  obscure  corner  of  her 
former  realm,  and  to-day  she  reappears  more  resplendent  than 
ever,  and  dares  meet  her  old  foes  face  to  face. 

The  two  great  currents  of  thought  which  have  rejected  meta- 
physics as  vain  in  its  object  and  erroneous  in  its  conclusions  are 
Positivism  and  Kantism. 

According  to  Auguste  Comte,  the  attempt  to  grasp  the  es- 
sences of  things  is  a  futile  endeavor.  We  cannot  go  beyond 
actual  facts  and  laws  of  facts.  Identical  are  the  views  of  Her- 
bert Spencer.  For  him,  our  knowledge  is  limited  to  appear- 
ances, and  the  reality  lying  behind  those  appearances  is  and 
must  be  unknown.3 

Positivism  thus  rejects  metaphysics,  is  even  bound  to  reject 
it.  A  philosophy  which  professes  not  to  step  beyond  the  facts 
of  sensible  experience  cannot  reach  the  universal  nature  which 
is  the  object  of  all  metaphysical  speculation.  It  should  even 
abandon  all  attempts  at  expressing  the  laws  of  facts,  and  be 
contented  with  the  immediate,  with  the  "  this,"  which  is  the 
only  thing  devoid  of  all  metaphysical  element. 

Kant,  whose  aim  was  to  combat  Hume's  scepticism  and  thus 
to  save  metaphysics  from  utter  destruction,  has  perhaps  dealt 
her  the  most  severe  blows.  He  has  taught  that  our  knowledge 
is  conditioned  by  our  natural  faculties,  and   that  the  reality 

"Woodbridge,  The  Problem  of  Metaphysics,  Philos.  Rev.,   1903,  p.  :!7.~.. 

3  Cf .  Spencer,  First  Principles,  C'hnp.  4. 


48 

which  we  Bee  through  the  forms  of  sensibility  and  the  categories 
of  understanding  is  necessarily  distorted  by  these  subjective  con- 
ditions and  never  appears  to  us  as  it  is  in  itself.  It  is  phenom- 
ena thai  we  know.  The  noumenon.  the  thing-in-itself,  is  abso- 
lutely unknowable.  A  science  professing  to  deal  with  reality  as 
it  is  becomes  therefore  meaningless  and  absurd. 

Both  Kantians  and  Positivists  labor  under  the  same  miscon- 
ception. All  facts  of  experience  have  come  to  he  divided  into 
two  great  classes.  Some  are  known  as  real,  others  as  apparent. 
We  have  observed  that  a  stick  which  looks  straight  in  ordinary 
conditions  looks  crooked  when  immersed  in  water.  As  our  sense 
of  touch  does  not  in  this  case  corroborate  the  conclusions  of  our 
visual  experience,  we  conclude  that  no  real  change  has  taken 
place  in  the  stick  itself,  that  it  is  still  really  straight,  but  appears 
crooked. 

This  division  is  swallowed  up  by  all  defenders  of  the  absolute 
relativity  of  knowledge.  They  undo,  as  it  were,  the  work  of 
experience,  and  leave  us  at  our  starting-point,  where  we  cannot 
escape  the  necessity  of  beginning  our  work  over  again.  If 
reality  lies  altogether  beyond  our  reach,  it  is  as  non-existent 
for  us,  and  the  appearances,  the  phenomena  with  which  alone 
we  have  to  deal,  become  the  only  possible  object  of  research,  the 
only  reality.  With  them  a  new  metaphysics  must  needs  arise, 
which,  upon  close  examination,  will  be  found  to  be  exactly  the 
one  we  have  rejected. 

The  positivistic  and  the  Kantian  positions  are  thus  untenable. 
They  are  also  illogical.  Both  positivists  and  Kantians  reach 
conclusions  that  are  metaphysical  in  themselves  and  unattain- 
able without  the  help  of  metaphysics.  They  assert,  for  example. 
that  all  knowledge  is  relative  and  that  reality  is  absolutely  un- 
knowable. This  is  a  conclusion  about  the  nature  of  reality 
itself,  a  conclusion  which  in  so  far  is  metaphysical.  And  if  we 
go  on  Baying  with  SpenceT  thai  the  unknowable  force  lying 
beyond  our  experience  is  the  cause  of  our  sense-impressions,  or. 

with    Kant,  that   the  i  hing-in-ilsel  f  is  the  necessary  condition  of 


49 

the  existence  of  the  phenomenal  world,  if  we  know  and  describe 
the  effects  which  the  absolute  reality  produces,  we  thereby  pro- 
fess to  know  a  good  deal  about  this  reality,  and  can  hardly 
describe  it  as  absolutely  unknowable. 

Section  2. — Scholastic  Theory  of  Act  and  Potency 

One  of  the  most  enlightened  among  neo-Scholastics,  Mr. 
Albert  Farges,  regards  the  doctrine  of  Act  and  Potency  as  the 
foundation-stone  of  the  peripapetic  and  Thomistic  metaphysics. 
"  La  theorie  de  Facte  et  de  la  puissance,  du  moteur  et  du  mobile 
est  la  clef  de  voute  de  tout  ce  gigantesque  edifice  eleve  a  la 
gloire  de  la  philosophic  spiritualiste  par  le  genie  d'Aristote  et 
de  saint  Thomas  d'Aquin."4  This  doctrine  has  been,  however, 
so  often  derided  in  modern  times  that  Mr.  Farges's  words  will 
at  first  savor  of  paradox.  The  Scholastics  have  been  accused  of 
introducing  into  their  philosophy  mysterious  entities,  occult 
causes,  and  of  moving  thereby,  in  the  most  strange  way,  as  by 
means  of  invisible  threads,  the  whole  machinery  of  the  world. 

In  order  to  remove  all  possible  prejudices,  it  will  be  well, 
before  proceeding  to  explain  the  theory  of  Act  and  Potency,  to 
quote  the  opinion  of  two  men  who  are  certainly  not  biased  in 
favor  of  Scholasticism.  The  first  of  them  is  Mr.  Vacherot. 
Speaking  of  the  peripatetic  philosophy,  he  expresses  himself 
thus : 

"  It  is  the  school  of  Aristotle  especially,  which  is  a  school  of 
science  and  of  positive  philosophy.  .  .  .  Nothing  is  less  specu- 
lative than  his  philosophy,  if  the  term  speculative  is  meant  for 
a  priori  conception.  .  .  .  The  whole  doctrine  of  Aristotle  rests 
upon  a  formula,  which  is  the  most  abstract  and  the  highest  ex- 
pression of  experience:  Potency  and  Act,  two  words  which  sum 
up  his  thought  and  explain  everything."5 

.Mr.  Boutroux  likewise,  although  a  sincere  Kantian,  not  only 
does  full  justice  to  Aristotle,  but  seems  to  prefer  his  teaching 

4  Farges,  Acte  et  Puissance,  p.  17. 
Vacherot,  Le  nouveau  Bpiritualisme,  i>.  Hi:;. 
5 


50 

to  the  doctrine  of  Kant  himself.  He  recognizes  that  Aristotle's 
philosophy  answers  particularly  to  the  scientific  preoccupations 
of  our  time,  "  repond  particulierement  aux  preoccupations  scien- 
tifiques  de  notre  epoque."0 

The  exposition  of  the  doctrine  of  Act  and  Potency  demands, 
as  an  indispensable  pre-requisite,  an  analysis  of  the  concept  of 
motion. 

The  existence  of  motion  or  change  was  denied  by  the  old 
Eleatic  school.  It  is  said  that  Aristotle,  in  answer  to  certain 
sophists  of  his  time,  who  endeavored  to  revive  Parmenides's  and 
Zeno's  arguments,  simply  began  to  walk.  This  answer,  so  trivial 
in  appearance,  was  as  profound  and  irrefutable  as  could  be.  It 
meant  that  motion  is  a  fact  of  our  experience,  and  cannot  be 
denied,  because  it  is  there  and  constantly  forces  itself  upon  us. 
Should  it  even  be  said  that  all  movements  and  changes  are 
deceit  ful  appearances  and  that  reality  is  immutable,  one  is  com- 
pelled to  admit  that  those  appearances  are  still  there,  are  real 
and  must  be  explained. 

Aristotle,  in  his  Physics,  distinguishes  three  classes  of  move- 
ment :  a  movement  purely  local  or  of  translation ;  a  change  in 
quality,  which  he  calls  alteration ;  a  change  in  quantity,  or 
development  and  reduction  of  mass.7 

Movement  is  thus  understood  in  a  broad  sense  and  cannot  be 
identified  with  local  motion.  Change  of  place  is  rather  an  effect 
of  motion  than  motion  itself.  The  essence  of  motion  rather  con- 
sists, to  use  Farges's  words,  in  a  tendency,  a  becoming,  an  instru- 
ment of  evolution  for  the  material  forces  of  nature,  "  une  tend- 
ance, un  devenir,  un  instrument  devolution  pour  les  fonts 
materielles  de  la  nature."8 

Now.  the  changes  we  observe  in  our  universe  do  not  take  place 
nt  random,  but  according  to  definite  laws.  Whenever  an  object 
is  placed  in  determinate  conditions,  it  begins  to  act  in  such  a 

•Grande  Encyclopedic,  art.  Aristote. 

'Phys.,  IV,  c.  2,  sect.  10. 

*  Parges,  Acte  et  Puissance,  Sect.  V. 


51 

way  as  to  show  that  it  possesses  a  peculiar  nature,  that  it  is  a 
unique  individual.  In  other  words,  we  are  bound  to  admit  the 
existence  of  purpose  in  our  world.  The  word  purpose  has  now 
come  to  mean  a  conscious  scheme.  It  has  been  identified  with 
design.  The  old  Scholastics  did  not  hesitate  to  use  it  in  a 
broader  sense.  They  spoke  of  intentio  natura  or  appetitus  nat- 
uralis  to  designate  the  unconscious  tendencies  of  lower  beings.9 

When  we  say  that  our  universe  is  purposive,  we  do  not  there- 
fore mean  that  it  is  made  according  to  a  plan;  that  it  is  designed 
by  a  supreme  being  who  directs  everything  to  his  ends,  who, 
hidden  behind  the  scenes,  moves  the  whole  mechanism.  Our 
world  may  be  thus  designed,  it  is  true,  but  this  is  not  the  ques- 
tion now.  We  only  mean  that  the  individuals  of  our  world  are 
controlled  by  their  own  character,  that  they  naturally  tend  to  a 
definite  result.  We  may  thus  consider  in  each  individual  two 
different  states:  the  one  in  which  it  is  still  undeveloped,  deter- 
minable, has  not  acquired  the  full  perfection  it  naturally  tends 
to;  the  other  in  which  it  is  already  determined,  perfected,  has 
reached  its  final  goal.  The  first  of  these  states  is  called  poten- 
tial by  the  Scholastics,  the  second  actual.  A  potential  being  is 
thus  an  imperfect,  but  perfectible  being.  An  actual  being  is  a 
being  already  perfected.     The  acorn  is  potentially  an  oak. 

No  mysterious  assumption,  I  believe,  is  needed  to  reach  these 
conclusions.  Potentiality  is  not  an  occult  cause  existing  behind 
the  acorn  and  acting  upon  it  in  some  unthinkable  manner;  it  is 
the  peculiar  character  which  the  acorn  possesses  as  an  individual, 
and  by  which  it  is  distinguished  from  all  other  individuals,  the 
property  which  enables  it  to  become  an  oak  and  nothing  else. 
It  may  be  impossible  to  tell  beforehand  the  nature  of  the  actual- 
ity toward  which  a  potential  being  tends.  A  microscopical 
examination  of  the  acorn  will  not  show  us  anything  resembling 
an  oak.  An  analysis  of  the  potential  will  not  give  us  the  actual. 
It  is  the  actual  itself  that  will  evince  the  potentialities  of  the 
being  which  gave  it  birth.     The  very  fact,  however,  that    the 

9  Cf .  Mercier,  M€taphysique  g€n£rale  on  Ontologie,  p,  489. 


52 

acorn,  and  the  acorn  alone,  invariably  becomes  an  oak,  compels 
us  to  admit  that  the  acorn  possesses  some  individual  properti.  3 
which  a  pea  does  not  possess,  that  it  contains  potentially  an  oak, 
while  the  pea  does  not.  Nothing  further  than  this  do  the  Scho- 
lastics maintain. 

We  arc  now  in  a  position  to  understand  Aristotle's  famous 
definition  of  motion  as  "the  act  of  the  potential  being  as 
potential." 

Between  the  purely  potential  state  of  tin1  being  which  is  not 
as  yet  tending  towards  an  end,  and  its  final  condition  after  the 
end  is  reached,  there  are  intermediate  stages.  The  new-born 
child  is  potentially  a  Kantian  philosopher,  although  he  has  not 
yet  done  anything  towards  an  insight  of  the  Kantian  theory. 
Between  the  state  of  his  mind  then  and  its  final  condition  when 
the  three  Critiques  are  adequately  grasped,  a  long  period  of 
time  will  probably  elapse.  There  will  be  the  university  stage, 
in  which  the  young  student  will  learn  with  amazement  that 
space  is  in  his  mind,  the  following  years  of  struggle  against  a 
thought  strange  in  itself  and  untowardly  presented,  epochs  of 
failure  and  discouragement,  epochs  of  partial  success. 

The  new-born  child  possesses  the  Kantian  philosophy  poten- 
tially; the  full-grown  philosopher  who  has  mastered  the  three 
Critiques  possesses  it  actually;  the  university  student  is  in  a 
state  of  movement. 

Motion  is  thus  an  act  of  the  potential  being;  an  act,  because 
the  potential  being  which  is  merely  potential  does  not  yet  tend 
towards  its  end,  is  not  yet  in  motion;  an  act  of  the  potential 
being,  because  if  the  being  is  already  actual,  has  completed  its 
evolutionary  process,  it  is  not  in  motion  any  longer.  Motion  is 
an  act,  but  an  imperfect  act;  an  act  which  has  not  yet  reached 
its  full  degree  of  actuality,  and  is  now  completing  itself. 

Section  :). — Scholastic  Theory  of  Substance 
The  simplest  observation  upon  the  objects  of  our  experience, 

shows   that    they  may  be  divided    into   two  -real    classes.      Some, 


53 

as  a  horse,  a  tree,  a  man,  we  conceive  as  existing  by  themselves. 
Others,  as  walking,  cannot  exist  but  in  something  else.  The 
former  are  called  substances  by  the  Scholastics ;  the  second,  acci- 
dents, qualities,  attributes.  Scholastic  philosophy  thus  defines 
substance  as  that  which  exists  by  itself;  accident  as  that  which 
cannot  exist  by  itself,  but  always  exists  in  something  else. 

The  etymology  of  the  word  substance  (substantia)  involves, 
it  is  true,  a  different  meaning.  It  evokes  the  idea  of  a  sub- 
stratum, of  some  sort  of  recipient  in  which  the  attributes  inhere. 
But,  as  we  have  elsewhere  remarked,  the  etymology  of  a  word 
does  not  always  give  us  the  key  to  its  actual  meaning.  In  our 
epoch  of  religious  liberty,  a  Protestant  may  spend  his  whole  life 
without  actually  protesting  against  any  religious  dogma.  He 
still  calls  himself  and  really  is  a  Protestant. 

ISTo  doubt  the  accidents,  being  unable  to  exist  by  themselves, 
exist  in  something  else;  and  substance  may  be  thus  correctly 
described  as  that  which  supports  accidents.  This  is  not,  how- 
ever, the  primary  meaning  of  the  word  substance,  which  strictly 
signifies  that  which  exists  by  itself. 

Before  we  proceed  to  a  more  detailed  study  of  the  concepts 
of  substance  and  accident,  it  will  be  worth  while  to  examine 
some  of  the  modern  theories  which  have  rejected  the  term  sub- 
stance altogether,  or  have  modified  its  meaning  so  as  to  render 
it  unrecognizable. 

Of  the  adversaries  of  substance,  John  Locke  must  head  the 
list.  Not  because  he  is  an  open  foe.  He  hesitates,  feels  dis- 
satisfied with  his  bellicose  attitude,  would  fain  come  to  a  com- 
promise. But  all  the  subsequent  and  more  resolute  adversaries 
have  been  at  his  school.  It  is  his  principles  they  follow;  it  is 
in  his  workshop  they  have  found  their  most  dreadful  weapons. 

Like  many  modem  philosophers,  John  Locke  regards  sub- 
stance as  a  support  for  accident-.  It  is  from  this  point  of  view 
that  he  aims  hi.-  missiles,  SO  that,  to  a  certain  extent,  he  con- 
stantly misses  the  mark  : 


54 

"  They  who  first  ran  into  the  notion  of  accidents  as  a  sort  of 
real  beings  that  Deeded  something  to  inhere  in,"  says  he,  "were 
forced  to  find  out  the  word  substance  to  support  them.  Had  the 
poor  Indian  philosopher  (who  imagined  that  the  earth  also 
wanted  something  to  bear  it  up),  but  thought  of  this  word  sub- 
stance, he  needed  not  to  have  been  at  the  trouble  to  find  an  ele- 
phant to  support  it,  and  a  tortoise  to  support  the  elephant:  the 
word  sol  ist  a  nee  would  have  done  it  effectually."10 

He  consequently  asserts  that  we  have  no  clear  idea  of  sub- 
stance : 

"  We  have  no  such  clear  idea  at  all,  and  therefore  signify 
nothing  by  the  word  substance,  but  only  an  uncertain  supposi- 
tion of  we  know  not  what,  i.  e.  (of  something  whereof  we  have 
no  particular  distinct  positive)  idea,  which  we  take  to  be  the 
substratum,  or  support,  of  those  ideas  we  know."11 

(Let  us  parenthetically  point  out  a  somewhat  unexpected 
metamorphosis.  We  had  believed  substance  to  be  a  support  of 
accidents.  We  are  now  told  it  is  a  support  of  ideas.  Our 
author  seems  willing  to  prove  by  all  possible  means  the  truth 
of  his  assertion  that  he  has  no  clear  idea  of  substance.) 

Let  us  not,  however,  misunderstand  Locke.  He  would  by  no 
means  maintain  that  we  are  in  absolute  ignorance  as  to  what 
substances  are;  he  even  positively  asserts  that  we  have  a  real 
knowledge  of  them.  But  he  adds  the  restricting  clause  that  this 
knowledge  does  not  go  very  far : 

"  Herein  therefore  is  founded  the  reality  of  our  knowledge 
concerning  substances,  that  all  our  complex  ideas  of  them  must 
be  such,  and  such  only,  as  are  made  up  of  such  simple  ones  as 
have  been  discovered  to  co-exist  in  nature.  And  our  ideas  being 
thus  true,  though  not  perhaps  very  exact  copies,  are  yet  the  sub- 
ject of  real  (as  far  as  we  have  any)  knowledge  of  them;  which 
(as  has  been  already  shown)  will  not  be  found  to  reach  very  far; 
but  so  far  as  it  does,  it  will  still  be  real  knowledge."12 

10  Iyock<>,  An  Essay  concerning  Human  Understanding,  Bk.  2,  chap. 
IS,  sect.   15). 

"Ibid.,  I5k.   1.  chap.  4,  sect.    18. 
"Ibid.,  Bk.  4,  chap.  4,  sect.   12. 


55 

Our  knowledge  of  substance,  which  had  been  described  as 
"  nothing  but  an  uncertain  supposition  of  we  know  not  what," 
is  now  confessed  to  be  a  real  knowledge,  as  real  as  any  knowl- 
edge we  may  have,  and  Locke's  opponents  may  doubt  whether 
his  attacks  were  not  merely  the  mock-fight  of  a  stage  performer. 
He  will  presently  throw  his  weapons  away,  and  we  will  hardly 
be  able  to  repress  a  smile  on  reading  the  following  terms  of 
surrender : 

"It  is  of  the  idea  alone  I  speak  here,  and  not  of  the  being 
of  substance.  And  having  everywhere  affirmed  and  built  upon 
it,  that  a  man  is  a  substance,  I  cannot  be  supposed  to  question 
or  doubt  of  the  being  of  substance,  till  I  can  question  or  doubt 
of  my  own  being."13 

David  Hume  is,  or  tries  to  be,  more  consistent  than  his  mas- 
ter. His  rejection  of  substance  seems  at  first  sight  well  grounded 
and  unanswerable,  and  has  deserved  him  the  credit  of  having 
delivered  philosophy  from  a  cumbersome  and  useless  conception, 
of  having  done  away  with  the  soul-substance  itself,  as  Berkeley 
had  done  with  the  bodily  substance. 

Hume's  attack  on  ancient  philosophy  is  a  sharp  attack  indeed. 
He  is  careful,  however,  before  engaging  in  the  struggle,  to  tell 
us — with  a  certain  naivete — that  he  does  not  understand  ancient 
philosophy  at  all.  "  The  whole  system,  says  he,  is  entirely  in- 
comprehensible."14 Now,  it  is  perhaps  too  much  to  say  that  a 
system  of  philosophy  is  not  understood  until  it  is  believed;  but 
it  cannot  be  denied  that  a  system  of  philosophy  is  not  understood 
until  belief  in  it  seems  at  least  possible.  Artistotle  was  a  man 
whose  mental  shrewdness  Hume  certainly  did  not  surpass,  who 
devoted  his  whole  life  to  study  as  earnestly  as  Hume  did.  who 
lived  in  a  country  not  inferior  as  regards  civilization  to  Hume's 
own  country,  who  moved  in  a  more  intellectual  atmosphere,  who 
breathed  a  purer  air.     The  system  of  philosophy  Aristotle  con- 

"  Ibid.,  Bk.  2,  chap.  23,  sect.  1,  Note. 

"Hume,  Treatise  on  Human  Nature,  15k.  1,  Ft.  4.  Soot.  .? ;  Selhy- 
Bigge's  ed.,  p.  222. 


56 

trived  was  undoubtedly  plain  in  his  own  mind.  If  ii  appears 
entirely  incomprehensible  to  Hume,  it  simply  means  thai  Hume 
does  not  understand  it  as  Aristotle  did,  does  not,  in  point  of  fact, 
understand  it  at  all. 

For  1 1  uini'.  as  for  Locke,  substance  is  primarily  a  kind  of 
substratum,  something  unknown  and  invisible,  which  continues 
the  same  amid  all  variations: 

"  In  order  to  reconcile  which  contradictions  the  imagination 
is  apt  to  feign  something  unknown  and  invisible,  which  it  sup- 
poses to  continue  the  same  under  all  these  variations;  and  this 
unintelligible  something  it  calls  a  substance,  or  original  and 
first  matter."15 

But  as,  according  to  him,  all  qualities  (such  as  the  color,  taste, 
figure,  solidity,  etc.,  of  a  melon)  may  be  conceived  as  distinct 
and  separate,  they  do  not  need  any  support,  and  substance  bo- 
comes  an  unintelligible  chimera : 

"Every  quality  being  a  distinct  thing  from  another,  may  be 
conceived  to  exist  apart,  and  may  exist  apart,  not  only  from 
every  other  quality,  but  from  that  unintelligible  chimera  of  a 
substance."16 

Hume  is  decidedly  a  most  interesting  man.  After  devoting 
all  his  energies  to  drive  away  the  notion  of  substance  from  the 
field  of  philosophy,  he  reduces  to  naught,  by  stroke  of  pen,  his 
elaborate  work,  and  presents  to  bis  amazed  reader  the  following 
statement : 

"If  any  one  should  evade  the  difficulty  by  saying  that  the 
definition  of  a  substance  is  something  which  may  exist  by  itself; 
and  that  this  definition  ought  to  satisfy  us:  Should  this  be  said. 
I  should  observe,  tbat  this  definition  agrees  to  everything  that 
can  possibly  be  conceived;  and  never  will  serve  to  distinguish 
substance  from  accident,  or  the  soul  from  its  perceptions."" 

Ibid.,  Bk.  1.  Pt.  4,  Sect.  3. 

"■•  Tbid.,  Selby  I :  i  ■_ 'b  ed.,  p.  222. 

"Ibid,,  Bk.   1.  Pt.   i.  Beet.  .">;  Selby-Bigge'a  ed..  p.  22:5. 


57 

That  substance  is  something  existing  by  itself  is  indeed  the 
only  thing  the  supporters  of  the  idea  of  substance  maintain ;  and 
Hume,  unconsciously,  unwillingly  perhaps,  becomes  one  of  their 
number.  There  is,  it  is  true,  in  his  statement,  an  inadmissible 
element  of  which  I  will  speak  in  the  sequel;  but  the  fundamental 
principle  it  contains  is  in  perfect  harmony  with  the  doctrine  for 
which  the  supporters  of  the  existence  of  substance  contend. 

A  few  more  words  before  dismissing  Hume.  Substances  have 
generally  been  divided  into  bodily  and  mental.  Berkeley  is  com- 
monly supposed  to  have  done  away  with  bodily  substances; 
Hume,  with  mental  substances.  This  view  must  be  qualified. 
Hume  acknowledges  that  he  believes  in  bodies — that  is  to  say,  in 
bodily  substances — and  thus  seems  to  go  one  step  backwards,  to 
destroy  Berkeley's  elaborate  work: 

"  We  may  well  ask,"  says  he,  "  What  causes  induce  us  to  be- 
lieve in  the  existence  of  body  ?  but  it  is  vain  to  ask,  Whether  there 
be  body  or  not  ?  That  is  a  point  which  we  must  take  for  granted 
in  all  our  reasonings."18 

As  regards  mind,  it  is  true  that  he  resolves  it  into  a  heap  or 
collection  of  perceptions : 

"  Mind,"  he  says,  "  is  nothing  but  a  heap  or  collection  of  dif- 
ferent perceptions,  united  together  by  certain  relations,  and  sup- 
posed, though  falsely,  to  be  endowed  with  a  perfect  simplicity 
and  identity."19 

Which  means  that  there  are  perceptions,  and  there  is  no  mind. 
But  when,  in  reading  the  Treatise  on  Human  Nature,  we  find 
such  expressions  as  these: 

"It  will  always  be  impossible  to  decide  with  certainty, 
whether  they  (the  impressions)  arise  immediately  from  the 
object,  or  are  produced  by  the  creative  power  of  the  mind,  or 
are  derived  from  the  author  of  our  being."20  .  .  .  "  CTpou  the 

"IbUL,  Bk.   1,  Pt.  4,  Set.  2. 

"Ibid.,  J'.k.  1.  Pt.  4.  Sect.  -1  ;  Selby  Bigge's  ed.,  |>.  ^17. 

"Ibid.,  Bk.  1.  I't.  :;.  Sect.  :.-.  Belby-Bigge'a  ed.,  i>.  84. 


58 

whole,  necessity  is  something  that  exists  in  the  mind,  aol   In 

objects."21  ..."  Impressions  are  naturally  the  most  vivid  per- 
ceptions of  the  mind."22  ..."  The  mind  falls  so  easily  from 
the  one  perception  to  the  other,  that  it  scarce  perceives  the 
change."23  .  .  .  "We  may  pronounce  any  quality  of  the  mind 
virtuous  which  causes  love  or  pride."24  .  .  .  "When  I  perceive 
the  causes  of  any  emotion,  my  mind  is  conveyed  to  the  effects, 
and  is  actuated  with  a  like  emotion."25  ..."  It  being  almost 
impossible  for  the  mind  to  change  its  character  in  any  consider- 
able article,  or  cure  itself  of  a  passionate  or  splenetic  temper, 
when  they  are  natural  to  it,"26 

we  feel  strangely  perplexed  as  to  what  Hume's  meaning  really 
is.  It  sounds  odd  to  speak  of  states  of  mind  if  there  is  no  mind. 
The  words  I,  our,  us,  themselves  become  meaningless  if  percep- 
tions alone  are  and  we  are  not. 

These  considerations  may  give  us  some  suspicion  as  to  the 
real  worth  of  Hume's  famous  rejection  of  substance.  They  will 
not  perhaps  induce  us  to  proclaim  with  Rickaby  that  "  the  ac- 
ceptance of  Hume's  doctrine  by  so  many  of  the  philosophers  in 
England  is  a  disgrace  to  the  sound  sense  of  the  nation";27  but 
they  will  compel  us  to  study  the  conception  of  substance  once 
more,  to  examine  whether  the  philosophy  which  advocates  its 
legitimacy  is  not,  after  all,  the  philosophy  of  truth. 

It  would  be  useless  to  pass  a  review  of  the  contemporary  phi- 
losophers who  reject  substance  from  their  system.  They  do 
little  more  than  adopting  Hume's  principles  and  repeating  his 
arguments.  Those  among  our  university  professors  who  have 
not  yet  come  back  to  Aristotle's  point  of  view  simply  tell  us  in 
their  own  words  what  Hume  said  long  ago.  The  Treatise  on 
II iiiiifin  X <il ure  is  their  profession  of  faith. 

-'  Ibid.,  Si-lliy-Higge's  ed.,  p.   1G5. 

nIbid.,  p.  208. 

a  Ibid.,  p.  208. 

1  Ibid.,  p.  675. 

Ibid.,  p.  576. 

-'  Ibid.,  p.  608. 
"Rickaby,  General  Metaphysics,  p.  238. 


59 

There  is  one  contemporary  writer,  however,  who  deserves  to 
be  singled  out  from  the  throng,  and  whose  philosophy  will  detain 
us  for  a  moment.     I  speak  of  John  Stuart  Mill. 

Mill  accepts  the  common  division  of  substances  into  bodies 
and  minds.  He  defines  a  body  as  "  the  external  cause  to  which 
we  ascribe  our  sensation  "  ;28  a  mind  as  "  the  unknown  recipient, 
or  percipient  of  them."29  At  the  first  blush,  this  seems  very 
clear;  but,  unlike  many  other  writers,  Mill  possesses  the  pecu- 
liarity of  appearing  clear  at  a  first  reading  and  less  clear  when 
we  read  him  again;  and,  strange  to  say,  the  more  we  read  him, 
the  obscurer  he  becomes.     At  one  place,  he  tells  us  that, 

"  as  we  know  not,  and  cannot  know  anything  of  bodies  but  the 
sensations  which  they  excite  in  us  or  in  others,  these  sensations 
must  be  all  that  we  can  at  bottom  mean  by  their  attributes,  and 
the  distinction  which  we  verbally  make  between  the  properties 
of  things  and  the  sensations  we  receive  from  them  must  origi- 
nate in  the  convenience  of  discourse  rather  than  in  the  nature 
of  what  is  denoted  by  the  terms  "  ;30 

at  another  place,  that 

"  a  sensation  is  to  be  carefully  distinguished  from  the  object 
which  causes  the  sensation ;  our  sensation  of  white  from  a  white 
object ;  nor  is  it  less  to  be  distinguished  from  the  attribute 
whiteness,  which  we  ascribe  to  the  object  in  consequence  of  its 
exciting  the  sensation."31 

Here,  after  explaining  that  a  cause  does  not  as  such  resemble 
its  effects,  that  an  east  wind  is  not  like  the  feeling  of  cold,  nor 
heat  like  the  steam  of  boiling  water,  that  matter  therefore  does 
not  necessarily  resemble  our  sensations,  he  concludes  that 

"it  may  be  safely  laid  down  as  a  truth  both  obvious  in  itself, 
and  admitted  by  all  whom  it  is  at  present  necessary  to  take  into 
consideration,  that,  of  the  outward   world,   we  know  and  can 

*>  J.  S.  Mill,  System  of  Loprio,  Bk.   1,  chap.  3,  sect.  7. 
°lbid.,  Bk.   1,  chap.  3,  sect.  8. 
Mlbid.,  Bk.   1,  chap.  3,  sect.  9. 
3X  Ibi<!.,   Bk.   1,  chap.  3,  sect.  3. 


60 

know  absolutely  nothing,  excepl  the  Bensations  which  we  experi- 
ence from  it  " . 

and  a  little  further  he  criticizes  Locke  for  admitting 

••  real  essences,  or  essences  of  individual  objects,  which  he  sup- 
posed  to  be  the  causes  of  the  sensible  properties  of  those 
objects."33 

Mill's  conception  of  substance  is  thus  far  from  being  clear. 
There  is,  however,  one  point  which  he  has  perfectly  grasped. 
He  admits  that  substance  is  primarily  that  which  exists  by  itself: 

"  An  attribute,"  says  he,  "must  be  the  attribute  of  something: 
color,  for  example,  must  be  the  color  of  something;  and  if  this 
something  should  cease  to  exist,  or  should  cease  to  be  connected 
with  the  attribute,  the  existence  of  the  attribute  would  be  at  an 
end.  A  substance,  on  the  contrary,  is  self-existent :  in  speaking 
about  it,  we  need  not  put  of  after  its  name.  A  stone  is  not  the 
stone  of  anything;  the  moon  is  not  the  moon  of  anything,  but 
simply  the  moon.'"34 

It  is  not  easy  to  see  why  Mill,  criticizing  this  conception,  finds 
in  it  lessons  of  English,  Greek,  Latin  or  German,  rather  than 
of  mental  philosophy.  When  we  say  that  a  color  is  the  color 
of  something  and  that  the  moon  is  not  the  moon  of  anything, 
we  do  not  apparently  use  meaningless  words.  We  speak  about 
the  real  objects  of  our  world,  and  describe  them  just  as  our 
experience  presents  them  to  us.  As  we  never  find  in  nature  a 
color  existing  by  itself,  and  we  find  a  moon  existing  by  itself, 
we  feel  compelled — not  by  the  necessity  of  our  language,  but  by 
the  necessity  of  the  kind  of  reality  we  have  got — to  speak  of  a 
color  as  a  color  of  something,  and  to  speak  of  the  moon  as  sim- 
ply the  moon.  It  is  reality  which  obliges  us  to  distinguish  a 
substance  from  an  attribute,  to  ascribe  to  the  former  a  character 
which  the  latter  does  not   posse.--. 

uIbid.,   Bk.   1.  chap.  :!.  sect.  7. 

Ibid.,  Bk.   I.  chap.  <;.  sect.  :\. 

"Ibid.,  Bk.  I.  chap.  ::.  sect.  (i. 


61 

Mill,  however,  tries  to  corroborate  his  views  by  the  following 
argument : 

"  As  for  the  self-existence  of  substances,  it  is  very  true  that 
a  substance  may  be  conceived  to  exist  without  any  other  sub- 
stance, but  so  also  may  an  attribute  be  conceived  to  exist  with- 
out any  other  attribute ;  and  we  can  no  more  imagine  a  substance 
without  attributes  than  we  can  imagine  attributes  without  a 
substance."35 

This  reasoning  seems  obvious  enough ;  and,  when  expressed  in 
the  antithetical  language  used  by  Mill,  may  even  appear  con- 
vincing. A  little  consideration,  however,  shows  that  it  lies 
under  a  great  confusion  of  ideas.  If  the  clause  "  an  attribute 
may  exist  without  any  other  attribute  "  simply  means  that  an 
agreeable  odor  may  be  indifferently  joined  to  a  red  or  to  a  blue 
color,  it  is  undoubtedly  true,  but  does  not  amount  to  much.  If, 
on  the  contrary,  it  means  that  an  attribute  may  exist  by  itself, 
without  any  other  conjoined  attribute,  it  must  simply  be  denied 
on  the  ground  that  it  involves  a  contradiction,  inasmuch  as  the 
being  thus  described  would  not  be  an  attribute,  but  a  substance. 

There  is  no  doubt  that  we  can  no  more  imagine  a  substance 
without  attributes  than  attributes  without  a  substance.  The 
attributes  are  the  very  elements  of  the  substance,  so  that  a  sub- 
stance without  attributes  would  mean  a  substance  without  ele- 
ments, or,  in  other  words,  a  thing  which  would  be  equal  to  noth- 
ing. But  the  self-existence  of  a  substance  does  not  and  cannot 
mean  that  it  exists  without  attributes.  It  means  that  it  exists 
by  itself,  while  the  attribute  does  not ;  and  herein  lies  the  essen- 
tial difference  between  them. 

Some  philosophers,  while  admitting  the  validity  of  the  con- 
cept of  substance,  have  given  more  or  less  inadequate,  definitions 
of  it.  Descartes  identities  substance  with  extension  or  thought  ; 
Leibniz,  with  activity.  For  Kant,  the  distinguishing  character 
of  substance  is  permanence:    "In  all  changes  of  phenomena, 

30  Ibid.,  Bk.  l.  ehap.  ■'!.  Beet.  (3. 


62 

substance  is  permanent,  and  the  quantum  thereof  in  nature  is 
neither  increased  nor  diminished.''36  This  seems  to  he  also  the 
view  which  Hegel  tries  to  convey  in  his  usual,  attractive 
language : 

"  The  necessary  is  in  itself  an  ahsolute  correlation  of  ele- 
ments, i.  e.,  the  process  developed  (in  the  preceding  paragraphs), 
in  which  the  correlation  also  suspends  itself  to  absolute  identity. 
In  its  immediate  form,  it  is  the  relationship  of  substance  and 
accident.  The  absolute  self-identity  of  this  relationship  is  sub- 
stance as  such,  which  as  necessity  gives  the  negative  to  this  form 
of  inwardness,  and  thus  invests  itself  with  actuality,  but  which 
also  gives  the  negative  to  this  outward  thing.  In  this  negativ- 
ity, the  actual,  as  immediate,  is  only  an  accidental  which  through 
this  bare  possibility  passes  over  into  another  actuality.  This 
transition  is  the  identity  of  substance,  regarded  as  form- 
activity."37 

Finally,  a  few  authors  have  believed  that  substance  is  essen- 
tially a  substratum,  an  unknowable  something  lying  beyond  the 
accidents,  and  have  thus  justified,  to  a  certain  extent,  the  con- 
fusion from  which  the  thinkers  who  reject  substance  altogether 
have  derived  their  greatest  strength.  Not  otherwise  is  substance 
defined  by  the  celebrated  Spanish  philosopher,  James  Balmes. 
He  regards  it  as  a  substratum,  "  a  thing  which  is  no  color,  but 
lends  itself  to  all  colors;  which  is  none  of  the  qualities  which 
we  experience,  but  the  subject  and  cause  of  them  all";38  a  per- 
manent substratum : 

"a  permanent  being  in  which  occur  the  changes  which  are  pre- 
sented to  us  in  the  sensible  phenomena  "  ;39 

an  unknowable  substratum : 

"  In  vain  you  ask  me,  what  is  this  being?  Give  me  the  intui- 
tion of  the  essence  of  corporeal  things,  and  I  will  tell  you;  but 
while  I  know  them  only  by  their  effects,  that  is,  the  impressions 
which  they  produce  in  me,  I  cannot  answer  you."40 

36  Kant,  Critique  of  Pure  Reason,  Meiklejohn's  transl.,  p.  136. 

"The  Logic  of   Eegel,  Wallace's  transl..  pp.  27:5-274. 

"Balmes,  Fundamental  Philosophy;  Prownson's  transl.,  Vol.  2.  p.  338. 

"Ibid.,  Vol.  2,  p.  339. 

"Ibid.,  V"i.  •_'.  p.  339. 


63 

St.  Thomas  and  the  Scholastics,  however,  regard  substance 
primarily  as  that  which  exists  by  itself;  and  it  is  astonishing 
that  Balmes,  who,  for  four  years,  read  no  other  book  than  the 
Summa  of  St.  Thomas,  saying  that  in  it  all  truths  are  contained, 
should  have  departed  from  his  master  in  this  important  point. 
St.  Thomas  says: 

"  Substantia  est  res,  cu jus  naturae  debetur  esse  non  in  alio ; 
accidens  vero  est  res,  cujus  naturae  debetur  esse  in  alio  "  ;41 

and  further: 

"  IUud  proprie  dicitur  esse,  quod  habet  ipsum  esse,  quasi  in  suo 
esse  subsistens.  Unde  solas  substantiae  vere  et  proprie  dicuntur 
entia."42 

Neo- Scholastics  universally  adhere  to  this  view,  and  are  so  far 
from  regarding  substance  as  a  support  of  accidents  that  some  of 
them  describe  God  as  a  substance  which  exists  by  itself,  and  to 
which  no  accidents  are  nor  can  be  joined.43 

The  Scholastic  theory  on  this  point  is  undoubtedly  right.  We 
cannot  deny  that  experience  presents  us  with  two  distinct  classes 
of  objects :  some  of  which  exist  by  themselves,  while  others  can- 
not exist  but  in  something  else.  An  object  existing  by  itself,  as 
a  lamb,  a  tree,  gold,  myself,  is  called  an  individual  or  a  sub- 
stance. An  object  existing  only  in  something  else,  as  walking, 
singing,  good  health,  color,  is  called  an  accident  or  an  attribute. 

The  words  accident  and  attribute,  although  sometimes  indis- 
criminately used,  are  not,  strictly  speaking,  synonymous.  The 
word  attribute  refers  to  an  essential  element  of  a  substance,  such 
as  reason  and  a  certain  bodily  form  in  man ;  accident,  to  an  ele- 
ment which  an  individual  may  lose  without  ceasing  to  be  what 
it  is;  such  as  health  in  man.     The  attribute  is  one  of  the  con- 

41  Thoma9  Aquinas,  Quolib.  9,  a.  5,  ad  2. 

"Thomas  Aquinas,  Summa  Theol.,  P.  i,  Q.  90,  a.  2. 

"  Cf .  Cornoldi,  Legons  de  Philos.  scol.,  p.  138;  Schiffini,  Principia 
Philos.,  p.  520;  Ginebra,  Elementos  de  Filos.,  Vol.  1,  p.  174;  Rickaby, 
General  Metaphysics,  p.  254. 


(54 

stituenl  elements  of  a  substance;  the  accident  is  aot.     As  this 

distinction  is  not  of  capital  importance  for  our  present  studv, 
we  Bhall  not  insist  upon  it  any  more. 

Substance  is  thus  Identifiable  with  individual,  and  means  a 
complete  object.  It  is  not  an  unknowable  thing  lying  beyond 
the  attributes;  it  is  the  attributes  themselves.  The  essence,  as 
I  lend  says,  must  appear  or  shine  forth.  It  is  not  proper,  how- 
ever, to  call  the  substance  a  heap  of  attributes,  because  it  is  the 
substance,  and  not  the  attributes,  that  possesses  individuality. 
Instead  of  defining  the  substance  in  terms  of  the  attributes,  we 
must  define  the  attributes  in  terms  of  the  substance. 

Substance  is  that  which  exists  by  itself.  Here  we  must  return 
for  a  moment  to  an  assumption  of  David  Hume,  of  which  we 
have  already  spoken.  We  have  seen  that  the  author  of  the 
Treatise  on  Human  Nature  admits  our  theory  in  its  essential 
principle.  But,  as  he  regards  everything  as  capable  of  existing 
by  itself,  and  hence  denies  the  existence  of  attributes,  the  con- 
ception of  substance  becomes  meaningless  in  his  hands,  just  as 
the  expression  "relative  knowledge"  becomes  meaningless  in 
the  system  of  absolute  relativity,  just  as  the  conception  of  sub- 
jective fact  becomes  meaningless  if  we  adopt  the  position  of  the 
subjectivist. 

An  analysis  of  the  facts  of  our  world  convinces  us  that  sub- 
stance is  not,  as  Hume  maintains,  each  individual  impression  or 
quality.  Experience  shows  that  these  individual  impressions  do 
not,  in  point  of  fact,  exist  apart  from  each  other.  Hume's 
capital  fallacy  consists  in  arguing  that  what  we  may  conceive  as 
existing  apart,  may  and  does  exist  apart  If  color,  etc..  existed 
apart  from  any  other  sensible  qualities,  it  would,  indeed,  be  a 
substance.  And  we  do  not  deny  that  it  might  possibly  exist  in 
this  manner.  But  the  question  is  not  whether  it  could,  but 
whether  it  does  so  exist.  And  our  constant  experience  shows 
that  it  does  not.  Experience  must  be  our  guide  as  to  the  nature 
of  reality,  llunie  overlooks  this  capital  truth,  and  thus  sorely 
confuse-  the  possible  with  the  actual.     A  railroad  may  be  con- 


65 

ceived  as  existing  from  here  to  the  moon,  but  it  does  not  exist. 
Hume's  reasoning  would  tend  to  prove  that  it  does. 

Substance  and  attributes  are  thus  valid  conceptions,  and  bear 
to  each  other  the  relation  of  whole  and  part. 

All  other  definitions  of  substance  must  be  rejected  as  incom- 
plete or  erroneous.  We  cannot  identify  substance  with  a  passive 
recipient,  as  Descartes  did,  because  experience  proves  beyond  the 
possibility  of  a  doubt  that  substances,  bodily  as  well  as  mental, 
are  endowed  with  activity.  Sugar  acts  upon  our  palate,  a  chem- 
ical product  upon  our  blood,  a  peal  of  thunder  upon  our  tym- 
panum. No  less  active  is  mind.  To  its  activity  is  due  the 
whole  progress,  the  whole  civilization  of  the  human  race.  Leib- 
niz's definition  of  substance  as  "  the  being  endowed  with  activ- 
ity "  is  certainly  the  expression  of  a  great  truth.  Passivity, 
however,  is  another  element  of  our  universe,  indispensable  to  an 
adequate  account  of  reality.  Some  of  the  properties  of  matter, 
such  as  extension  and  inertia,  can  hardly  be  explained  without 
taking  passivity  into  account.  The  fact  of  knowledge  itself, 
although  involving  an  activity  on  our  part,  forces  us  to  regard 
our  mind  as  a  passive  recipient,  capable  of  being  affected  by  all 
sorts  of  objects,  and  necessarily  determined  by  the  particular 
reality  which  possesses  the  character  of  evident  truth. 

Finally,  with  regard  to  Kant's  identification  of  substance  with 
the  permanent  in  change,  we  will  simply  remark  that  a  perma- 
nent element  in  the  continuous  flux  of  things  is,  indeed,  gener- 
ally admitted  by  scientists  nowadays,  and  that,  if  we  choose  to 
call  it  substance,  no  great  harm  will  ensue.  In  doing  so,  how- 
ever, we  depart  from  the  usual  acceptation  of  the  word  sub- 
stance, and  reduce  ourselves  to  the  necessity  of  inventing  new- 
terms  for  distinguishing  things  existing  by  themselves  from 
things  existing  only  in  something  else. 

Our  definition  of  substance  ;is  the  being  existing  by  itself  may 
be  interpreted  in  different  ways.  It  may  lie  -aid  that  finite 
beings  cannot  be  properly  defined  as  existing  by  themselves, 

inasmuch   as   they   have   not    in    themselves   the  ground   of  their 
6 


66 

existence.  God  has  created  them  and  continually  preserves 
them;  and  this  preservation  is  a  continual  creation,  so  that,  if 
it  should  cease,  all  things  would  be  reduced  to  nothing.  Finite 
brings  are  thus  essentially  contingent.  They  depend  upon  the 
knowledge  and  power  of  God,  who  is  the  only  being  really  exist- 
ing by  itself. 

This  remark  was  passed  by  Descartes,  who  confessed  that  his 
definition  of  substance  properly  applied  to  God  alone.  Un- 
willing, however,  to  depart  from  the  ordinary  use  of  language, 
he  admitted  two  orders  of  finite  substances:  bodies  and  spirits, 
and  supposed  that  the  essence  of  body  consists  in  extension,  the 
essence  of  spirit  in  thought.  Spinoza  took  up  Descartes's  idea, 
and  was  not  dismayed  by  its  pantheistic  implications.  He  de- 
fined substance  as  "  that  which  is  in  itself  and  is  conceived 
through  itself;  in  other  words,  that  of  which  a  conception  can 
be  formed  independently  of  any  other  conception,"44  and  showed 
that  God  is  the  only  substance.  The  same  doctrine  has  been 
revived — with  some  important  modifications — by  Hegel  and  his 
school.  All  monistic  idealists  maintain  that  there  is  only  one 
mind.  They  contend  that,  as  all  things  are  inter-related,  they 
are  parts  of  a  single  whole,  which  is  the  Absolute,  and  in  which 
everything  else  has  its  reality,  its  meaning,  its  very  being.  A 
that,  Bradley  would  say,  is  not  a  mere  that:  it  also  involves  a 
what.  And  as  any  that  is  related  to  all  the  other  thats,  and 
hence  to  all  the  other  whats,  and  thus  comprises  the  whole  series 
of  thats  and  whats  within  its  own  what,  it  clearly  follows  that 
there  is  only  one  all-embracing  what,  which  is  the  Absolute. 

This  view,  which  closely  resembles  the  Christian  doctrine  of 
the  Deity,  may  certainly  contain  much  truth.  If  there  is  a  crea- 
tive mind,  whose  knowledge  is  the  cause  of  all  things,  as  St. 
Thomas  teaches,  and  of  whom  we  are,  as  it  were,  the  dreams,  it 
is  strictly  true  that  there  is  only  one  individual,  one  all-embrac- 
ing substance.  But,  whatever  good  grounds  we  may  have  for 
the  existence  of  a  supreme  mind,  we  do  not  know  it  by  intuition, 

**  Spinoza,  Ethics,  Bonn's  ed.,  p.  45. 


67 

and  it  is  upon  our  knowledge  of  our  own  world,  of  the  world  we 
possess  here  and  now,  that  we  build  our  philosophical  concep- 
tions. In  this  world,  we  find  many  individuals  which,  although 
related  to  other  beings,  are  complete  by  themselves  in  the  sense 
that  we  can  think  of  them  as  independent  of  any  other  indi- 
vidual.    This  leads  us  to  the  problem  of  individuality. 

For  the  Monists,  then,  there  is  only  one  individual.  All 
things,  they  claim,  are  so  connected  that  any  single  object  has 
no  meaning  apart  from  the  rest.  It  is  true  that  the  same  ex- 
perience which  presents  us  with  individuality,  obliges  us  to 
recognize  continuity.  We  ought  not,  however,  to  insist  upon 
one  of  the  elements  of  our  experience  and  unduly  disregard  the 
other.  Continuity  exists;  but,  besides  the  fact  that  it  fails  to 
prove  the  existence  of  a  mind  in  which  all  things  are  one,  the 
doctrine  of  the  identity  of  all  things  in  the  Absolute  cannot  have 
much  meaning  for  our  practical  life,  and  appears  to  us  as  the 
night  in  which  all  cows  are  black. 

The  recognition  of  a  variety  of  individuals,  or  substances, 
becomes  therefore  a  necessity.  But  the  question  arises  as  to 
what  the  individual  will  be;  and,  on  this  point,  the  greatest 
diversity  of  opinion  still  prevails.  The  most  extreme  view 
would  recognize  as  individuals  nothing  but  the  ultimate  sub- 
divisions of  being:  the  atoms  in  the  inorganic  realm,  the  cell 
among  organisms.  Man  would  thus  cease  to  be  an  individual 
and  become  a  colony. 

A  closer  investigation  of  the  nature  of  reality  might  perhaps 
reconcile  all  opposite  views.  Scientific  investigations  seem  to 
have  established  that  all  material  beings  are  made  up  of  identical 
ultimate  parts,  or  electrons.  It  is  likewise  admitted  that  the 
inorganic  and  organic  realms  present  no  fundamental  differ- 
ence, and,  instead  of  dividing  chemistry  into  inorganic  and  or- 
ganic, as  was  done  before,  we  now  regard  it  as  essentially  one. 

The  conclusion  to  be  derived  from  these  scientific  discoveries 
is  that  the  electron  is  the  ultimate  individual,  not  only  in  the 
mineral,  but  also  in  the  organic  realm. 


68 

A  whole  organism,  however,  i>  with  equal  propriety  an  indi- 
vidual, because  it  is  a  unique  and  complete  being,  with  its  own 
life,  its  proper  operations,  its  peculiar  activity. 

Finally,  the  molecule  and  the  atom  are  also  individuals;  the 
former  for  the  physicist,  the  latter  for  the  chemist.  The  mole- 
cule cannot  be  divided  by  physical  means.  It  possesses  a  unity 
of  its  own  and  is  the  individual  about  which  the  science  of 
physics  is  concerned.  Chemistry,  on  the  other  hand,  operates 
upon  the  atoms  themselves.  It  is  by  combining  them  in  differ- 
ent ways  that  it  effects  the  various  chemical  transformations, 
that  it  produces  the  immense  variety  of  compound  substances. 

We  are  thus  compelled  to  distinguish  different  classes  of  indi- 
viduals or  substances,  which  do  not  exclude  one  another,  but 
exist  in  such  a  way  that  the  individual  of  a  lower  class  is  at  the 
same  time  an  element  in  the  constitution  of  the  individuals  of 
the  higher  class.  (This  principle,  we  must  here  observe,  does 
not  unqualifiedly  apply  to  God,  as  will  be  seen  in  the  sequel.) 

Wo  have,  accordingly: 

1.  The  absolute  individual,  or  God. 

2.  The  organic  individual,  as  man. 

3.  The  physical  individual,  or  the  molecule. 

4.  The  chemical  individual,  or  the  atom. 

5.  The  ultimate  individual,  or  the  electron. 

Our  list  purposely  omits  finite  spirits,  as  angels,  because  as 
they  do  not  fall  within  our  experience,  and  a  knowledge  of  them 
cannot  be  reached  by  reason  alone,  philosophy  is  not  concerned 
with  them. 

Section  4. — Scholastic  Theory  of  Cause 

According  to  Scholastic  philosophy,  cause  is  the  principle 
upon  which  a  thing  depends  in  its  being  or  its  becoming. 
"Causa  dicunhir  c.r   quibvs   res  dependit   secundum    esse  vel 

lirri."^ 
"Mercier,  M^taphysique  g£n€rale  ou  Ontologie,  p.  529. 


69 

Aristotle  and  the  Scholastics  distinguish  four  kinds  of  causes : 
material,  formal,  efficient  and  final. 

The  material  and  the  formal  causes  are  the  constitutive 
principles  of  beings.  As  we  shall  deal  with  them  at  great  length 
in  our  chapter  on  cosmology,  we  shall  abstain  from  treating  of 
them  now.  Our  present  study  will  therefore  be  limited  to  the 
efficient  and  the  final  causes. 

In  the  opinion  of  the  plain  man,  an  efficient  cause  is  that 
which  really  produces  an  effect.  When  the  laborer  drinks  a 
glass  of  water,  and  thus  quenches  his  thirst,  he  believes  that  the 
thirst-quenching  not  only  occurred  after,  but  was  produced  by 
the  action  of  the  water. 

It  has  become  a  fashion  in  philosophy  to  deride  the  notions 
of  the  plain  man.  A  student  nowadays  is  often  smiled  at  for 
his  naivete  if  he  believes  that  his  book  is  really  in  his  desk  when 
nobody  perceives  it ;  he  is  looked  upon  as  ignorant  of  the  in- 
variable laws  of  nature  if  he  regards  his  will  as  free;  he  is 
ridiculed  as  a  fetich-worshipper  if  he  feels  the  slightest  sym- 
pathy for  the  old  doctrine  of  causal  power.  For  my  part,  I 
confess  that  I  can  hardly  part  from  these  naive  beliefs;  and,  at 
the  risk  of  being  mocked  for  not  having  yet  bestridden  the 
threshold  of  philosophy,  I  frankly  take  part  with  the  plain  man 
in  his  realism,  his  libertarianism,  his  belief  in  efficiency. 

The  Scholastic  doctrine  of  efficient  cause  has  met  two  classes 
of  opponents :  some,  following  Hume,  have  dropped  out  the  con- 
cept of  efficiency  altogether  and  reduced  causality  to  a  mere 
invariable  antecedence;  others,  with  Malebranehe.  have  accepted 
the  genuine  notion  of  cause,  but  they  have  limited  it  to  the 
Supreme  Being,  denying  all  efficiency  to  created  things. 

Malebranche's  occasionalism  needs  not  detain  us  long.  There 
is  actually  little  danger  of  limiting  causality  to  Cod  alone.  In- 
clined as  we  are  to  question  the  very  existence  of  a  supreme 
mind,  we  feel  little  sympathy  tor  a  system  which  considers  this 
mind  as  the  onlv  efficient    factor  in   the  world. 


70 

We  shall  therefore  limit  ourselves  to  a  few  considerations 
which  have  heen  frequently  urged  against  occasionalism. 

1.  Malehranche's  fundamental  principle  that  activity  Lb 
proper  to  God  alone  and  cannot  be  communicated  to  creatures, 
is  devoid  of  foundation.  God  can  do  all  that  is  intrinsically 
possible;  and  there  is  nothing  so  evidently  possible  as  a  creature 
endowed  with  activity. 

2.  God's  wisdom  manifests  itself  in  the  infinite  variety  of 
organisms  we  observe  in  the  universe.  From  the  molecule  of 
the  mineral  to  the  elaborate  body  of  man,  there  is  a  wonderful 
series  of  organized  beings  possessed  of  particular  potentialities, 
endowed  with  a  surprising  adaptation  of  means  to  ends.  The 
paw  of  the  cat,  for  example,  so  perfectly  adapted  to  the  catching 
of  the  prey,  is  a  marvel  for  the  naturalist.  Xow,  if  finite  beings 
possess  no  efficiency;  if,  when  the  cat  stretches  its  paw,  it  is 
God  that  catches  the  mouse — as  Malebranche  would  maintain — 
the  intricate  organization  of  created  things  becomes  a  useless 
machinery.  The  external  world  itself  is  altogether  unnecessary; 
and,  should  it  be  annihilated,  we  would  noways  notice  its  disap- 
pearance. 

3.  Our  own  consciousness,  which  has  been  justly  called  the 
ultimate  court  of  appeal  in  the  science  of  mind,  testifies  that, 
whenever  we  act,  our  own  course  of  action  is  in  dependence  upon 
our  will.  So  little  are  we  convinced  that  God  acts  in  us,  that 
we  feel  remorse  whenever  our  action  is  not  done  in  accordance 
with  duty,  and  do  not  doubt  that  we  can  act  otherwise  in  the 
future.  It  is  true  that  Malel tranche  admits  the  freedom  of  the 
will ;  but,  in  so  doing,  he  obeys  his  theological  prejudices  rather 
than  the  logic  of  his  system. 

Let  us  now  pass  to  Hume's  theory  of  causation,  which  is  not, 
like  Malehranche's,  an  object  of  interest  to  the  antiquarian  alone, 
but  is  still  vivid  among  us;  and,  despite  its  shortcomings,  does 
not  seem  as  yet  doomed  to  a  speedy  disappearance. 

1 1  nine's  analysis  of  the  idea  of  causation  is  often  honored  as 
his    greatesl    contribution    to    philosophy.     And    it    cannot    be 


71 

denied  that  it  is  a  superb  piece  of  work,  that  it  evinces  a  remark- 
able power  of  analysis  in  its  author.  If  we  grant  the  original 
assumptions  from  which  Hume  starts,  we  are  irresistibly  led, 
step  by  step,  to  his  final  conclusion.  But,  similar  to  an  archi- 
tect who  would  build  a  stately  edifice  upon  a  slender  foundation, 
Hume  has  failed  to  probe,  in  a  sufficient  degree,  the  ground  upon 
which  he  has  been  at  work,  so  that  his  elaborately  constructed 
mansion,  in  spite  of  the  studied  arrangement  of  its  parts,  affords 
no  safe  lodging  to  the  traveler,  who  feels  compelled  to  shun  it 
as  by  a  natural  instinct. 

The  fundamental  principle  given  by  Hume  at  the  outset,  and 
which  he  keeps  constantly  in  mind,  is  that  all  our  ideas  are 
derived  from  impressions.46 

He  accordingly  asks  what  impression  produces  the  idea  of 
causation.  It  cannot  be  a  quality  of  the  object,  "  since,  which- 
ever of  these  qualities  I  pitch  on,  I  find  some  object  that  is  not 
possessed  of  it,  and  yet  falls  under  the  denomination  of  cause 
and  effect."47  It  must  therefore  be  a  relation  among  objects;48 
and  Hume  is  led  to  examine  the  different  kinds  of  relation  from 
which  the  idea  of  causation  may  arise.  He  at  first  discovers 
contiguity  and  succession.49  He  does  not,  however,  attach  much 
importance  to  this  discovery;  and,  after  a  weak  attempt  to 
establish  its  truth  by  reasoning,  he  tells  us  that,  if  his  argument 
appears  satisfactory,  it  is  well ;  if  not,  we  are  begged  to  suppose 
it  such.50 

He  soon  discovers,  however,  a  necessary  connection  as  the 

essential  element  of  causation;  but  he  does  not  at  first  find  any 

light  as  to  the  real  nature  of  this  connection,  and  resolves  "  to 

beat  the  neighboring  fields,  without  any  certain  view  or  design, 

with  the  hope  that  his  good  fortune  will  at  last  guide  him  to 

what  he  searches  for."51 

<6  Hume,  Treatise  on  Human  Nature.  Selby-Bigge's  ed.,  p.  4. 

"Ibid.,  p.  75. 

48  Ibid.,  p.   75. 

"Ibid.,  pp.  7.V-7G. 

"Ibid.,  p.  70. 

51  Ibid.,  p.  7S. 


72 

An  examination  of  the  proposition  that  "Whatever  has  a  be- 
ginning lias  also  a  cause  of  existence"  convinces  him  that  it 
expresses  a  principle  neither  intuitively  nor  demonstrably  cer- 
tain, ami  he  triumphantly  refutes  it  by  the  following  argu- 
ment : 

"  As  all  distinct  ideas  are  separable  from  each  other,  and  as 
the  ideas  of  cause  and  effect  arc  evidently  distinct,  it  will  be  easy 
for  us  to  conceive  any  object  to  be  non-existent  this  moment. 
and  existent  the  next,  without  conjoining  to  it  the  distinct  idea 
of  cause  or  productive  principle.  The  separation,  therefore,  of 
the  idea  of  cause  from  that  of  a  beginning  of  existence,  is  plainly 
possible  for  the  imagination;  and  consequently  the  actual  sepa- 
ration of  these  objects  is  so  far  possible,  that  it  implies  no  con- 
tradiction nor  absurdity."52 

The  conclusion  is  that  our  belief  in  the  necessity  of  a  cause 
must  be  derived  from  experience,  and  Hume  proceeds  to  examine 
the  particular  note  of  our  experience  to  which  the  idea  of  causa- 
tion may  be  due.  When  he  least  expected  it,  he  discovers  a 
new  relation  in  which  he  eagerly  hails  the  long-sough t-f or 
answer,  and  we  are  told  that  the  necessary  connection  between 
cause  and  effect  is  their  constant  conjunction/'3  At  once,  some 
interesting  conclusions  are  drawn,  viz.,  that  we  have  no  right 
to  apply  causation  to  future  experience,  inasmuch  as  we  can 
conceive  a  change  in  the  course  of  nature,  and  therefore  that 
change  is  possible;  also,  that  causal  necessity  is  something  that 
exists  in  the  mind,  not  in  objects.64 

Hume  does  not,  however,  deny  a  power  in  the  cause,  nor  a 
real  production  : 

'■  We  may  remark,"  says  he,  "not  only  that  two  objects  are 
connected  by  the  relation  of  cause  and  effect  when  the  one  pro- 
ducee  a  motion  or  any  action  in  the  other,  but  also  when  it  has 
a  power  of  producing  it"/'5 

■  Ibid.,  pp.  70-80. 

'  Ibid.,  p.  87. 

M  Ibid.,  p.   L65. 

'■  Ibid.,  p.  12. 


73 

and  further : 

"  It  will  always  be  impossible  to  decide  with  certainty  whether 
they  (the  impressions)  arise  immediately  from  the  object,  or 
are  produced  by  the  creative  power  of  the  mind,50  or  are  derived 
from  the  author  of  our  being."57 

Some  incidental  outbursts  of  honesty  even  reveal  him  as 
identifying  the  causal  action  with  real  production: 

"  Should  any  one  pretend  to  define  a  cause  by  saying  it  is 
something  productive  of  another,  it  is  evident  he  would  say 
nothing.  For  what  does  he  mean  by  production  ?  Can  he  give 
any  definition  of  it,  that  will  not  be  the  same  with  that  of 
causation?  If  he  can,  I  desire  it  may  be  produced.  If  he 
cannot ;  he  here  runs  in  a  circle,  and  gives  a  synonymous  term 
instead  of  a  definition.'"58 

Such  passages  as  this  might  tempt  us  to  go  and  shake  hands 
with  Hume  at  once,  in  the  belief  that  we  have  at  least  come  to 
an  agreement.  It  would  not  be  prudent,  however,  to  act  too 
hastily.  In  a  subsequent  chapter,  the  supposed  power  and 
efficacy  of  causes  is  examined  at  great  length.  Hume's  original 
assumption  that  all  ideas  are  copies  of  previous  impressions, 
there  convinces  him  that  "  we  have  no  idea  of  power  or 
efficacy  "  ;59  that,  when  we  use  those  words,  we  have  really  no 
distinct  meaning;60  finally,  that  the  power  which  unites  causes 
and  effects  resides  in  our  mind.61 

In  his  reduction  of  the  causal  action  to  a  constant  con- 
junction, Hume  was — if  we  believe  him — actuated  by  a  most 
laudable  purpose.  He  intended  to  rid  philosophy  of  those 
mysterious  entities,  of  those  occult  powers,  which  had  so  long 
crawled  in  the  study  of  the  learned,  and  had  not  yet  been  fully 
dispelled  by  the  enlightenment  of  the  new  century. 

M  We  remember  that  wo  have  no  mind. 

"Ibid.,  p.  84. 

"Ibid.,  p.  77. 

"Ibid.,  pp.  160-101. 

"Ibid.,  p.  162. 

•'  Ibid.,  p.   106. 


74 

Unfortunately,  it  often  happens  that  a  mystery  is  replaced 
by  another  mystery  greater  than  the  first;  that  a  most  unreason- 
able demand  on  our  power  of  faith  is  made  by  the  very  men  who 
are  sometimes  so  difficult  to  satisfy  in  matter  of  proof.  This  is 
exactly  the  case  with  David  Hume.  Motions  and  changes  were 
satisfactorily  accounted  for  in  the  old  causal  theory,  and  become 
a  perfect  mystery  in  his.  Let  us  suppose  that  the  event  A  has 
been  followed  by  the  event  B.  As,  according  to  Hume's  assump- 
tion, the  two  events  A  and  B  may  be  conceived  as  unconnected, 
we  may  neglect  the  element  A,  and  reduce  the  series,  A,  B,  to 
the  series  not-B,  B.  If  we  maintain  the  necessity  of  an  efficient 
principle,  we  will  explain  the  production  of  B  by  the  action  of 
A;  which,  as  Aristotle  would  say,  contains  B  potentially.  If  we 
deny  efficient  action,  we  must  maintain  either  that  B  comes  from 
nothing,  or  that  it  comes  from  not-B.  But,  as,  on  the  one  hand, 
from  nothing  nothing  can  come;  and  as,  on  the  other  hand, 
not-B  simply  denotes  beings  in  which  B  does  not  enter  as  an 
element,  no  shadow  of  reason  is  given  for  the  production  of  B, 
and  we  find  ourselves  face  to  face  with  a  reality  incomparably 
more  mysterious  than  the  causal  principle  which  had  been  dis- 
carded for  its  mysterious  character. 

Passing  to  a  closer  examination  of  Hume's  theory,  we  will  at 
once  remark  that  his  first  principle:  "  all  ideas  are  derived  from 
impressions,"  not  only  is  not  self-evident,  but  is  absolutely 
erroneous.  It  is  true  that  all  knowledge  begins  with  sense- 
experience;  but  it  does  not  follow  that  all  ideas  are  copies  of 
sense-impressions.  If  such  were  the  case,  we  would  never  be 
able  to  step  beyond  the  data  of  the  senses;  we  would  be  incapable 
of  forming  universal  concepts;  even  memories  of  past  impres- 
sions would  become  inexplicable,  and  we  could  not  attribute  any 
reality  but  to  the  present  instant.  Our  mental  faculties  are 
originally  aroused  into  exercise  by  the  data  of  the  senses;  but 
they  possess  an  activity  of  their  own  which  enables  them  to 
connect  what  sense-experience  presents  as  unconnected;  to  reason 
about  given  data;  to  reach  conclusions  about  nature  which  are 


75 

implied  in  the  natural  facts,  but  are  not  directly  given,  and 
must  be  drawn  by  the  active  power  of  our  mind. 

Hume  repeatedly  maintains  that  the  idea  of  cause  implies  a 
necessary  connection.62 

Now,  constant  conjunction  is  unable  to  give  us  the  idea  of 
necessity.  For,  what  does  constant  conjunction  mean?  Simply 
that  in  all  singular  past  instances  we  observed,  two  events  hap- 
pened to  be  connected.  Each  instance  was  a  contingent  fact 
independent  of  all  others.  As  we  cannot  step  be}'ond  the  data 
furnished  by  sense-perception,  we  cannot  reach  any  law  of  con- 
nection between  the  individual  cases,  which  remain  essentially 
singular  and  unconnected;  so  that  their  multitude,  however 
great  it  may  be,  is  unable  to  alter  their  contingent  character. 
Hume,  it  is  true,  grasped  this  consequence,  and  tried  to  explain 
our  idea  of  the  necessary  character  of  the  cause,  not  from  an 
accumulation  of  individual  cases,  but  from  a  natural  propensity 
of  our  mind  to  pass  from  the  idea  of  one  object  to  the  idea  of 
another.63  It  would  be  interesting  to  know  whether  this  pro- 
pensity of  the  mind  is  derived  from  sense-impressions  or  not. 
If  it  is.  we  hardly  sec  how  it  can  assume  a  character  of  necessity. 
It  cannot  certainly  get  it  from  the  sense-impressions  themselves, 
because  each  impression  is  a  contingent  fact  unconnected  with 
the  rest.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  this  propensity  is  not  derived 
from  sense-impressions ;  if  it  is  a  natural  and  innate  disposition, 
we  have  an  idea  not  derived  from  impressions,  and  Hume's 
fundamental  principle  falls  to  the  ground. 

Moreover,  the  resolution  of  cause  into  constant  conjunction 
presents  the  capital  blemish  of  disregarding,  in  the  conception 
of  cause,  the  causal  element  itself.  Hume  closely  resembles  a 
theatrical  manager  who  would  give  the  play  of  Hamlet  without 
the  Prince  of  Denmark. 

Constant  conjunction  and  efficiency  arc  by  no  means  identical 
concepts.     Constant  conjunction  means  that  an  event  invariably 

"Ibid.,  pp.  77,  78,  etc. 
"Ibid.,  p.  92. 


76 

comes  after;  efficiency  means  thai  the  second  event  not  only 
comes  after,  bul  is  due  to  the  first.  There  may  be  efficiency 
without  constant  conjunction,  and  constant  conjunction  without 
efficiency. 

Constant  conjunction  between  two  events  may  take  place 
without  any  action  of  the  one  upon  the  other  when  both  events 
are  due  to  a  single  cause.  In  nature,  night  is  invariably  fol- 
lowed by  day;  but  is  not.  on  that  account,  regarded  as  its  cause. 
Their  constant  conjunction  is  due  to  the  fact  that  both  night 
and  day  are  produced  by  the  successive  positions  of  the  sun. 

In  a  mathematical  scries,  such  as: 

(/  x  x)n  =  I  -f  nx  +  4a;2  +  Bx*  +  . . ., 

a  definite  term,  nx,  is  invariably  followed  by  another  definite 
term,  Ax2.  Their  constant  conjunction  is  due  to  the  nature  of 
the  expression  (I-{-x)n,  and  by  no  means  to  anything  like 
efficient  action. 

Efficiency,  on  the  other  hand,  may  appear  without  constant 
conjunction.  It  is  true  that  it  cannot  thus  appear  in  the  realm 
of  the  necessary.  Objects  of  nature  are  determined  by  their 
own  potentialities  to  some  definite  effects;  and,  whenever  they 
are  placed  in  suitable  conditions,  the  reaction  which  occurs  gives 
rise  to  these  effects.  The  like  does  not  hold  with  regard  to  free 
agents.  Human  beings  are  persuaded  of  their  own  efficient 
action  in  singular  instances,  even  when  similar  cases  have  never 
taken  place  in  the  past  and  are  not  likely  to  take  place  in  the 
future.  Only  once  did  Lincoln  sign  the  Emancipation 
Proclamation.  Nobody  doubts  the  efficiency  of  his  will  in  this 
momentous  crisis  of  our  history,  although  a  similar  conjuncture 
had  never  occurred  before  and  will  never  occur  again.  Lincoln 
might  then  have  acted  otherwise;  and,  should  our  country  be 
placed  in  identical  circumstances  once  more,  we  clearly  conceive 
that  our  president  might  take  a  different  course  of  action.  We 
would  thus  have  identical  antecedents,  and  different  results,  and 
would  not  hesitate,  however,  to  attribute  the  result  in  both  cases, 
to  the  ellieii'ut  action  of  the  head  of  the  nation. 


77 

In  physical  nature  itself,  we  often  attribute  efficient  action 
to  objects  which  have  not  been  invariably  conjoined.  In  all  our 
past  experience,  we  may  have  observed  that  quinine  is  an  ex- 
cellent remedy  for  fever.  The  ninety-nine  patients  to  whom  we 
administered  it  were  in  different  circumstances  with  regard  to 
age,  physical  constitution  and  general  health;  but  all  presented 
the  identical  character  of  being  affected  with  fever;  and  all,  on 
taking  quinine,  were  suddenly  relieved.  We  thus  feel  no  doubt 
as  to  the  efficient  action  of  quinine,  and  a  new  patient  having 
got  the  same  disease,  we  have  recourse  to  our  nostrum  again. 
Unfortunately,  as  soon  as  the  sick  man  has  swallowed  our 
favorite  remedy,  he  feels  worse  and  dies.  The  result  is  un- 
expected. It  is  contrary  to  the  previous  course  of  things. 
There  is  certainly  no  constant  conjunction.  Still,  we  cannot 
help  attributing  to  quinine  the  deplorable  event.  We  feel  sure 
that  quinine  has  killed  our  sick  man. 

Efficiency  and  constant  conjunction  go  together  in  the  phys- 
ical world  when  one  single  agent  is  at  work.  But  when  several 
causes  are  acting  in  different  directions,  they  may  incidentally 
meet,  and,  by  their  conjunction,  give  rise  to  an  unexpected 
result,  which  presents  no  necessary  connection  with  any  of  the 
particular  causes,  and  is  simply  attributed  to  chance,  although 
the  causes  at  work  have  been  efficient  factors.  This  is  exactly 
what  happens  in  the  case  of  our  sick  man.  A  chemist  could 
tell  us  beforehand  the  result  of  his  experiments,  because  he  has 
to  do  with  materials  directly  acting  upon  one  another,  and 
whose  action  is  not  thwarted  by  appreciable  contrary  forces. 
But  the  chemical  products  used  by  the  physician  do  not  neces- 
sarily act  in  accordance  with  his  expectation  because  the  inner 
nature  of  the  patient  reacts  and  often  produces  effects  which 
had  not  been  anticipated.  Had  [lume  been  interested  in  medi- 
cine, he  might  have  felt  some  suspicion  as  to  the  value  of  his 
identification  of  efficiency  with  constanl  conjunction. 

What  he  has  missed  is  the  reaction  itself  which  takes  place  as 
soon  as  the  two  agents  are  brought  together.     Be  has  Been  the 


78 

antecedent  conditions,  the  subsequent  result  :  he  lias  overlooked 
the  very  instant  in  which  the  causal  action  occurs. 

The  philosophy  of  invariable  sequence  thus  falls  heavily  to  the 
ground  under  the  weight  of  its  unfounded  assumptions  and 
absurd  consequences,  without  any  hope  of  ever  being  able  to  rise 
again.  The  efficient  action  of  Aristotle  and  the  schoolmen, 
proud  of  its  decisive  victory,  appears  on  the  field  anew  as  the 
only  theory  capable  of  giving  a  satisfactory  account  of  experi- 
ence. It  shows  us  that  in  all  cases  in  which  a  reaction  takes 
place,  a  result  not  only  follows  some  definite  antecedents,  but 
is  due  to  their  natural  potentialities:  that  the  quenching  of  fire 
follows  the  application  of  water  precisely  because  water  is 
endowed  with  a  capacity  for  quenching  fire;  a  capacity  which 
other  agents,  such  as  cotton,  do  not  possess,  inasmuch  as  these 
agents,  being  placed  in  similar  conditions,  similar  results  do 
not  follow. 

The  much  ridiculed  answer  that  opium  causes  sleep  because 
it  possesses  a  dormitive  virtue,  is  not  only  the  expression  of 
common  sense,  but  a  highly  philosophic  truth.  It  is  the  best, 
nay  the  only  answer  that  could  possibly  be  given.  Since 
Moliere  WTote  his  play,  and  the  Parisian  theatre-goers  stupidly 
laughed  at  what  the  talent  of  the  poet  was  able  to  present  in  so 
comical  a  light,  the  burst  of  laughter  has  spread  all  over  the 
world.  Everybody  has  jeered  at  the  foolish  reply:  but,  for 
powerful  reasons,  no  one  has  ever  been  able  to  correct  it. 

The  problem  of  final  causes  has  been  sometimes  formulated 
in  the  following  picturesque  form :  The  bird  has  wings,  and  it 
flies.     Does  it  fly  because  it  has  wings,  or  has  it  wings  to  fly  ? 

As  Mgr.  Mercier  remarks,04  this  formulation  of  the  problem 
is  unfortunate.  It  seems  to  imply  that  the  efficient  and  the 
final  causes  exclude  each  other;  a  principle  which  all  advocates 
of  finality  would  undoubtedly  reject. 

The  final  cause  may  be  defined  as  the  good  for  the  sake  of 

M  Mercier,  Metaphysique  genfrale  ou  Ontologie,  p.  481. 


79 

which  the  efficient  cause  acts,  "  hoc  dicimvs  esse  finem  in  quod 
tendit  impetus  agentis."™ 

The  final  cause  may  be  considered  in  rational  and  irrational 
beings.  In  rational  beings,  it  is  a  known  and  accepted  end 
which  determines  their  present  acts.  In  irrational  beings,  it  is 
a  controlling  factor,  a  natural  end  to  which  they  irresistibly 
tend. 

All  beings  act  for  an  end,  and  it  is  this  end  that  determines 
their  activity.  If  an  agent  were  not  tending  to  a  definite  end, 
it  would  be  indifferent  towards  acting  in  this  or  that  way,  and 
consequently  would  never  begin  to  act. 

The  existence  of  final  causes,  thus  demonstrable  a  priori,  may 
equally  be  proved  from  experience.  There  is  little  doubt  that 
conscious  beings  act  with  an  end  in  view.  The  young  man  who 
wants  to  become  a  skilful  physician  begins  by  studying  chem- 
istry and  anatomy;  afterwards  submits  to  a  long  and  perhaps 
wearisome  course  in  a  medical  school;  voluntarily  abstains  from 
numberless  enjoyments  towards  which  he  feels  naturally  in- 
clined, but  which  would  divert  his  attention  from  the  goal  he 
wants  to  reach;  spends  his  days  and  a  good  part  of  his  nights 
perusing  bulky  volumes  which,  in  other  circumstances,  he  would 
regard  as  sovereignly  tedious.  Why  does  this  young  man  submit 
to  such  an  irksome  task?  What  enables  him  to  throw  off  his 
natural  indolence  ?  Simply  the  end  he  has  in  view,  the  good  he 
purposes  to  obtain.  This  good  which,  by  its  attraction,  exercises 
such  a  powerful  influence  upon  the  activity  of  the  student,  is 
evidently  a  cause. 

In  unconscious  beings,  there  exists  a  similar  determining 
principle.  The  acorn  buried  in  the  ground  tends  to  a  definite 
end.  If  placed  in  a  favorable  environment,  it  will  not  act  at 
random,  but  will  insensibly  approach  the  goal  it  has  been  as- 
signed by  nature.  Every  succeeding  day  will  witness  a  more 
complete  actualization  of  the  oak,  which  at  fust  existed  only  in 
a   potential   form.     Only   when    this   end   is   reached   shall    the 

"Thomas  Aquinas,  Contra  Gentiles,  Lib.  3,  cap.  2. 


80 

tendency  of  the  acorn  cease;  only  then  shall  its  final  purpose 
be  realized. 

These  considerations  forcibly  impose  the  final  cause  upon 
the  attention  of  the  philosopher.  Even  among  defenders  of 
modern  thought,  the  old  Scholastic  problem  of  finality  reap- 
pears. In  a  remarkable  essay  published  in  the  Hibbert  Journal. 
Mr.  George  Henslow  quite  recently  developed  a  theory  at  bottom 
identical  with  the  teaching  of  the  schoolmen.  He  gave  to  the 
old  causa  finalis  the  name  of  "directivity": 

"  Suppose  a  kitten  and  a  young  hawk  are  brought  up  on  pre- 
cisely the  same  animal  food,  both  being  carnivorous,  one  de- 
velops into  a  cat,  with  fur,  having  bones  and  muscles,  etc.,  of 
totally  different  character  from  those  of  the  adult  hawk,  with 
feathers,  etc.  The  same  molecules  of  food  supplied  the  ma- 
terials for  the  building  up  of  their  bodies :  why  are  the  results 
so  totally  different  ?  So,  too,  in  all  animals  and  vegetables :  why 
should  certain  substances  be  guided  to  certain  places — salts  of 
lime  to  bones,  silica  to  teeth  and  claws,  phosphate  to  brain,  etc. 
The  molecules  are  first  driven  about  mechanically  in  the  blood 
by  certain  forces ;  various  chemical  combinations  are  made  under 
the  action  of  other  forces ;  but  what  directs  all  the  forces  which 
finally  impel  the  new-made  molecules  to  take  up  certain  posi- 
tions and  no  others  in  the  building  up  of  a  body?  Directivity 
is  a  useful  word  to  express  the  fact.  It  commits  one  to  nothing 
as  to  its  source;  but  it  at  least  supplies  a  term  to  express  the 
analogy  between  the  chemist's  mind  and  Nature's — what?'"00 

Scientists,  it  may  be  observed,  leave  final  causes  entirely  out 
of  account,  and  feel  little  more  sympathy  for  efficient  causes. 
Tt  is  the  scientific  development  of  modern  times  that  has  con- 
tribnted  more  than  anything  else  to  the  apparent  discredit  of  the 
causal  theory.  It  might  oven  be  added  that  the  wilful  neglect 
of  causal  action  lias  been  a  most  efficienl  Eactor  in  the  develop- 
ment of  science.  Why.  then,  should  the  metaphysician  cling  to 
a  theory  whose  downfall  has  been  such  a  blessing  to  mankind? 

"Henslow,    Directivity;    Hibberi    Journal,    Vol.    G    (October.    1907), 

pp.   L50   I-".  I. 


81 

Would  it  not  be  bettor  to  discard  efficiency  and  finality  from  the 
field  of  philosophy  as  well  as  from  the  field  of  science? 

No  doubt  this  is  a  real  difficulty.  It  is  the  point  which 
empiricists  and  positivists  love  to  emphasize,  and  it  gives  them 
so  strong  a  foothold  that,  despite  the  ungrounded  assumptions 
and  irrational  consequences  of  their  system,  they  bravely  hold 
their  own.  It  must  be  remarked,  however,  that  the  scientist 
and  the  metaphysician  have  very  different  problems  to  face. 
Science  is  concerned  merely  with  facts  and  results.  The 
chemist  has  simply  to  establish  the  fact  that,  if  two  grams  of 
hydrogen  and  sixteen  grams  of  oxygen  are  brought  together  and 
submitted  to  the  action  of  the  electric  spark,  water  will  in- 
variably follow.  The  biologist  needs  not  go  beyond  the  actual 
conditions  necessary  to  the  duplication  and  development  of  the 
cell.  For  him,  a  monster  is  no  less  natural  than  a  normal 
organism.  Science,  as  Pasteur  clearly  pointed  out,  is  essentially 
positivistic. 

But,  does  the  scientific  position  solve  the  enigma  of  the  world  ? 
Does  it  satisfy  our  thirst  for  knowledge?  Are  there  not  many 
genuine  problems  which  science  does  not  approach  ?  Why  is  the 
proportion  2  to  16  necessary  for  the  production  of  water?  'Why 
do  organisms  usually  reach  a  normal  development,  and  are 
monsters  so  rare?  These  are  questions  which  the  metaphysician 
alone  is  able  to  answer.  He  alone  is  concerned  with  the  ulti- 
mate nature  of  reality.  He  alone  professes  to  make  a  thinking 
study  of  things.  The  scientist  formulates  the  law  that  an 
embryo  placed  in  such  and  such  circumstances  will  develop  into 
such  an  organism.  The  metaphysician  takes  up  these  scientific 
facts,  studies  their  mutual  connections  and  implications,  and  is 
led  by  the  facts  themselves  to  the  conclusion  that  the  embryo 
does  not  develop  at  random,  but  is  constantly  controlled  and 
tends  to  a  definite  result. 


CHAPTER    IV 
SCHOLASTIC    COSMOLOGY 

Section  1. — Chief  Hypotheses  as  to  the  Constitution  of 

Matter 

The  question  of  the  constitution  of  matter  is  one  of  those 
fundamental  problems  which,  in  the  course  of  human  investiga- 
tion, have  been  most  widely  discussed,  and  of  which  an  adequate 
solution  will  perhaps  never  be  attained.  It  is  one  of  those  ques- 
tions before  which,  according  to  Herbert  Spencer,  human  reason 
must  humbly  confess  its  powerlessness ;  a  question  which  seems 
to  prove  a  mystery  for  the  human  mind  and  to  point  to  the 
existence  of  the  unknowable  in  nature. 

All  attempts  at  a  solution  of  this  great  problem  may  be  classi- 
fied under  two  heads:  they  are  all,  in  some  way,  connected  with 
the  two  theories  of  Atomism  and  Dynamism. 

The  atomistic  theory  sprung  originally  from  ancient  Greece. 
According  to  Aristotle  and  Theophrastus,  it  is  to  Leucippus  that 
we  must  attribute  the  honor  of  its  discovery.  But,  as  we  know 
so  little  of  Leucippus,  and  as  his  very  existence  has  even  been 
called  into  doubt,1  we  generally  consider  Democritus,  his  illus- 
trious disciple,  as  the  founder  of  the  system. 

The  loss  of  all  the  writings  of  Democritus  is  indeed  one  of 
the  most  deplorable  facts  in  the  history  of  human  investigation. 
With  what  burning  interest  would  we  not  follow  the  efforts  of 
his  genius  to  get  rid  of  the  untenable  hypotheses  of  his  contem- 
poraries and  to  reach  a  satisfactory  exposition  of  the  intrinsic 
nature  of  things!  And  still,  deplorable  though  it  be.  such  a 
loss  is  unhappily  a  fact;  and  our  only  substitute. for  a  study  of 
the  philosophy  of  Democritus  is  to  turn  t<>  its  poetical  oxposi- 

1  cf.  John   Burnet,   Early  Creek   Philosophy,  p.  360. 

82 


83 

tion,  as  given  by  Lucretius  in  his  justly  admired  poem  De 
Eerum  Natura. 

The  atomistic  theory  has  undergone,  in  the  course  of  time, 
many  profound  modifications.  Hard  atoms  and  absolute  void 
were  the  only  elements  which  Democritus  supposed  to  exist  in 
nature.  In  recent  times,  there  has  arisen  the  idea  of  a  univer- 
sal medium,  of  a  fluid  everywhere  present,  penetrating  all  bodies, 
and  serving  as  a  connecting-link  between  the  atoms. 

The  existence  of  the  ether  is  indeed  only  a  hypothesis,  but  it 
is  a  hypothesis  that  has  been  rendered  very  probable  by  scientific 
discoveries;  and  now,  it  may  almost  be  considered  as  an  estab- 
lished fact.  At  present  we  will  not  discuss  the  probabilities  in 
favor  of  each  of  the  particular  ether  theories  that  have  been 
brought  forward.  This  theme  will  be  fully  treated  in  one  of 
the  ensuing  sections  of  this  chapter.  Suffice  it  to  say  that, 
although  all  physicists  do  not  agree  as  to  the  inherent  constitu- 
tion of  ether,  they  all  unanimously  affirm  its  existence. 

Atomism  admits  only  matter  and  passive  emotion  in  nature. 
Still,  a  majority  of  thinkers  did  not  deem  these  two  elements 
sufficient  to  account  for  the  activity  which  our  everyday  experi- 
ence shows  us  to  exist  in  the  universe,  and  therefore  they  thought 
it  indispensable  to  introduce  into  nature  the  element  of  force. 
And  thus  the  theory  of  Dynamism  originated. 

We  shall  refrain  from  presenting  the  various  theories  held  by 
the  ancient  Greeks,  which  might  be  termed  dynamic.  We  shall 
not  even  touch  upon  Leibniz's  famous  doctrine  of  monads,  but 
we  shall  consider  as  the  true  representative  of  Dynamism  the 
Jesuit  Boscovich.  Instead  of  the  hypothesis  of  hard  atoms. 
Boscovich  proposed  to  consider  nature  as  formed  of  unextended 
points,  of  indivisible  centers  of  force,  which  mutually  attract  and 
repel  each  other,  are  therefore  capable  of  furnishing  a  satisfac- 
tory explanation  of  the  activity  manifested  in  nature,  and  give 
us  the  illusion  of  continuous  extension,  in  the  same  way  as 
points  placed  very  near  each  other  might  lead  us  to  believe  in 
their  forming  continuous  letters. 


84 

Scholastic  cosmology  might  be  described  as  an  intermediate 
position  between  the  two  systems  just  outlined.  Its  defenders 
pi  proach  atomists  for  denying  activity  to  nature,  and  contend 
that  an  explanation  of  all  the  phenomena  of  the  world  by  mere 
matter  and  passive  motion  is  forever  doomed  to  remain  a  fruit- 
less attempt.  On  the  other  hand,  they  consider  the  dynamic 
view  to  be  similarly  inadequate.  They  assert  that,  although 
passivity  cannot  be  the  only  element  in  nature,  its  very  existence 
must  not  be  denied,  and  they  put  forward  the  theory  of  Matter 
and  Form  as  the  only  possible  explanation  of  the  universe. 

I  must  here  confess  that  I  have  never  felt  for  the  theory  of 
Matter  and  Form  that  unreserved  sympathetic  feeling  where- 
with I  have  subscribed  to  so  many  Scholastic  doctrines.  I  can- 
not help  regarding  the  Thomistic  cosmology  as  arbitrary,  assail- 
able in  many  points,  inconsistent  with  our  advanced  scientific 
discoveries.  The  fact  that  physics  and  chemistry  unanimously 
adhere  to  some  form  of  atomism  is  of  great  significance.  Scho- 
lastics are  perfectly  justified  in  insisting  on  the  shortcomings 
of  Atomism  and  Dynamism.  They  are  right  when  they  assert 
that  activity,  as  well  as  passivity,  must  be  admitted  in  the  com- 
position of  our  world.  Unhappily,  the  theory  they  propose  does 
not  rest  upon  cogent  reasons,  and  therefore  it  should  be  frankly 
rejected,  or  made  to  undergo  important  modifications. 

The  most  cursory  observation,  Scholastics  would  say,  suffices 
to  show  in  all  matter  the  element  of  quantity.  A  solid  may 
become  a  liquid  and  a  liquid  a  gas.  A  body  may  be  made  to 
assume  an  infinite  number  of  forms:  its  volume  may  be  in- 
creased or  decreased;  it  may,  by  chemical  combination,  acquire 
a  nature  utterly  dill'erent  from  the  one  it  formerly  possessed; 
but  in  all  these  transformations,  in  all  these  fundamental 
changes,  there  remains  the  element  of  quantity,  unchanged  and 
unchangeable,  always  identical  with  itself,  mid  which  thus  seems 
to  he  ;i  common  element   in  all  material  things. 

On  the  other  hand,  we  cannot  help  observing  the  greatest 
diversity  in  nature.      We  find   in  every  object  an   immense  mini- 


85 

ber  of  peculiar,  specific  properties.  We  have  before  our  eyes 
the  great  division  of  bodies  into  inorganic  and  organic.  In  the 
inorganic  realm,  we  have  solids,  liquids  and  gases,  metalloids 
and  metals,  the  simple  elements  which  chemistry  has  found  to 
exist,  and  whose  number  is  daily  increased  by  scientific  research. 
We  have  the  innumerable  combinations  of  those  elements,  and 
the  appearance  in  compound  bodies  of  properties  essentially  dif- 
ferent from  those  of  their  simple  constituents. 

And  if  we  turn  our  eyes  to  the  sphere  of  life,  if  we  consider 
the  infinite  chain  of  living  beings,  from  the  amoeba  swimming 
in  our  blood  to  the  more  highly-developed  body  of  man — sub- 
jects of  inexhaustible  research  to  the  scientific  mind — are  we 
not  struck  with  wonder  and  amazement? 

When  we  consider  with  a  philosophic  mind  these  properties 
of  matter,  we  see  that  its  qualitative  variety  and  its  quantitative 
identity  are  diametrically  opposite.  It  is  this  opposition  that 
led  the  Scholastics  to  affirm  that  such  properties  must  be  the 
result  of  different  principles. 

Another  argument  in  favor  of  the  existence  of  Matter  and 
Form,  at  least  as  strongly  insisted  upon  as  the  one  we  have  just 
explained,  is  derived  from  the  supposed  essential  transforma- 
tions that  take  place  in  chemical  combinations:  "Dans  ce  fait 
bien  compris  et  sagement  interprets,  says  Mr.  Nys,  est  contenue 
comme  en  germe  toute  la  theorie  de  l'Ecole  sur  la  nature  dcs 
corps."2 

In  a  chemical  combination,  Scholastics  are  prone  to  say,  some- 
thing remains  and  something  is  changed.  That  something  is 
changed — or,  in  other  words,  thai  a  new  substance  is  produced — 
is  proved  beyond  any  doubt  by  the  fact  that  the  physical  proper- 
ties of  the  compound  differ  essentially  from  those  of  their  con- 
stituent elements.  It  is  no  less  true  that  something  remains, 
for  otherwise  we  would  QOl  have  a  change,  hut  a  real  creation. 
The  new  element  is  a  substantial  pari  of  tin1  compound,  because 
it  distinguishes  it  from  its  simple  constituents.     The  stable  ele- 

-  Xys,  ( losmologie,  p.  170. 


86 

menl  ia  also  a  substantia]  pari  of  the  compound.  It  is  the 
determinable  principle  which,  actuated  by  the  new  element,  has 
given  rise  to  a  new  substance.  The  new  element  is  the  sub- 
stantial form;  the  stable  element,  primordial  matter. 

Francisco  Ginebra,  following  Thomas  Aquinas,  gives  of  Mat- 
ter and  Form  the  following  definitions: 

"Form  is  the  incomplete  substance  which  determines  matter 
and  constitutes  it  in  a  determinate  species.  Matter  is  the  in- 
complete material  substance  which,  actuated  by  the  substantial 
form,  produces  a  complete  corporeal  substance."3 

Matter  is  then,  in  the  Scholastic  system,  the  passive  element 
of  objects.  It  is  the  same  in  all  material  things,  which  acquire 
their  diversity  by  means  of  the  substantial  form.  But  primord- 
ial matter  cannot  exist  in  a  state  of  isolation ;  it  is  necessarily 
united  to  the  substantial  form,  and  the  infinite  variety  of  these 
forms  is  the  cause  of  all  the  diversity  we  behold  in  nature. 

Section  2. — Natuee  and  Properties  of  Primordial  Matter 

To  have  a  fair  ide<i  of  what  Primordial  Matter  is — or,  to 
speak  more  definitely,  of  what  is  meant  by  that  term — is  indeed 
a  most  arduous  task,  one  whose  difficulty  is  enhanced  still  fur- 
ther by  the  unsubstantial  and  indefinite  character  of  the  concep- 
tion itself. 

This  difficulty  is  recognized  by  all  Scholastic  philosophers  and 
frankly  admitted  by  one  of  the  most  ardent  sympathizers  of 
peripatetic  philosophy,  Barthelemy  Saint-IIilairc: 

"  As  to  these  abstractions/5  says  he  in  the  Preface  to  his  Phys- 
ics, "the  most  difficult  point  is  to  understand  them;  but,  once 
understood,  they  appear  neither  false  nor  useless.  Therefore, 
instead  of  rejecting  this  formula,  one  must  endeavor  to  know 
what  it  signifies."' 

Albert   Farges,   in   his   most   valuable    work    on    the   subject, 

Ginebra,   ElementoB  de  Filosofia,  Vol.  1,  p.  200. 
*  Saint-Hilaire,  Physique,  Preface,  p.  38. 


87 

deems  it  helpful  to  give  us  at  first  a  negative  definition:  "To 
say  what  Primordial  Matter  is  not,  says  he,  is  a  very  easy 
thing."5  He  then  proceeds  to  show  that  it  is  neither  a  sub- 
stance nor  an  accident ;  and  that,  for  this  reason,  it  cannot  fall 
within  the  group  of  Aristotle's  categories: 

"Can  primordial  matter  be  classed  as  one  of  the  categories? 
It  is  clear  that  it  cannot ;  as  it  is  neither  an  attribute  nor  a 
complete  substance,  and  categories  do  not  comprise  but  these 
two  sorts  of  realities."6 

This  passage  is  of  the  utmost  importance,  for  Aristotle  him- 
self understood  by  categories  the  supreme  genera  to  which  the 
ideas  of  all  things  could  be  reduced,  and  the  same  view  is  still 
held  by  Scholastic  philosophers.  We  are  thus  led  to  the  view 
that  primordial  matter  is  not  a  reality. 

The  doubtful  character  of  the  existence  of  primordial  matter 
was  felt  even  in  the  Middle  Ages.  From  the  very  works  of  the 
founders  of  Scholastic  philosophy,  many  extracts  might  be 
adduced,  to  show  how  slender  was  the  foundation  whereon  Scho- 
lastic cosmology  was  reared.  St.  Thomas  Aquinas,  in  his  opus- 
cule entitled  De  prlncipiis  naturce,  makes  the  following  signifi- 
cant assertion : 

"  Materia  dicitur  quod  habet  esse  ex  co  quod  sibi  advenit,  quia 
de  se  esse  incompletum,  immo  nullum  esse  habet."7 

It  is  here  clearly  stated  that  primordial  matter  not  only  has 
an  incomplete  being,  but  has  no  being  at  all. 

In  the  Sum  ma  contra  Gentile*,  the  Angelic  Doctor  speaks 
again  in  almost  the  same  way : 

"  Ipsum  esse,"  says  he,  "  non  est  proprius  actus  materia1,  sed 
substantia?  totius;  ejus  enim  actus  est  esse,  de  quo  possumus 
dicere  quod  sit.  Esse  autem  non  dicitur  de  materia  Bed  de 
toto."8 

*  Fargee,  Nfatiere  et  Forme,  |>.  138. 

"Ibid.,  j).   139. 

'Thomas  Aquinas,  De  principiia  Datura,   \\\i.   in  init. 

"Thomas  Aquinas,  Summa  contra  GentileB,  lib.  2,  <M]>.  .*>}. 


88 

Other  similar  statements  are  quoted  and  discussed  by  Duns 
Scotus.  In  bis  treatise  De  Berum  Principio  (Qusestio  VII),  he 
warns  as  against  the  teaching  of  a  few  authors  who  Beem  to 
regard  primordial  matter  as  a  mere  potentiality  without  an 
actual  existence.  Among  the  philosophers  he  thus  mentions, 
we  find  the  names  of  Plato,  Aristotle,  and  St.  Augustine.  But 
these  writers  do  not,  according  to  Scotus,  really  teach  that 
primordial  matter  does  not  exist.  They  simply  have  in  mind 
the  fact  that,  of  all  existing  things,  it  has  the  smallest  degree 
of  actuality. 

Scotus  then  passes  to  a  direct  proof  of  the  existence  of  pri- 
mordial matter,  and  brings  two  classes  of  arguments:  the  first 
from  authority,  the  second  from  the  light  of  reason. 

The  proofs  taken  by  him  from  reason  are  four  in  number  and 
read  thus: 

1.  "  Si  materia  non  esset  aliqua  res  actu,  ejus  entitas  non 
distingueretur  ah  entitate  et  actualitate  formae,  et  sic  nullam 
realem  compositionem  faceret  cum  ea." 

2.  "  Inter  ens  actu  et  nihil,  non  est  medium ;  ergo  si  materia 
pra?ter  formam  non  habet  aliquem  actum  essendi,  erit  nihil; 
ergo  agens  creatum  ageret  de  nihilo,  cum  agat  de  materia." 

3.  "Secundum  Philosophos,  materia  est  in  potentia  ad  alia; 
sed  secundum  eos,  nihil  ad  nihil  est  in  potentia :  ergo  materia, 
ut  materia,  non  est  nihil;  ergo  habet  aliquem  actum  de  se,  et  si 
non  subsistentias,  tamen  existent ia." 

4.  "Item,  posse  pati  ad  materiam  reducitur,  sicut  agere  ad 
formam;  sed  quod  non  esl  aliquid  actu,  non  est  principium 
patiendi,  nee  fundamentum ;  ergo  necessario  materia  habet 
actualitatem  aliam  ah  actualitate  fornuv,  in  qua  actualitate 
forma1  fhindantur,  et  stabiliuntur."8 

These  lour  proofs  are  simply  intended  to  demonstrate  that,  if 
we  admit  the  theory  of  matter  and  form,  we  must  regard  pri- 
mordial matter  as  something  actual.  There  is,  however,  another 
alternative:  the  rejection  of  the  theory  of  matter  and  form. 
This  alternative,  unhappily,  Huns  Scotus  docs  not  consider. 

'Dun-  Scotus,   !),•   K. iiim    Principio.  ().   7,  art.    1. 


89 

At  the  risk  of  intruding  too  much  upon  the  patience  of  our 
readers,  we  will  reproduce  the  words  of  a  devoted  seeker  after 
truth,  of  a  man  who  strove  during  his  whole  life  to  reach  a 
satisfactory  knowledge  of  nature,  to  understand  in  a  clear  and 
definite  way  what,  in  the  thought  of  his  time,  was  still  obscure 
and  indefinite.  St.  Augustine,  in  that  sublime  work  which  is 
not  only  a  humble  confession  of  his  life  and  a  profound  study 
of  the  human  heart,  but  likewise  a  treatise  in  which  the  philoso- 
phy of  his  time  is  exposed  and  skillfully  analyzed,  considers 
thus  the  question  of  matter  and  form : 

"  But  I,  Lord,  if  I  would,  by  my  tongue  and  my  pen,  confess 
unto  thee  the  whole,  whatever  Thyself  hath  taught  me  of  that 
matter — the  name  whereof  hearing  before,  and  not  understand- 
ing, when  they  who  understood  it  not,  told  me  of  it,  so  I  con- 
ceived of  it  as  having  innumerable  forms  and  diverse,  and  there- 
fore did  not  conceive  it  at  all,  my  mind  tossed  up  and  down  foul 
and  horrible  '  forms '  out  of  all  order,  but  yet  '  forms ' ;  and  I 
called  it  without  form,  not  that  it  wanted  all  form,  but  because 
it  had  such  as  my  mind  would,  if  presented  to  it,  turn  from,  as 
unwonted  and  jarring,  and  human  frailness  would  be  troubled  at. 
And  still  that  which  I  conceived  was  without  form,  not  as  being 
deprived  of  all  form,  but  in  comparison  of  more  beautiful 
forms;  and  true  reason  did  persuade  me,  that  I  must  utterly 
uncase  it  of  all  remnants  of  form  whatsoever,  if  I  would  con- 
ceive matter  absolutely  without  form ;  and  I  could  not ;  for 
sooner  could  I  imagine  that  not  to  be  at  all,  which  should 
be  deprived  of  all  form,  than  conceive  a  thing  betwixt  form 
and  nothing,  neither  formed,  nor  nothing,  a  formless  almost 
nothing."10 

We  conjecture  that  the  state  of  mind  which  St.  Augustine 
here  describes  as  having  been  his  own  has  also  been  experienced 
by  many  a  student  who  has  tried  to  represent  to  himself  clearly 
ami  distinctly  what  primordial  matter  is.  It  appeal's,  in  one 
form  or  other,  in  the  writings  of  all  the  masters  of  Scholasti- 
cism, who.  although  they  unanimously  maintain  thai  primordial 

'"St.  Augustine,  Confessions,  Bk.  XI  I.  art.  6;  Pussy's  ed.,  p.  261. 


90 

matter  actually  exists,  cannot  fail  to  recognize  that  its  actuality 
is  indeed  very  weak,  and  even  to  drop  here  and  there  a  word 
tending  to  show  thai  it  has  really  no  actuality  at  all. 

Lei  us  now  pass  to  a  positive  exposition  of  the  nature  and 
properties  of  primordial  matter. 

In  the  foregoing  section  of  this  chapter  we  have  given  the 
following  definition,  which  would  he  accepted  by  all  Scholastics : 
Matter  is  the  incomplete  material  substance  which,  actuated  by 
the  substantial  form,  produces  a  complete  corporeal  substance. 

All  substances,  according  to  this  view,  are  composed  of  two 
real,  distinct,  unisolable  principles:  matter  and  form.  Matter 
is  the  same  in  all  bodies,  and  it  is  form,  and  form  alone,  that 
is  the  cause  of  the  infinite  variety  of  material  things:  "  Omnium 
generabilium  et  corruptibilium  est  eadem  materia."11  Matter 
and  form,  on  account  of  their  unisolable  character,  are  incom- 
plete substances,  and  it  is  from  their  mutual  union  that  com- 
plete corporeal  substances  arise. 

Changes  in  things  are  classified  as  accidental  or  essential.  In 
accidental  changes,  such  as  occur  in  physical  processes,  the  form 
remains  identical  with  itself.  But  in  essential  changes,  such 
as  chemical  combinations,  matter  alone  remains.  The  substan- 
tial form  which  existed  before  the  combination  ceases  to  exist, 
and  there  arises  a  new  form  as  the  cause  of  the  new  substance 
of  which  experience  evidences  the  appearance. 

The  fact  of  chemical  combination  plays  an  important  part  in 
Scholastic  cosmology;  and,  although  a  few  Mediaeval  philoso- 
phers such  as  Albert  the  Great,  taught  that  the  elements  re- 
mained  in  the  compound,  and  one  of  the  greatest  among  the 
aeo-Scholastics,  Liberatore,  holds  that  the  theory  of  essential 
changes  in  chemical  processes  is  not  necessarily  connected  with 
the  Scholastic  system,  it  i-  nevertheless  incontrovertible  that  the 
great  majority  of  Scholastics  admit  in  chemical  combinations  an 
essential  transformation,  and  we  have  seen  how  Mr.  Nys  bases 

Thomas  Aquinas,  Bumma  Theol.,  I'.  1.  Q.  .">('». 


91 

<in  this  very  transformation  his  strongest  argument  for  the 
existence  of  matter  and  form. 

According  to  this  view,  oxygen  and  hydrogen  do  not  really 
exist  in  water,  as  there  takes  place,  in  the  act  of  combination,  a 
real  change  of  nature.  The  only  means  of  knowing  the  truth 
in  this  matter  is  experience;  hut  the  most  powerful  microscopes 
show  us,  in  the  particles  of  a  compound,  the  most  perfect  homo- 
geneity, and  the  dissolvents  of  its  simple  elements  have  upon  it 
no  effect  whatsoever.  The  atomistic  view  that  an  atom  of  water 
is  a  mere  juxtaposition  of  two  atoms  of  hydrogen  and  one  of 
oxygen  is  consequently  pronounced  to  be  arbitrary  and  unscien- 
tific, and  unable  to  account  for  the  essential  difference  which 
exists  between  a  simple  mixture  and  a  combination. 

And  here  Farges  brings  forth  the  example  of  gunpowder,  in 
which  the  three  elements  of  saltpeter,  sulphur  and  carbon  are 
so  intimately  intermingled  that  no  microscope  enables  us  to  dis- 
cern their  presence.  Still,  the  heterogeneity  of  the  compound 
and  its  character  of  mixture  can  be  shown  by  means  of  dissol- 
vents. Water  dissolves  saltpeter  and  has  no  effect  whatever 
upon  sulphur  and  carbon;  then  another  chemical  product  may 
eliminate  sulphur,  leaving  carbon  in  a  state  of  isolation. 

On  the  other  hand,  no  dissolvent  of  the  elements  of  a  chemical 
combination  has  any  effect  upon  the  compound.  Its  homogene- 
ous character  remains  unaltered,  and  the  only  means  of  sepa- 
rating its  elements  is  another  chemical  operation. 

Mr.  Farges  endows  primordial  matter  with  the  following 
properties:  indestructibility,  simplicity  of  essence,  identity  in 
all  material  substances,  passivity,  quantitativeness,  impenetra- 
bility, need  of  a  substantial  form.'-' 

Primordial  matter  is  indestructible,  ami  canno-1  cease  to  exist 
unless  it  be  annihilated  by  an  act  of  Divine  Omnipotence. 

It  is  simple  as  regards  it:-  essence,  hut  essentially  multiple  in 
it-  parts.  It  is  the  cause  of  the  extension  and  divisibility  of 
bodies;  it  is  the  principle  of  quantity. 

12  Cf.  Farges,  Matiere  et  Forme,  J.  Parti.'.  p.  1  mi'. 


92 

It  is  Identical  in  all  material  substances,  which,  as  we  have 
Been,  are  distinguished  from  one  another  by  means  of  the  sub- 
stantial form.  Primordial  matter  is  therefore  the  principle  of 
all  that  which  is  common  to  all  material  substances,  namely 
extension,  divisibility,  impenetrability,  quantity,  etc. 

In  all  objects,  it  constitutes  the  passive  principle,  the  prin- 
ciple of  inertia,  whereas  the  substantial  form  is  the  principle 
of  activity. 

Finally,  primordial  matter,  not  being  able  to  exist  in  a  state 
of  isolation,  stands,  by  the  same  fact,  in  need  of  a  substantial 
form.  Still,  matter  does  not  join  itself  indistinctly  to  any  kind 
of  form,  but  has  a  special  aptitude  to  choose  the  form  which 
suits  it  best.  And  we  are  thus  led  to  the  theory  of  the  hierarchy 
of  forms,  corresponding  to  the  various  degrees  of  perfection  and 
development  in  primordial  matter. 

"  The  more  elevated  in  the  hierarchy  of  beings  the  form  is," 
says  Farges,  "the  more  must  matter  be  prepared  by  a  series  of 
intermediate  forms,  which  gradually  dispose  and  elevate  it. 
And  this  is  true  in  the  order  of  physico-chemical  phenomena  as 
well  as  in  the  biological  order.  And  in  no  case  could  dispro- 
portionate elements  be  united,  as,  for  example,  a  human  soul 
with  the  organism  of  an  ape.*'13 

Thus  far  we  have  spoken  of  primordial  matter  in  a  general 
way,  without  taking  into  account  the  various  divisions  given  by 
Scholastic  philosophers,  both  in  the  Middle  Ages  and  in  our  own 
day.  We  do  not  think  these  divisions  indispensable  to  a  thor- 
ough compivheiisiuii  ill'  the  theory,  and  neo-Scholastics  are 
unanimous  in  considering  many  of  them  as  useless  subtleties. 
We  cannot,  however,  abstain  from  enumerating  the  most  impor- 
tant among  them,  and  we  feel  confident  that  such  an  enumera- 
tion will  give  a  more  comprehensive  view  of  Scholastic  thought, 
and  easily   make  us  understand   the  drift   of  that   teaching. 

The  lirst  division  which  sue.Lr<'Ms  itself  is  that  of  primordial 
and  secondary  matter. 

Fa  rg<  -.   Mai  ie t    Forme,  p.   147. 


93 

Secondary  matter  is  the  complete  material  substance  modifi- 
able by  accidents,  as,  for  example,  any  chemical  substance. 
Primordial  matter  is  the  incomplete  material  substance  which, 
actuated  by  the  substantial  form,  produces  a  complete  corporeal 
substance.14 

We  can  easily  see  by  these  definitions  that  primordial  matter 
alone  is  matter  strictly  speaking.  The  so-called  secondary  mat- 
ter is  any  material  object  as  it  exists  in  nature,  after  having 
been  actuated  by  the  substantial  form:  it  is  matter  as  under- 
stood by  the  plain  man,  but  it  must  be  carefully  distinguished 
from  the  materia  prima  of  the  schoolmen. 

Another  well-known  division  of  matter  is  the  out  of  which, 
the  in  which,  and  the  about  which. 

Primordial  matter  is  out  of  which  relatively  to  the  complete 
substance,  or  to  the  substantial  form  which  is  educed  from  it. 
The  body  of  a  brute,  for  example,  is  the  matter  out  of  which  its 
soul  is  evolved. 

Primordial  matter  is  in  which  with  regard  to  the  substantial 
form  considered  as  united  with  it,  and  forming  with  it  a  com- 
plete substance.  In  this  sense,  the  body  of  a  brute  is  the  matter 
in  which  its  soul  exists  in  a  state  of  indissoluble  union. 

Finally,  primordial  matter  is  about  which  with  regard  to  the 
efficient  cause  by  whose  action  it  is  produced.  The  body  of  a 
brute  is  thus  the  matter  about  which  generation  is  concerned. 

Matter  out  of  which  has  also  been  subdivided  into  passing 
and  persistent  matter.  Thus,  the  matter  of  the  wood  submitted 
to  the  action  of  the  fire  is  passing;  while  the  matter  of  the  wood 
used  by  the  carpenter  to  manufacture  a  piece  of  furniture  is 
persistent.15  Not  only  is  this  subdivision  of  little  account,  hut 
it  seems  to  be  based  upon  a  wrong  interpretation  of  the  terms, 
inasmuch  as  primordial  matter  is  persistent  ill  both  cases,  and 
that  which  is  really  passing  is  the  substantial  form. 

14  C'f.  Ginebra,  Elementoe  de  Filosofla,  Vol.  1.  ]>.  200, 

16  Cf.  Harper,  op.  cit..  Vol.  2,  ]>.   188. 


94 

But  the  divisions  of  matter  which  show  Mediaeval  subtlety  at 
its  l"-i  are  to  be  found  in  Duns  Scotus. 

A  singular  view  on  this  subject  had  already  appeared  in  the 
eleventh  century.  The  celebrated  Jewish  philosopher,  11m 
Gabirol,  had  advanced  in  his  principal  work,  Fons  Vitm,  a  start- 
ling theory  of  universal  matter,  according  to  which  all  sub- 
stances, spiritual  as  well  as  material,  were  to  be  regarded  as 
composed  of  matter  and  form.10  This  strange  doctrine  was 
later  on  adopted  by  some  Christian  writers  and  became  one  of 
the  leading  characteristics  of  the  Franciscan  school. 

Almost  two  centuries  after  the  death  of  Ibn  Gabirol,  the  first 
Franciscan  teacher  of  theology  in  the  University  of  Paris, 
Alexander  of  Hales,  expressedly  taught  in  his  Summa  Theologies 
that  spiritual  substances  are  composed  of  matter  "  qua?  nee  est 
subjecta  motui  nee  contrarietati."17  The  same  view  was  main- 
tained by  St.  Bonaventure,18  and  also  by  Duns  Scotus: 

"Ego  autem  ad  positionem  Avicembroni  redeo;  et  primam 
partem,  scilicet  quod  in  omnibus  creatis  per  se  subsistentibus 
tarn  corporalibus  quam  spiritualibus  sit  una  materia,  teneo,  sicut 
ostensi  in  praecedenti  qua?stione."19 

With  that  distinguishing  subtlety  which  forms  the  essential 
characteristic  of  his  philosophy,  Duns  Scotus  introduces  a  new 
division  of  the  materia  prima.  He  divides  it  into  materia 
pri in')- prima,  materia  secundo-prima,  and  materia,  tertio-prima. 

The  materia  prvmo-prima.j  or  materia  metaphysica,  seems  to 
be  identical  with  the  universal  matter  of  Ibn  Gabirol  and  of  the 
Franciscan  teachers.  It  is  absolutely  indeterminate  and  exists 
in  all  beings,  incorporeal  as  well  as  corporeal. 

The  materia  secundo-prvma,  <>r  materia  mathematica}  is  de- 
fined as  the  subject  of  generation  and  corruption: 

"Fons  Vite,  V,  21. 

"Cf.  Turner.  History  <>f  Philosophy,  i>.  .'527. 
1  In  2.  Bent.,   Di-.  .'!.   I'.    1.  art.   1. 
"  Dun-.  Scotus,  |)c  Kiniiu  Principio,  Q.  s.  art.  4;  Opera,  Vol.  4.  p.  378. 


95 

"  Est  subjectum  generationis  ct  corruptionis,  quam  mutant 
agentia  creata,  seu  Angeli  seu  agentia  corruptibilia."20 

The  materia  tertio-prima  is  defined  as  the  matter  of  any  par- 
ticular natural  agent: 

"  Dicitur  autem  materia,  tertio-prima  materia  cujuscumqne 
artis,  et  materia  cujuslibet  agentis  naturalis  particularis,  quia 
omne  tale  agit  veluti  de  aliquo  semine,  quod  quamvis  materia 
prima  sit  respectu  omnium,  qua?  per  artem  producuntur,  sup- 
ponit  tamen  materiam,  quae  est  subjectum  generationis,  et  ulte- 
rius  aliquam  formam  per  naturam  productam,  aliter  nulla  ars 
quidquam  operatur."21 

To  sum  up  in  a  few  words: 

The  materia  prim  o- prim  a,  or  metaphysical  matter,  constitutes 
the  passive  principle  of  all  finite  beings,  spiritual  as  well  as 
material. 

The  materia  secundo- prima  is  the  passive  principle  of  cor- 
poreal substances  only,  and  is  called  mathematical  because  it 
is  the  base  of  extension  and  quantity. 

The  materia  tertio-prima  is  the  matter  of  the  plain  man,  and 
does  not  differ  from  what  we  have  elsewhere  termed  secondary 
matter. 

Section  3. — Nature  axd  Properties  of  the  Substantial 

Form 

Contrasted  with  primordial  matter,  or  the  passive  principle 
of  all  things,  there  is  in  them  all  an  active  principle  called  sub- 
stantial form.  It  is  the  form  that  causes  all  beings  to  be  what 
they  are,  that  ranges  them  in  determinate  species.  Unlike  mat- 
ter, it  is  not  the  same  everywhere,  bu1  is  found  with  a  greater 
or  less  degree  of  perfection  according  to  the  excellence  of  the 
being  it  constitutes.  There  is  therefore  a  countless  multitude 
of  substantial  forms  correlative  to  the  multiplicity  of  things. 

"Duns  ScottiSj  De  Rerum  Principio,  cv>.  B,  art.  -'5. 

-•  Ibid.,  ilinl.  x 


96 

[norganic  bodies  possess  forms  of  the  lowest  order,  and  we 
reach  more  perfed  forms  as  we  ascend  in  the  scale  of  being?. 
In  the  vegetable  kingdom,  the  form  is  the  vegetative  soul,  also 
called  the  principle  of  life:  in  animals,  it  is  the  sensitive  soul, 
far  more  perfect,  material  however  and  doomed  to  perish  with 
the  animal  frame  to  which  it  is  joined.  Tn  man,  the  substantial 
form  is  the  spiritual  soul,  which  is,  by  its  nature,  intrinsically 
independent  of  matter,  and  cannot  be  affected  by  the  death  of 
the  body.  iUthough  changeable  in  its  operations  and  capable 
of  development,  it  is,  as  to  its  essence,  absolutely  immutable  and. 
by  consequence,  destined  to  continue  in  existence  throughout  all 
eternity. 

Besides  the  substantial  form,  Scholastics  admit  accidental 
forms  which,  like  color,  figure,  etc.,  are  accidents  which  modify 
the  complete  substance. 

In  the  foregoing  section,  we  have  already  hinted  at  some  of 
the  properties  of  the  substantial  form.  We  have  spoken  of  the 
hierarchy  of  forms,  corresponding  to  the  various  degrees  of  per- 
fection in  primordial  matter.  We  have  also  seen  that,  whereas 
matter  is  in  all  things  the  passive  principle,  the  substantial 
form  is  the  principle  of  activity: 

"  The  first  essential  attribute  of  the  form  is  to  be  the  princi- 
ple and  the  source  of  the  activity  or  energy  which  we  find  in 
corporeal  substances,  now  in  potency,  now  in  actual  operation."22 

Of  the  remaining  properties  of  the  substantial  form,  the  most 
important  arc  the  following  two:  its  simplicity,  and  its  need 
of  primordial  matter. 

The  latter  may  have  been  easily  inferred  from  the  exposition 
given  in  the  preceding  section.  Like  primordial  matter,  the 
substantia]  form  does  not  and  cannot  exist  by  itself  in  nature: 

"The  material  form  has  an  innate  Deed,  and.  if  such  a  figure 
lie  allowed,  a   natural   desire,  f  appetitus   naturalis '  for  matter, 

because,  according  to  the  will  of  the  Creator,  it  cannot  exist 
"Fargea,  Matiere  el   Forme,  p.  L26. 


97 

without  that  natural  complement  which  gives  it  a  body,  a  defi- 
nite place  and  a  sensible  expression."23 

About  this  unisolable  character  of  the  substantial  form  per- 
fect unanimity  does  not,  however,  exist  among  the  schoolmen. 
All  Scholastics  are  unanimous  in  maintaining  that  the  form  is 
essentially  joined  to  the  matter  in  all  corporeal  things;  but 
whether  the  same  holds  true  of  spiritual  beings  is  a  very  contro- 
verted question.  We  have  seen  how  Duns  Scotus,  following  Ibn 
Gabirol  and  the  Franciscan  school,  attributes  matter  to  all 
beings,  and  terms  materia  primo-prima  what  might  be  described 
as  immaterial  matter. 

The  great  majority  of  Scholastic  philosophers  reject  Duns 
Scotus's  theory  on  this  point,  and  affirm  with  St.  Thomas  that, 
in  spiritual  beings,  form  exists  without  matter.  But  as,  accord- 
ing to  St.  Thomas,  matter,  and  not  form,  is  the  principle  of 
individuation,  it  follows  that  there  cannot  exist  two  angels 
of  the  same  species.  St.  Thomas  unequivocally  admits  the 
inference : 

"  Si  ergo  angeli  non  sunt  compositi  ex  materia,  et  forma,  ut 
dictum  est  supra,  sequitur  quod  impossible  sit,  esse  duos  angelos 
unius  speciei:  sicut  etiam  impossibile  esset  dicere,  quod  essent 
plures  albedines  separata?,  aut  plures  humanitatcs,  cum  albe- 
dines  non  sint  plures,  nisi  secundum  quod  sunt  in  pluribus 
substantiis."24 

This  deduction  might  lead  us  to  conclude  that,  at  the  death 
of  the  body,  human  souls  will  be  deprived  of  the  principle  that 
made  them  separate  individuals  and  will  be  one  and  the  same. 
Such  a  conclusion  would  either  overthrow  St.  Thomas's  theo- 
logical view  of  eternal  life,  or  be  a  rcductio  ad  dbsurdum  of  his 
theory  of  form.  But  he  meets  the  objection  with  a  most  re- 
markable subtlety  by  saying  that  the  souls  of  men  will  ever 
remain  distinct,  because,  although  they  will  be  separated  from 
their  material  frames,  they  will  still  retain  a  certain  habitudo 

"Ibid.,  p.  134. 

M  Thoma8  Aquinas,  Sumnia  Theologiea,  Pars  1,  Q.  f>0,  art.  4,  c. 

8 


98 

ad  corpus  which  will  be  sufficient  to  distinguish  them  from  other 
souls. 

The  remaining  property  of  the  substantial  form  is  its  sim- 
plicity. It  has  been  remarked  that  primordial  matter,  although 
it  is  the  principle  of  quantity  and  divisibility,  possesses  a  certain 
simplicity.  It  is  simple  in  its  essence  and  essentially  multiple 
in  its  parts.  The  substantial  form  is  likewise  simple  in  its 
essence,  but,  unlike  primordial  matter,  it  is  endowed  with  sim- 
plicity as  regards  its  parts. 

On  this  point  an  explanation  seems,  however,  indispensable. 
All  material  beings  fall  under  two  great  classes:  they  are  either 
organic  or  inorganic.  An  organic  being  is  admitted  by  all  Scho- 
lastics to  be  really  one;  hence  it  possesses  but  one  form;  but 
inorganic  beings  are  not  endowed  with  the  same  character  of 
unity.  They  are  merely  aggregates  of  simple  parts,  called  mole- 
cules or  atoms,  each  of  which  has  its  own  individual  existence. 
It  is  therefore  to  the  molecule  or  to  the  atom  that  the  simplicity 
of  form  belongs. 

Simplicity  of  form  understood  in  this  manner  has  been  unani- 
mously accepted  in  the  school;  but  a  certain  number  of  philoso- 
phers have  thought  it  necessary  to  admit  in  organic  beings  some 
subordinate  forms  destined,  not  to  destroy  the  simplicity  which 
the  substantial  form  possesses,  but  to  give  more  consistency  to 
6ome  points  which,  in  the  ordinary  Scholastic  doctrine,  seemed 
to  be  inconsistent. 

The  doctrine  of  the  plurality  of  forms  was  maintained  by 
Henry  of  Ghent.  He  admitted  in  man,  besides  the  rational 
soul,  a  subordinate  form,  which  he  named  forma  corporeitatis 
or  mixtionis,  and  to  which  he  attributed  the  function  of  causing 
the  great  variety  of  our  organs  and  the  substantial  organization 
of  matter.     He  proved  its  existence  by  the  following  argument : 

"Alitor  enim  nihil  homo  in  generatione  hominis  generaret 
substantial*'.  Bed  tantummodo  corrumperet."'8 

"Quodlibet,   111,   1G.     Of.  Turner,  History  of  Philosophy,  p.  385. 


99 

This  forma  corporeitatis  was  said  to  exist  in  the  embryo  be- 
fore the  appearance  of  the  spiritual  soul,  and  to  continue  to 
exist  in  the  body  after  death,  until  decomposition  takes  place. 

Xot  long  afterwards  the  same  doctrine  was  rendered  famous 
by  Duns  Scotus.  This  subtle  thinker  maintained  that  the  sub- 
stantial form  determines  matter  to  a  mode  of  being,  but  does 
not  determine  it  perfectly,  and  leaves  in  it  a  certain  potentiality, 
or  aptitude  for  a  higher  form.  And  when  matter  arrives  at  the 
possession  of  this  higher  form,  the  inferior  form  continues  to 
be  present;  so  that,  the  more  perfect  the  matter  is,  the  greater 
the  plurality  of  forms  with  which  it  is  endowed.26 

The  same  view  appeared,  in  a  more  or  less  modified  form,  in 
later  Scholastic  thought.  Lessius,  Conninck,  Mayr  and  others 
admitted  in  animals  a  certain  number  of  partial  forms,  which 
they  called  forms  of  the  bones,  of  the  flesh,  of  the  eyes,  etc. 
They  similarly  spoke  of  the  forms  of  leaves  and  roots  in  plants. 
However,  the  great  majority  of  Scholastics,  following  St. 
Thomas,  teach  that  living  organisms  cannot  possess  more  than 
one  substantial  form.  They  assert  that  the  forma  corporeitatis 
is  impossible  and  unnecessary. 

It  is  impossible  because  if  it  were  a  substantial  form  animat- 
ing the  body  before  the  appearance  of  the  spiritual  soul,  as  its 
supporters  maintain,  the  spiritual  soul,  inasmuch  as  it  would 
thus  be  united  to  a  substance  already  complete,  could  not  be  a 
substantial,  but  only  an  accidental  form. 

It  is  unnecessary,  because,  according  to  Scholastic  philosophy, 
a  form  of  a  higher  order  gives  to  the  matter  to  which  it  is  joined 
not  only  the  characteristic  properties  it  possesses  by  its  nature, 
but  also  all  properties  belonging  to  the  forms  of  a  lower  order. 
Our  spiritual  soul,  for  instance,  gives  us  not  only  spiritual  facul- 
ties, but  also  the  sensitive  faculties  of  the  brute  and  the  vegeta- 
tive life  of  the  plant.27 

This  exposition  of  the  theory  of  the  substantial  form  demands 

n  Cf.  Duns  Scotus,  De  Rcrum  principio,  Q.  8,  art.  4. 

27  Gf.  Urraburu,  Compendium  Philosophic  Scholastica>,  Vol.  4,  pp.  2!)  ft". 


100 

as  a  complement  a  few  words  about  a  formula  often  met  with 
in  Scholastic  treatises:  Forma  educitur  e  potentia  materia. 

Willi  the  exception  of  the  human  soul,  all  substantial  forms 
are  intrinsically  dependent  on  matter,  and,  for  this  reason,  are 
called  material.  Still,  they  do  not  exist  in  matter  actually,  but 
potentially;  for  otherwise  changes  would  be  only  accidental,  not 
substantial.  These  forms  are  not  created,  inasmuch  as  creation 
is  the  production  of  a  being  from  nothing,  and  substantial  forms 
are  produced  out  of  preexisting  matter.  Now,  observing  what 
occurs  in  substantial  changes,  we  see  that,  in  order  that  the 
change  may  take  place,  it  must  be  accompanied  by  some  deter- 
minate conditions.  On  the  appearance  of  these  conditions  a 
new  substance  is  produced.  This  mode  of  production  is  what 
Scholastics  call  eduction  out  of  the  potency  of  matter.28  The 
spiritual  soul  alone  is  not  educed  in  this  manner.  Being  by  its 
nature  spiritual,  it  is  intrinsically  independent  of  the  body  and 
is  created  immediately  by  God. 

Section  4. — Modern  Science  and  the  Constitution  of 

Matter 

It  is  only  with  the  greatest  reserve  that  one  can  enter  on  dis- 
cussing the  constitution  of  matter.  So  many  brilliant  minds 
have  grappled  with  this  stupendous  problem,  only  to  give  up  its 
solution  in  despair,  that  many  think  it  a  mere  waste  of  time  to 
try  to  drag  Nature's  secret  from  her  pent-up  bosom. 

Such  a  proceeding,  however,  is  but  the  position  of  despair 
and  can  hardly  be  justified. 

Any  existing  thing  can  be  understood,  because  to  understand 
( hit  us  legere)  is  to  know  a  thing  as  it  is,  to  read  its  most  inti- 
mate nature.  It  is  not  meant  by  this  assertion  that,  in  our 
actual  condition,  we  can  be  omniscient.  Things  which  do  not 
fall  within  the  sphere  of  our  experience  will  forever  remain 
unknown  to  us;  but,  in  the  constitution  of  this  material  world, 

88  Cf.  Thomas  Aquinas,  De  Potentia,  Q.  3,  art.  8. 


101 

there  is  apparently  nothing  lying  beyond  the  grasp  of  our  intel- 
lectual powers.  An  adequate  explanation  of  the  constitution  of 
matter  does  not  therefore  seem  an  impossibility,  although  we 
frankly  admit  that  it  has  not  been  yet  reached,  and  we  doubt 
whether  our  triumph  on  this  point  will  ever  be  complete. 

It  has  always  seemed  to  us  that  Dynamism  is  somewhat  fanci- 
ful, and  the  relatively  small  number  of  followers  it  has  gained 
among  men  of  science  cannot  but  confirm  us  in  the  same  view. 

According  to  P.  G.  Tait,29  the  most  fatal  objection  to  which 
it  is  exposed  is  that  it  is  incapable  of  explaining  inertia,  a  dis- 
tinctive^— perhaps  the  most  distinctive — property  of  matter. 
This  remark  is  not  absolutely  devoid  of  value,  as  the  manner  in 
which  Dynamism  accounts  for  inertia  seems  rather  arbitrary. 
Still,  we  do  not  think  that  Tait  does  full  justice  to  his  oppo- 
nents' view,  nor  can  it  be  maintained  that  the  dynamic  explana- 
tion of  inertia  is  altogether  valueless. 

According  to  Dynamism,  nothing  exists  in  nature  but  centers 
of  force,  whose  essence  is  to  act.  The  action  of  one  of  these 
centers  will  be  prevented  from  producing  its  natural  effect  if  it 
is  counteracted  by  the  resistance  of  another  force  of  equal  and 
opposite  value.  And  thus  the  state  of  equilibrium  will  arise 
and  will  be  a  mode  of  tension.  Inertia  is  thus  explained  in  this 
system  not  by  the  absence,  but  by  the  equilibrium  of  forces. 

A  greater  deficiency  of  Dynamism  is  perhaps  its  incapability 
of  explaining  extension.  The  centers  of  force  it  admits  in 
nature  are  unextended.  By  being  conglomerated  in  countless 
numbers,  they  give  rise  to  an  apparent,  illusory  extension,  in  the 
same  way  as  points,  placed  side  by  side,  may  lead  us  to  believe 
in  their  forming  continuous  letters. 

The  comparison  just  given,  first  proposed  by  Boscovich  him- 
self, simply  ignores  the  difficulty.  Points  placed  side  by  side 
may  lead  us  to  believe  in  their  forming  continuous  letters,  pro- 
vided each  of  them  possesses  a  certain  extension.  If  the  points 
are  altogether  unextended;  if,  as  regards  extension,  each  one  is 

»Cf.  Tait,  Properties  of  Matter,  p.  20. 


102 

nothing,  their  sum  will  also  be  nothing,  and  no  illusion  of  con- 
tinuous letters  will  be  possible.  This  is  precisely  what  takes 
place  in  Boscovich's  system.  His  centers  of  force  either  are  in 
contact  with  one  another  or  they  are  not.  If  they  are,  they 
co-penetrate  one  another,  and  there  is  no  extension.  If  they 
are  not — besides  the  fact  that  the  so-called  heresy  of  distance 
action  is  then  involved — we  have  a  series  of  points,  none  of 
which  has  extension;  and  as  each  one,  in  so  far  as  extension  is 
concerned,  is  thus  nothing;  as  between  them  there  is  only  void 
space,  which  is  equally  nothing,  we  cannot  conceive  how  from 
the  union  of  those  countless  nothings  a  something — even  as  an 
illusion — can  arise. 

The  atomistic  theory  presents  likewise  a  large  number  of  dif- 
ficulties that  baffle  our  powers  of  observation  and  reasoning  and 
leave  us  face  to  face  with  the  dreadful  sight  of  our  utter  insig- 
nificance. Mere  atoms  in  the  universe  of  matter,  we  took  pride 
in  our  intellectual  omnipotence.  We  looked  on  the  towns  we 
had  built,  the  rivers  we  had  spanned,  the  oceans  we  had  crossed. 
We  saw  wTith  delight  thunder  and  lightning  yield  to  our  caprice. 
We  then  called  ourselves  the  kings  and  lords  of  Nature.  Un- 
deceive thyself,  0  man !  thy  body  is  but  an  atom  and  thy  mind 
is  powerless.  The  lowliest  fact  of  nature  is  for  thee  a  mystery. 
and  the  more  thou  shalt  study,  the  more  clearly  shalt  thou  see 
that  ignorance  is  thy  destined  lot. 

Ancient  Atomism  admitted  nothing  but  atoms  and  void  space. 
In  order  to  avoid  the  assumption  of  distance  action,  the  hypo- 
thesis of  a  fluid  called  ether  was  subsequently  introduced.  A 
mere  hypothesis  at  first,  when  invoked  to  explain  only  the  phe- 
nomena of  light,  the  theory  of  ether  was  strengthened  almost 
indefinitely  when  Clerk  Maxwell  showed  that  the  phenomena  of 
the  electromagnetic  field  can  be  explained  by  an  ether  identical 
in  nature  with  the  luininiferous  medium. 

The  greal  discovery  of  the  English  scientist  was  still  further 
confirmed  by  the  experiments  of  Hertz,  who  detected  the  exist- 
ence and  measured  the  speed  of  the  electro-magnetic  waves,  thus 


103 

laying  the  foundation  upon  which  the  edifice  of  wireless  teleg- 
raphy has  recently  been  erected.30 

There  seems  thus  not  to  he  the  slightest  doubt  as  to  the  exist- 
ence of  ether.  But,  if  we  advance  one  step  further  and  try  to 
investigate  its  inherent  constitution,  we  will  find  ourselves  in- 
volved in  darkness  and  condemned  to  nescience. 

Some  physicists  have  regarded  ether  as  composed  of  minute 
particles,  of  a  sort  of  atoms,  infinitesimal  in  comparison  with 
those  of  ordinary  matter,  but  still  atoms.  This  view  was  held 
by  Lord  Kelvin,  by  Whetham,31  and  taken  as  the  current  ether 
theory  by  Herbert  Spencer,  who  gave  it  as  a  proof  of  the  un- 
knowable character  of  the  reality  which  surrounds  us  in  nature.32 
The  same  view  has  been  defended  in  February,  1907,  by  Mr. 
Yeronnet,  in  the  Revue  de  Philosophic.  These  are  Mr.  Veron- 
net's  words: 

"  The  electrical  theory  obliges  us  to  reduce  matter  and  its 
phenomena  to  a  system  of  attractive  and  repulsive  central  forces, 
called  electrons.  These  forces  are  obliged  to  act  at  distance, 
inasmuch  as  they  are  found  in  the  atomic  or  granulous  state. 
They  form  discontinuous  centers,  and  ether  itself  is  constituted 
by  them."33 

It  is  clear  that,  as  an  explanation  of  distance  action,  ether, 
thus  understood,  simply  shifts  the  question.  If  it  is  composed 
of  minute  particles,  these  either  must  be  separated  by  absolute 
void,  and  we  are  thus  brought  back  to  our  starting-point,  or  they 
demand  a  second  ether  to  explain  the  first,  and  we  must  admit 
an  infinity  of  similar  fluids,  of  which  each  and  all  are  absolutely 
valueless  as  an  interpretation  of  distance  action. 

The  opposite  view,  more  generally  maintained  nowadays,  is 
that  ether  is  not  composed  of  atoms  separated  by  void  space, 
but  is  itself  absolutely  continuous.     This  conception  is  repeat- 

m  C'f .  Whetham,  Recent  Development  of  Physical  Science,  p.  270. 

"Ibid.,  p.  292. 

nCf.  Spencer,  First  Principles,  l't.  1.  Chap.  8,  sect.  18. 

"La  matiere,  les  ions,  les  electron^:    I'rr.  <lr  I'hilos.,   1!>07,  p.   166. 


104 

edly  expressed  by  Joseph  Larmor,  in  his  famous  work:  JFJthcr 
and  Matter: 

"  All  that  is  known  (or  perhaps  need  be  known)  of  the  aether 
itself  may  be  formulated  as  a  scheme  of  differential  equations 
defining  the  properties  of  a  continuum  in  space,  which  it  would 
be  gratuitous  to  further  explain  by  any  complication  of  struc- 
ture."34 

The  same  conception  is  also  entertained  by  Sir  Oliver  Lodge, 
who  sums  up  in  the  following  words  his  own  view  on  the  subject: 

"  As  far  as  we  know,  it  (ether)  appears  to  be  a  perfectly 
homogeneous  incompressible  continuous  body,  incapable  of  being 
resolved  into  simpler  elements,  or  atoms;  it  is,  in  fact,  continu- 
ous, not  molecular."35 

Now,  is  this  second  view  in  any  way  more  satisfactory  than 
the  first?  Our  knowledge  of  nature  shows  us  that  the  essential 
difference  existing  between  solids,  liquids  and  gases,  is  due  to 
the  greater  or  less  degree  of  continuity  of  their  structural  par- 
ticles. In  the  gaseous  state  a  molecule  freely  passes  from  one 
molecular  system  into  another.  A  diminution  of  temperature 
lessens  the  vibratory  motion  of  the  molecules,  which  are  then 
reduced  to  a  definite  system,  and  are  limited  in  their  motion  by 
the  molecules  surrounding  them.  The  result  is  the  liquid  state. 
A  further  decrease  of  temperature  draws  the  molecules  still 
nearer  to  one  another.  Each  one  enters  the  sphere  of  action  of 
the  others,  losing  thereby  the  possibility  of  translatory  move- 
ment, and  becoming  limited  to  orbital  motion.  A  material 
object  becomes  therefore  more  and  more  solid  in  proportion  as 
its  continuity  increases.  If  ether  be  perfectly  continuous,  it 
must  be  incomparably  more  solid  than  any  other  object.  That 
ilii-  is  m>t  the  case  is  almost  an  evident  truth,  inasmuch  as  if 
ether  were  endowed  with  such  a  degree  of  solidity,  it  is  incon- 
ceivable  how  movement  in  it  would  be  possible. 

"/.armor,  .Ether  and  Matter,  p.  78. 
"Lodge,  Modern  Views  of  Electricity,  p.  396. 


105 

Modern  physicists  reply  to  this  objection  by  saying  that  we 
must  not  conceive  ether  as  an  ordinary  material  substance: 
"  The  properties  of  aether,  says  Sir  Oliver  Lodge,  must  be  some- 
what different  from  those  of  ordinary  matter."36  We  doubt 
whether  this  remark  will  seem  convincing.  Ether  is  either  ma- 
terial, or  it  is  not.  If  it  is  material,  it  must  be,  like  matter, 
composed  of  particles — either  continuous  or  discrete — and  the 
laws  which  apply  to  matter  in  general  must  apply  to  it  also.  If, 
on  the  other  hand,  it  is  not  material,  it  is  inconceivable  that  it 
may  act  upon  matter,  or  be  a  connecting-link  between  atoms. 

Whatever  may  be  the  view  we  accept  as  to  the  nature  of  ether, 
we  are  thus  facing  enigmas  whose  solution  seems  to  be  far  be- 
yond the  reach  of  our  present  knowledge  and  to  be  destined  to 
be  a  puzzle  to  human  thought  for  many  a  future  generation. 

Let  us  not,  however,  conclude  from  these  remarks  that  our 
knowledge  of  nature  has  not  been  increased  by  science.  Al- 
though the  unknown  still  exists,  positive  results  have  been  ob- 
tained, especially  in  these  last  years,  to  such  an  extent  that  we 
may  seem  justified  in  the  hope  that  what  is  still  mysterious  for 
us  will  be  revealed  to  the  rising  generation. 

The  first  great  step  toward  an  actual  knowledge  of  matter 
was  made  by  John  Dalton.  He  revived  the  hypothesis  of  atoms 
to  explain  the  fact  that  the  elements  of  a  compound  combine  in 
definite  proportions,  and  suggested  that  these  proportions  rep- 
resent the  relative  weight  of  the  atoms. 

As  the  atomic  weights  of  many  elements  were  found  to  be 
multiples  of  that  of  hydrogen,  Prout  supposed  that  the  atom  of 
hydrogen  was  the  ultimate  basis  from  which  all  substances  were 
made.  This  suggestion,  however,  implied  that,  the  equivalents 
of  all  substances  should  be  integers,  which  was  not  confirmed  by 
experience,  and  Prout's  view  was  forcibly  abandoned.  Such 
was  still  the  situation  when,  in  1897,  J.  J.  Thomson  detected, 
in  the  cathode  rays  of  a  vacuum  tube,  corpuscles  about  one 
thousand  times  smaller  than  the  atom  of  hydrogen.     These  cor- 

"  Lodge,  op.  oit.,  p.  39G. 


10G 

pusclcs  were  shown  to  be  identical  whatever  might  be  the  nature 
of  the  tube  or  of  the  gas  it  contained.  Vast  was  the  field  opened 
to  science  by  this  astounding  revelation.  The  newly-discovered 
corpuscles  were  found  to  be  atoms  of  electricity,  were  called  elec- 
trons, and  recognized  as  the  long-sought-for  ultimate  basis  of 
matter,  as  the  sub-atoms  which,  grouped  in  various  ways,  give 
rise  to  the  chemical  atoms  of  all  material  objects. 

The  existence  of  the  electrons  has  been  repeatedly  evidenced 
by  experience;,  and  it  has  received  a  strong  confirmation  by  tHe 
recent  discovery  of  radio-active  substances. 

The  first  observations  on  radio-activity  were  made  by  Bec- 
querel,  who,  in  1896,  discovered  that  compounds  of  uranium 
affect  photographic  plates  through  an  opaque  covering.  The 
labors  of  Mr.  and  Mrs.  Curie,  of  Mr.  Rutherford,  and  other  dis- 
tinguished men  of  science,  have  thrown  the  desired  light  on  the 
subject. 

It  is  now  well  known  that  uranium,  radium,  thorium,  and  a 
few  other  metals  constantly  emit  three  types  of  rays,  known  as 
the  a,  f3,  and  y  rays.  The  /?  rays  have  been  most  successfully 
studied,  and  arc  known  to  consist  of  negative  corpuscles,  or 
electrons,  projected  with  the  velocity  of  light.  The  a  rays  have 
been  shown  to  consist  of  positively  charged  bodies,  projected 
with  a  velocity  of  about  one  tenth  of  the  velocity  of  light.  The 
y  rays  are  the  only  ones  whose  nature  is  not  yet  fully  known. 
The  results  of  experience  incline  us  to  believe  that  they  are 
analogous  to  Rbntgen  rays  and  consist  of  wave-pulses  traveling 
through  ether  with  incredible  velocity. 

The  study  of  radio-active  substances  has  also  made  known  the 
fact  that  not  only  atoms  are  divisible  and  composed  of  electrons, 
but  that  real  changes  take  place  in  the  atoms  themselves,  by  a 
process  of  disintegration,  followed  by  a  regrouping  of  the  elec- 
trons, and  that  new  substances  thus  arise  from  elements  chem- 
ically simple, 

From  uranium  and  thorium  products  have  been  obtained. 
considerably  more  active  than  those  metals  themselves.     To  these 


107 

new  substances  the  names  of  uranium-X  and  thorium-X  have 
been  given.  But  further  observation  has  shown  that  these 
highly  active  products  little  by  little  lose  their  activity,  and  that 
the  metals  from  which  they  were  obtained  regain  at  the  same 
time  the  energy  they  had  temporarily  lost. 

These  interesting  phenomena  have  been  explained  by  the  fact 
that  all  radio-active  substances  have  high  atomic  weights,  are 
therefore  of  a  great  complexity,  and  thus  very  instable.  They 
constantly  undergo  a  process  of  disintegration  of  which  their 
radio-activity  is  the  result.  One  or  more  particles  are  detached 
from  the  atom,  and  the  atomic  equilibrium  is  thus  momentarily 
lost.  Finalty,  the  electrons  arrange  themselves  differently, 
attain  a  new  temporary  equilibrium,  and  give  rise  to  the  sub- 
stances known  as  thorium-X  and  uranium-X. 

No  doubt  is  therefore  to  be  entertained  as  to  the  real  changes 
that  take  place  in  the  atoms  themselves.  And  these  changes 
bring  to  our  minds  the  possible  realization  of  the  dreams  of  the 
Mediaeval  alchemists,  at  which,  for  so  long  a  time,  we  have  been 
wont  to  smile.  If  the  atom  is  a  complex  structure  which,  on 
the  occurrence  of  certain  conditions,  is  disintegrable,  there  is 
nothing  absolutely  impossible  in  the  transmutation  of  one  metal 
into  another.  The  only  question  is  to  bring  about  the  condi- 
tions which  the  atomic  disintegration  necessitates.  Do  such 
conditions  exist  for  all  chemical  elements?  We  are  not  in- 
clined to  believe  it,  but  their  existence  is  not  an  impossibility, 
and  the  hope  of  the  Mediaeval  alchemist  was  not  so  preposterous 
as  we  have  been  taught  to  believe. 

The  facts  which  modern  science  may  look  upon  as  established 
truths  are  the  following: 

All  substances,  physically  considered,  are  composed  of  mole- 
cules, which  may  be  termed  physical  units,  contain  one  or  more 
chemical  atoms,  and,  by  their  incessant  motion,  give  rise  to  bent 
and  other  physical  phenomena. 

The  molecules  are  composed  of  atoms,  or  chemical  units, 
which,  by  their  regrouping  in  differenl  manners,  give  rise  to  the 


108 

various  compound  substances  and  are  indivisible  by  chemical 
processes. 

Finally,  these  atoms  are  nothing  but  groups  of  ultimate  units, 
or  electrons,  which  are  the  same  for  all  substances,  and,  by  their 
arrangement  in  different  ways,  form  the  simple  elements  which, 
until  recently,  had  been  believed  ultimate. 

The  recent  views  as  to  the  structure  of  the  atoms,  which  we 
have  briefly  described,  present  a  certain  likeness  to  the  Scholas- 
tic theory  of  matter  and  form.  This  theory,  by  means  of  some 
modifications,  might  even  be  brought  into  perfect  harmony  with 
these  scientific  results. 

The  modifications  I  have  in  view  are  the  following: 

Let  us  call  primordial  matter  the  mass  of  electrical  units,  or 
electrons,  which  have  been  shown  to  be  the  ultimate  ground- 
work out  of  which  all  material  elements  are  built. 

Let  us  call  substantial  form  the  different  arrangements  of 
these  ultimate  units,  to  which  the  variety  of  material  substances 
is  due. 

Primordial  Matter  will  thus  be  the  same  in  all  things.  The 
diversity  of  nature  of  the  various  substances  will  be  due  to  the 
substantial  form. 

Our  theory  will  be  more  in  harmony  with  the  spirit  of  Aris- 
totle, who,  in  explaining  matter  and  form  by  means  of  brass 
and  a  statue,  implies  that  it  is  a  real  entity,  and  not  an  abstrac- 
tion, that  he  has  in  view. 

All  the  facts  upon  which  the  Scholastic  doctrine  of  matter 
and  form  is  based  will  be  satisfactorily  explained.  The  stability 
of  quantity  under  all  modifications  of  bodily  substances  will  be 
accounted  for  by  the  fact  that  the  ultimate  units,  although 
arranged  in  different  ways,  are  still  present  in  the  same  number. 

As  for  the  hypothesis  of  substantial  changes  in  chemical  com- 
binations, it  must  be  frankly  abandoned.  The  atom  of  water 
ti i ust  not  lie  regarded  as  a  homogeneous  substance,  but  as  a  mere 
juxtaposition  of  two  atoms  of  hydrogen  and  one  of  oxygen.  The 
permanence   of   the  elements   in    the  compound    is   universally 


109 

admitted  by  chemists  to-day.  It  is  involved  in  the  electron 
theory  and  has  received  a  new  confirmation  from  the  phenomena 
connected  with  radio-activity.  A  study  of  the  compounds  of 
radio-active  metals  has  shown  that  the  rate  of  emission  of  the 
radiations  depends  only  on  the  quantity  of  the  element  present, 
and  is  not  affected  by  the  amount  of  inactive  substance  which 
the  compound  contains.  It  is  thus  made  clear  that  in  a  metallic 
compound  we  have  not  a  substance  composed  of  homogeneous 
atoms,  but  that  the  very  atoms  of  the  simple  elements  are  juxta- 
posed and  form  new  molecules.  To  Farges's  objection  that,  in 
the  case  of  a  mere  juxtaposition,  the  dissolvents  of  the  simple 
elements  should  be  effective,  we  will  answer  that  dissolution  is 
a  physical — not  a  chemical — process,  that  dissolvents  can  act 
only  on  physical  units  or  molecules,  and  that  the  atoms  which, 
by  their  juxtaposition,  form  these  molecules,  being  chemical 
units,  are  separable  only  by  chemical  processes. 


CHAPTER    V 
SCHOLASTIC    PSYCHOLOGY 

Section  1. — Theory  of  Abstraction 

Experimental  Psychology  is  a  new-born  science  still  seeking 
its  definite  path.  After  numerous  hesitations  and  partial 
failures,  it  has  come  to  the  conviction  that  its  true  aim  is  not 
to  supplant  the  old  metaphysical  psychology,  but  to  walk  side 
by  side  in  the  most  peaceable  manner.  Experimental  psycholo- 
gists know  full  well  to-day  that  the  worth  of  the  results  they 
will  obtain  will  be  inversely  proportional  to  the  metaphysical 
preoccupations  they  cherish.  Wiser  than  their  older  brethren, 
they  limit  themselves  to  measuring  on  the  skin  of  the  forehead 
the  degree  of  fatigue  produced  by  an  intellectual  work,  and 
abstain  from  all  hypotheses  concerning  the  materiality  or  the 
spirituality  of  the  mind. 

Metaphysical  psychology  enjoys  therefore  an  independent 
existence.  It  remains  a  branch  of  philosophy,  whereas  its 
younger  sister  is  a  positive  science. 

Scholastic  psychologists  adhere  to  Aristotle's  definition  of  the 
soul:  " Anima  est  actus  primus  corporis  physici  organici, 
potentia  viiam  habentis"  regard  the  soul  as  the  substantial  form 
of  the  body,  and  maintain  that  it  is  essentially  simple,  spiritual 
and  immortal. 

Their  proofs  of  the  spirituality  and  of  the  immortality  of  the 
soul  will  find  their  place  at  the  end  of  the  present  chapter. 
Before  we  expound  them,  it  is  necessary  to  discuss  a  question 
which  may  be  said  to  lie  at  the  very  foundation  of  Scholastic 
psychology:  the  question  of  abstraction. 

The  theory  which  regards  the  mind  as  capable  of  abstracting 
from  all  particular  determinations  and  of  forming  general  ideas 

110 


Ill 

has  received  in  modern  times  many  severe  blows.  The  cele- 
brated British  philosopher,  George  Berkeley,  regards  the  over- 
throw of  that  theory  as  a  necessary  presupposition  of  his  system. 
In  the  Introduction  to  his  Principles  of  Human  Knowledge,  he 
gives,  in  a  somewhat  jocose  fashion,  a  minute  account  of  what 
he  understands  by  abstraction.  He  tells  us,  for  example,  that, 
by  the  abstract  idea  of  body  is  meant  "  body  without  any  par- 
ticular shape  or  figure,  without  covering,  either  of  hair,  or 
feathers,  or  scales,  etc.,  nor  yet  naked :  hair,  feathers,  scales  and 
nakedness  being  the  distinguishing  properties  of  particular 
animals,  and  for  that  reason,  left  out  of  the  abstract  idea."1  He 
thereupon  confesses  that  he  cannot,  by  any  effort  of  thought, 
conceive  the  abstract  idea  thus  described.  His  conclusion  is 
that  an  abstract  general  idea  is  an  absurdity  and  that  the  only 
ideas  we  are  entitled  to  regard  as  general  are  particular  ideas 
which  are  made  to  represent  or  stand  for  all  other  particular 
ideas  of  the  same  sort.2 

Berkeley's  rejection  of  abstraction  rests  upon  a  lamentable 
confusion  which  has  originated  in  Locke  and  pervaded  the  whole 
body  of  modern  philosophy:  the  confusion  of  the  two  terms 
Phantasm  and  Idea. 

A  writer  who  feels  little  sympathy  for  the  schoolmen,  John 
Stuart  Mill,  confesses  that  they  were  unrivalled  in  the  con- 
struction of  technical  language,  and  that  their  definitions  have 
seldom  been  altered  but  to  be  spoiled.3  Nowhere  perhaps  does 
his  remark  apply  more  justly  than  in  the  present  case. 

A  phantasm  is  the  imaginary  representation  of  a  particular 
object  previously  perceived.  It  is  a  kind  of  mental  picture 
which  reproduces  more  or  less  faithfully  what  we  have  experi- 
enced in  the  past.  Besides  the  power  of  reproduction,  we 
possess  the  faculty  of  combining  the  objects  of  our  previous 
experience  in  an  infinite  variety  of  forms.     Now  an  imposing 

1  Fraser's  Selection  from  Berkeley,  p.   13. 

3Ibid.,  p.  17. 

•J.  S.  Mill,  System  of  Logic,  Bk.   1,  chap.  2,  sect.  4. 


112 

structure  we  have  admired  during  the  day  is  present  to  our 
mind.  We  endeavor  to  reproduce  it  faithfully,  to  reconstruct 
one  by  one  its  minutest  details.  One  moment  has  elapsed  and 
our  imagination  is  wandering  in  the  most  capricious  fashion. 
Horace's  monster  sits  triumphingly  on  the  ruins  of  the  monu- 
ment so  carefully  constructed  in  the  previous  instant,  and  which 
has  now  crumbled  to  pieces  and  disappeared  forever  with  the 
instant  of  time  which  brought  it  forth.  The  range  of  our 
imagining  power  is  thus  unlimited.  Each  one  of  our  mental 
pictures,  however,  represents  one  single  particular  object.  How- 
ever blurred  may  be  the  image,  however  indefinite  its  features, 
it  is  always  singular.  I  cannot  form  a  mental  picture  of  a 
triangle  without  giving  it  a  definite  size  and  shape,  by  which 
it  becomes  one  individual,  distinguishable  from  all  other  pos- 
sible triangles. 

It  is  to  the  phantasm  thus  described,  and  improperly  called 
idea,  that  Berkeley's  criticisms  apply.  That  ideas  of  this  sort 
cannot  be  abstract  goes  without  saying.  No  triangle  can  be 
imagined  that  is  not  either  scalene,  isosceles  or  equilateral;  no 
body  that  is  not  either  covered  or  naked.  But  it  is  not  an  idea 
of  this  sort  that  the  great  masters  of  Scholasticism  considered 
as  the  product  of  abstraction. 

Besides  the  power  of  reproducing  and  combining  our  past 
sensations — a  power  we  possess  in  common  with  the  lower 
animals — there  exists  in  us  a  faculty  of  conceiving  the  universal 
as  such,  of  forming  true  ideas. 

The  idea,  which,  to  avoid  all  confusion,  it  would  perhaps 
be  better  to  call  concept,  is  no  mental  picture  whatever.  It  is  a 
notion  of  our  mind,  the  knowledge  of  what  something  is.  We 
know  that  a  triangle  is  a  geometrical  figure  consisting  of  three 
sides  and  three  angles.  This  knowledge  is  the  idea  of  the 
triangle.  It  is  clear  and  distinct,  and  is  also  universal,  inas- 
much as  it  applies  to  all  triangles  we  may  happen  to  conceive. 
It  is  an  abstract  idea,  because  it  is  not  limited,  like  the  phan- 
tasm, to  one  particular  object,  but  may  be  truly  predicated  of  a 


113 

whole   class.     The   essential   characteristics   which   separate    it 
from  the  phantasm  may  be  reduced  to  the  following  three : 

1.  The  idea  is  one.  The  idea  of  a  triangle  is  one  and  the 
same  for  all  possible  triangles.  The  phantasm,  on  the  contrary, 
is  multiple.  The  imaginary  picture  of  a  right  triangle  is  unlike 
that  of  a  scalene  triangle. 

2.  The  idea  is  universal,  inasmuch  as  we  predicate  it  of  all 
existing  and  possible  objects  of  a  class;  the  phantasm  is  singular 
and  concrete,  because  it  applies  to  a  determinate  object  and  to 
no  other. 

3.  The  idea  is  necessary  and  immutable.  The  elements  of 
the  concept  of  a  triangle  are  invariably  three  sides  and  three 
angles.  The  phantasm  is  mutable  and  contingent.  It  changes 
as  rapidly  as  the  objects  which  present  themselves  to  our  senses.4 

The  confusion  we  have  thus  described  may  be  readily  ac- 
counted for.  Our  intelligence  cannot  easily  operate  without 
its  concomitant  phantasm.  Although  a  reasoning  about  a  tri- 
angle might  be  effected  without  the  help  of  a  sensible  image, 
it  could  not  be  but  at  the  cost  of  the  most  strenuous  mental 
efforts.  This  is  the  reason  why  text-books  on  geometry  exhibit 
sensible  images  side  by  side  with  the  demonstrations.  It  is  the 
reason  why  Locke  and  the  whole  British  empirical  school  have 
been  led  to  a  confusion  which  even  such  a  clear-minded  man 
as  Berkeley  has  been  unable  to  detect. 

One  of  the  most  interesting  pastimes  of  a  scholar  is  the 
perusal  of  the  works  of  the  great  masters  of  human  thought 
with  the  purpose  of  reading  between  their  lines  what  they 
themselves  have  not  read,  of  deducing  from  their  principles  the 
logical  consequences  they  have  not  deduced.  Berkeley  in  par- 
ticular may  offer  us  some  delicious  hours  of  entertainment. 
Talented  as  he  was,  he  could  not  but  recognize  that  the  concep- 
tions of  our  minds  are  not  copies  of  sensible  impressions,  that 
the  ideas  of  God  and  of  the  soul  are  not  mere  reproductions  of 
the  data  of  sense-experience.     Unwilling,  however,  to  give  up 

*Cf.  C.inebra.  Elementos  de  Filosofia,  Vol.  2,  {>.  73. 
9 


114 

his  theory  of  ideas,  he  thought  he  could  save  his  position  by 
U6ing  the  word  notion: 

"  So  far  as  1  can  see/'  said  he,  "  will,  soul,  spirit,  do  not  stand 
for  different  ideas,  or  in  truth  for  any  idea  at  all,  but  for  some- 
thing which  is  very  different  from  ideas,  and  which,  being  an 
Agent,  cannot  be  like  unto,  or  represented  by,  any  idea  whatso- 
ever. Though  it  must  be  owned  at  the  same  time  that  we  have 
some  notion  of  soul,  spirit,  and  the  operations  of  the  mind,  such 
as  willing,  loving,  hating,  inasmuch  as  we  know  or  understand 
the  meaning  of  these  words."5 

We  must  confess  that  in  these  few  lines  the  author  of  the 
Principles  utterly  overthrows  the  elaborate  controversy  of  his 
Introduction.  Let  him  call  his  idea  phantasm  and  his  notion 
idea,  and  his  agreement  with  us  will  be  absolutely  perfect.  He 
has  thus  proved  that  an  abstract  phantasm  is  an  impossibility, 
which  we  readily  grant  him.  He  has  proved  nothing  against 
the  Scholastic  doctrine  of  abstraction,  and  would  even  probably 
admit  with  us  that  his  notions  of  soul  and  spirit  are  truly 
general,  and  that  they  apply  to  all  existing  spirits  or  souls. 

Closely  related  to  the  theory  of  phantasms  and  ideas,  is  the 
division  of  our  mental  faculties  into  organic  and  inorganic. 

Organic  faculties  are  those  we  possess  in  common  with  the 
lower  animals.  In  their  nature  and  operations,  they  depend 
upon  our  bodily  organs.  Such  are  the  imagination  and  the 
sensitive  memory.  Inorganic  faculties,  on  the  other  hand,  de- 
pend upon  the  soul  alone.  They  are  essentially  spiritual,  and 
would  continue  to  exist  and  to  operate  if  our  mind  were  sepa- 
rated from  its  bodily  frame. 

Upon  this  classification  of  our  mental  powers  is  based  the 
essential  distinction  maintained  by  Scholastics  between  men  and 
brutes.  Lower  animals  possess  only  organic  faculties.  They 
can  form  phantasms,  but  no  ideas.  They  never  reach  the  uni- 
versal because  they  lack  intelligence,  by  which  alone  the  uni- 
versal is  reached. 

•  Berkeley,  op.  cit.,  p.  53. 


115 

Section  2. — Nature  of  the  Human  Soul 

Scholastic  philosophers  regard  the  soul  as  the  substantial  form 
of  the  body,  from  which  it  is  intrinsically  independent,  though 
united  with  it  in  a  manner  characterized  as  substantial  and 
personal. 

By  the  intrinsical  independence  of  the  body  is  meant  that  the 
soul  is  an  activity  by  itself,  that  it  is  not  determined  by  ma- 
terial conditions,  and  hence  that  it  will  continue  to  exist  and 
to  exercise  its  operations  after  the  death  of  the  body. 

By  the  substantial  and  personal  union  is  meant:  (a)  that  the 
human  compound  is  a  substance  by  itself;  and  (6)  that  man 
is  the  compound,  and  not  the  soul  alone.  The  nature  of  this 
union  is  very  clearly  expressed  by  St.  Thomas  in  the  following 
formula :  "  In  each  one  of  us,  by  the  soul  and  body,  is  con- 
stituted a  double  unity,  of  nature  and  of  person,"  "  ex  anima 
et  corpore,  constituitur  in  unoquoque  nostrum  duplex  unitas, 
naturce  et  persona."* 

The  doctrine  of  intrinsical  independence  separates  Scholastic 
philosophy  from  materialism.  The  doctrine  of  substantial  and 
personal  union  sets  it  apart  from  the  dualistic  systems  of  Plato 
and  Descartes,  which  regards  man  as  a  spirit  accidentally  united 
with  the  body,  and  governing  it  as  the  pilot  governs  his  vessel. 

The  human  soul  is  further  described  as  possessing  the  three 
characteristics  of  simplicity,  spirituality  and  immortality. 

The  proofs  of  the  simplicity  of  the  human  soul  may  be  con- 
densed in  the  following  form :  The  nature  of  a  being  is  known 
from  its  operations.  The  operations  of  the  soul  are  essentially 
simple.     Hence  the  soul  itself  is  by  nature  essentially  simple. 

Examples  of  simple  operations  of  the  soul  may  be  adduced 
and  multiplied  at  will.  There  arc  the  simple  ideas  of  being, 
truth,  virtue  and  the  like,  which  cannot,  by  any  effort  of 
thought,  be  conceived  as  divisible.  There  are  the  intellectual 
acts  of  judgment,  which  presuppose  a  simple  subject  and  can 
hardly  be  explained  in  any  other  hypothesis.  If  the  mind 
"Thomas  Aquinas,  Summa  Theol.,  P.  3,  q.  2,  art.  1,  ad  2. 


116 

which  apprehends  the  subject  and  the  predicate  is  not  one  and 
indivisible,  we  have  no  judgment  whatever,  but  merely  two 
different  impressions  without  any  possible  connection.  Kant 
was  perfectly  aware  of  this  truth  when  he  formulated  at  the 

basis  of  his  philosophy  the  principle  that  experience  by  itself 
furnishes  only  detached  and  unconnected  facts,  and  that  no 
judgment  is  possible  without  a  mental  synthesis. 

The  doctrine  of  the  simplicity  of  the  soul  has  been  attacked 
by  David  Hume  in  a  most  ingenious  manner.  He  describes  it 
as  a  true  atheism,  capable  of  justifying  all  those  sentiments  for 
which  Spinoza  is  "  so  universally  infamous." 

"  There  are  in  my  experience,*'  says  he,  "  two  different  systems 
of  being,  to  which  I  suppose  myself  under  a  necessity  of  assign- 
ing some  substance,  or  ground  of  inhesion.  I  observe  first  the 
universe  of  objects  or  of  body :  the  sun,  moon  and  stars ;  the 
earth,  seas,  plants,  animals,  men,  ships,  houses,  and  other  pro- 
ductions either  of  art  or  nature.  Here  Spinoza  appears,  and 
tells  me  that  these  are  only  modifications;  and  that  the  sub- 
ject, in  which  they  inhere,  is  simple,  incompounded,  and  in- 
divisible. After  this  I  consider  the  other  system  of  beings,  viz.. 
the  universe  of  thought,  or  my  impressions  and  ideas.  There  I 
observe  another  sun,  moon  and  stars;  an  earth,  and  seas,  covered 
and  inhabited  by  plants  and  animals;  towns,  houses,  mountains, 
rivers ;  and  in  short  everything  I  can  discover  or  conceive  in  the 
first  system.  Upon  my  enquiry  concerning  these,  Theologians 
present  themselves,  and  tell  me,  that  these  are  also  modifica- 
tions, and  modifications  of  one  simple,  uncompounded,  and  in- 
divisible substance.  Immediately  upon  which  I  am  deafened 
with  the  noise  of  a  hundred  voices,  that  treat  the  first  hypothesis 
with  detestation  and  scorn,  and  the  second,  with  applause  and 
veneration.  I  turn  my  attention  to  these  hypotheses  to  see 
what  may  be  the  reason  of  so  great  a  partiality,  and  find  that 
they  have  the  same  fault  of  being  unintelligible,  and  that  as 
far  as  we  can  understand  them,  they  are  so  much  alike,  that  it 
is  impossible  to  discover  any  absurdity  in  one,  which  is  not  com- 
mon to  both  of  them.  We  have  no  idea  of  any  quality  in  an 
object,  which  does  not  agree  to,  and  may  not  represent  a  quality 
in  an  impression;  and  that  because  all  our  ideas  are  derived 
from  our  impressions.     We  can  never,  therefore,  find  any  repug- 


117 

nance  betwixt  an  extended  object  as  a  modification,  and  a  single 
imcompounded  essence,  as  its  substance,  unless  that  repugnance 
takes  place  equally  betwixt  the  perception  or  impression  of  that 
extended  object,  and  the  same  uncompounded  essence.  Every 
idea  of  a  quality  in  an  object  passes  through  an  impression ;  and 
therefore  every  perceivable  relation,  whether  of  connexion  or 
repugnance,  must  be  common  both  to  objects  and  impressions."7 

The  objection  so  clearly  exposed  by  Hume,  and  which,  from 
his  own  point  of  view,  seems  unanswerable,  loses  much  of  its 
force  if  we  bear  in  mind  the  distinction  pointed  out  above 
between  ideas  and  phantasms.  The  phantasm,  being  a  copy  of 
a  previous  impression,  is  no  doubt  composed  of  parts,  just  as 
well  as  the  impression  is.  If  I  picture  in  my  mind  the  frontis- 
piece of  Columbia  University,  ten  different  columns  stand  there 
before  me,  the  length  of  each  of  which  may  be  divided  into  two 
parts;  and  these  may  again  be  subdivided  at  least  as  easily  as 
the  real  columns  could  be.  I  believe  everybody  would  agree 
with  Hume  on  this  point;  but  such  are  not  the  operations  from 
which  the  simplicity  of  the  soul  is  deduced.  The  sun,  moon 
and  stars  Hume  describes  as  existing  in  his  universe  of  thought 
are  as  truly  multiple  as  those  of  the  universe  of  nature.  The 
rivers  he  imagines  are  made  of  drops  of  water,  the  trees  of 
branches  and  leaves.  But  the  conclusion  to  which  he  is  led  by 
these  considerations,  his  conviction  that  the  soul  is  not  simple, 
but  divisible  like  the  universe  of  matter;  is  that  conviction 
divisible  also?  Can  it  be  mentally  cut  into  two  parts,  two  half- 
convictions  ;  or,  similar  to  the  river,  is  it  made  up  of  an  infinite 
number  of  drops  of  conviction?  These  are,  however,  the 
absurdities  from  which  we  cannot  escape  if  we  are  unwilling  to 
admit  the  essentially  simple  character  of  intellectual  ideas. 

A  great  number  of  concepts,  it  is  true,  are  in  a  certain  sense 
divisible.  Upon  their  divisibility  is  based  the  Scholastic 
division  of  concepts  into  simple  and  complex.  Complex  con- 
cepts are  made  up  of  several  Bimple  elements.     The  concept  of 

T  Hume,  Treatise  on   Human  Nature,  Selby-Bigge'fl  ed.,  pp.  242-243. 


118 

man,  for  example,  may  be  resolved  into  the  elements  of  animal 
and  rational.  This  sort  of  division  is,  however,  quite  different 
from  that  of  material  beings,  or  of  their  reproduction  in  our 
mind.  The  red  surface  I  see  or  imagine  may  be  divided  into 
two  red  surfaces,  identical  in  nature  with  the  first,  and  differ- 
ing from  it  only  in  quantity.  The  elements  of  the  concept  of 
man  are  of  an  entirely  diverse  order.  They  are  not  merely  two 
halves  of  a  whole.  They  differ  from  each  other  and  from  the 
whole  in  quality,  and  the  entire  process  of  division  rests  upon 
their  specific  differences.  But  as  qualitative  division  cannot, 
like  quantitative  division,  be  continued  ad  infinitum,  we  must 
finally  arrive  at  essentially  simple  concepts,  and  conclude  that 
they  are  produced  by  an  essentially  simple  being. 

The  questions  of  the  simplicity  and  of  the  spirituality  of 
the  soul,  although  closely  connected,  must  be  carefully  dis- 
tinguished. Every  spiritual  being  is  simple;  but  a  simple  being 
is  not  necessarily  spiritual.  Scholastic  text-books  give  as  an 
instance  of  a  simple,  non-spiritual  being  the  soul  of  the  lower 
animals,  which  depends  upon  the  body  in  all  its  operations, 
comes  into  existence  with  the  body,  and  ceases  to  be  as  soon 
as  the  body  dies. 

The  spirituality  of  the  human  soul  may  be  defined  as  its 
intrinsical  independence  of  matter.  In  virtue  of  that  inde- 
pendence, it  is  not  affected  by  the  death  of  our  organism,  it  does 
not  disappear  with  our  last  breath.  When  this  mortal  life  of 
ours  comes  to  an  end,  our  spirit  springs  forth;  and,  free  from 
material  bonds,  starts  a  new  and  purer  life,  a  life  that  shall 
know  no  death. 

The  spirituality  of  the  soul  is  proved  from  the  nature  of 
its  faculties :  the  intelligence  and  the  will.  These  faculties 
have  for  objects  the  universal  and  the  necessary.  It  is  to  the 
universal  as  such,  to  a  nature  conceived  with  an  absolute — not 
an  individual — character,  that  our  intelligence  tends.  It 
studies  the  essence  of  the  object,  abstracting  from  the  indi- 
vidual characteristics  of  "this''  object.    A  peculiar  aspect  of 


119 

the  universal  is  its  necessity.  This  necessity,  human  intelli- 
gence does  not  fail  to  grasp.  It  directs  its  efforts  to  the  im- 
mutable aspects  of  things,  and  abstracts  from  the  contingent 
character  they  possess  as  individuals. 

Our  will  likewise  tends  to  the  universal  manifested  in  the 
form  of  the  absolute  good.  No  limited  and  relative  good  can 
satisfy  us.  It  is  in  the  union  with  an  absolute  perfection  that 
out  will  would  rest,  that  it  would  find  its  perfect  happiness. 

Now,  these  characters  of  universality  and  necessity  un- 
equivocally separate  our  mental  faculties  from  the  pure  forces 
of  matter.  Matter  is  essentially  individual,  and  envelops  in 
individual  conditions  all  objects  of  which  it  is  an  essential  con- 
stituent. Our  mental  faculties  are  thus  independent  of  matter, 
and  the  soul,  the  substance  they  constitute,  is  necessarily  en- 
dowed with  the  same  independence.8 

Several  other  arguments  of  lesser  importance  are  adduced  to 
confirm  the  same  view.  The  act  of  self-consciousness,  for 
example,  is  said  to  separate  the  soul  from  all  material  agents; 
for,  whereas  matter  can  act  upon  itself  only  in  the  sense  that 
a  certain  particle  can  act  upon  another  particle,  the  human 
mind  can  and  does  reflect  upon  itself  in  such  a  manner  that  the 
Ego  reflecting  and  the  Ego  reflected  upon  are  one  and  the 
same.9 

A  third  proof  very  much  insisted  upon  is  deduced  from  the 
contrast  between  the  effects  produced  upon  the  intellect  and  the 
senses  by  their  respective  objects.  When  the  excellence  of  the 
object  of  sense  increases  beyond  a  certain  limit,  the  organ 
undergoes  corruption,  and  is  eventually  destroyed.  A  vivid 
light  impairs  our  eye-sight;  a  prolonged  contemplation  of  the 
sun  may  result  in  blindness.  Our  intellect,  on  the  contrary,  be- 
comes keener  and  more  penetrating  when  the  object  it  ponders 
becomes  more  sublime. 

The  characteristics  which  separate  sense  from  intellect  are 
reduced  by  Urraburu  to  the  following  six: 

•  Cf.  Gardair,  La  Nature  Humuine,  pp.  169  fT. 
'  Maher,  Psychology,  3d  cd.,  pp.  452  fl". 


120 

1.  (Which  is  essential  and  the  root  of  the  others.)  Intellect 
is  an  inorganic  or  spiritual  faculty;  sense  is  organic  and 
material. 

2.  Sense  is  found  in  all  animals;  intellect  only  in  rational 
animals  or  men. 

3.  Sense  knows  only  the  singular;  intellect  knows  the 
universal. 

4.  Sense  extends  only  to  material  objects;  intellect  to  im- 
material objects  as  well. 

5.  No  sense  knows  itself  or  its  own  operation;  the  intellect 
knows  itself  and  its  operation. 

6.  The  senses  are  corrupted  by  the  excellence  of  the  sensible 
object ;  the  intellect  remains  uncorrupted,  however  excellent 
its  object  may  be.10 

The  remaining  property  of  the  soul,  its  immortality,  follows 
from  the  previous  two  as  a  logical  consequence.  The  soul,  being 
essentially  simple,  cannot,  like  the  body,  perish  by  dissolution 
of  parts;  and,  on  the  other  hand,  being  spiritual,  having  its 
peculiar,  independent  life,  not  being  conditioned  in  its  existence 
and  operations  by  the  bodily  organism,  it  cannot  cease  to  exist 
simply  because  the  organism  is  destroyed.  The  theological 
belief  in  another  life  is  thus  not  only  shown  to  harmonize  with 
reason,  but  is  deduced  from  the  fundamental  principles  of 
philosophy.  Whether  human  reason  can  likewise  prove  the 
eternity  of  this  new  life,  is  considered  a  debatable  question. 
Maher,  in  his  Psychology,  answers  it  negatively.  As  a  theo- 
logian, he  believes  in  eternal  life;  as  a  philosopher,  although  he 
sees  no  reason  why  the  soul  should  ever  perish,  he  admits  that 
"  leaving  Revelation  aside  and  arguing  solely  from  reason,  he 
does  not  see  any  perfectly  demonstrable  proof  of  the  everlasting 
existence  of  human  souls."  "  Almighty  God,"  adds  he,  "  could 
by  an  exercise  of  His  absolute  power,  annihilate  the  human  soul 
as  well  as  any  other  object  which  He  has  created."11 

10  Cf.  Urraburu,  Compendium  Philosophic  Scholastics',  Vol.  4,  p.  240. 
"  Maher.    op,    cit.,    p.    486.      The    same    view    is    also    maintained    by 
Meurin,  Ethics,  p.  161. 


121 

I  believe  that  most  neo-  Scholastics  would  disagree  with  Fr. 
Maher  on  this  point.  They  would  be  inclined  to  maintain 
that  the  human  soul  can  be  proved,  not  only  to  endure  for  a 
certain  time  after  death,  but  to  endure  forever.  This  view  is 
clearly  exposed  and  defended  in  the  works  of  Urraburu.  Start- 
ing from  the  ordinary  arguments  of  the  school,  the  learned 
Jesuit  demonstrates  that  the  soul  cannot  perish  like  the  body  by 
a  natural  death,  and  he  reaches  Maher's  conclusion  that  the 
soul  can  cease  to  exist  only  through  an  act  of  annihilation  of 
an  all-powerful  God.  But,  whereas  Maher  stops  at  this  point, 
and  leaves  human  reason  uncertain  whether  God  will  destroy  or 
not  the  spirit  he  has  created,  Urraburu  shows  that  such  an 
annihilation  would  involve  an  inconsistency  in  God's  own 
nature.  His  argument  may  be  outlined  as  follows:  God  has 
constituted  the  human  soul  in  such  a  way  that  it  is  naturally 
immortal.  If  he  should  choose  to  destroy  it  by  an  act  of  his 
will,  there  would  be  a  contradiction  between  the  creative  act  by 
which  he  gave  the  soul  an  immortal  nature  and  the  destructive 
fiat  which  would  reduce  it  to  nothingness.  As  no  such  contra- 
diction can  be  supposed  in  an  absolutely  perfect  being,  the  soul 
will  exist  forever.  Urraburu  corroborates  his  teaching  by  the 
authority  of  St.  Thomas.  The  annihilation  of  the  soul  would 
be  a  miracle,  and  a  miracle  never  takes  place  except  as  a  mani- 
festation of  God's  glory.  But,  St.  Thomas  says,  "  redigere 
aliquid  in  nihilum  non  pertinet  ad  gratia  manifestation  em, 
cum  magis  per  hoc  divina  potent ia  ct  bonitas  ostendatur,  quod 
res  in  esse  conservetur."12 

Section  3. — Locus  of  the  Human  Soul 

The  title  of  this  section  suggests  a  venerable  formula,  fre- 
quently derided  nowadays  and  more  frequently  misunderstood, 
the  famous  Tota  in  toto,  et  tota  in  qualibet  parte,  which  has  been 
recently  pronounced  "  disconcerting  but  to  the  chosen  few  who 

"Thomas  Aquinas,  Summn  Theol..   P.   1.  (,).    104.  art.  4.  c.     Cf.   lira 
buru,  op.  tit.,  pp.  C5G  fl". 


122 

have  embraced  a  philosophy  of  contradictions,  and  rejoice  in  the 
absurdity  of  the  conclusions  to  which  their  reasonings  conduct 
them." 

The  words  I  have  just  quoted  are  from  Mr.  Fullcrton.  In  a 
chapter  of  his  System  of  Metaphysics,  entitled  "  The  Atomic 
Self."  he  exposes  the  semi-materialistic  opinion  of  the  plain 
man  about  mind,  and  traces  it  back  to  the  philosophies  of  tbe 
most  ancient  times.  He  holds  that  the  teachings  of  those  old 
systems  have  become  incorporated  into  theology  and  ethics,  have 
left  their  traces  upon  language  and  literature,  have  become  a 
part  of  the  common  thought  of  the  human  race,  and  are  now 
accepted  by  the  great  mass  of  men  as  self-evident  truths. 

"  Ancient  philosophers  believed  the  mind  to  be  material  and 
unequivocally  in  the  body.  It  was  composed  of  fine  round 
atoms,  highly  movable  atoms,  etc.  It  could  be  inhaled  and 
exhaled,  and  might  escape  through  a  gaping  wound,  as  wine 
spouts  through  the  rent  wine-skin.  It  was  a  kind  of  matter 
and  nothing  more,  having  the  same  right  to  occupy  space  that 
has  any  other  form  of  matter.  Afterward  it  was  for  centuries 
still  in  the  body,  but  in  a  much  more  indefinite  and  inconsistent 
fashion.  It  was  wholly  in  the  whole  body,  and  wholly  in  every 
part."13 

The  Scholastic  formula  is  thus  regarded  by  Fullerton  as  the 
direct  offspring  of  old  materialism.  It  is  materialism  still, 
although  somewhat  transfigured.  It  is  materialism  aware  of  its 
inner  incongruity,  and  trying  to  save  its  own  life  by  means 
of  vague  subterfuges.  The  mind  is  still  located  in  the  body, 
but  its  presence  there  is  regarded  as  immaterial.  Descartes  who 
emphasized  the  presence,  but  neglected  its  immaterial  character, 
located  the  soul  in  the  pineal  gland.  The  scholastics  emphasize 
both  sides  of  the  inconsistent  doctrine.  They  "stir  up  the 
contradiction  and  make  it  growl,  striking  fear  to  the  heart  of 
the  beholder." 

l'lillerton's  doctrine  on  the  locus  of  the  soul  is  identical  with 
1 1  u iiK-s.     Although  we  differ  from  the  author  of  tbe  Treatise 

UG.   S.    Fullcrton.  System  of  Metaphysics,  p.  2C7. 


123 

on  Human  Nature  in  many  essential  points,  we  cannot  but 
fully  agree  with  him  here,  and  even  regard  his  teaching  as 
irrefutable.  Location  in  a  determinate  place  is  a  property  of 
material  beings,  and  has  no  sense  except  if  applied  to  such. 
The  chair  upon  which  I  am  sitting  is  said  to  be  located  between 
the  walls  of  my  room  in  so  far  as  it  can  give  rise  to  tactual  and 
visual  impressions  spatially  related  to  the  impressions  caused 
by  the  walls  themselves.  When  we  assert  that  the  point  A  is 
between  B  and  C,  we  mean  that  a  line  going  from  B  to  C  would 
pass  through  A.  Location  in  space,  thus  applied  to  material 
beings,  is  perfectly  intelligible;  but,  as  Hume  and  Fullerton 
maintain,  it  loses  all  meaning  if  predicated  of  mind.  It  sounds 
nonsensical  to  assert  that  a  thought  is  placed  between  a  desk 
and  a  blackboard,  that  ten  different  volitions  are  actually  cross- 
ing the  street ;  but  if  we  express  the  same  idea  in  different  words, 
if  we  say  that  the  human  mind  is  placed  in  a  certain  portion 
of  our  organism  or  in  our  whole  body,  the  absurdity  of  the 
assertion  becomes  less  apparent  and  may  be  easily  overlooked. 
It  exists,  nevertheless,  and  to  say  that  our  mind  is  located  in  our 
body,  or  that  God  is  located  everywhere — if  we  take  the  word 
located  in  its  proper  meaning — is  no  less  preposterous  than  to 
say  that  a  benevolent  desire  took  the  ferry-boat,  and  was  slowly 
carried  from  New  York  to  Brooklyn. 

Where  is  our  mind  then?  And  where  is  God?  Such  ques- 
tions cannot  be  answered  but  in  the  following  way:  Our  mind 
is  nowhere,  and  God  is  nowhere.  The  "  where  "  implying  parts 
outside  of  parts,  and  being  a  property  of  matter  alone,  cannot 
be  predicated  of  immaterial  things.  And  if  it  sounds  odd  to 
say  that  spirits  are  nowhere,  it  is  because  we  are  so  immersed 
in  material  thinking  that  we  cannot  believe  that  a  thing  can 
exist  without  material  relations.  The  existence  of  our  mind  is 
an  immediate  fact  of  consciousness.  It  is  an  ultimate  fact  upon 
which  all  our  knowledge  is  grounded,  and  which  itself  needs  no 
proof.  It  is  the  center  from  which  we  have  to  start  in  our 
investigations  concerning  reality.     But  the  relations  which  our 


124 

mind  bears  to  the  rest  of  the  universe  cannot  be  assimilated,  to 
the  relations  of  particles  of  matter.  We  fully  agree  with  Hume 
and  Fullerton  that  a  philosophical  system  tending  to  localize 
mind  in  a  definite  portion  of  space  must  be  rejected  as  absurd. 

What  becomes  of  the  Scholastic  formula  then?  Must  we, 
without  more  ado,  regard  it  as  the  outcome  of  an  illogical 
materialistic  conception  of  an  immaterial  thing?  Some  power- 
ful motives  at  once  come  forth  and  give  to  this  view  the  greatest 
uncertainty.  St.  Thomas's  doctrine  of  the  soul,  inspired  by 
Christian  theology,  is  more  decidedly  immaterialistic  than  the 
theories  of  Locke,  Hume,  and  the  whole  British  empirical  school. 
For  whereas  sensism  resolves  ideas  into  sense-impressions  and 
admits  only  a  difference  of  degree  between  sense  and  intellect, 
St.  Thomas  and  the  schoolmen  maintain  that  the  difference  is 
not  of  degree  but  of  kind,  that  between  the  sensuous  impression 
and  the  intellectual  thought  there  is  an  impassable  chasm.  How 
strange  would  it  sound  then  that  he  who  might  be  described  as 
the  foremost  adversary  of  materialism,  should  himself  fall  into 
the  very  errors  he  constantly  opposes ! 

A  careful  study  of  the  doctrines  of  St.  Thomas  suffices  to 
absolve  him  from  all  charges  of  materialism.  The  Angelic 
Doctor  not  only  did  not  intend  to  localize  the  mind  in  a  definite 
portion  of  space,  but  he  was  as  fully  aware  as  Hume  of  the 
evident  truth  that  position  in  space  is  a  property  of  matter  and 
of  matter  alone. 

In  the  Sum  ma  contra  Gentiles,  St.  Thomas  examines  how  an 
intellectual  substance  can  be  united  to  the  body,  and  teaches  that 
there  are  two  kinds  of  contact :  a  contact  through  quantity, 
which  is  proper  to  material  beings  alone,  and  a  contact  through 
virtue,  which  may  belong  to  immaterial  beings  as  well.  This 
latter  kind  is  however  described  as  contact  only  metaphorically. 
A  spirit  is  said  to  touch  only  in  so  far  as  it  acts,  only  in  the 
6ense  in  which  we  are  entitled  to  say  that  a  sad  news  touches  us: 

"  Si  igitur  sint  aliqua  tangentia  qua*  in  quantitatis  ultimis 


125 

non  tangant,  dicentur  nihilominus  tangere,  in  quantum  agunt ; 
secundum  quern  modum  dicimus,  quod  contristans  nos  tangit."14 

Further  on,  the  Christian  teaching  of  God's  ubiquity  compels 
St.  Thomas  to  take  up  the  same  question  again.  And  now  as 
before,  his  teaching  is  unmistakably  clear: 

"  Ees  autem  incorporea  in  aliquo  esse  dicitur  secundum  con- 
tactum  virtutis,  quum  careat  dimensiva  quantitate.  Sic  igitur 
se  habet  res  incorporea  ad  hoc  quod  sit  in  aliquo  per  yirtutem 
suam,  sicut  se  habet  res  corporea  ad  hoc  quod  sit  in  aliquo  per 
quantitatem  dimensivam.  Si  autem  esset  aliquod  corpus  habens 
quantitatem  dimensivam  infinitam,  oporteret  illud  esse  ubique. 
Ergo,  si  sit  aliqua  res  incorporea  habens  virtutem  infinitam, 
oportet  quod  sit  ubique.     Est  igitur  ubique."15 

We  thus  see  that,  in  St.  Thomas's  view,  the  words:  God  is 
everywhere,  simply  mean  that  he  acts  upon  all  beings.  We  also 
see  that  the  presence  of  the  soul  in  the  body  must  not  be 
regarded  as  a  material  presence.  It  is  not  in  the  body  as  the 
blood  is  in  our  veins.  Properly  speaking,  it  is  not  in  the  body 
at  all.  It  simply  acts  upon  the  body,  and  touches  it  as  a  piece 
of  bad  news  touches  our  heart.  The  formula :  Tola  in  toto  et 
tola  in  aliqua  parte,  thus  understood,  loses  all  its  material  flavor. 
Instead  of  appearing  as  a  nonsensical  collection  of  words,  worthy 
of  derision  and  scorn,  it  steps  forth  as  a  flash  of  genius,  as  a 
profound  truth  which  commands  our  admiration  and  our  assent. 

'♦Thomas  Aquinas,  Summa  contra  Gentiles,  Lib.  2,  chap.  56. 
"Ibid.,  Lib.  3,  cap.  68. 


CHAPTER   VI 
SCHOLASTIC    NATURAL    THEOLOGY 

Section  1. — Natural  and  Revealed  Theology 

The  very  title,  Natural  Theology,  suggests  that  some  other 
kind  of  theology  exists.  And,  indeed,  Scholastics  have  always 
carefully  distinguished  between  natural  and  revealed  theology. 
This  is  one  of  the  points  which  unmistakably  separate  the 
Scholastic  system  from  the  philosophy  of  the  Hegelian  school. 
According  to  Hegel  and  his  disciples,  no  truth  lies  beyond  the 
reach  of  the  human  mind.  God  is  an  object  of  experience  as 
clearly  present  to  our  natural  faculties  as  tables  and  chairs.  An 
adequate  knowledge  of  the  Absolute  is  thus  perfectly  possible, 
and  theology  becomes  a  branch  of  philosophy. 

St.  Thomas  and  the  Scholastics,  on  the  other  hand,  believe 
that  the  Divine  Essence  cannot  be  known  by  our  finite  minds. 
Our  natural  faculties  may  lead  us  to  the  knowledge  of  God's 
existence;  they  may  even  enable  us  to  reach  a  true  knowledge 
of  his  nature;  but,  as  this  knowledge  is  not  reached  by  direct 
intuition,  but  by  the  consideration  of  the  finite  world  in  which 
we  live,  it  cannot  be  adequate. 

As  the  imperfect  knowledge  of  God  our  mind  can  attain  may 
be  supplemented  by  the  Divine  Revelation,  the  science  of  the- 
ology is  evidently  twofold:  Natural  Theology  deals  with  the 
knowledge  of  God  human  reason  can  attain  by  its  natural  forces ; 
Revealed  Theology  deals  with  the  knowledge  of  God  which  lies 
beyond  the  reach  of  our  natural  faculties  and  is  attainable  only 
by  revelation.  The  philosopher  is  thus  concerned  with  natural 
theology  ;  he  has  nothing  to  do  with  revealed  theology. 

12G 


127 

Section  2. — Proofs  of  God's  Existence 

All  possible  proofs  of  the  existence  of  the  Divine  Mind  may 
be  classified  under  three  heads : 

1.  The  a  priori  proof,  derived  from  the  very  concept  of  God, 
and  usually  known  as  ontological  argument. 

2.  The  a  posteriori  proofs,  by  which  we  ascend  from  the 
knowledge  of  the  finite  world  to  the  knowledge  of  the  infinite. 

3.  The  moral  arguments,  drawn  from  the  nature  and  aspira- 
tions of  the  human  heart;  also,  from  the  common  consent  of 
mankind. 

The  ontological  argument  has  never  enjoyed  much  favor 
among  Scholastic  philosophers.  First  proposed  by  Anselm  of 
Canterbury  and  at  once  assailed  by  Gaunilo  the  monk,  it  has 
been  discussed  and  finally  rejected  by  Thomas  Aquinas.  Ac- 
cepted in  a  slightly  modified  form  by  Descartes  and  Leibniz,  it 
has  been  rejected  again  by  Kant  and  readmitted  by  Hegel,  who 
believed  that  since  its  first  formulation  until  the  time  of  Kant 
it  had  been  unanimously  accepted  among  philosophers.1 

These  repeated  attempts  to  rehabilitate  the  fallen  argument 
have  been  a  decided  failure.  Neo-Scholastics  to-day  regard  the 
ontological  proof  as  worthless,  and,  in  so  doing,  are  perfectly 
justified.  The  weak  point  of  the  argument  has  been  clearly 
pointed  out  by  Thomas  Aquinas.2  Anselm's  reasoning  unduly 
passes  from  the  ideal  to  the  real  order.  The  conception  of  the 
most  perfect  being  must  include  the  element  of  existence,  as 
Anselm  believed ;  but  this  existence  must  be  ideal,  limited  to  the 
concept  of  our  mind,  and  cannot  legitimately  be  predicated  of 
the  objective  world. 

The  argument  from  the  moral  law  has  been  repeatedly  formu- 
lated and  defended.  All  men,  it  has  been  said,  believe  in  the 
existence  of  a  moral  law.  They  all  regard  some  actions  as 
praiseworthy,   others   as  condemnable.     Now,    without   God,   a 

1  Cf.  Hegel,  History  of  Philosophy,  pp.  G2  and  64. 
'Thomas  Aquinas,   Summa  Theol.,  P.   1,  Q.  2,  art.   1;   C.  G.,   Lib.    1, 
cap.  11. 


128 

moral  law  would  ho  an  absurdity,  because  the  very  notion  of  a 
law  implies  the  existence  of  a  legislator,  endowed  with  a  suffi- 
cient authority  to  impose  it  and  give  it  a  sanction. 

Is  this  line  of  reasoning  defensible?  We  are  not  inclined  to 
believe  it.  The  fact  that  some  acts  are  universally  praised  as 
good,  while  others  are  universally  condemned,  may  be  sufficiently 
explained  from  the  nature  of  the  acts  themselves  without  any 
necessity  of  a  recourse  to  a  supreme  Lawgiver.  There  is  no 
doubt  that  if  God  exists,  he  is  the  foundation  and  the  source 
of  all  truth,  and  therefore  the  ultimate  ground  of  the  moral 
law;  but,  as  his  existence  is  precisely  in  question,  it  is  from  the 
human  acts  themselves  that  we  must  start.  As  no  mathema- 
tician needs  to  postulate  a  Divine  Being  in  order  to  understand 
that  the  sum  of  the  angles  of  a  triangle  has  been  universally 
believed  to  be  equal  to  two  right  angles,  so  the  moralist  needs 
no  God  to  account  for  the  fact  that  incontinence  is  universally 
regarded  as  degrading  and  courage  as  praiseworthy.  The  very 
results  of  our  acts  give  us  the  clue  as  to  their  moral  character. 
Scholastic  philosophers  are  thus  right  when  they  refuse  to  assign 
to  the  argument  from  the  moral  law  a  primary  importance. 

Another  moral  argument,  altogether  different  from  the  one 
we  have  presently  considered,  is  derived  from  the  common  con- 
sent of  mankind.  Like  all  moral  arguments,  the  argument 
from  universal  consent  is  regarded  by  Scholastics  as  of  second- 
ary importance.  It  is,  however,  defended  as  legitimate,  and 
invariably  finds  a  place  in  treatises  on  natural  theology.  The 
fact  itself  that  all  peoples  have  believed  in  a  Supreme  Being 
seems  to  admit  of  no  reasonable  doubt.  To  Spencer's  objection 
that  the  savage's  concepts  of  God  have  been  evolved  out  of  ghosts 
or  ancestor-spirits,  and.  with  the  evolution  of  human  ideas,  have 
gradually  acquired  a  nobler  form,  Scholastics  answer  that  the 
conceptions  of  God  found  among  savage  or  semi-civilized  na- 
tions are  corruptions  of  a  purer  and  older  form,  and  that  the 
tendency  of   mankind    is   thus  to   fall   away   from   a   primitive 


129 

monotheism.3  Whether  this  theory  can  be  maintained  nowa- 
days, I  will  not  here  discuss.  I  will  limit  myself  to  remarking 
that  it  is  far  from  rendering  the  argument  from  universal  con- 
sent unassailable.  This  argument  even  becomes  valueless  if  we 
take  into  account  the  fact,  attested  by  the  Biblical  relation  and 
generally  admitted  to-day  by  natural  science,  that  all  men  have 
come  from  a  single  stem.  The  force  of  the  argument  lies  in 
the  fact  that  a  notion  of  the  Deity  is  found  among  all  tribes  of 
men,  and  must  thus  be  due  to  human  nature  itself,  inasmuch 
as  an  error  or  a  fraud  might  have  crept  among  one  particular 
nation,  but  could  not  possess  a  universal  character.  Now  if  all 
men  had  a  common  origin,  if  there  was  at  the  beginning  a  single 
family,  it  may  be  perfectly  well  supposed  that  an  erroneous 
notion  has  been  accepted  by  this  family,  and,  transmitted  to  its 
posterity,  has  become  a  universal  error  of  the  human  race. 

The  arguments  we  have  described  as  a  ■posteriori  are  especially 
insisted  upon  by  St.  Thomas  and  his  modern  followers.  These 
arguments  invariably  start  from  the  knowledge  of  the  world 
given  in  experience,  and  rise  to  the  knowledge  of  God.  They 
assume  different  forms,  which  may  be  reduced  to  the  two  we 
shall  presently  expose. 

The  first  is  sometimes  described  as  "  physical  argument."  It 
starts  from  the  order  of  the  world,  the  perfect  adaptation  of 
means  to  ends  which  we  find  around  us,  and  concludes  that  such 
an  adaptation  evidently  points  to  the  existence  of  a  supreme 
Designer.  Absolutely  speaking,  a  casual  shock  of  atoms  might 
indeed  have  produced  the  world  such  as  it  is,  just  as  printing 
characters,  thrown  at  random,  might  give  the  play  of  Hamlet, 
but  the  chance  for  such  a  production  is  so  insignificant  that  it 
may  be  neglected. 

This  argument  has  received  a  severe  blow  from  Darwin's 
theory  of  natural  selection.  It  is  even  contended  that  it  has 
been  absolutely  killed.  It  is  morally  impossible  that  the  paw 
of  the  cat,  so  perfectly  adapted  to  the  catching  of  the  prey, 

3  Of.  Driscoll,  God,  pp.  29  ff. 

10 


130 

should  have  been  produced  by  a  casual  shock  of  atoms,  just  as 
it  is  morally  impossible  that  printing  types,  thrown  at  random, 
should  give  the  play  of  Hamlet.  But,  if  we  adopt  the  theory 
of  natural  selection;  if  we  admit  that  the  types  which  happen 
to  fall  in  the  definite  place  they  have  in  the  play  shall  persist 
in  existence  while  the  others  shall  disappear,  the  play  of  Hamlet 
will  fatally  be  produced. 

We  should  be  cautious,  however,  not  to  assert  too  hastily  that 
the  argument  from  design  has  been  absolutely  killed.  The 
hypothesis  of  natural  selection  explains  the  order  of  the  world 
without  taking  a  supreme  Designer  into  account.  But  what  of 
natural  selection  itself?  How  are  we  to  explain  the  tendency 
of  the  atoms  towards  definite  arrangements,  the  fact  that  some 
arrangements  persist  in  existence  while  others  are  destroyed? 
Instead  of  the  innate  tendency  of  the  atoms  towards  definite 
groups,  why  was  there  not  a  tendency  towards  a  perpetual  chaos? 
A  chaotic  cosmos  seems  indeed  the  only  possible  outcome  of  a 
mere  shock  of  atoms,  and  the  hypothesis  of  natural  selection  is 
a  nonsense  if  we  do  not  admit  finality.  All  the  perfections  of 
the  future  world  must  thus  be  supposed  to  exist  potentially  in 
the  originary  chaos,  and  the  necessity  of  a  designer  by  no  means 
disappears. 

The  metaphysical  argument  is  based  upon  the  principle  of 
causality.  The  fact  that  no  beginning  of  existence  can  happen 
without  a  cause  has  been  proved  in  our  chapter  on  metaphysics 
and  needs  not  be  insisted  upon.  In  the  metaphysical  argument, 
the  form  of  the  principle  of  causality  is  somewhat  modified. 
"  Whatever  does  not  exist  of  absolute  necessity,  it  is  contended, 
cannot  exist  without  a  proportionate  cause."4  Which  means 
that  the  cause,  considered  in  its  totality,  must  contain  a  perfec- 
tion at  least  equal  to  that  of  the  effect.  The  validity  of  this 
form  of  the  principle  of  causality  might  perhaps  be  questioned. 
It  is  strongly  defended  by  neo-Scholastics,  who  contend  that  if 
the  cause  failed  to  be  proportionate,  the  excess  of  the  effect 

4  Boedder,  Natural  Theology,  p.  33. 


131 

would  really  be  without  cause,  and  the  general  law  of  causality 
would  be  thereby  violated.5 

The  necessity  of  a  proportionate  cause  being  admitted,  the 
existence  of  a  Supreme  Mind  follows  as  a  necessary  consequence. 
A  clear  idea  of  the  Scholastic  line  of  reasoning  may  be  gathered 
from  the  following  three  propositions  in  which  the  argument 
may  be  summed  up : 

1.  There  are  changes  in  our  world,  and  these  changes  pre- 
suppose a  cause.  The  truth  of  this  first  proposition  has  been 
clearly  shown  in  our  chapter  on  metaphysics. 

2.  These  changes  presuppose  a  self -existing  cause.  If  the 
cause  of  the  changes  is  not  self- existing,  it  must  be  caused  by 
something  else.  This  something  else,  if  not  self-existing,  must 
also  be  caused,  and  we  must  finally  arrive  at  a  self-existing 
being;  otherwise  we  would  have  an  infinite  process,  and  no 
change  would  be  possible,  inasmuch  as  a  sufficient  cause  of  the 
change  could  never  be  found.  Thus  far  there  is  nothing  in  our 
argument  which  a  materialist  would  fail  to  admit.  A  self- 
existing  being  exists,  he  would  say,  but  we  need  not  go  beyond 
the  molecule,  the  atom,  the  material  world.  The  following 
proposition  separates  the  Scholastic  system  from  all  materialis- 
tic hypotheses: 

3.  This  self-existing  being  must  be  an,  immaterial  and  free 
being.  The  ultimate  cause  of  the  world  must  not  simply  be  a 
cause;  it  must  be  a  proportionate  cause.  The  world  contains 
immaterial  and  free  beings,  such  as  the  human  soul.  Therefore 
the  cause  of  the  world  must  be  an  immaterial  and  free  being, 
that  is  to  say,  a  personal  God. 

Section  3. — Attributes  of  God 

The  Divine  Being  of  the  Scholastics  possesses  three  funda- 
mental attributes:  he  is  infinite,  one  and  simple. 

The  doctrine  of  an  infinite  God  is  not  without  difficulty. 
Some  Catholic  philosophers  have  thought  that,  although  faith 

'Ibid.,  p.  34. 


132 

obliges  us  to  believe  in  the  infinity  of  the  Supreme  Being,  this 
infinity  cannot  strictly  be  proved  by  reason  alone.  In  a  recent 
article  of  the  Revue  de  Philosophie  (1906),  Mr.  Dessoulavy 
expressed  his  sympathy  for  Schiller's  thesis  on  this  subject. 
The  modern  followers  of  St.  Thomas,  however,  strongly  insist 
upon  the  capacity  of  philosophy  to  reach  a  knowledge  of  the 
infinity  of  God.  They  adopt  the  line  of  reasoning  which  led 
Aristotle  and  Thomas  Aquinas  to  the  concept  of  pure  actuality 
(actus  purus). 

Every  finite  being,  they  argue,  consists  of  actuality  and  po- 
tency: of  actuality  in  so  far  as  it  possesses  some  perfections; 
of  potency,  in  so  far  as  it  is  capable  of  acquiring  the  perfections 
it  does  not  possess.  Now  the  actual  is  logically  anterior  to  the 
potential,  because  a  potential  being  cannot  become  actual  unless 
it  be  acted  upon  by  an  actual  being.  The  ultimate  cause  of 
reality  must  not  therefore  contain  any  potentiality;  otherwise  it 
would  presuppose  another  cause  and  would  not  be  ultimate.  Tt 
must  be  pure  actuality,  and  accordingly  possess  all  perfections 
in  an  infinite  degree.6 

From  the  infinity  of  God  follows  his  unity  as  a  logical  conse- 
quence. If  there  were  several  Gods,  they  should  differ  in  some 
characteristics.  Each  of  them  would  thus  lack  the  peculiar 
perfections  which  characterize  the  others,  and  none  could  be 
infinite.7 

The  proof  of  God's  simplicity  rests  upon  his  self -existence. 
Whatever  is  compound  depends  upon  its  constituent  elements 
and  upon  the  cause  of  their  union.  As  God  is  the  ultimate 
ground  of  all  reality,  he  cannot  depend  upon  anything  else  and 
must  be  absolutely  simple.8 

From  these  three  fundamental  attributes,  all  attributes  of  the 

Mf.  Thomas  Aquinas,  C.  G.,  lib.  1,  cap.  16;  also  Garrigou-Lagrange, 
Le  Dieu  iini  du  Pragmatisme,  Rev.  des  set.  philos.  et  theol.,  1907,  pp. 
252  ff. 

M'f.  Thomas  Aquinas,  Summa  Theol.,  P.  1,  Q.  11,  art.  3. 

8Cf.  Thomas  Aquinas,  Summa  Theol.,  P.  1,  Q.  3,  art.  7;  Boedder, 
Natural  Theology,  p.  93. 


133 

Divine  Being  are  derived.  They  are  not  all,  however,  estab- 
lished in  the  same  way.  As  our  intuitive  knowledge  is  limited 
to  finite  beings,  it  is  from  these  finite  beings  that  we  must  rise 
to  a  conception  of  the  infinite.  Now  the  attributes  of  creatures 
are  of  several  orders:  some  involve  imperfection,  others  do  not. 
The  attributes  which  involve  imperfection,  such  as  extension,  rea- 
son, etc.,  cannot  be  predicated  of  God  who  is  infinitely  perfect. 
Those  which  involve  no  imperfection,  such  as  intelligence,  power, 
etc.,  are  properly  in  God.  But  whereas  finite  beings  possess 
these  attributes  in  a  limited  degree,  God,  in  virtue  of  his  in- 
finity, possesses  them  as  boundless  and  infinite. 

The  attributes  of  the  Supreme  Being  may  be  therefore  classi- 
fied into  negative  and  positive. 

The  negative  attributes  are  immutability,  eternity  and  im- 
mensity. They  do  not  give  us  any  real  knowledge  of  God. 
They  simply  remove  from  the  conception  of  the  Infinite  some 
imperfections  attached  to  finite  things.  They  do  not  show  us 
what  God  is,  but  what  he  is  not. 

God's  immutability  is  closely  connected  with  his  infinity. 
Whatever  admits  of  change  is  not  infinitely  perfect.  It  lacks 
at  some  moment  of  its  existence  the  perfections  it  subsequently 
acquires.  It  possesses  some  potentiality  and  is  not,  like  the 
Divine  Being,  absolutely  actual. 

God's  eternity  can  be  proved  in  a  similar  way.  When  the 
Scholastics  assert  that  God  is  eternal,  they  do  not,  as  is  some- 
times supposed,  simply  mean  that  he  had  no  beginning  and  shall 
know  no  end;  they  also  remove  from  his  conception  the  element 
of  succession.  They  mean  that  there  exists  for  him  no  past  and 
no  future;  that  his  being  is  a  perennial  present. 

We  have  already  touched  upon  the  question  of  God's  im- 
mensity in  our  chapter  on  Psychology.  We  have  shown  that,  in 
St.  Thomas's  view,  the  assertion  that  "  God  is  everywhere  "  does 
not  mean  that  he  is  present  in  all  parts  of  space  as  bodies  are. 
It  means  that  he  acts  upon  all  things;  tbat  he  is  present  in 
them  by  a  contact  of  virtue,  not  by  a  contact  of  quantity. 


134 

The  positive  attributes  of  the  Divine  Being  are  his  knowledge, 
his  will,  and  his  omnipotence. 

God  has  a  comprehensive  knowledge  of  his  essence,  and  in  his 
own  essence  he  sees  the  essences  of  all  real  and  possible  things. 
His  knowldge  extends  to  the  contingent  as  well  as  to  the  neces- 
sary; and,  inasmuch  as  he  is  eternal,  to  the  future  as  well  as 
to  the  past. 

The  faculty  of  will  consisting  in  the  love  of  the  object  pre- 
sented by  the  intellect  as  good,  involves  no  imperfection  and 
must  be  found  in  the  Supreme  Being.  God  loves  his  own  es- 
sence necessarily,  because  his  essence  is  the  supreme  and  infinite 
good,  and  is  therefore  worthy  of  an  infinite  love.  His  love  for 
creatures  is  an  outcome  of  the  love  he  bears  to  himself.  It  is 
in  his  own  essence  that  he  knows  all  finite  beings,  of  which  his 
essence  is  the  prototype.  It  is  in  his  own  essence  that  he  loves 
all  finite  beings,  the  perfections  and  the  goodness  of  which  are 
found  in  his  essence  in  an  infinite  degree. 

God  is  also  omnipotent.  He  can  do  by  a  single  act  of  will 
whatever  is  not  intrinsically  impossible.  As  for  things  whose 
concept  involves  a  contradiction — such  as  a  square  circle,  or  a 
man  being  an  ass — it  is  only  an  improper  use  of  the  terms  that 
leads  us  to  assert  that  God  cannot  do  them:  it  would  be  more 
correct  to  say  that  the  things  themselves  cannot  be  done.  They 
involve  a  contradiction,  and  the  Infinite  Being  must  above  all 
be  self-consistent.  It  is  the  same  self-consistency  that  explains 
how  God  cannot  possibly  commit  sinful  acts.  The  essence  of 
sin  consisting,  not  precisely  in  the  production  of  an  effect,  but 
in  the  opposition  of  our  free  will  to  the  eternal  law  of  God,  its 
presence  in  the  Divine  Being  would  involve  the  denial  of  his 
own  self. 

The  preceding  classification  of  the  attributes  of  God  should 
not,  however,  lead  us  to  believe  that  the  Divine  Essence  is  con- 
sidered by  Thomists  as  divided  into  separate  and  unconnected 
compartments.     Hegel's  reproach  against  the  old  Metaphysics, 


135 

of  cutting  off  from  their  connection  the  tenns  of  thought,9  is 
absolutely  unjust  if  directed  against  Scholastic  speculation. 
St.  Thomas  and  his  followers  insist  upon  the  physical  and  meta- 
physical simplicity  of  the  Divine  Being.  We  assign  attributes 
to  God,  it  is  true;  but  we  must  not  forget  that  these  attribues, 
although  different  for  us,  are  essentially  one  in  God.  God  is 
his  essence,  or  his  nature;10  his  essence  is  his  own  being;11  his 
intellect  his  own  being;12  his  will  is  also  his  own  being.13  If 
we  are  compelled  to  study  his  attributes  separately,  it  is  on 
account  of  the  imperfection  of  our  mind,  which,  being  essentially 
finite,  cannot  grasp  the  Infinite:  " Balbutiendo,  ut  possumux, 
excclsa  Dei  resonamus.'ni 

9  Hegel,  Logic,  Wallace's  ed.,  pp.  60  ff. 

10  Thomas  Aquinas,  Summa  Theol.,  P.  1,  Q.  3,  art.  3. 
u  Ibid..  P.  1,  Q.  3,  art.  4. 

11  Ibid.,  P.  1,  Q.  14,  art.  4. 
"Ibid.,  P.  1,  Q.  19,  art.  1. 

14  Ibid.,  P.  1,  Q.  4,  art.  1,  ad  1. 


CHAPTER    VII 
SCHOLASTIC    MORAL    PHILOSOPHY 

According  to  Mr.  De  Wulf,  the  essential  characteristics  of 
the  Scholastic  system  of  ethics  may  be  reduced  to  two  heads:  it 
is  eudemonistic  and  libertarian. 

In  order  to  form  a  clear  conception  of  the  nature  of  this 
eudemonism,  a  few  considerations  about  the  necessary  conditions 
underlying  the  activity  of  all  beings  will  not  be  out  of  place 
here. 

Waiving  all  other  considerations,  it  must  be  admitted  that  all 
agents  act  for  a  definite  end.  This  is  true  not  only  of  conscious 
beings,  but  likewise  of  inanimate  objects.  It  follows  as  a  neces- 
sary consequence  from  the  fact  that  our  cosmos  presents  us  with 
distinct  individuals,  each  of  which  is  endowed  with  a  peculiar 
nature.  When  dynamite  blows  up  an  edifice,  it  acts  towards 
an  end  as  well  as  the  acorn  when  it  becomes  an  oak.  Like  the 
acorn,  it  possesses  an  essential  character,  definite  potentialities 
which,  under  proper  conditions,  will  forcibly  become  actual. 
The  only  difference  that  exists  between  the  potentiality  of  the 
inorganic  and  of  the  organic  world  lies  in  the  fact  that  inorganic 
agents  do  not  possess  any  principle  of  self-actuation,  and  there- 
fore they  do  not  act  except  when  moved  by  some  external  cause. 
Organic  beings,  on  the  other  hand,  are  endowed  with  an  inner 
principle  of  self-determination.  It  is  in  this  very  principle  that 
the  essence  of  life  consists:  "The  living  being,"  says  St. 
Thomas,  "  is  the  one  that  can  move  itself,"  "  Vita  est  substantia 
cui  conrrnit  secundum  naturam  suam  movcrc  seipsam."1 

Plants,  however,  although  self-determined,  are  not  conscious 
of  the  end  toward  which  their  own  nature  compels  them  to  tend. 

1  Thomas  Aquinas,  Summa  Thool.,  P.   1,  Q.   18,  art.  2,  c. 

136 


137 

They  are  thus  inferior  to  sentient  beings,  whose  essential  charac- 
teristic is  a  more  or  less  clear  consciousness  of  their  own  peculiar 
activities.  Man  alone  possesses  an  intellectual  knowledge  of  his 
end,  because  he  is  the  only  being  endowed  with  reason  and  capa- 
ble of  forming  universal  concepts.  He  alone  properly  knows 
his  end  and  can  adopt  the  most  suitable  means  to  reach  it.  He 
alone  is  a  moral  being. 

Ends  may  be  divided  into  proximate  and  ultimate.  Proxi- 
mate ends  are  those  that  are  not  desired  for  themselves;  but  only 
in  so  far  as  they  are  steps  towards  the  attaining  of  ultimate 
ends.  Strictly  speaking,  they  are  not  ends,  but  means.  Ulti- 
mate ends  are  desired  for  their  own  sake  and  therefore  they  are 
not  subservient  to  anything  else.  If  we  consider  health  as  the 
ultimate  end  a  sick  man  has  in  view — an  end  which  cannot  be 
ultimate  for  him  in  so  far  as  he  is  a  man,  but  only  in  so  far 
as  he  is  a  sick  man — the  acquiring  of  the  remedies  which  he  is 
obliged  to  take  in  order  to  get  rid  of  his  disease  will  be  a  proxi- 
mate end. 

Proximate  ends  being  thus  properly  means,  an  infinite  series 
of  such  ends  becomes  absurd,  and  we  must  admit  that  rational 
beings  not  only  act  for  an  end,  but  for  an  ultimate  end. 

The  great  question  of  morality  consists  therefore  in  the  deter- 
mination of  the  ultimate  end  of  man.  All  actions  subservient 
to  this  end  will  be  good;  all  actions  inconsistent  with  this  end 
will  be  bad.  Now,  if  this  world  of  ours  is  rational,  we  must 
admit  that  the  end  of  all  beings  is  true  to  their  nature.  It  can- 
not be  but  the  actualization  of  the  potentialities  they  contain, 
the  unfolding  of  the  latent  perfections  which  constitute  their 
very  essence. 

This  most  important  truth  hns  been  relegated  to  oblivion  by 
all  that  put  the  foundation  of  morality  on  a  mere  external 
principle. 

Whether  we  build  our  ethical  system  upon  the  common  con- 
sent of  mankind,  as  Saint-Lambert  did,  or  upon  the  civil  law, 
as   llobbes,  or  upon  the  will  of  God,  ;is  Cruaras,  we  remove 


138 

rationality  from  our  world,  and,  by  so  doing,  we  destroy  mor- 
ality itself.  All  external  systems  of  ethics  imply  that  no  action 
is  good  or  bad  in  itself;  that  an  act  we  now  regard  as  good  would 
be  bad  if  some  determinate  free  agent  had  willed  it  so;  might 
become  bad  this  very  day  if  the  will  or  the  caprice  of  the  law- 
giver should  vary.  Under  such  conditions  no  science  of  ethics 
is  possible. 

The  end  of  man  is  thus  the  complete  actualization  of  his 
nature — or  to  use  a  term  current  in  ancient  Greece — perfect 
happiness. 

Here  Scholastic  ethics  meets  a  powerful  adversary  which, 
under  a  variety  of  forms,  has  controlled  modern  thought,  has 
assumed  different  garbs  according  to  the  varying  circumstances, 
and,  repeatedly  unmasked,  has  appeared  again  and  again,  its 
appearance  being  the  signal  for  prolonged  applause;  a  system 
which,  under  the  specious  names  of  hedonism.  Epicurianism, 
utilitarianism,  is  to-day  perhaps  more  vigorous  than  ever  and 
prides  itself  upon  its  able  defenders  and  legions  of  adherents. 

The  difference  between  hedonism  and  Scholasticism  lies  in 
this:  Hedonism  inculcates  that  pleasure  is  the  ultimate  criterion 
of  morality,  and  that  an  action  is  good  only  in  so  far  as  it  is 
pleasurable;  whereas  for  Scholasticism  goodness  lies  in  the 
nature  of  the  act  itself,  and  pleasure  is  simply  an  effect  which 
may  follow  from  a  moral  act,  which  will  necessarily  accompany 
the  good  in  the  long  run,  but  which  is  not  the  good. 

A?  hedonists  often  allege  the  authority  of  1'lato  and  Aristotle 
in  support  of  their  theory,  it  will  be  worth  while,  before  expos- 
ing the  prime  defect  of  Hedonism,  to  quote  a  few  passages  which 
clearly  show  that  Plato  and  Aristotle  did  not  confuse  the  pleas- 
urable with  the  good,  and  that  furthermore  they  held,  in  regard 
to  the  final  end  of  man,  the  very  beliefs  that  characterize  the 
ethical  system  of  the  Scholastics. 

The  first  passage  IS  taken  from  Flato's  CJorgias: 

"Listen  in  me,  then,  while  I  recapitulate  the  argument:  l> 
the  pleasant   the  same  as  the  good?     Not  the  same.     Callicles 


139 

and  I  are  agreed  about  that.  And  is  the  pleasant  to  be  pursued 
for  the  sake  of  the  good?  or  the  good  for  the  sake  of  the  pleas- 
ant? The  pleasant  is  to  be  pursued  for  the  sake  of  the  good. 
And  that  is  the  pleasant  at  the  presence  of  which  we  are  pleased, 
and  that  is  good  at  the  presence  of  which  we  are  good?  To  be 
sure.  And  we  are  good,  and  all  good  things  whatever  are  good 
when  some  virtue  is  present  in  them?  That,  Callicles,  is  my 
conviction.  But  the  virtue  of  each  thing  whether  body  or  soul, 
instrument  or  creature,  when  given  to  them  in  the  best  way, 
comes  to  them  not  by  chance,  but  as  the  result  of  the  order  and 
truth  and  art  which  are  imparted  to  them.  Am  I  not  right? 
I  maintain  that  I  am.  .  .  .  And  is  not  the  soul  which  has  an 
order  of  her  own  better  than  that  which  has  no  order  of  her 
own  ?  Certainly.  And  the  soul  which  has  an  order  is  orderly  ? 
Of  course.  And  that  which  is  orderly  is  temperate?  Assuredly. 
And  the  temperate  soul  is  good?  No  other  answer  can  I  give, 
Callicles  dear.  ...  If  the  temperate  soul  is  the  good  soul,  the 
soul  which  is  in  the  opposite  condition,  that  is  the  foolish  and 
intemperate  is  the  bad  soul. 

"  And  will  not  the  temperate  man  do  what  is  proper,  both  in 
relation  to  gods  and  men;  for  he  would  not  be  temperate  if  he 
did  not  what  is  proper?  Yes,  certainly.  And  in  his  relation 
to  other  men  he  will  do  what  is  just,  and  in  his  relation  to  the 
gods  he  will  do  what  is  holy;  and  he  who  does  what  is  just  and 
holy  cannot  be  other  than  just  and  holy?  Very  true.  And 
he  must  be  courageous,  for  the  duty  of  a  temperate  man  is  not 
to  follow  or  to  avoid  what  he  ought  not,  but  what  he  ought, 
whether  things,  or  men,  or  pleasures,  or  pains,  and  patiently  to 
endure  what  he  ought ;  and  therefore,  Callicles,  the  temperate 
man,  being,  as  we  have  described,  also  just  and  courageous  and 
holy,  cannot  be  other  than  a  perfectly  good  man,  nor  can  the 
good  man  do  otherwise  than  well  and  perfectly  whatever  he 
does;  and  he  who  does  well  must  of  necessity  be  happy  and 
blessed,  and  the  evil  man  who  docs  evil  miserable."2 

As  we  see,  happiness  is  by  no  means  identified  with  pleasure. 
Tt  consists  in  a  certain  virtue,  in  an  order  which  characterizes 
the  soul  of  the  good  man.  The  temperate  soul  is  the  good  soul ; 
the  foolish  and  intemperate  is  the  bad  soul. 

1  Plato,  Dialogues,  Jowett's  oil..  Vol.  3,  pp.  97-98. 


140 

A  similar  doctrine  is  held  by  Aristotle.  In  the  first  book  of 
his  Nicomachean  Ethics,  he  teaches  that  happiness  is  neither 
pleasure,  nor  honor,  nor  wealth,  but  "  an  energy  of  the  soul 
according  to  virtue."     These  are  Aristotle's  own  words : 

"  Men  seem  not  unreasonably  to  form  their  notion  of  the 
good,  and  of  happiness,  from  observing  the  different  lives  which 
men  lead.  The  many  and  most  sordid  class  suppose  it  to  be 
pleasure,  and  therefore  they  are  content  with  a  life  of  enjoy- 
ment.3 

"  But,  perhaps,  to  say  that  happiness  is  the  greatest  good, 
appears  like  stating  something  which  is  already  granted;  and  it 
is  desirable  that  we  should  explain  still  more  clearly  what  it  is. 
Perhaps,  then,  this  may  be  done,  if  we  take  the  peculiar  work  of 
man;  for  as  to  the  musician,  and  statuary,  and  to  every  artist, 
and  in  short  to  all  who  have  any  work  or  course  of  action,  the 
good  and  excellence  of  each  appears  to  consist  in  their  peculiar 
work ;  so  would  it  appear  to  be  with  man,  if  there  is  any  peculiar 
work  belonging  to  him  .  .  . 

"  What,  then,  must  this  peculiar  work  be?  For  life  man 
appears  to  share  in  common  with  plants;  but  his  peculiar  work 
is  the  object  of  our  inquiry :  we  must,  therefore,  separate  the 
life  of  nutrition  and  growth.  Then  a  kind  of  sensitive  life 
would  next  follow ;  but  this  also  he  appears  to  enjoy  in  common 
with  the  horse,  the  ox,  and  every  animal.  There  remains,  there- 
fore, a  certain  practical  life  of  a  being  which  possesses  reason; 
and  of  this  one  part  is,  as  it  were,  obedient  to  reason,  the  other 
as  possessing  it,  and  exercising  intellect.  But  this  life  also 
being  spoken  in  two  ways  (according  to  energy  and  according 
to  habit),  we  must  take  that  according  to  energy;  for  that 
appears  to  be  more  properly  so  called.  Now  if  the  work  of 
man,  and  of  a  good  man,  is  the  same  generically,  as  in  the  case 
of  a  harper,  and  a  good  harper  (and  so,  in  short,  in  all  cases, 
superiority  in  each  partieular  excellence  being  added  to  each 
particular  work)  ;  for  it  is  the  work  of  a  harper  to  play,  of  a 
good  harper  to  play  well :  and  if  we  assume  the  peculiar  work 
of  man  to  be  a  kind  of  life,  and  this  life  an  energy  of  the  soul 
and  actions  performed  with  reason;  and  the  peculiar  work  of 
ri  good  man  to  be  the  same  things  done  well,  ami  honorably;  and 
everything  to  be  complete  according  to   its   proper  excellence: 

'Aristotle,  NTicomachean  Ethics,  Bk.  l.  chap.  5;   Browne's  ed.,  p.  7. 


141 

if,  I  repeat,  these  things  are  true,  it  follows,  that  man's  chief 
good  is  "  an  energy  of  the  soul  according  to  virtue  " ;  but  if  the 
virtues  are  more  than  one,  according  to  the  best  and  most  per- 
fect virtue;  and  besides  this,  we  must  add,  in  a  perfect  life:  for 
as  neither  one  swallow,  nor  one  day,  makes  a  spring;  so  neither 
does  one  day,  nor  a  short  time,  make  a  man  blessed  and 
happy/'4 

Let  us  now  directly  examine  hedonism  itself. 

In  the  first  place,  it  sounds  like  a  truism  to  say  that  the 
words  "  good "  and  "  pleasurable "  cannot  be  unqualifiedly 
taken  as  convertible  terms.  The  common  belief  of  mankind 
looks  upon  as  good  many  actions  that  do  not  bring  any  real 
pleasure  to  their  authors.  The  payment  of  a  debt,  charity  to 
the  poor,  self-sacrifice,  are  praised  all  over  the  world.  On  the 
other  hand,  many  acts  bringing  great  pleasure  are  universally 
condemned.  The  drunkard  and  the  libertine  are  objects  of 
contempt  to  every  right-thinking  man. 

Hedonists  meet  this  objection  by  saying  that  the  pleasure 
given  as  the  basis  of  our  conduct  is  not  the  particular  pleasure 
of  the  moment,  but  the  pleasure  in  the  long  run.  The  presently 
expected  satisfaction  is  a  worthy  motive  of  action  only  in  so  far 
as  it  does  not  make  impossible  the  attainment  of  a  satisfaction 
more  remote.  Although  in  some  particular  cases,  the  pursuit  of 
a  proximate  satisfaction  is  not  to  be  considered  as  inferior  to 
that  of  ultimate  gratifications,  it  is  none  the  less  a  fundamental 
principle  that  the  guidance  by  simple  and  immediate  feelings 
must  be  subordinated  to  the  authority  of  higher  and  more  com- 
plex feelings. 

It  cannot  be  denied  that  hedonism  thus  explained  contains  a 
great  deal  of  truth.  The  egoistic  element  of  all  our  acts  must 
be  frankly  recognized.  The  }>oor  workman  who  trods  under 
foot  his  inordinate  thirst  for  intoxicating  liquor  in  order  that 
his  wife  and  children  may  have  Bome  bread  to  eat,  relinquishes 
an  immediate  good  to  obtain  a  more  distant  good,  the  welfare 

*  Ibid.,   Bk.   1.  chap.  7:    Browne's  od..  pp.   15-17. 


142 

and  happiness  of  his  family,  and.  as  a  eonsequenee,  his  own 
peace  and  jov  at  home.  The  sister  of  charity,  who  leaves  her 
home  ami  parents,  who  renounces  forever  the  most  legitimate 
joys  of  life,  the  pleasures  that  the  matrimonial  state  and  the 
rearing  of  children  would  hring  to  her ;  who  spends  her  days 
and  her  nights  at  the  bedside  of  a  poor  sick  man  whom  she  has 
never  met  before,  to  whom  she  feels  attached  by  no  earthly 
bonds,  whom  nevertheless  she  attends  with  all  the  painstaking 
cares  of  a  most  devoted  mother,  whom  she  finally  snatches  from 
the  claws  of  death,  expecting  no  earthly  reward,  knowing  full 
well  that  the  only  prize  of  her  self-abnegation  will  be  an  un- 
timely death;  this  sister  of  charity,  whose  whole  life  seems  to 
be  a  glowing  impersonation  of  altruism,  is,  from  a  hedonistic 
point  of  view,  just  as  selfish  as  the  most  vulgar  man.  She 
renounces  the  pleasures  of  this  world  to  enjoy  the  pleasures  of 
the  world  to  come.  She  abandons  relatives,  riches,  life  itself, 
all  finite  and  perishable  goods,  to  secure  the  possession  of  treas- 
ures that  never  fade  nor  grow  old.  The  prize  she  covets  is  none 
less  than  God  himself. 

Pleasurable  actions,  however,  can  be  made  co-extensive  with 
good  actions  only  in  assuming  there  is  a  future  life.  As  many 
hedonists  would  be  loath  to  take  such  a  life  into  account,  would 
rather  profess  with  Hegel  that  this  every-day  world,  what  is  here 
and  now,  has  been  a  very  good  exchange  for  the  shadowy  other- 
world  about  which  ancient  philosophers  worried  themselves  sick, 
there  will  come  in  their  way  a  great  many  facts  which  their 
system — in  the  form  we  are  at  present  considering — will  be 
unable  to  explain.  No  future  gratification,  if  we  simply  con- 
sider this  actual  world  of  ours,  can  possibly  accrue  to  the 
soldier  who,  in  a  brave  fight  against  the  foes  of  his  country, 
dies  the  death  of  a  hero  on  the  battlefield.  If  he  is  unknown 
to  the  world,  lie  will  not  even  reach  the  glory  of  having  his  name 
recorded  in  the  annals  of  his  country ;  he  will  not  be  held  up  to 
the  school-boys  of  future  generations  as  the  ideal  citizen. 
Obscure  in  life;  still  more  obscure  in  death.     No  man,  however, 


143 

would  call  into  question  the  intrinsic  worth  of  his  heroic  death. 

Facts  of  this  kind  have  caused  the  downfall  of  individual 
hedonism  and  given  birth  to  the  celebrated  formula,  so  univer- 
sally admitted  by  hedonists  to-day :  "  the  greatest  good  for  the 
greatest  number."  In  this  new  form  of  the  system,  not  only 
must  immediate  satisfactions  give  way  to  satisfactions  more 
remote,  but  the  present  and  the  future  pleasures  of  the  indi- 
vidual must  be  subordinated  to  the  pleasures  of  the  whole  com- 
munity. All  forms  of  self-sacrifice  are  thus  easily  justified. 
The  sister  of  charity  will  die  in  her  prime  of  life  at  her  post 
of  duty,  but  the  hundreds  of  unfortunate  people  whom  she  has 
rescued  from  death  will  live  and  society  will  be  benefited.  The 
hero  will  be  killed  on  the  battlefield,  but  his  country  will  be 
saved. 

Scholastic  moralists  would  admit  that  pleasure  and  good  are 
co-extensive.  If  good  actions  are  those  performed  in  harmony 
with  our  nature,  they  must  needs  produce  pleasurable  results  at 
the  present  moment  or  at  some  future  time.  We  cannot  deny 
this  principle  without  denying  the  rational  character  of  our 
world.  And  as  here  below  many  deeds,  universally  regarded  as 
good,  do  not  give  rise  to  any  pleasurable  consequence,  there 
must  exist  a  more  perfect  world,  in  which  whatever  seems  irra- 
tional in  this  will  be  rectified.  But,  although  pleasure  and  good 
are  co-extensive,  they  are  far  from  being  identical  terms.  Pleas- 
ure bears  to  good  the  relation  of  an  effect  to  its  cause.  A  good 
action  will  produce  pleasurable  results ;  but  it  will  produce  them 
on  account  of  its  own  inherent  nature.  The  goodness  will 
belong  to  the  elements  of  the  action  itself,  regardless  of  the 
consequences  that  may  possibly  follow  from  it.  A  ripe  apple 
will  give  rise  to  pleasant  gustatory  impressions,  but  those  im- 
pressions will  be  due  to  the  peculiar  nature  and  disposition  of 
the  atoms  of  the  apple  itself,  which  will  thus  possess  an  intrinsic 
goodness,  independently  of  the  sensations  it  may  produce.  And 
if  the  apple  decays,  it  is  in  the  apple  itself  that  a  change  from 
good  to  bad  will  occur:  it  will  be  bad  even  if  nobody  ever  tastes 


144 

it  What  is  true  of  an  external  object  is  likewise  true  of  all 
that  belongs  to  the  inner  nature  of  man.  All  our  acts  possess 
a  value  of  their  own,  which  must  be  regarded  as  primary,  while 
the  ensuing  consequences  are  looked  upon  as  only  secondary. 
The  good  is  thus  identifiable  with  what  is  in  harmony  with  our 
nature.  But  as  we  are  endowed  with  several  orders  of  faculties, 
as  we  are  made  up  of  body  and  soul,  and  thereby  possess  a 
sensuous  and  an  intellectual  appetite,  the  gratification  of  our 
lower  impulses  must  be  subordinated  to  our  nobler  energies. 
We  must  live  according  to  our  nature,  but  to  our  whole  nature. 
The  satisfaction  of  a  sensuous  desire  is  thus  good  in  itself,  but 
becomes  bad  if  the  exercise  of  a  nobler  faculty  is  thwarted 
thereby : 

"  Delectationes  corporales,"  says  St.  Thomas,  "  sunt  secundum 
partem  sensitivam,  qua?  regulatur  ratione:  et  ideo  indigent  tem- 
perari  et  refisenari  per  rationem."5 

The  assertion  that  the  satisfaction  of  a  sensuous  desire  is  good 
in  itself  puts  Scholastic  moralists  in  conflict  with  the  author  of 
the  Critique  of  Practical  Reason.  According  to  Immanuel 
Kant,  a  work  is  good  when  it  is  done,  not  only  from  duty,  but 
from  pure  duty.6  Whenever  some  natural  impulse  furnishes 
the  motive  of  a  good  deed,  this  deed  is  thereby  deprived  of  its 
moral  worth.  Our  actions  must  spring  from  duty  alone,  and 
not  from  any  natural  inclination  whatsoever: 

"  To  be  beneficent  when  we  can  is  a  duty,"  says  Kant,  "  and 
besides  this  there  are  many  minds  so  sympathetically  constituted 
that,  without  any  other  motive  of  vanity  or  self-interest,  they 
find  a  pleasure  in  spreading  joy  around  them,  and  can  take 
delight  in  the  satisfaction  of  others  so  far  as  it  is  their  own 
work.  But  1  maintain  that  in  such  a  case,  an  action  of  this 
kind,  however  proper,  however  amiable  it  may  be,  has  neverthe- 
less qo  true  moral  worth,  but  is  on  a  level  with  other  inclina- 
tions, e.  ;/.,  the  inclination  to  honor,  which,  if  it   is  happily 

•Thomas  Aquinas,  Bumma  Tneol.,  1-2,  Q.  31,  art.  r>.  ad  3. 

'  Kant.  Critique  <>f  Practical  Reason  and  ol  hex  works,  Abbott's  <■<!.,  p.  23. 


145 

directed  to  that  which  is  in  fact  of  public  utility  and  accordant 
with  duty,  and  consequently  honorable,  deserves  praise  and  en- 
couragement, but  not  esteem.  For  the  maxim  lacks  the  moral 
import,  namely,  that  such  actions  be  done  from  duty,  not  from 
inclination."7 

Kant's  system  of  morals,  perfectly  correct  in  so  far  as  it  recog- 
nizes that  moral  actions  must  spring  from  our  own  individuality, 
not  from  any  external  principle,  correct  also  when  it  points  out 
the  insufficiency  of  hedonism,  fails  to  recognize  the  legitimacy 
of  our  natural  inclinations.  Inconsistent  when  he  divides  our 
mind  into  two  compartments,  and  sets  the  practical  against  the 
pure  reason,  the  solitary  of  Koenigsberg  is  guilty  of  a  similar 
inconsistency  in  his  practical  realm.  He  splits  up,  as  it  were, 
our  intimate  self,  opposes  one  part  to  another,  cherishes  one 
fragment  as  genuine  and  praiseworthy,  rejects  the  other  as 
spurious  and  baneful.  He  prostrates  himself  before  the  cate- 
gorical imperative,  which  indeed  originates  from  the  very  depths 
of  our  soul,  is  God  himself  speaking  to  our  heart  and  making  us 
know  our  duties  through  the  voice  of  our  own  nature;  but,  at 
the  same  time,  he  condemns,  as  adequate  moral  motives,  those 
cravings,  those  natural  aspirations  which  form,  as  well  as  the 
voice  of  pure  duty,  a  constituent  part  of  our  own  selves.  His 
system,  repulsive  to  the  ordinary  man  for  its  barrenness,  incon- 
gruous with  the  common  beliefs  of  mankind  in  so  far  as  it 
deprives  of  moral  worth  not  only  the  charity  of  the  good-natured 
man,  but  the  sacrifice  of  the  hero  who  dies  for  his  country,  is 
inadmissible  in  the  world  of  thought  because  it  makes  man  a 
mere  bundle  of  contradictory  elements. 

The  second  characteristic  of  Scholastic  ethics  is  its  liber- 
tarianism. 

The  doctrine  of  free  will  has  been  so  often  misrepresented, 
and  rejected  on  that  account,  that  a  few  explanatory  remarks 
will  not  be  out  of  place  here.  It  is  quite  absurd  to  cal]  a  free 
volition  a  causeless  cause  or  a  motiveless  act.     Libertarians  are 

'  Ibid.,  p.  14. 
11 


146 

far  from  teaching  that  free  actions  are  done  without  a  motive: 
they  simply  contend  that  the  motive  does  not  necessarily  deter- 
mine our  will.  Our  will,  they  say,  is  a  rational  faculty  whose 
object  is  the  good.  Now  a  good  determines  our  will  only  if  it 
is  good  in  every  respect.  As  long  as  there  remains  in  it  some 
undesirable  aspect — as  is  the  case  with  all  the  finite  things  of 
this  world — our  will  has  not  what  it  naturally  tends  to,  perfect 
happiness,  and  is  not  therefore  necessarily  determined : 

"  Si  proponatur  aliquod  objectum  voluntati,  quod  sit  univer- 
Baliter  bonum,  et  secundum  omnem  considerationem,  ex  neces- 
sitate voluntas  in  illud  tendit,  si  aliquid  velit:  non  enim  poterit 
velle  oppositum:  si  autem  proponatur  sibi  aliquid  objectum, 
quod  non  secundum  quamlibet  considerationem  sit  bonum,  non 
ex  necessitate  voluntas  fertur  in  illud."8 

The  laborer  who.  after  toiling  laboriously  for  long  hours  every 
day,  brings  his  wife  the  fruit  of  his  toil  and  fatigue  instead  of 
spending  it  in  a  grog-shop,  certainly  acts  with  an  end  in  view. 
He  is  determined  by  a  motive;  but  his  own  consciousness  elo- 
quently testifies  that  this  motive  did  not  determine  his  will 
necessarily,  that  he  might  have  acted  otherwise. 

Scholastics  are  unanimous  in  regarding  free  will,  thus  under- 
stood, as  an  indispensable  presupposition  of  all  morality.  The 
recognition  of  this  truth  does  not  belong  solely  to  them.  Kant, 
whose  philosophy  lies  open  to  criticism  in  many  other  respects, 
joins  here  in  perfect  harmony  with  the  teachings  of  the  School. 
Free  will  has  a  conspicuous  place  in  his  system  of  ethics,  is 
indeed  its  corner-stone.  He  regards  it  as  an  essential  condition 
of  all  true  morality. 

I  f  we  start  from  fatalistic  principles,  if  we  regard  all  our  acts 
as  necessarily  determined  by  our  character  and  surroundings,  all 
possibility  of  acting  differently  from  what  we  did  disappears, 
and  the  words  merit  and  demerit  lose  all  their  significance. 

It  will  perhaps  seem  strange  that  a  philosophy  professing  to 

'Thomae  Aquinas,  Bumma  Theol.,  1-2,  Q.  10,  art.  2,  c. 


147 

be  a  revival  of  Thomism  should  defend  any  thesis  of  free  will. 
Many  non-Catholic  writers,  indeed,  look  upon  St.  Thomas  as  an 
angry  determinist.     We  will  limit  ourselves  to  two  quotations: 

"  In  the  first  place,"  says  Fullerton,  "  it  may  help  one  to  realize 
how  erroneous  is  the  current  notion  that  this  doctrine  (of  free 
will)  has  some  natural  connection  with  religion  and  good  mor- 
als, and  that  they  may  be  expected  to  be  found  in  conjunction. 
When  Stoic  and  Epicurean  are  placed  in  contrast,  it  is  certainly 
not  to  the  advantage  of  the  latter.  And  surely  no  man  can 
regard  x\ugustine  as  less  religious  than  Pelagius,  St.  Thomas  as 
less  religious  than  Duns  Scotus,  Luther  as  less  religious  than 
Erasmus,  and  Jansenius  as  less  religious  than  his  Jesuit  oppo- 
nents. A  glance  at  the  history  of  human  thought  tempts  one 
to  maintain  that  men  of  strong  religious  feeling  are  less  likely 
to  become  "  free-willists  "  than  other  men.  Their  peculiar  dan- 
ger appears  to  be  a  lapse  into  some  sort  of  fatalism."9 

Our  second  quotation  will  be  taken  from  the  Swiss  philoso- 
pher, Charles  Secretan: 

"II  (St.  Thomas)  attribue  la  coulpe  au  libre  arbitre  de  la 
volonte :  '  Hoc  enim  imputatur  alicui  in  culpam,  quum  deficit 
a  perfecta  actione  cujus  dominus  est  secundum  voluntatem.  .  .  . 
Deus  est  auctor  mali  paenae,  non  autem  mali  culpa?.'  Ces  decla- 
rations semblent  precises,  mais  elles  ne  sauraient  tenir  devant 
le  determinisme  absolu  qui  forme  la  base  de  tout  le  systeme."10 

And  a  little  further  on  he  continues: 

"  Le  libre  arbitre  n'est,  aux  yeux  du  dernier  Pere  de  l'Eglise, 
que  la  faculte  de  s'ecarter  de  la  raison.  II  n'est  done  pas  ques- 
tion de  libre  arbitre  en  Dieu."11 

•  Fullerton,  System  of  Metaphysics,  p.  557. 

10  Secretan,  La  Restauration  du  Thomisme;  Rev.  Philos.,  Vol.  18,  p.  78. 

11  Ibid.,  p.  78.  Let  us  compare  with  this  last  statement  the  following 
passage  from  St.  Thomas's  Summa  contra  Gentiles: 

"  Caput  LXXXVIII:  Quod  in  Deo  est  liberum  arbitrium.  Ex  predictis 
autem  ostendi  potest,  quod  in  Deo  lit>eruin  arbitrium  invenitur,  nam 
liberum  arbitrium  dicitur  respectu  eorum  quae  non  necessitate  quis  vult, 
Bed  propria  sponte;  unde  in  nobis  est  liberum  arbitrium  respectu  ejux 
quod  volumus  currere  vel  ambulare.  Deus  autem  alia  a  se  non  ex  neces- 
sitate vult,  ut  supra  ostensum  est.  Deo  igitur  liberum  arbitrium  habere 
competit "   (C.  (J.,  L.  1,  c.  88).     Riavm  teneatis,  amioit 


148 

Seeretan,  however,  does  not  feel  perfectly  at  ease.  He  feels 
no  doubt  about  St.  Thomas's  strict  determinism.  Nevertheless, 
he  is  compelled  to  recognize,  in  the  works  of  the  Angelic  Doctor, 
some  teachings  sounding  very  much  like  an  admission  of  free 
will.  He  concludes  that  a  contradiction  permeates  the  whole 
system : 

"  En  contradiction  flagrante  avec  son  determinisme,  avec  son 
optimisme  absolu,  avec  ses  doctrines  sur  l'etendue  de  la  causalite 
divine  et  sur  la  prescience  de  tous  les  futurs,  Thomas  professe 
eategoriquement  le  libre  arbitre."12 

Let  us  now  turn  to  the  works  of  St.  Thomas  himself  and  see 
whether  he  would  accept  as  his  the  doctrines  thus  imputed  to 
him.  We  shall  confine  ourselves  to  a  few  striking  passages,  and 
refer  those  who  should  desire  more  abundant  information  to  the 
Summa  Theologica,  the  Sum  ma  contra  Gentiles  and  the  Opus- 
cula,  of  which  a  thorough  study  is  necessary  for  a  complete 
understanding  of  the  philosophy  of  St.  Thomas,  and  in  which 
the  point  which  interests  us  at  present  is  repeatedly  and  ade- 
quately discussed. 

In  the  Summa  contra  Gentiles,  St.  Thomas  teaches  that  all 
intellectual  substances  are  endowed  with  free  will : 

"  Caput  XLVIII. — Quod  substantias  intellectuals  sunt  liberi 
arbitrii  in  agendo.  Ex  his  autem  apparet,  quod  praedictee  sub- 
stantia? sunt  liberi  arbitrii  in  agendo,  quod  enim  arbitrio  agant, 
manifestum  est  eo  quod  per  cognitionem  intellectivam  judicium 
habent  de  operandis.  libertatem  autem  necesse  est  eas  habere, 
si  habent  dominium  sui  actus,  ut  ostensum  est  (c.  47).  Sunt 
igitur  prasdictas  substantias  liberi  arbitrii  in  agendo."13 

He  gives  his  view  on  Divine  Providence,  and  professes  that 
it  does  not  interfere  with  the  free  will  of  man  : 

"  Caput  LXXIII. — Quod  divina  providcntia  non  excludit 
arbitrii  libertatem.     Ex  quo  patet  quod  providentia  divina  vol- 

12  Ibid.,  p.  82. 

11  C.  ().,   Lib.  2,  c.  48. 


149 

untatis  libertati  non  repugnat.  .  .  .  Per  gubernationem  cujus- 
cumque  providentis,  res  gubernata?  deducuntur  ad  finem  con- 
venientem;  unde  et  de  providentia  divina  Gregorius  Nyssenus 
dicit  (De  philos.,  1.  8,  c.  2)  quod  est  'voluntas  Dei  per  quam 
omnia  quae  sunt  convenientem  deductionem  accipiunt.'  Finis 
autem  ultimus  cujuslibet  creaturae  est  ut  consequatur  divinam 
similitudinem,  sicut  supra  (c.  17)  ostensum  est.  Esset  igitur 
providentiae  repugnans,  si  alicui  rei  subtraheretur  illud,  per 
quod  assequitur  similitudinem  divinam :  agens  autem  volunta- 
rium  assequitur  divinam  similitudinem  in  hoc,  quod  libere  agit: 
ostensum  est  enim  liberum  arbitrium  in  Deo  esse:  non  igitur 
per  providentiam  prohibetur  voluntatis  libertas."14 

In  the  same  chapter,  he  formally  condemns  the  determinism 
of  the  Stoics: 

"  Per  hoc  autem  excluditur  opinio  Stoycorum  qui  secundum 
ordinem  quendam  causarum  intransgressibilem,  quern  Graeci 
ymarmenen  vocabant,  omnia  ex  necessitate  dicebant  provenire."15 

In  his  Summa  Theologica,  his  most  perfect  work,  the  fruit  of 
his  maturer  years,  in  which  the  thought  of  his  whole  life  is  con- 
densed, the  same  truths  are  again  and  again  enunciated.  In  the 
83d  chapter  of  the  first  part,  he  unequivocally  admits  free  will 
in  man: 

"  Respondeo  dicendum,  quod  homo  est  liberi  arbitrii :  alioquin 
frustra  essent  consilia,  exhortationes,  praecepta,  prohibitiones, 
praemia,  et  pcenae.  Ad  cujus  evidentiam  considerandum  est, 
quod  quaedam  agunt  absque  judicio,  sicut  lapis  movetur  deor- 
sum;  et  similiter  omnia  cognitione  carentia.  Quaedam  autem 
agunt  judicio,  sed  non  libero,  sicut  animalia  bruta.  Judicat 
enim  ovis  videns  lupum,  eum  esse  fugiendum,  naturali  judicio, 
et  non  libero:  quia  non  ex  collatione,  sed  ex  naturali  instinctu 
hoc  judicat:  et  simile  est  de  quolibet  judicio  brutorum  anima- 
lium.  Sed  homo  agit  judicio:  quia  per  vim  cognoscitivam  judi- 
cat, aliquid  esse  fugiendum,  vel  prosequendum.  Sed  quia  judi- 
cium istud  non  est  ex  naturali  instinctu  in  particulari  operabili, 
sed  ex  collatione  quadain  rat  inn  is,  ideo  agit  libero  judicio,  potens 

'■*  C.  G.,  Lib.  3,  c.  73. 
15  C.  G.,  Lib.  3,  c.  73. 


150 

in  di versa  (Vrri :  ratio  onim  circa  contingens  habet  viam  ad  oppo- 
Bita,  ut  patet  in  Dialecticis  syllogismis,  et  Rhetoricis  persua- 
sionibus:  particularia  autem  operabilia  sunt  quaxlam  contin- 
gentia  et  ideo  circa  ea  judicium  rationia  ad  diversa  se  habet,  et 
non  est  determination  ad  unum.  Et  pro  tanto  necesse  est,  quod 
homo  sit  liberi  arbitrii  ex  hoc  ipso,  quod  rationalis  est."16 

He  even  teaches  that  free  acts  are  the  only  acts  that  may 
properly  be  styled  human : 

"  Respondeo  dicendum,  quod  actionum,  qua?  ab  homine  agun- 
tur,  illae  sola?  proprie  dicuntur  humana?,  qua?  sunt  propria?  hom- 
inis  inquantum  est  homo:  differt  autem  homo  ab  irrationalibus 
creaturis  in  hoc,  quod  est  suorum  actuum  dominus;  unde  ilia? 
sola?  actiones  vocantur  proprie  humana?,  quarum  homo  est  dom- 
inus; est  autem  homo  dominus  suorum  actuum  per  rationem  et 
voluntatem;  unde  et  liberum  arbitrium  esse  dicitur  facultas 
voluntatis,  et  rationis;  ilia?  ergo  actiones  proprie  humana?  dicun- 
tur, qua?  ex  voluntate  deliberata  proccdunt:  si  qua?  autem  alia? 
actiones  homini  conveniant,  possunt  dici  quidem  hominis  ac- 
tiones, sed  non  proprie  humana?,  cum  non  sint  hominis,  inquan- 
tum est  homo."17 

He  discusses  the  relations  of  God  to  man  more  closely  still 
than  in  the  Summa  contra  Gentiles,  and  reaches  the  same 
conclusions : 

"  Quia  igitur  voluntas  est  activum  principium  non  determina- 
tum ad  unum,  sed  indifferenter  sc  habens  ad  multa;  sic  Deus 
ipsam  movet,  quod  non  ex  necessitate  ad  unum  determinat,  sed 
remanet  motus  ejus  contingens,  et  non  necessarius,  nisi  in  his, 
ad  qua?  naturaliter  movetur."18 

Therefore,  there  cannot  be  the  slightest  doubt  as  regards  St. 
Thomas's  libertarianism.  It  must  be  admitted,  however,  that 
a  peculiar  doctrine  of  his,  universally  accepted  by  his  modern 
followers,  seems,  at  first  sight,  to  be  hardly  reconcilable  with 
human  liberty;  it  is  the  doctrine  of  prescience,  predestination 

■•Summa  Theol.,  P.  i,  Q.  83,  art.  1,  c. 
"Ibid.,  1-2.  Q.  ],  art.  1,  c. 
"Ibid.,  1-2,  Q.   10,  art.  4,  c. 


151 

and  reprobation.  St.  Thomas  asks  whether  men  are  predesti- 
nated by  God,  and  he  unreservedly  answers  that  they  are: 

"  Deo  conveniens  est  homines  praedestinare."19 

He  adds  that  God  reprobates  some  men;20  that  the  elect  are 
chosen  by  Him : 

"  Unde  praedestinatio  aliquorum  in  salutem  eternam  prsesup- 
ponit  secundum  rationem,  quod  Deus  illorum  velit  salutem.  Ad 
quod  pertinet  electio,  et  dilectio  "  ;21 

that  the  number  of  the  elect  is  certain  not  only  formally,  but 
materially;  that  is  to  say,  God  does  not  only  know  how  many 
men  will  be  saved;  but  he  also  knows  whether  John,  Peter  and 
Thomas  will  be  saved: 

"  Eespondeo  dicendum,  quod  numerus  praedestinatorum  est 
certus.  Sed  quidam  dixerunt,  eum  esse  certum  formaliter,  sed 
non  materialiter :  ut  puta,  si  diceremus  certum  esse,  quod  cen- 
tum, vel  mille  salventur,  non  autem  quod  hi,  vel  illi.  Sed  hoc 
tollit  certitudinem  praedestinationis,  de  qua  jam  diximus.  Et 
ideo  oportet  dicere,  quod  numerus  prasdestinatorum  sit  certus 
Deo  non  solum  formaliter,  sed  etiam  materialiter."22 

It  is  thus  clear  that,  according  to  this  view  of  St.  Thomas, 
God  knows  all  future  events;  that,  his  knowledge  being  immu- 
table, all  things  will  necessarily  come  to  pass  as  he  actually 
knows  them;  that  the  number  of  the  elect  is  thus  determined; 
that  God  knows,  with  regard  to  any  man,  not  only  whether  he 
will  be  saved  or  damned,  but  what  the  determination  of  his  will 
will  be  in  each  particular  case;  that  there  is  not  the  slightest 
possibility  for  any  one  of  us  to  change  in  the  least  degree  God's 
eternal  and  immutable  decrees  in  our  regard. 

We  do  not  deny  that  there  is  here  an  apparent  clash  with  St. 
Thomas's  teaching  about  free  will.     The  opposition  of  the  two 

"Ibid.,  1-2,  Q.  23,  art.   1,  c. 

"Ibid.,  1-2,  Q.  2.3.  art.  3. 

11  Ibid.,  1-2,  Q.  23,  art.  4,  c. 

-Ibid,,  1-2,  Q.  23.  art.  :;.  c. 


1 52 

doctrines,  however,  exists  only  in  appearance,  and  disappears  as 
soon  as  we  grasp  St.  Thomas's  conception  of  God.  His  theory 
of  the  Divine  Being  has  been  exposed  in  our  chapter  on  Natural 
Theology.  Suffice  it  to  recall  that  God  being  eternal,  there  is 
no  future  for  him,  but  a  perpetual  present.  He  has  not  existed 
through  an  infinite  temporal  series,  a  series  of  successive  instants 
of  which  there  was  no  beginning  and  which  shall  know  no  end; 
he  even  does  not  properly  exist:  He  is.  What  is  a  future  for 
us  is  thus  not  a  future  for  God,  and  it  is  only  an  imperfection 
of  our  language  that  compels  us  to  speak  of  God's  prescience. 
He  does  not  know  our  acts  before  we  perform  them;  he  knows 
them  as  actual.  His  knowledge  is  not  logically  anterior,  but 
posterior  to  the  free  determination  of  our  will.  It  is  hard  for 
us,  of  course,  limited  as  we  are  to  our  temporal  series,  to  have 
a  clear  conception  of  a  knowledge  of  this  kind.  We  may,  how- 
ever, have  an  idea  of  it — though  imperfect — by  considering  our 
own  knowledge  of  the  present  and  of  the  past.  We  actually 
know  that  John  has  done  this  and  Thomas  that,  and  our  knowl- 
edge does  not  interfere  in  the  least  with  the  freedom  of  their 
actions.  It  is  in  a  similar  way  that  God  knows  our  future 
deeds.  He  knows  them  as  done.  He  predestinates  some  men 
because  they  freely  act  in  accordance  with  the  moral  law;  he 
reprobates  others  because  they  freely  disobey  his  precepts;  he 
knows  how  many  men  will  be  saved  just  as  we  might  know  the 
exact  number  of  soldiers  who  were  slain  at  Gettysburg. 


CHAPTER    VIII 
FORERUNNERS    OF    THE    NEO-SCHOLASTIC    REVIVAL 

The  causes  which  led  to  the  downfall  of  Scholastic  philosophy 
in  the  fifteenth  century  may  be  classified  as  internal  and 
external. 

Among  the  external  causes  the  most  important  are : 

1.  The  humanistic  movement  which,  by  bringing  to  light  the 
literary  beauties  of  the  pagan  classics,  and  insisting  upon  the 
form  in  which  the  thoughts  were  expressed  rather  than  upon  the 
thoughts  themselves,  was  directly  opposed  to  the  spirit  which 
had  animated  the  schoolmen. 

2.  The  rapid  progress  of  natural  science  which,  after  having 
shown  the  insufficiency  of  the  old  physical  system,  extended  its 
condemnation  to  the  metaphysical  principles  with  which  this 
system  was  only  accidentally  connected. 

3.  The  rise  of  Protestantism  which,  by  its  opposition  to  the 
Church  of  Rome,  led  to  the  rejection  of  the  principle  of  author- 
ity and  incited  the  minds  of  the  new  generation  to  deny  or  to 
question  all  that  had  been  held  sacred  in  the  past. 

4.  The  invention  of  printing,  considered  by  Haureau  as  the 
event  which  gave  the  death-blow  to  Scholastic  metaphysics. 
During  the  thirteenth  and  fourteenth  century,  all  instruction 
was  forcibly  oral,  and  the  great  centers  of  learning,  in  which 
Scholasticism  predominated,  were  the  only  sources  from  which 
a  philosophical  instruction  could  be  obtained.  After  the  in- 
vention of  printing,  when  books  became  of  easy  access,  ;i  course 
in  the  universities  ceased  to  be  indispensable,  and  a  new  philos- 
ophy, systematically  opposed  to  the  teachings  of  the  schools, 
gradually  found  acceptance  among  the  people. 

The  very  supporters  of  Scholasticism  contributed,  however, 

153 


154 

more  than  anything  else,  to  discredit  the  system  they  were 
called  to  defend.  The  spirit  which  had  animated  the  great 
masters  of  the  thirteenth  century  had  completely  disappeared. 
Vain  subtlety  had  replaced  the  profound  reasoning  of  the  past. 
The  argument  from  authority,  considered  by  St.  Thomas  as 
the  weakest,  had  been  raised  to  an  undue  importance.  The 
new  scientific  spirit,  into  which  the  great  Scholastics  of  the 
thirteenth  century  would  have  so  eagerly  entered,  was  opposed 
with  unanimity  by  their  degenerate  successors.  Instead  of  har- 
monizing their  principles  with  the  new  physical  discoveries,  as 
Aristotle  and  Thomas  Aquinas  would  have  done,  they  opposed 
with  all  their  might  the  very  spirit  of  their  time.  They  de- 
clared it  to  be  opposed  to  the  philosophical  doctrines  they  cher- 
ished, and  thus  raised  an  unnecessary  and  unequal  struggle,  in 
which  the  old  Metaphysics  was  doomed  to  perish. 

Scholastic  philosophy  did  not,  however,  completely  disappear. 
An  important  movement  of  Thomistic  revival  took  place  during 
the  sixteenth  century  and  enriched  Scholastic  literature  with 
many  eminent  contributions.  Thomas  de  Vio  Cajetanus  (1469- 
1534),  Vasquez  (1551-1604),  Toletus  (1532-1596),  Fonseca 
(1528-1599),  and  especially  Suarez  (1548-1617),  were  pro- 
found thinkers,  worthy  of  the  great  masters  whose  principles 
they  had  adopted. 

The  influence  exercised  by  the  philosophy  of  St.  Thomas 
during  the  seventeenth  century  was  also  considerable.  Bossuet 
(1627-1704)  and  Fenelon  (1651-1715),  although  controlled 
by  Descartes  to  a  certain  extent,  and  sometimes  regarded  as 
Cartesians,  developed  a  body  of  doctrines  which  is  by  no  means 
opposed  to  the  principles  of  the  Angelic  Doctor.  Among  the 
philosophical  works  of  Bossuet,  the  Traite  de  la  connaissance 
de  Dieu  et  de  soi-meme,  the  Logique  and  the  Traite  du  libre 
arbitre  are  of  special  significance.  The  philosophical  doctrines 
tiny  contain  are  evidently  inspired  by  the  teachings  of  St. 
Thomas. 

Many  writers  of  the  same  period  were  more  strictly  Thomistic 


155 

still.  John  of  Saint-Thomas  (1589-1644),  Antoine  Goudin 
(1639-1695),  Cosmo  Alemanni  (1559-1634),  Caramuel  (1606- 
1682),  Gnerinois  (1640-1703),  may  be  counted  among  the  most 
distinguished  representatives  of  Scholasticism.  Several  of  their 
works  have  been  republished  or  studied  during  the  present  cen- 
tury. 

During  the  eighteenth  century,  the  philosophy  of  the  school- 
men was  gradually  abandoned.  The  theories  of  Locke  and 
Condillac  found  their  way  into  many  Catholic  centers.  Among 
the  defenders  of  Thomism  at  that  time,  we  may  mention  the 
Spaniard  Valcarcel,  who  devoted  his  efforts  to  the  refutation 
of  Descartes,  Spinoza,  Malebranche  and  Locke;  the  Jesuit 
Barthelemy  des  Bosses  (1688-1738),  who  corresponded  with 
Wolf  and  Clarke  and  translated  Leibniz's  Theodicy;  the  Domin- 
ican Roselli,  whose  Summa  Philosophica  is  said,  to  have  inspired 
the  neo-Thomists  of  the  nineteenth  century. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  nineteenth  century,  the  philosophy 
of  St.  Thomas  had  been  almost  completely  abandoned.  Catho- 
lics themselves  were  striving  to  build  independent  systems  of 
thought.  In  Italy,  the  saintly  founder  of  the  Institute  of 
Charity,  Antonio  Eosmini  (1797-1855)  advocated  a  kind  of 
idealism  which  had  been  severely  attacked  by  the  early  Roman 
Thomists.  In  Germany,  Baader  (1765-1841),  Hermes  (1775- 
1831),  Frohschammer  (1821-1893),  and  Giinther  (1783-1863) 
were  greatly  influenced  by  Hegelian  idealism.  Gorres  himself 
(1776-1848),  one  of  the  greatest  German  Catholics,  advanced 
sotme  philosophical  principles  more  directly  connected  with 
spiritism  than  with  Thomistic  philosophy. 

In  France,  traditionalism  was  in  vogue.  It  was  defended  by 
De  Bonald  (1754-1840),  Bonnetty  (1798-1879),  Bautaiu 
(1795-1867),  Ventura  de  Raulica  (1792-1861),  and,  in  a 
slightly  modified  form,  by  Lamennais  (1782-1854). 

Some  works  of  Ventura  are,  however,  permeated  by  purely 
Thomistic  principles,  so  that  their  author  may  justly  be  re- 
garded as  one  of  the  immediate  forerunners  of  the  neo-Scho- 


156 

lastic  revival  in  France.  "  In  Father  Ventura,''  says  Cardinal 
Gonzalez,  "two  men  may  be  considered.  There  may  be  seen, 
on  the  one  hand,  an  enthusiastic  admirer  of  St.  Thomas,  and, 
at  the  same  time,  a  supporter  of  traditionalism,  a  disciple  of 
I)e  Maistre  and  De  Bonald.  In  La  Philosophic  chrctienne,  he 
is  a  genuine  representative  of  Thomism,  while  in  some  other 
works,  he  seems  driven  by  traditionalistic  principles  to  the  very 
limits  of  orthodoxy  and  reason."1 

During  the  first  part  of  the  nineteenth  century,  there  were 
many  signs  of  a  return  to  the  Middle  Ages.  The  romantic 
movement  in  France  strove  to  direct  literature  towards  Medi- 
a?val  customs  and  history.  Hugo's  "Notre  Dame  de  Paris," 
published  in  1831,  contains  a  vivid  picture  of  the  life  of  Medi- 
aeval Paris.  In  other  fields  of  human  speculation,  similar  at- 
tempts were  made.  The  philosophers  of  the  Middle  Ages  soon 
became  an  object  of  general  interest.  Not  long  after  the  publi- 
cation of  Notre  Dame  de  Paris,  Victor  Cousin  (1792-1867) 
made  known  to  the  world  unknown  works  of  Abelard  and  Roger 
Bacon  and  published  those  learned  studies  about  the  Middle 
Ages  which  must  be  regarded  as  one  of  his  most  genuine  titles 
to  the  gratitude  of  philosophy. 

At  the  same  time,  another  eminent  scholar,  Charles  de  Remu- 
sat  (1797-1875),  following  the  same  line  of  research,  wrote 
about  Abelard,  Anselm  and  Bacon.  Barthelemy  Haureau 
(1812-1896)  published  his  remarkable  works  on  the  Middle 
Ages.  The  great  Scholastic  philosophers  were  at  last  emerg- 
ing from  the  oblivion  to  which  they  had  been  so  unjustly  con- 
demned. 

In  other  European  countries,  identical  tendencies  could 
easily  be  discerned.  In  Germany,  Friedrich  Schlegel  (1772- 
1829)  had  already  shown  the  real  merit  of  Mediaeval  philosophy 
in  Iiis  famous  History  of  Ancient  and  Modem  Literature 
Among  Catholic  thinkers,  a  return  to  Thomistic  principles  was 
then    effected.     Mohler   and    his    illustrious    disciple    Stauden- 

1  (  f.  Gonzalez,  Bistoria  de  la  Filosofia,  V.  4,  pp.  428  II". 


157 

maier  (1800-1856),  by  their  condemnation  of  all  forms  of 
rationalism  and  their  strict  orthodoxy,  prepared  the  minds  for 
the  Scholastic  revival  which  Kleutgen,  Stockl  and  Werner  in- 
augurated so  brilliantly  in  Germany. 

Not  long  afterwards,  Barthelemy  Saint-Hilaire  (1805-1895) 
translated  the  works  of  Aristotle,  and  Felix  Kavaisson  published 
his  Essai  sur  la  metaphysique  d'Aristotc,  which  greatly  con- 
tributed to  impose  the  peripatetic  speculation  upon  the  attention 
of  the  world.  The  way  was  thus  fully  prepared  for  San- 
severino  and  Kleutgemj 


CHAPTER    IX 

THE    NEO-SCHOLASTIC    REVIVAL    IN    ITALY 

The  direct  initiator  of  the  neo-Scholastic  movement  in  Italy 
was  Cajetano  Sanseverino,  canon  of  Naples. 

Sanseverino  (1811-1865)  was  at  first  an  enthusiastic  ad- 
mirer of  Descartes.  The  episode  of  his  life  which  marked  the 
turning-point  of  his  philosophical  career  has  been  told  by  many 
historians.  In  the  year  1840,  Sanseverino  received  the  visit  of 
Father  Sordi  S.  J.,  who  had  read  and  annotated  St.  Thomas's 
Sum  ma  Thcologica,  Sordi  pointed  out  to  Sanseverino  the 
shortcomings  of  Descartes's  thought  and  the  superiority  of  the 
Thomistic  principles  in  the  solution  of  all  philosophical  prob- 
lems. Great  was  the  struggle  for  the  devout  canon.  For 
twenty  years,  he  applied  himself  to  a  thorough  study  of  St. 
Thomas's  philosophy.  At  the  light  of  the  Summa  Thcologica 
he  read  all  modern  writers  and  became  more  and  more  con- 
vinced of  their  insufficiency.  The  result  of  his  investigations 
was  the  Philosophia  christiana  cum  antiqua  et  nova  comparata, 
a  work  which,  unfinished  as  it  is,  consists  of  seven  quarto 
volumes  and  displays  an  uncommon  erudition,  a  remarkable 
knowledge  of  modern  philosophy,  and,  above  all,  an  enthusiastic 
admiration  for  the  Angelic  Doctor. 

According  to  Cardinal  Gonzalez,  the  Philosophia  christiana 
has  a  double  defect.  With  regard  to  its  method,  it  presents  a 
somewhat  awkward  distribution  of  arguments,  and,  at  times, 
exceedingly  diffuse  articles.  With  regard  to  its  spirit,  it  is 
too  narrowly  attached  to  the  philosophy  it  defends.  Sanseverino 
acci  pts  St.  Thomas's  conclusions  even  in  the  minutest  details, 
and  despises  modern  thought  as  altogether  vain  and  worthy  of 
contempt.1 

1  Cf.  (Jonznloz,  l'hilosophia  eloinciitarin,  pp.  383   384. 

158 


159 

In  spite  of  these  defects,  the  Philosophia  Christiana  has  exer- 
cised an  immense  influence  upon  Catholic  thinkers.  For  many 
years,  it  has  been  the  great  work  of  neo-Scholasticism,  the 
fountain  at  whose  pure  waters  all  came  to  drink  the  spirit  of  the 
Thomistic  regeneration.  In  its  narrow-mindedness  itself,  it 
has  found  a  multitude  of  followers.  Too  often  have  neo- 
Scholastics  shared  Sanseverino's  contempt  for  modern  thought. 
They  have  not  even  taken  the  trouble  to  read  non-Scholastic 
writers  in  their  original  works.  Why  submit,  indeed,  to  such 
a  wearisome  task?  Had  not  Sanseverino  done  the  work  once 
for  all?  Had  he  not,  from  the  narrowness  of  his  cell,  pro- 
nounced an  ultimate  verdict  upon  modern  thinking?  And 
thus,  Sanseverino's  word  has  been  taken,  not  only  with  regard 
to  the  exposition  of  modern  philosophical  systems,  but  also  with 
regard  to  his  very  criticisms. 

The  Philosophia  Christiana  was  at  first  the  object  of  violent 
attacks.  Cartesians  and  Eosminians  agreed  in  denouncing  it. 
But  Sanseverino  was  defended  by  his  disciple  Signoriello,  and 
encouraged  by  his  archbishop,  Riario  Sforza.  Shortly  after- 
wards, an  Academy  of  St.  Thomas  was  founded  at  Naples,  and 
honored  by  the  approbation  of  Pius  IX.  All  seemed  to  indi- 
cate that  the  efforts  towards  a  Thomistic  revival  would  be 
crowned  with  success. 

The  archiepiscopal  see  of  Perusa  was  then  occupied  by 
Joachim  Pecci  who,  as  early  as  1858,  had  founded  an  Academy 
of  St.  Thomas.  Pecci  was  in  close  connection  with  Cardinal 
Sforza,  with  whose  cooperation  he  had  already  written  a  refuta- 
tion of  Ontologism.  He  greatly  sympathized  with  the  Thom- 
istic revival  which  was  taking  place  in  Naples,  and  addressed  a 
memoir  to  Pius  IX,  asking  him  to  declare  St.  Thomas  patron 
of  the  universities. 

At  the  same  time,  there  lived,  in  another  point  of  the  Italian 
peninsula,  a  remarkable  man,  who  was  destined  to  be  the  very 
life  of  the  new  movement,  to  impose  it  bun  grc  mal  gre,  and 


100 

to  silence  all  malcontents.  It  was  the  famous  Jesuit  John 
Mary  Cornoldi. 

Cornoldi  is  undoubtedly  one  of  the  most  interesting  figures 
of  the  neo-Scholastic  revival.  As  soon  as  he  heard  of  the  work 
done  in  other  places,  he  intended  not  to  remain  behind.  Acad- 
emies had  been  founded  in  Naples  and  Perusa:  he  would  found 
in  Bolonia  an  Academy  of  his  own.  Unwilling,  however,  to  be 
a  mere  imitator,  he  made  up  his  mind  to  create  something  truly 
original.  The  two  other  Academies  were  simply  philosophical ; 
his  would  be  medico-philosophical.  The  Academia  filosofico- 
medica  di  San  Tommaso  was  accordingly  founded  (1874), 
in  which  Travaglini,  Venturoli  and  Zanon  represented  science; 
Cornoldi,  Battaglini  and  Rubbini,  philosophy.  The  review  La 
Scicnza  Italiana,  the  organ  of  the  new  institution,  has  been 
published  until  1891. 

In  the  Roman  universities,  however,  Thomism  did  not  as  yet 
seem  to  gain  a  footing.  The  philosopher  most  in  view  in  Rome 
at  the  time  was  the  Jesuit  Tongiorgi,  a  remarkable  thinker, 
sometimes  called  by  his  admirers  '"the  Balmes  of  Italy."  On 
the  whole,  Tongiorgi's  philosophy  may  be  regarded  as  Thomistic. 
The  few  questions  in  which  he  departs  from  Scholastic  prin- 
ciples are  precisely  those  in  which  Scholastic  principles  are 
the  weakest.  He  thus  refuses  to  admit  the  theory  of  Matter 
and  Form  as  an  adequate  explanation  of  the  nature  of  bodies, 
and  advocates  a  kind  of  Atomism.  Nevertheless,  Tongiorgi 
felt  no  sympathy  for  a  revival  of  Thomism. 

Such  was  the  state  of  affairs  when,  in  1878,  Joachim  Pecci 
was  elected  Pope.  The  situation  was  at  once  greatly  changed. 
Pius  IX  had  sympathized  with  the  Thomistic  revival.  He  had 
even  sent  a  letter  of  approbation  to  the  archbishop  of  Naples. 
In  Rome,  however,  unwilling  to  vex  his  anti-Thomistic  pro- 
fessors, he  had  done  nothing.  As  we  shall  see,  the  new  pope 
will  not  hesitate  to  act  more  resolutely. 

In  the  very  letter  in  which  he  announced  his  elevation,  Leo 
XIII    quoted  from  the  text  of    St.  Paul:    videte  ne  quis  vos 


161 

decipiat  per  philosophmm,  and  greatly  commmended  the  phi- 
losophy of  St.  Thomas  as  the  true  philosophy.  The  Roman 
College  at  once  adopted  the  views  of  the  head  of  the  Church ; 
and,  at  the  solemn  session  by  which  the  school  year  1878-79 
opened,  Father  Cardella,  speaking  in  the  name  of  all,  declared 
"that  he  would  take  St.  Thomas  as  the  rule  and  law  of  his 
teaching."2 

The  pope  was  delighted.  His  Roman  professors,  whom  he 
had  believed  so  obstinate,  were  as  docile  as  children.  Before  he 
had  said  a  word,  they  had  understood  and  anticipated  his 
wishes.  So  perfect  seemed  their  dispositions !  So  splendid 
were  their  promises !  Unhappily,  they  were  promises  only,  and 
nothing  was  done.  Father  Palmieri,  who  had  taken  Tongiorgi's 
place,  not  only  did  not  act  in  accordance  with  the  papal  in- 
structions, but  applied  himself  to  point  out  from  his  chair  the 
inconsistencies  of  St.  Thomas's  thought,  the  contradictions  to 
which  Scholasticism  necessarily  leads.  As  for  Caretti — Pal- 
mieri's  co-worker — he  did  not  dare  depart  a  whit  from  his  dear 
Descartes,  save  to  adopt  metempsychosis.  The  pope's  endeavor 
was  decidedly  a  flat  failure. 

What  could  be  done?  Leo  XIII's  own  brother  and  co- 
operator  in  Perusa,  Joseph  Pecci  (1807-1890),  then  advised 
him  to  establish  in  Rome  a  free  course  of  Thomism  and  to  con- 
fide it  to  Father  Cornoldi.  The  advice  was  judged  excellent 
and  immediately  followed.  Cornoldi  arrived  at  Rome,  proud 
of  the  reputation  he  had  gained  in  Bolonia  as  a  scientist  and  a 
philosopher,  and  of  the  honorable  mission  he  had  just  received 
of  implanting  the  philosophy  of  St.  Thomas  in  the  very  capital 
of  the  Christian  world. 

Cornoldi's  course  was  open  to  all  the  students  of  the  Roman 
University,  and  presided  by  the  regular  professors  of  the  Ro- 
man College,  to  whom  was  added  Joseph  Pecci,  who  was  soon 
made  a  cardinal.     The  subjects  discussed  were  chiefly  physics, 

aCf.  Besse,  Deux  centres  du  mouvement  thomiste,  pp.  15—10. 
12 


L62 

psychology  and  metaphysics.  To  all  questions  whatsoever, 
Cornoldi,  St.  Thomas  in  hand,  could  answer!  In  the  Summa 
Theologica  was  to  be  found  the  key  to  all  difficulties  of  modern 


science 


At  the  same  time,  there  began  to  spread  a  rumor  that  Leo 
XIII  was  preparing  an  encyclical  letter  about  Christian  phi- 
losophy. The  uneasiness  of  the  Cartesian  professors  was  grow- 
ing day  by  day.  That  Thomistic  revival  they  had  so  much 
despised  when  confined  to  Naples  and  Perusa,  was  now  taking 
Rome  by  storm.  The  dreaded  encyclical  appeared.  Leo  XIII 
greatly  commended  the  philosophy  of  Thomas  Aquinas  and 
insisted  upon  a  study  of  the  genuine  works  of  the  great 
Scholastics : 

"  Providete  ut  sapientiam  Thomas  ex  ipsis  ejus  fontibus 
hauriatur."3 

More  than  any  other  Scholastic  must  St.  Thomas  be  studied 
because  he  gathered  all  previously  discovered  truths  in  a  great 
synthetic  system,  which  he  still  considerably  increased: 

"  Illorum  doctrina,  velut  dispersa  cujusdam  corporis  membra, 
in  unum  Thomas  collegit  et  coagmentavit,  miro  ordine  diges- 
sit,  et  magnis  increments  ita  adauxit,  ut  catholicae  Ecclesiae 
singulare  presidium  et  decus  jure  meritoque  habeatur."4 

There  is  no  part  of  philosophy  which  he  has  not  solidly  dis- 
cussed : 

"  Nulla  est  philosophise  pars,  quam  non  acute  simul  et  solide 
pertractarit :  de  legibus  ratiocinandi,  de  Deo  et  incorporeis  sub- 
stantiis,  de  homine  aliisque  sensibilibus  rebus,  de  humanis  acti- 
bus  eorumque  principiis  ita  disputavit,  ut  in  eo  neque  copiosa 
qurcstionum  seges,  neque  apta  partium  dispositio,  neque  optima 
procedendi  ratio,  neque  principiorum  firmitas  aut  argumen- 
torum  robur,  neque  dicendi  perspicuitas  aut  proprietas,  neque 
ahstrnsa  quacque  explicandi  facilitas  desiderctur."5 

'Encyclical  .Kterni  Patris;  In  Thomas  Aquinaa's  Summa  Theol., 
Romas,  1894,  Vol.  G,  pp.  425  ff. 

4  ll.nl.,    p.    432. 
1  Ibid.,   p.   4.'i2. 


163 

This  return  to  the  past,  however,  is  far  from  being  a  retro- 
gression. All  Mediaeval  vain  subtleties  must  be  discarded.  All 
Scholastic  teachings  which  are  not  in  harmony  with  modern 
scientific  discoveries  must  be  abandoned: 

"  Si  quid  enim  est  a  doctoribus  Scholasticis  vel  nimia  sub- 
tilitate  quesitum,  vel  parum  considerate  traditum,  si  quid  cum 
exploratis  posterioris  aevi  doctrinis  minus  coherens,  vel  denique 
quoquo  modo  non  probabile,  id  nullo  pacto  in  animo  est  aetati 
nostra?  ad  imitandum  proponi."0 

Modern  scientific  progress  must  be  welcomed  as  a  benefit  to 
philosophy : 

"  Non  eos  profecto  improbamus  doctos  homines  atque  solertes, 
qui  industriam  et  eruditionem  suam,  ac  novorum  inventorum 
opes  ad  excolendam  philosophiam  afferunt:  id  enim  probe  in- 
telligimus  ad  incrementa  doctrinae  pertinere."7 

The  influence  of  the  pope's  encyclical  was  simply  immense. 
The  revival  of  Tbomism,  which  had  been  limited  to  some  iso- 
lated efforts,  was  then  taken  seriously  by  most  of  the  Catholic 
thinkers.  Suffice  it  to  mention  the  celebrated  professor  of  the 
Catholic  University  of  Lille,  Amedee  de  Margerie.  Mr.  de 
Margerie,  although  more  than  fifty  years  of  age  when  the  papal 
encyclical  appeared,  at  once  made  a  thorough  study  of  the 
works  of  St.  Thomas — which  were  completely  unknown  to  him 
— and  adopted  his  doctrine  in  a  great  many  points. 

In  Rome  itself,  the  success  of  the  pope  was  complete.  This 
was  due  in  great  part  to  the  fact  that  Leo  XITT,  instructed  by 
his  first  failure,  took  the  precaution  to  corroborate  his  instruc- 
tions by  forcible  measures.  Palmieri  and  Caretti  were  dis- 
charged from  their  chairs,  and  the  new  appointments  made  left 
no  doubt  as  to  the  final  issue  of  the  affair.  All  understood 
that  this  time  the  pope  would  be  victorious. 

The  men  honored  by  the  papal  choice  as  professors  of  phi- 

•Ibid.,  p.  436. 
'•Ibid.,  p.  434. 


164 

losophy,  in  Rome,  were  the  following:  Cornoldi  was  made  pro- 
fessor at  the  Roman  College,  Zigliara  at  the  Minerva,  Loren- 
zelli  and  Satolli  at  the  Propaganda,  Talamo  at  the  Apollinaris. 
As  all  these  men  have  distinguished  themselves  by  eminent  pro- 
ductions, I  will  say  a  few  words  about  each  of  them. 

Giovanni  Mari  Cornoldi,  S.J.  (1822-1892),  besides  his  two 
great  works:  Instituliones  Philosophies  Speculative  and  La 
Filosofia  Scolastica  di  San  Tommaso  e  di  Dante,  and  numerous 
shorter  treatises  in  which  he  defends  the  Scholastic  principles 
and  attacks  opposite  doctrines,  especially  Rosminianism  (Cf. 
Bibliography),  has  contributed  many  articles  to  the  Civilta 
Cattolica.  Less  profound  as  a  philosopher  than  Zigliara  or 
Sanseverino,  he  has  nevertheless  done  the  greatest  service  to 
the  neo-Thomistic  cause  by  the  very  activity  he  has  displayed. 
The  direct  aim  of  his  great  works,  as  well  as  of  his  numerous 
essays,  is  most  praiseworthy.  He  strove  to  point  out  the  per- 
fect harmony  existing  between  Thomism  and  science,  to  give  a 
scientific  basis  to  neo-Scholasticism.  This  is  the  very  spirit 
which  has  recently  inspired  Desire  Mercier  and  the  Institute  of 
Louvain.  Unhappily,  Cornoldi's  efforts  have  not  always  been 
intelligent  and  have  met  with  little  success.  He  is  chiefly 
known  to-day  for  his  bitter  criticisms  of  modern  thought.  In 
his  Prolcgomeni,  he  divides  all  philosophers  into  three  groups: 
the  true  philosophers,  that  is  to  say,  the  Scholastics;  the  liberal 
philosophers,  or  those  who  do  not  accept  all  Scholastic  doc- 
trines; the  non-philosophers,  to  which  group  all  others  belong.8 
Well  known  is  Cornoldi's  phrase  describing  modern  philosophy 
as  "  the  pathology  of  human  reason."0 

Less  unfair  to  moderns  has  been  Thomas  Zigliara,  O.P. 
(1833-1893).  His  Sumvia  Philosophica,  in  which  he  closely 
adheres  to  St.  Thomas's  doctrine,  has,  for  a  long  time,  served 
as  a  text-book  in  Catholic  seminaries,  and  is  much  in  use  still 
to-day.     His  most  valuable  contribution  to  philosophy  is  prob- 

•Cf.  Gomez  Ezquierdo,  Historia  de  la  Filosofia  del  siglo  XIX,  p.  4G4. 
•Cornoldi,  Lecons  de  Philosophic  Scolastique;   Paris,  1878,  p.   16. 


165 

ably  the  work  entitled:  Delia  luce  intellettuale.  The  author 
refutes  traditionalism  and  ontologism,  and  conclusively  shows 
that  the  ontologists  have  no  right  to  invoke  the  authority  of  St. 
Thomas  to  support  their  theories. 

Benedetto  Lorenzelli,  actual  archbishop  of  Lucca,  has  fol- 
lowed Aristotle  in  his  Philosophic  Theoretics  Instituliones. 
How  closely  he  shares  Cornoldi's  contempt  for  modern  thought 
may  be  inferred  from  his  division  of  philosophy  into  the  four 
following  periods:  (1)  a  period  of  formation,  from  Thales  to 
Aristotle;  (2)  a  period  of  decrease  and  perversion,  from  Aris- 
totle to  Christ;  (3)  a  period  of  increase  and  perfection,  from 
Christ  to  Thomas  Aquinas;  (4)  a  period  of  corruption,  from 
Descartes  to  our  own  day.10 

Francesco  Satolli  is  a  faithful  disciple  of  Cardinal  Cajetan. 
At  the  example  of  the  great  commentator  of  the  sixteenth  cen- 
tury, he  chiefly  applies  himself  to  the  writing  of  learned  com- 
mentaries on  the  works  of  the  Angelic  Doctor.  In  Sum  mam 
Theologicam  Divi  Thome  Aquinatis  is  the  title  of  three  suc- 
cessive treatises  in  which  many  questions  of  the  Sum  ma  Theo- 
logica  are  expounded  and  studied. 

In  his  Logic  (Enchiridion  Philosophic,  Pars  la,  continens 
logicam  universam),  Mgr.  Satolli  has  been,  like  Lorenzelli,  a 
disciple  of  Aristotle.  He  has  been  reproached  with  making  an 
excessive  use  of  dialectical  reasoning,  and  thus  rendering  "  in- 
tricate and  labyrinthic  "  what  is  clear  by  itself.  His  last  work, 
De  habitibus,  contains  a  valuable  discussion  of  Spencer's  theory 
of  conduct. 

Salvatore  Talamo  is  chiefly  known  for  his  work,  UAristoie- 
lismo  dclla  Scolastica,  one  of  the  most  valuable  productions  of 
early  Roman  neo-Thomism.  The  aim  of  the  treatise  is  to  de- 
fend Scholastic  philosophy  against  the  unfounded  reproach  of 
servile  Aristotelism,  which,  for  several  centuries,  had  been  al- 
most unanimously  directed  against  the  schoolmen. 

The  first  chapters  of    the  work   deal    with   the  character  of 

10  Cf.  Gomez  Izquicrdo,  op,  <*it..  p.  464. 


166 

Mediaeval  speculation.  The  author  clearly  shows  that  the  phi- 
losophy of  the  schoolmen,  although  intimately  connected  with 
theology,  had  an  object  and  a  method  of  its  own,  with  which 
theology  was  not  concerned. 

In  the  second  part,  the  author  studies  the  ground  of  the  pref- 
erence given  to  Aristotle  in  the  Middle  Ages.  The  reasons  he 
assigns  are  the  following: 

1.  Aristotle  was  the  greatest  master,  nay  the  inventor  of  one 
of  the  most  important  branches  of  philosophy,  the  science  of 
logic,  which  studies  the  laws  of  our  mind  and  the  method  we 
must  follow  in  the  research  of  truth. 

2.  Aristotle's  works  contained  a  treasure  of  information 
about  all  branches  of  human  knowledge:  natural  science,  ethics, 
politics,  psychology,  metaphysics,  etc. 

3.  Aristotle  gave  the  example  of  a  methodic  discussion  and 
a  concise  style,  rejecting  the  beautiful  garb  under  which  Plato 
often  concealed  the  impossibility  of  a  demonstration. 

4.  Finally,  the  Stagirite  revealed  to  the  curiosity  of  the  Medi- 
eval philosophers  the  origin  of  philosophy  and  its  development 
among  the  Greeks.11 

The  enthusiasm  with  which  the  philosophy  of  Aristotle  was 
accepted  was,  however,  far  from  mere  slavishness.  Whenever 
the  Scholastics  found  in  Aristotle  some  theory  they  judged 
erroneous,  they  did  not  hesitate  to  reject  it.12  They  likewise 
modified  and  perfected  the  system  of  the  master  in  a  great  many 
points.  With  regard  to  the  essential  relations  between  the  uni- 
verse and  God,  the  final  end  of  man,  the  spirituality  and  immor- 
tality of  the  soul,  etc.,  they  taught  definite  doctrines  which  Aris- 
totle had  denied  or  very  imperfectly  treated.13  Their  concep- 
tion of  the  act  of  creation  was  also  essentially  different  from 
Aristotle's    conception.     Aristotle    had    admitted    God    as    the 

11  Cf.  Talamo,  L'Aristotelismo  della  Scolastica,  3.  cd.,  Siena,  1881. 
pp.  234  ff. 

13  Ibid.,  pp.   151  ft". 
"Ibid.,  pp.  3G1  ff. 


107 

necessary  cause  of  the  world,  but  had  regarded  him  simply  as  a 
demiurge  acting  upon  eternally  preexisting  matter.  The  Scho- 
lastics conceived  creation  as  a  production  of  the  world  out  of 
nothing.14 

While  the  professors  we  have  mentioned  were  working  hard 
for  the  success  of  their  cause,  there  came  into  notice  another 
man  who  had  not  attracted  the  attention  at  first,  perhaps  be- 
cause he  shunned  public  notice,  who  had  written  much,  how- 
ever, and  who,  from  the  silence  of  his  cell,  proved  as  able  a 
defender  of  the  new  movement  as  the  men  who  were  expound- 
ing their  views  from  a  university's  cathedra. 

Matteo  Liberatore,  S.J.  (1810-1892),  was  already  an  old  man 
at  the  time  we  consider.  His  Institution es  Philosophiccr,  pub- 
lished many  years  before,  had  been  often  reissued,  and,  as  well 
as  Zigliara's  Summa,  have  proved  an  excellent  text-book  in  many 
Catholic  institutions.  Anticipating  the  pope's  advice,  Libera- 
tore had  shunned  all  useless  questions,  and  had  defended  the 
essential  principles  of  Scholasticism  in  a  clear  and  elegant  lan- 
guage. Not  satisfied  with  the  general  exposition  contained  in 
his  first  work,  he  later  took  up  some  special  topics,  chiefly  in  the 
field  of  Scholastic  psychology,  and  published  learned  treatises, 
which  have  been  translated  into  various  languages  (cf.  Bibliog- 
raphy). He  even  made  use  of  the  dramatic  form  to  defend  his 
philosophical  theories,  as  in  L'autocrazia  deU'ente,  comedy  in 
three  acts  (Naples,  1880).  His  works  do  not  evince  a  deep 
knowledge  of  the  philosophical  thought  outside  of  Italy ;  but  he 
has  mastered  Italian  philosophy  and  given  thorough  criticisms 
of  the  doctrines  of  Gioberti  and  Rosmini.  The  latter  part  of 
his  life  was  devoted  to  social  studies.  He  pointed  out  the  way 
in  which  the  Catholic  Church  can  accommodate  itself  to  a  cer- 
tain kind  of  socialism.  Finally,  Liberatore  was  one  of  the 
founders  of  the  review  Civiltd  Cattolica  (1850),  which  has  not 
ceased  to  be  one  of  the  most  efficient  organs  of  Catholic  thought 
in  Italy. 

14  Ibid.,  p.   151. 


108 

In  the  meantime,  the  success  of  the  Roman  professors  was 
becoming  more  and  more  complete.  In  1880,  Leo  XIII  ordered 
the  preparation  of  a  new  edition  of  the  works  of  St.  Thomas. 
At  the  same  time,  an  Academy  of  St.  Thomas  was  founded  in 
Rome  itself  (October  13,  1879).  It  was  composed  of  thirty 
members:  ten  taken  from  Rome,  ten  from  the  rest  of  hah. 
ten  from  other  countries.  Pecci  and  Zigliara  were  chosen  as 
presidents.15 

The  work  of  the  Accademia  Eomana  di  San  Tommaso  soon 
attracted  the  attention  and  the  criticisms  of  the  Italian  thinkers. 
It  was  claimed  that  the  new  Scholastics  were  not  following  the 
precepts  of  Leo  XIII,  that  they  applied  the  Thomistic  principles 
to  scientific  discoveries  in  the  most  ridiculous  manner,  that  they 
had  produced  nothing  original,  save  repeated  attacks  on  Ros- 
mini.  These  charges,  formulated  as  early  as  1886  by  Benzoni 
in  the  Rivista  italiana  di  Filosofia,  have  been  taken  up  again  by 
Besse,  in  his  pamphlet,  Deux  centres  du  mouvement  thomiste. 
The  aim  of  Mr.  Besse  in  this  little  treatise  is  to  compare  the 
work  done  at  Rome  by  the  early  neo-Scholastics  with  the  work 
done  at  Louvain  to-day,  and  to  show  that  at  Louvain  only  some- 
thing truly  philosophical  has  been  accomplished;  that  the 
Louvain  professors  alone  have  acted  in  agreement  with  the  papal 
instructions  and  with  the  necessities  of  our  time. 

The  most  important  charges  formulated  by  Mr.  Besse  against 
the  Roman  Thomists  are  the  following: 

1.  On  all  points  common  to  philosophy  and  faith,  the  Roman 
Thomists  strove  to  connect  the  natural  and  the  supernatural, 
and  became  mere  interpreters  of  the  Christian  dogmas.16 

2.  They  did  not  study  modern  philosophy,  but  uncritically 
accepted  Sanseverino's  conclusions.  Their  criticisms,  therefore, 
contain  nothing  personal,  nothing  serious,  and  have  brought  dis- 
credit upon  the  cause  their  authors  pretended  to  defend.17 

ttCt  Blanc,   Histoirc  de  la   Philosophic,  t.  3,  p.  5.r)fl. 
I'.  -*c.  Deux  centres  du  mouvement  thomiste,  p.  25. 
"Ibid,,  pp.  30-31. 


169 

3.  Lacking  all  principles  of  critical  method,  the  Roman 
Thomists  have  not  even  succeeded  in  their  interpretations  of 
St.  Thomas.18 

Mr.  Besse  excepts  from  his  wholesale  condemnation  Signori- 
ello  for  his  Vocabularium  peripatetico-scholasiicum,  and  Talamo 
for  his  study  on  Aristotle.  But  these  examples,  the  author  con- 
tinues, have  found  no  imitators.19 

'  The  truth  contained  in  Mr.  Besse's  pamphlet  must  be  frankly 
acknowledged.  Roman  Thomists  have  often  remained  in  a  com- 
plete ignorance  of  the  spirit  and  the  contents  of  modern  phi- 
losophy. Without  understanding  modern  thinkers,  they  have 
mercilessly  condemned  them.  Non-Scholastic  philosophical 
productions  have  been  described  as  heretical;  their  authors, 
even  the  most  inoffensive,  as  men  who  had  wilfully  opposed  all 
rules  of  common  sense  and  truth.  The  neo-Scholastic  move- 
ment has  thus  ostracized  itself  from  the  current  of  modern 
thought.  It  has  failed  to  attract  the  attention  of  the  non- 
Catholic  world.  Its  very  existence  has  been,  for  a  long  time, 
systematically  ignored.  Only  in  recent  years,  and  after  taking 
another  direction,  has  neo-Scholasticism  been  deemed  worthy  of 
study.  Only  after  neo-Kantians  have  become  convinced  that 
the  professors  of  Louvain  possessed  a  knowledge  of  the  Kantian 
philosophy  which  would  honor  any  center  of  learning  have  they 
begun  to  ask  themselves  whether  neo-Scholasticism  could  not 
contain  something  good,  whether  it  is  not  a  philosophy. 

Mr.  Besse,  however,  has  probably  overlooked  a  most  important 
fact,  which  might  have  led  him  to  modify  his  sentence  of  con- 
demnation. The  early  Roman  Thomists  were  not  in  the  same 
position  as  their  followers  of  the  present  day.  Their  aim  was 
not  to  impose  the  Thomistic  revival  upon  the  consideration  of 
the  world  of  philosophy  at  large,  but  to  effect  its  acceptance 
from  the  part  of  the  Catholic  Church.  Only  after  Thomism 
had  gained  a  sure  footing  among  Catholic  thinkers  could  it  step 

"Ibid.,  p.  35. 
"Ibid.,  p.  34,  note. 


170 

boldly  forward  and  proclaim  its  existence  to  the  outside  world. 
This  is  the  reason  why  the  Roman  Thomists  have  worked  hard 
and  fast  to  show  the  perfect  harmony  of  their  system  with  the 
body  of  revealed  truths.  Tt  is  the  reason  why  they  have  made 
merciless  attacks  upon  all  other  philosophies,  and  have  seen  a 
heresy  where  there  was  at  most  an  error.] 

The  neo-Thomists  of  the  present  day  ought  not  to  censure 
too  hastily  the  work  of  their  older  brethren.  It  is  the  Roman 
Scholastics  that  have  firmly  implanted  Thomism  in  the  Catholic 
world.  They  have  faithfully  grasped  the  task  that  lay  before 
them,  and  have  fulfilled  it  with  the  greatest  success.  The 
means  they  have  taken  were,  on  the  whole,  the  best  they  could 
take,  the  only  ones,  perhaps,  that  could  insure  success. 

The  early  neo-Thomists  we  have  studied  have  found  numerous 
disciples  who  have  continued  and  perfected  the  work  of  the  mas- 
ters. In  1879,  the  Lazarist  Albert  Barberis  (1847-1896) 
founded  in  Piacenza  a  Latin  philosophical  review,  the  Divus 
Thomas,  which  has  been  the  organ  of  neo-Scholasticism  in  Italy, 
and  in  which  Tornatore,  Vinati,  Ermoni,  and  other  eminent 
men,  have  published  learned  dissertations.  The  professors  of 
Louvain  themselves  have  occasionally  honored  the  Divus  Thomas 
by  their  articles.  Quite  recently,  the  publication  of  the  Divus 
Thomas  has  been  interrupted.  Nobody  regrets  the  fact  more 
sincerely  than  we  do.  It  is  perhaps  true  that  modern  languages 
are  a  more  suitable  instrument  than  Latin  for  philosophical  dis- 
cussions. All  interested  in  neo-Scholasticism  were  none  the  less 
glad  to  read  dissertations  written  by  modern  Scholastics  in  the 
very  language  of  the  schoolmen.  After  having  enjoyed  the 
Divus  Thomas  for  so  many  years,  we  feel  that  its  actual  absence 
is  a  real  lack  to  Scholastic  literature,  and  we  sincerely  implore 
the  distinguished  professors  of  Piacenza  to  alter  their  decision 
and  begin  their  work  anew. 

Barberis  is  also  the  author  of  two  Latin  dissertations:  Posi- 
tivismus  ac  nova,  mrlhodus  psycliologica  (1887),  and  Esse  for- 
male  eslnr  rci  iniriiisrcinn  mi  nun?  (  1SS1  ).  which,  by  the  solid- 


171 

ity  of  the  reasoning  and  the  depth  of  the  doctrine,  assure  their 
author  a  place  among  the  most  profound  metaphysicians  of 
our  day. 

Among  the  recent  defenders  of  neo-Scholasticism  in  Italy,  the 
best  known  are:  the  Jesuits  Schiffmi,  De  Maria  and  Salis  Seewis, 
and  the  distinguished  professor  of  Pa  via,  Giuseppe  Ballerini. 

Santo  Schiffmi  (1841-1906),  for  a  long  time  professor  at  the 
Gregorian  University,  published  a  complete  and  detailed  course 
of  Scholastic  philosophy.  His  Principia  philosophica  deal  with 
logic  and  ontology;  his  Disputationes  metaphysics  specialis, 
with  cosmology;  his  Disputationes  philosophice  moralis,  with 
moral  philosophy.  In  1888,  in  a  learned  article  of  the  Annates 
de  Philosophic  chretienne,  Count  Domet  de  Vorges  praised 
Schiffmi's  Ontology  as  the  most  solid  and  profound  then  exist- 
ing.20 One  of  the  most  interesting  studies  Schiffmi's  volumes 
contain  is  an  analysis  of  the  influence  of  will  upon  belief,  which 
reminds  us  of  the  tenets  of  our  pragmatists. 

Michael  de  Maria  became  famous  in  1892,  after  publishing 
three  volumes  of  philosophical  studies  with  the  title  Philosophic 
Peripatetico-Scholastica.  In  his  criticisms  of  modern  philoso- 
phy, De  Maria  closely  resembles  his  Roman  predecessors.  In 
his  contempt  for  modern  thought,  he  is  not  far  from  Cornoldi's 
position,  as  may  be  gathered  from  the  following  passage  of  his 
preface : 

"  Principio  quidem  semper  persuasum  habui,  philosophiam  ad 
tot  absurda  et  incredibilia  amplectenda  in  ipsa  Christiana?  socie- 
tatis  luce  eo  misere  nostris  temporibus  declinasse,  quod  paulatim 
et  pedententim  ab  illis  principiis  discessit  qua?  S.  Thomas  ex 
Aristotele  accepta  mirifice  illustravit  et  cum  Christiana  revela- 
tione  composuit.  Ex  quo  facile  erat  intelligere  nullam  meli- 
orem  expediendae  salutis  reperiri  posse  nam,  quam  ad  illam 
sapientiam  plane  reverti,  a  qua  inconsulte  admodum  et  temere 
discessum  est."21 

"Cf.  Domet  de  Vorges,  Bibliographic  de  la  Philosophic  thomiste  de 
1877  a  1887;  Ann.  de  Philoa.  ohr.,  vol.  xviii,  pp,  529ff. 

"  De   Maria.    PhilOBOphia   Peripatetico-Scholastica,  Vol.    1.   p.   viii. 


172 

"Do  Maria's  work,  however,  is  excellent  in  many  respects.  Be- 
sides its  intrinsic  value  as  an  exposition  of  the  Scholastic  phi- 
losophy, it  presents  a  special  interest  on  account  of  the  profound 
studies  it  contains  about  St.  Thomas's  doctrine  on  some  special 
topics,  viz.,  on  essence  and  existence,22  on  the  nature  of  the 
individual,23  etc. 

Francis  Salis  Seewis  (1835-1898)  is  chiefly  known  for  his 
treatise,  Delia  conoscenza  sensitiva,  published  in  1881,  and  a 
study  of  the  doctrines  of  St.  Augustine,  St.  Thomas  and  Suarez 
on  spontaneous  generation,  published  in  1897.  The  author 
studies  the  Scholastic  doctrines  from  the  point  of  view  of  mod- 
ern physiology  and  compares  the  teachings  of  St.  Thomas  with 
the  positive  results  obtained  in  our  day  by  Helmholz,  Wundt, 
Weber,  etc.  By  his  careful  study  of  modern  scientific  discov- 
eries, Salis  Seewis  frankly  departs  from  the  contemptuous 
neglect  of  the  early  Roman  Thomists  and  opens  to  the  neo- 
Scholastic  movement  in  Italy  an  era  of  progress.24 

Giuseppe  Ballerini,  already  known  by  a  treatise  on  socialism 
and  a  theological  dissertation  about  the  Eucharistic  dogma,  pub- 
lished in  1904  a  study  on  the  principle  of  causality  and  the 
existence  of  God,  //  principio  di  causalita  e  Vesistenza  di  Dio 
dl  fronte  alia  scienza  mod  em  a.  He  regards  the  principle  of 
causality  as  the  real  point  at  issue  between  the  Scholastics  and 
their  opponents.  He  discusses  its  objectivity,  combats  Hume's 
theories,  and  shows  the  connection  of  the  idea  of  cause  with  the 
belief  in  the  existence  of  God. 

A  complete  study  of  neo-Scholasticism  in  Italy  should  contain 
the  names  of  the  Jesuits  De  Mandato,  Remer,  and  Taparelli 
cPAzeglio,  the  author  of  the  celebrated  Saggio  di  Diritto  natur- 
alc;  of  Prisco,  Chiesa,  Cappellazzi,  Puccini,  and  of  the  distin- 
guished logician  Lorenzo  Schiavi.  It  should  not  fail  to  mention 
the  accurate  and  painstaking  edition  of  the  works  of  St.  Bona- 

■  Ibid.,  Vol.  1,  pp.  441  ff. 
13  Ibid.,  Vol.  1,  pp.  629  IV. 
"Cf,  Gomez  (zquierdo,  op.  cit.,  p.  450. 


173 

venture,  begun  in  1882  by  the  Franciscan  fathers  of  Quaracchi, 
near  Florence,  who  have  thereby  done  an  immense  service  to  the 
cause  of  Scholasticism.  The  same  fathers  are  actually  promis- 
ing to  the  learned  world  a  critical  edition  of  the  works  of  Roger 
Bacon.  Finally,  one  of  them,  Mariano  Fernandez  Garcia,  has 
just  published  a  work  which  will  be  of  great  help  for  the  study 
of  Duns  Scotus's  philosophy.  Its  title  is:  Lexicon  Scholasticum 
Philosophico-Theologicum,  in  quo  continentur  termini,  defini- 
tiones,  distinctiones  et  effata  a  B.  Joanne  Duns  Scoto  Doctore 
Subtili. 


CHAPTER   X 

THE    NEO-SCHOLASTIC    REVIVAL    IN    SPAIN,    PORTUGAL, 
AND    SPANISH    AMERICA 

Section  1. — The  Neo-Scholastic  Revival  in  Spain 

Our  ordinary  philosophical  studies  in  American  institutions 
may  easily  lead  us  to  the  belief  that  there  is  no  such  a  thing  as 
a  Spanish  philosophy.  Who,  among  our  university  students, 
has  ever  heard  of  a  Spanish  philosopher?  Who  could  presently 
name  one?  Our  complete  ignorance  on  this  point  must  perhaps 
be  excused.  Some  years  ago,  Mr.  Guardia  wrote  an  article  in 
the  Revue  Philosophique  to  prove  that  we  are  right.  He  gave 
it  the  attractive  title  of  La  misere  philosophique  en  Espagnc, 
and  strongly  defended  the  thesis  that  Spain  possesses  no  philoso- 
phy.1 The  same  thesis  had  been  defended  a  few  years  before 
by  the  Mexican  priest  Agustin  Rivera,  who  had  extended  his 
condemnation  to  the  Spanish-speaking  countries  of  the  Xew 
World.2  Few  Spaniards,  however,  would  agree  with  these  two 
men.  Patriotism  is  strong  beyond  the  Pyrenees,  and  the  asser- 
tions to  which  it  frequently  leads  the  fiery  sons  of  Pelayo  would 
sound  incredible  to  the  cool-headed  Anglo-Saxon  race.  It 
seems  that  the  distinguished  writer  Marcelino  Menendez  y 
Pelayo  has  placed  Spanish  philosophy  on  equal  footing  with  the 
philosophical  systems  of  France  and  Italy,  and  has  judged  it 
inferior  only  to  Greek  and  German  speculation.  To  most  of 
us,  this  judgment  would  seem  rather  bold.  It  has  been  con- 
demned as  too  timid  by  William  Garcia,  who  does  not  hesitate 
to  give  Spanish  philosophy  the  first  place.  His  line  of  reason- 
ing is  very  simple.      Ho  summarily  dismisses  German  philosophy 

1  Rev.  Philos.,  1893,  pp.  287  II. 

3  In  the  work:    La   Filosofia  en  la  Nueva   Espafia,  Lagos,  1885. 

174 


175 

as  a  mere  play  of  imagination  and  no  knowledge  of  truth.  As 
regards  Greek  philosophy,  Garcia,  as  a  genuine  Scholastic,  does 
full  justice  to  Aristotle;  but,  he  adds,  Aristotle  has  been  sur- 
passed by  St.  Thomas,  so  that  the  Thomistic,  or  Italian  philoso- 
phy, is  really  the  first  philosophy.  Now,  the  Thomistic  philoso- 
phy has  become  Spanish  by  right  of  conquest.  Hence,  it  is  clear 
that  Spanish  philosophy  is  the  first  philosophy.3 

Our  belief  as  to  the  real  worth  of  Spanish  thought  may  be 
greatly  influenced  by  the  point  of  view  from  which  we  study  the 
question.  A  Kantian,  for  example,  can  hardly  be  proud  of  the 
influence  the  Critique  of  Pure  Reason  has  exercised  on  the 
Spanish  soil.  If,  as  Mr.  Latinus  points  out,  only  two  Spaniards, 
during  the  nineteenth  century,  have  judged  it  useful  to  go  and 
study  philosophy  in  Germany,  if  the  physician  Nieto  Serrano  is 
actually  the  only  Kantian  in  Spain,4  all  who  maintain  that 
philosophy  must  flow  from  Koenigsberg,  that  we  must  go  back 
to  Kant,  will  be  apt  to  be  as  severe  to  Spanish  thought  as  Rivera 
and  Guardia  have  been. 

A  neo-Scholastic  will  no  doubt  be  more  indulgent.  Spain  is 
perhaps  the  only  country  in  which  the  Scholastic  traditions 
have  never  been  entirely  forgotten.  A  long  time  before  San- 
severino  published  his  Philosophia  Christiana  and  Leo  XIII  his 
encyclical,  distinguished  Spaniards  had  defended  the  essential 
principles  of  the  Aristotelian  and  Thomistic  philosophy.  Dur- 
ing the  course  of  the  nineteenth  century,  Spain,  as  we  shall  see, 
has  produced  three  great  philosophers  who  are  certainly  among 
the  greatest  of  whom  the  Scholastic  revival  may  boast.  One  of 
them,  Urraburu,  is  still  living;  the  other  two,  Balmes  and  Gon- 
zalez, have  departed  from  this  world  many  years  ago,  but  their 
works  are  immortal. 

At  the  end  of  the  eighteenth  century,  the  sensism  of  Locke 
and  Condillac  was  introduced  into  Spain  and  gained  many  dis- 

8  Garcia,  Tomismo  y  Neotomismo.  pp.  350-351. 

4  Latinus,  Une  excursion  philosophique  en  ESspagne,  Rev.  \co-Scol., 
1901,  pp.   192  ff. 


17b' 

ciples.  Among  its  best  known  adherents  may  be  mentioned  the 
Jesuits  Eximeno  and  Andres.  Scholasticism,  however,  did  not 
disappear  altogether.  It  was  defended  by  Rafael  Puigcerwr, 
O.P.,  in  his  Philosophic,  Sancti  Thorn  w  Aquinatis,  auribus  hujus 
temporis  accommodate,,  which  was  used  as  a  text-book  in  many 
institutions. 

Nol  long  afterwards,  Francisco  Alvarado,  O.P.  (1756-1814), 
generally  known  as  "el  filosofo  rancio  "  (the  rank  philosopher), 
acquired  a  great  celebrity  by  his  Cartas  Aristotelicas  and  his 
Cartas  Criticas,  in  which  he  defended  the  philosophy  of  St. 
Thomas  against  the  heterodox,  political,  social  and  philosoph- 
ical theories  which  had  been  recently  introduced  into  Spain. 

But  the  man  who  gave  to  Spanish  philosophy  its  greatest 
splendor  during  the  first  half  of  the  nineteenth  century  was 
undoubtedly  Balmes. 

James  Balmes  was  born  in  Vich  (Catalonia)  in  1810  and  died 
in  1848.  Completely  unknown  in  1840,  he  acquired  in  a  few 
years  an  immense  reputation.  He  alone  succeeded  in  awakening 
the  interest  of  Europe  in  Spanish  thought.  Besides  numerous 
social  productions,  among  which  must  be  mentioned  a  compara- 
tive study  of  Protestantism  and  Catholicism  with  regard  to 
their  influence  upon  European  civilization,  Balmes  has  written 
the  following  philosophical  works:  El  Criterio,  or  a  study  of 
the  criteria  of  truth,  which,  in  Mr.  Turner's  opinion,  is  his  most 
valuable  contribution  to  philosophy;  Cartas  a  un  esceptko,  a 
collection  of  letters  in  which  scepticism  is  most  ably  discussed; 
Filosofia  elemental;  and  Filosofia  fundamental,  the  work  upon 
which  his  fame  as  a  philosopher  chiefly  rests. 

Orestes  A.  Brownson  declares  the  Fundamental  Philosophy 
to  be  not  only  Balmes's  masterpiece,  but  the  most  important 
work  published  on  the  bases  of  philosophy  during  the  nineteenth 
century.'  This  judgment  is  too  eulogistic  perhaps;  but  we 
must  at  least  admit  that  Balmes's  work  has  acquired  the  charac- 

1  Balmes,  Fundamental  Philosophy,  New  fork,  1903;  Brownson's 
Introduction,  p.  viii. 


177 

ter  of  a  philosophical  classic,  and  will  be  studied  as  long  as 
philosophy  endures  upon  the  face  of  the  earth. 

When  Balmes  wrote  his  works,  there  were  as  yet  no  signs  of 
a  return  to  Thomism.  His  philosophy,  accordingl)',  is  not 
directly  connected  with  the  neo-Scholastic  revival.  It  is,  how- 
ever, Thomistic  in  its  essential  character  and  in  most  of  its 
details.  Thomas  Aquinas  was  the  favorite  author  of  the  Span- 
ish thinker,  who  regarded  the  Summa  Theohgica  as  the  foun- 
tain of  all  truth.  Balmes's  thought  has  also  been  influenced, 
although  in  a  less  degree,  by  Descartes  and  the  Scottish  school. 
Greatly  sympathetic  to  Reid,  Balmes  professes  the  same  aversion 
to  Idealism,  and,  speaking  of  Berkeley,  exclaims :  "  Insanity  is 
insanity  still,  however  sublime  it  may  be."6 

Unlike  the  early  Roman  Thomists,  Balmes  possesses  a  re- 
markable knowledge  of  modern  philosophy.  He  knows  thor- 
oughly Descartes,  Locke,  Condillac,  Hume,  Lamennais,  and  his 
criticisms  of  Kant  may  be  read  with  profit  even  to-day  by  all 
students  of  German  philosophy.  One  of  the  ideals  which 
Balmes  cherished,  and  which  a  premature  death  did  not  allow 
him  to  realize,  was  a  thorough  study  and  a  refutation  of  German 
idealism.  Strange  to  say,  Balmes  is,  however,  less  far  from 
Kant  than  he  supposes. 

Kant  teaches  the  subjectivity  of  space.     Balmes  says: 

"The  idea  of  extension  is  a  primitive  fact  of  our  mind.  It 
is  not  produced  by  sensations,  but  precedes  them,  if  not  in  time, 
at  least  in  the  order  of  being."7 

Kant  teaches  that  our  knowledge  of  the  external  world  is 
nothing  but  a  knowledge  of  phenomena,  and  that  the  thing-in- 
itself  is  unknowable.     Balmes  says: 

"A  pure  spirit — the  existence  of  which  we  must  always  sup- 
pose; for,  though  all  finite  beings  were  annihilated,  there  would 
still  remain  the  infinite  being  which  is  God — a  pure  spirit  would 

•Balmes,  Fundamental  Philosophy.  V.   1,  p.  11. 
'Ibid.,  V.  1,  p.  347. 
13 


178 

know  the  extended  world  just  as  it  is  in  itself,  and  would  not 
have  the   sensible   representations   either   external   or   internal 

which  we  have.''8 

Kant  teaches  that,  even  with  regard  to  our  own  self,  our 
knowledge  is  phenomenal.     Balmes  says: 

"  The  Ego  does  not  see  itself  intuitively ;  it  is  offered  to  itself 
only  mediately,  by  its  acts;  that  is,  so  far  as  it  is  known,  it 
is  in  the  same  category  as  all  other  external  beings,  which  are 
all  known  by  their  effect  upon  us."9 

A  comparative  study  of  the  philosophies  of  Balmes  and  Kant 
would  be  of  great  interest,  The  scope  of  this  treatise  obliges 
us  to  limit  ourselves  to  a  suggestion  and  a  few  remarks.  What- 
ever the  conclusions  of  such  a  study  might  be,  one  thing  is 
beyond  doubt:  Balmes's  principles  show  a  marked  tendency  to 
subjectivism.  He  professes  that  we  possess  certainty  only  with 
regard  to  internal  phenomena,  and  that  we  know  external  objects 
by  means  of  a  natural  instinct. 

Ramon  Marti  de  Eixala  (died  1857),  although  lacking  the 
depth  of  genius  of  Balmes,  exercised  a  more  direct  influence 
upon  Spanish  thinking.  Surrounded  by  a  number  of  disciples, 
he  gave  birth  to  the  school  known  as  "  Catalonian  school."  One 
of  his  disciples,  Llorcns,  eagerly  entered  into  the  spirit  of  the 
Thomistic  revival  which  was  then  taking  place  in  Italy,  and, 
during  the  last  years  of  his  life,  strove  to  put  his  doctrine  in 
perfect  harmony  with  those  of  Sanseverino  and  Cornoldi. 

Not  long  afterwards,  the  same  province  of  Catalonia,  proud 
of  such  thinkers  as  Marti  and  Balmes,  produced  another  philoso- 
pher of  real  merit,  Antonio  Cornelias. 

Antonio  Cornelias  y  Cluet  (1832-1884)  has  not  enjoyed  dur- 
ing his  life  the  noisy  celebrity  in  which  other  men  delight. 
Even  after  his  death,  he  has  remained  unknown  for  many  years, 
and  his  name  would  probably  be  forgotten  to-day  were  it  not 

•Ibid.,  V.   1.  p.  432. 
•Ibid.,  V.   1.  p.  42. 


179 

for  the  learned  study  made  by  the  distinguished  historian  of 
philosophy,  Gomez  Izquierdo,  in  the  review  La  Cultura  Es- 
pafiola  (cf.  Bibliography).  Comellas's  life,  as  Gomez  Izquierdo 
points  out,  may  be  summed  up  in  these  two  words:  Solitude 
and  study. 

His  greatest  contribution  to  philosophy  are  his  Demonstration 
de  la  armonia  entre  la  religion  catolica  y  la  ciencia  and  his  Intro- 
duction a  la  Filosofia. 

The  man  who  has  raised  Spanish  philosophy  to  its  greatest 
height  during  the  second  half  of  the  nineteenth  century  is 
Cardinal  Gonzalez. 

Zeferino  Gonzalez  y  Diaz-Tunon  (1831-1892),  born  in  Vil- 
loria,  entered  the  Dominican  order  at  the  age  of  thirteen  and 
was  sent,  when  quite  a  young  man,  to  the  mission  of  the  Philip- 
pines. In  Manila,  he  taught  philosophy  and  theology  and  pub- 
lished his  first  work :  Estudios  soore  la  Filosofia  de  Santo  Tomas, 
which  evinces  a  deep  knowledge  of  the  philosophy  of  the  Angelic 
Doctor,  and  is  regarded  by  many  critics  as  the  most  remarkable 
work  on  the  subject  written  during  the  nineteenth  century. 

Compelled  by  his  health  to  return  to  Spain  in  1865,  Gonzalez 
contributed  to  La  Ciudad  de  Dios  and  other  periodicals  numer- 
ous philosophical  essays.  His  Philosophic  elementaria,  his 
Estudios  religiosos,  filosoficos,  cientificos  y  sociales,  his  most 
recent  work,  La  Biblia  y  la  Ciencia  (1891),  and  especially  his 
Historia  de  la  Filosofia,  in  which  a  whole  volume  is  devoted  to 
Mediaeval  philosophy,  have  given  the  last  touch  to  his  reputation 
as  a  philosopher  and  assured  him  a  place  among  the  greatest 
thinkers  of  his  country  and  the  most  genuine  defenders  and 
propagators  of  neo-Scholasticism. 

Cotemporaneous  with  Gonzalez  are  Orti  y  Lara  and  Pidal  y 
Mon. 

Juan  Manuel  Orti  y  Lara  has  written  immensely.  His  most 
important  philosophical  works  may  be  seen  in  our  bibliography. 
Besides  his  Psicologia,  his  Logica,  his  £tica  and  other  construc- 
tive works,  he  deserves  the  gratitude  of  neo-Scholastics  for  his 


180 

refutation  of  the  pantheistic  philosophy  of  Krausc  and  of  the 
work  of  Draper.  His  conception  of  the  Thomistic  movement 
is,  however,  very  narrow.  Orti  y  Lara  does  not  take  any  inter- 
est in  modern  philosophy,  which  he  regards  as  "  resting  upon 
error  and  sin.''10 

Alejandro  Fidal  y  Mon,  born  in  Madrid  in  1847,  is  chiefly 
known  as  a  political  writer.  His  principal  contributions  to 
philosophy  are  a  work  entitled  Sistemas  filosoficos  (1873),  and 
a  study  on  St.  Thomas,  Santo  Tomds  de  Aquino  (1875),  which 
has  been  greatly  praised  by  Cardinal  Gonzalez. 

Among  the  most  recent  Spanish  neo-Scholastics,  let  us  men- 
tion :  Arnaiz,  Cepeda,  Daurella,  Donadiu,  Gonzalez  y  Arintero, 
Lemos,  Hernandez  y  Fajarnes,  Miralles  y  Sbert,  the  Jesuits 
Urraburu  and  Mendive,  the  historian  of  philosophy  Gomez 
Izquierdo. 

J.  Mendive,  S.J.  (died  1906),  is  the  author  of  a  course  of 
philosophy,  written  at  first  in  Spanish,  and  afterwards  pub- 
lished in  Latin  (1886).  Like  many  other  Jesuits,  he  has  been 
reproached  with  following  Suarez  too  closely  in  his  interpreta- 
tions of  St.  Thomas. 

Antonio  Hernandez  y  Fajarnes,  professor  in  the  University 
of  Zaragoza,  is  the  author  of  a  series  of  philosophical  and  scien- 
tific works  in  which  the  fundamental  principles  of  Scholasticism 
are  defended  and  opposed  to  the  antagonistic  modern  theories. 
His  first  work,  Psicologia  celidar  (1884),  is  an  able  refutation 
of  HaeckePs  biological  theories.  His  Ontologia  (1887)  is 
directed  against  positivism. 

Juan  Gonzalez  de  Arintero,  O.P.,  published  in  1904  a  work 
entitled  La  Providencia  y  la  Evolution,  whose  chief  aim  is  the 
proof  of  the  existence  of  finality  in  the  universe.  Fr.  Arintero 
attacks  the  doctrine  of  pure  chance;  and,  in  his  chapter  on  evo- 
lution, clearly  shows  that  evolution  without  finality  is  contrary 
to  reason,  to  experience,  to  science  itself. 

10  (f.  LatimiB,  Une  excursion  philosophique  on  Espagne,  Rev.  Veo- 
Scol.,  1901. 


181 

No  less  profound  is  the  scientific  knowledge  of  Placido  Angel 
Lemos.  In  his  work,  La  Vida  Organica,  published  in  1902,  he 
defends  the  validity  of  the  concept  of  substance,  proves  against 
Haeckel  the  unity  of  the  living  being,  studies  the  origin  of  life 
upon  the  earth,  and  strives  to  show  that  a  perfect  harmony  exists 
between  scientific  discoveries  and  the  teachings  of  the  Bible. 

Mr.  Alberto  Gomez  Izquierdo,  actually  professor  in  the  sem- 
inary of  Zaragoza,  has  contributed  to  the  Revista  de  Aragon  and 
the  Cultura  Espahola  numerous  articles  in  which  he  has  venti- 
lated interesting  questions  concerning  the  history  of  philosophy. 
He  has  also  published  a  History  of  Philosophy  in  the  XIX  cen- 
tury, which  is  one  of  the  most  important  and  best  documented 
works  we  possess  on  the  subject.  Mr.  Gomez  has  entirely 
omitted  Spanish  philosophy  from  his  History,  but  he  has  prom- 
ised a  separate  volume  on  the  subject,  which  all  who  are  inter- 
ested in  philosophical  researches  expect  with  feverish  eagerness. 

John  Joseph  Urraburu,  S.J.,  published  in  1890  eight  big 
Latin  quarto  volumes  with  the  title  Institutiones  Philosophical. 
The  first  deals  with  Logic,  the  second  with  Ontology,  the  third 
with  Cosmology,  the  next  three  with  Psychology,  the  last  two 
with  Natural  Theology. 

Some  years  afterwards,  he  exposed  his  teachings  anew  in  a 
more  concise  form,  and  published  a  Compendium  Philosophies 
Scholastics  which,  in  spite  of  its  modest  title,  consists  of  no  less 
than  five  large  octavo  volumes. 

Fr.  Urraburu's  works  constitute  a  monumental  production, 
one  of  the  greatest  treasures  neo-Scholastic  literature  possesses. 
In  his  method,  Urraburu  is  a  pure  Roman  Thomist.  He  uses 
the  Latin  language,  the  syllogistic  form,  and  proves  the  truth 
of  his  teachings  from  the  authority  of  the  Church  and  the 
Divine  Revelation  as  often  and  as  willingly  as  by  human  reason. 
He  differs  from  many  Roman  Thomists  by  his  knowledge  of 
modern  scientific  results.  The  conclusions  he  derives  from  these 
results  are  not  always  justifiable,  but  his  knowledge  of  the  scien- 
tific facts  themselves  cannot  be  denied. 


182 

Urraburu's  works — perhaps  on  account  of  the  very  method 
they  follow — have  not  attracted  the  attention  they  deserve. 
Their  author's  name  is  not  even  mentioned  in  Mr.  Blanc's  Dic- 
tion naire  de  l'hUosophie,  published  in  1906.  The  actual  cur- 
rent of  neo-Scholasticism,  chiefly  due  to  the  influence  of  Mgr. 
Mercier  and  the  Institute  of  Louvain,  is  unfavorable  to  Urra- 
buru.  It  professes  that  the  Latin  language  ought  to  be  dis- 
carded in  philosophical  discussions,  and  that  philosophy  ought 
to  be  regarded  as  a  science  which  must  go  its  own  way.  without 
any  predeterminate  conclusion  imposed  by  theological  beliefs. 
To  the  objection  that  this  has  not  been  the  method  followed  by 
St.  Thomas,  the  Scholastics  of  Louvain  would  answer  that  St. 
Thomas  acted  in  harmony  with  the  spirit  of  his  time,  and  that, 
if  he  lived  now,  he  would  likewise  act  in  harmony  with  the  spirit 
and  methods  of  our  day.  This  may  be  very  true,  but  it  proves 
too  much.  If  St.  Thomas  lived  to-day,  a  Positivist  might  ask, 
if  he  breathed  in  our  intellectual  atmosphere,  would  he  be  a 
Dominican?     Would  he  be  a  Scholastic? 

Urraburu's  method  is  perhaps,  on  the  whole,  more  consistent 
with  the  principles  of  Scholasticism  than  his  opponents'  view. 
The  Scholastics  of  Louvain  are  as  profoundly  convinced  of  the 
truth  of  the  doctrines  of  the  Church  as  Urraburu  is.  They 
believe  as  strongly  as  the  eminent  Spaniard  that  a  philosophical 
or  a  scientific  conclusion  opposed  to  the  revealed  truths  is  erron- 
eous and  must  be  rejected.  If  such  be  the  case,  and  if  the  pri- 
mary aim  of  philosophy  be  the  attainment  of  truth,  is  it  not 
illogical  to  abstain  from  taking  theological  doctrines  as  a  guide 
in  philosophical  investigations? 

A  proof  from  Scripture  will  not  appeal  to  the  modern  mind. 
In  Protestant  countries  especially  it  will  sound  as  profoundly 
unphilosophical.  But  we  must  not  forget  that  Urraburu  writes 
in  a  Catholic  country  and  for  Catholic  readers.  The  spirit  of 
free  interpretation  has  led  Protestant  theology  very  far.  Many 
Protestant  ministers  to-day  doubt  the  existence  of  hell,  and  a 
fi  w  are  inclined  to  transform  a  personal  God  into  an  ethical  or 


183 

metaphysical  principle.  The  case  of  the  Catholic  clergy  is  quite 
different.  All  who  are  really  Catholics  firmly  believe,  not  only 
in  a  personal  God,  who  sees  us  and  watches  over  us,  in  a  hell  in 
which  the  reprobate  will  be  tortured  with  the  devils  during  the 
whole  eternity,  but  even  in  the  Immaculate  Conception  and  the 
infallibility  of  the  pope. 

It  cannot  be  denied  that  the  spirit  of  Louvain  is  more  in  har- 
mony with  modern  thought.  This  is  the  reason  why  the  works 
published  by  the  Institut  Superieur  de  Philosophic  have  been 
translated  into  various  languages  and  have  attracted  the  atten- 
tion of  all  Europe,  whereas  Urraburu's  bulky  volumes  have  been 
forgotten  in  some  dusty  corner  of  a  conventual  library.  The 
study  of  the  works  of  the  learned  Jesuit  is,  however,  indispensa- 
ble for  an  adequate  understanding  of  the  spirit  of  Scholasticism. 

Let  us  not  leave  Spain  without  mentioning  some  important 
reviews  which  have  greatly  helped  the  cause  of  neo-Thomism. 
Razon  y  Fe,  La  Ciudad  de  Dios,  the  Revista  de  Aragon,  and  the 
Cultura  Espahola  have  published  articles  of  great  interest.  Of 
greater  interest  still  is  the  Revista  Luliana,  founded  in  Barce- 
lona in  1901,  and  whose  aim  is  the  publication  and  the  critical 
interpretation  of  the  works  of  the  Medieval  Spanish  philosopher 
Eaymond  Lully. 

Section  2. — The  Neo-Scholastic   Revival   ix   Portugal11 

The  march  of  philosophy  in  Portugal  is  closely  connected 
with  that  of  philosophy  in  Spain.  Both  countries  have  been 
inspired  by  the  same  masters,  and  have  followed  parallel  direc- 
tions in  their  speculation.  By  the  end  of  the  eighteenth  cen- 
tury, the  dominant  system  in  Portuguese  institutions  was  a 
sensism  inspired  by  Locke  and  Condillac.  The  Jesuits  of 
Coimbra,  who  alone  clung  to  an  orthodox  Thomism,  were  se- 
verely attacked  by  other  religious  orders,  especially  by  the  Ora- 
torians    and    Augustinians.     Condillac's    Art    de    Penser    was 

11  Cf.  Ferreira-Deusdado.  La  Philosophic  Thomiate  «'ii  Portugal,  Rev. 
N4o-Scol.,  1898. 


184 

translated  into  Portuguese  and  published  in  1818.  The  Ora- 
tor in n  Fr.  John  the  Baptist,  the  archdeacon  Luiz  Antonio  Ver- 
ney  and  Theodoro  d' Almeida  frankly  introduced  modern  systems 
of  thought  into  the  Portuguese  philosophical  circles. 

Little  was  done  in  Portugal  for  a  restoration  of  Thomism 
before  the  publication  of  Leo  XI IPs  encyclical.  The  few  con- 
tributions to  Scholastic  literature  written  in  Portuguese  during 
that  period,  do  not  belong  to  Portugal  proper,  but  to  Asia  or 
America. 

In  Macao,  the  Jesuit  Francis  X.  Rondina  (1827-1897),  an 
Italian  by  birth,  published  in  1869  a  course  of  philosophy  in 
harmony  with  the  Scholastic  principles.  The  title  of  the  work- 
is:  Compendia  de  Philosophia  theoretica  e  pratica  para  uso  da 
mocidadc  portuguesa  na  China.  The  author  has  been  directly 
inspired  by  St.  Thomas,  Suarez,  Goudin,  Balmes,  Gonzalez,  and, 
to  a  certain  extent,  by  Rosmini. 

Two  years  later,  Jose  Soriano  de  Sousa,  professor  in  Pernam- 
buco  (Brazil),  published  his  Licoes  de  Philosophia  elemrnlar 
racional  e  moral,  perfectly  Thomistic  in  spirit,  which  he  dedi- 
cated to  Emperor  Pedro  II. 

After  the  promulgation  of  the  encyclical  JEterni  Patris,  the 
Catholics  of  Portugal  entered  without  hesitation  into  the  spirit 
of  the  Roman  Pontiff.  By  the  philosophical  academies  they 
founded,  the  reviews  and  the  works  they  published,  they  have 
assured  to  their  country  a  conspicuous  place  in  the  history  of 
neo-Thomism. 

In  1881,  an  Academy  of  St.  Thomas  was  founded  in  Coimbra, 
and,  by  means  of  its  organ,  the  review  Institucbes  christas, 
actively  contributed  to  turn  the  attention  of  Portugal  to  the 
Thomistic  revival.  The  foundation  of  the  Academy  of  St. 
Thomas  was  soon  followed  by  the  publication  of  philosophical 
works  inspired  by  Scholastic  principles.  Among  the  writers 
who  thus  served  the  cause  of  neo-Scholastieism,  the  best  known 
are  Sinibaldi,  Pereira  Gomez  de  Carvalho  and  Madureira. 

Tbiiigo  Sinibaldi,  professor  in  the  seminary  of  Coimbra,  pub- 


185 

lished  in  1889  his  Prcplectiones  Philosophic  christiance,  and, 
three  years  later,  his  Ehmentos  de  Philosophia,  which  has  been 
honored  by  several  editions. 

Clement  Pereira  Gomez  de  Carvalho,  professor  in  the  Central 
Eyceum  of  Coimbra,  is  also  the  author  of  a  work  entitled  Eh- 
mentos de  Philosophia,  which  was  published  in  1894. 

Bernardo  Augusto  de  Madureira,  professor  in  the  Faculty  of 
Theology  of  the  University  of  Coimbra,  published,  in  1881,  a 
poem  entitled,  0  sol  d' Aquino,  which  deals  with  the  life  and  the 
philosophy  of  the  Angelic  Doctor,  and  was  dedicated  by  the 
author  to  the  new-born  Academy  of  St.  Thomas.  Since  that 
time,  Mr.  Madureira  has  also  published  a  manual  of  Elementary 
Philosophy  (1896). 

Another  active  supporter  of  neo-Thomism  in  Portugal  is  Mr. 
Manuel  Jose  Martins  Capella,  to  whose  initiative  is  due  the 
foundation  of  a  chair  of  Thomistic  philosophy  in  the  seminary 
of  Braga  (1892). 

More  recently,  Mr.  Teixera  Guedes  has  organized  in  Santarem 
a  Philosophical  and  Literary  Academy,  whose  aim  is  the  diffu- 
sion of  the  Thomistic  doctrines  among  the  people.  The  Acad- 
emy has  been  inaugurated  in  1897  by  the  Cardinal  Archbishop 
of  Lisbon. 

Section  3. — The  Neo-Scholastic  Revival  in  Mexico 

By  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth  century,  Scholastic  philoso- 
phy had  practically  disappeared  from  the  Mexican  soil.  Even 
Catholics  regarded  with  the  greatest  disrespect  a  system  which, 
in  previous  centuries,  had  been  defended  in  Mexico  by  so  many 
illustrious  thinkers.  From  August,  1815,  to  May,  1817,  there 
was  published  in  Mexico  a  religious,  political,  scientific  and  lit- 
erary periodical,  known  as  El  Catolico.  Its  columns  contained 
numerous  articles  dealing  with  History  of  Philosophy,  especially 
with  Scholasticism.  These  articles  were  published  anony- 
mously, but  it  appears  from  the  works  of  the  eminent  historian 


186 

Valverde  Tellez  that  they  were  <lue  to  the  pen  of  the  Jesuit 
Arrillaga." 

Arrillaga  defines  Scholasticism  in  terms  of  its  method  of 
exposition,  gives  a  cold  praise  to  Abelard  and  Thomas  Aquinas, 
calling  them  "  rare  geniuses  who,  in  another  time,  could  have 
done  wonders,"  is  particularly  severe  towards  Duns  Scotus, 
speaks  of  Lully's  Ars  magna  as  of  a  collection  of  extravagances. 
Similar  views  were  current  at  the  time.  The  greatest  Catholic 
thinker  Mexico  has  produced,  Clemen te  de  Jesus  Munguia,  does 
not  absolutely  escape  them.  After  exposing  the  Scholastic  doc- 
trine about  the  origin  of  ideas,  the  distinguished  bishop  finds 
himself  at  a  loss  to  explain  how  "  such  an  absurd  theory  could 
enjoy  so  great  a  vogue,  and  for  so  long  a  time,  among 
philosophers."13 

The  philosophical  system  of  Munguia,  however,  agrees  in  the 
main  with  the  principles  of  the  School.  He  who  has  been  called 
by  his  admirers  "  the  Balmes  of  Mexico  "  may  be  regarded  with 
justice  as  one  of  the  forerunners  of  the  neo-Scholastic  movement 
in  his  country.  Our  bibliography  contains  the  titles  of  his  most 
important  philosophical  publications. 

The  first  man  who,  by  his  writings  and  his  influence,  directly 
contributed  to  the  revival  of  Thomism  in  Mexico  is  Bishop 
Sollano. 

Jose  Maria  de  Jesus  Diez  de  Sollano  y  Davalos  was  born  in 
San  Miguel  de  Allende  (Guanajuato)  in  1820.  After  studying 
in  his  native  town  and  in  Mexico,  he  was  ordained  priest  in 
1844,  and  became  successively  rector  of  the  College  of  San 
Gregorio,  of  the  Seminary  and  of  the  University.  In  1863  he 
was  made  bishop  of  Leon  by  Pius  IX.     He  died  in  1881. 

The  philosophical  writings  of  Bishop  Sollano  are  not  of  great 
importance.  They  are  limited  to  an  annotated  edition  of  Roux's 
Logic,   a   pastoral   letter   dealing  with    the   encyclical   Mterni 

■Cf.  Valverde  Tellez,  Bibliograffa  Filosofica  Mexicana,  p.  41. 
"  Cf.    Valverde    Tellez,    Apuntaciones    historicas    de    la    Filosoffa    en 
Mexico,  p.  202. 


187 

Patris,  and  a  dissertation  about  the  Immaculate  Conception. 
Nevertheless,  Sollano  must  be  regarded  as  one  of  the  best  pro- 
pagators of  neo-Scholasticism  in  Mexico,  on  account  of  the  influ- 
ence he  exercised  upon  the  direction  of  philosophy  in  making 
of  his  seminary  of  Leon  one  of  the  most  active  centers  of  neo- 
Thomism. 

From  all  parts  of  the  Mexican  republic  there  soon  arose  dis- 
tinguished writers  to  defend  the  essential  principles  of  Scholas- 
tic philosophy,  so  that  the  nco-Scholastic  movement  in  Mexico 
can  compare  without  too  much  disadvantage  with  the  same 
movement  in  European  nations. 

Agustin  de  la  Rosa  (born  1824),  canon  of  Guadalajara, 
defended  the  Scholastic  doctrine  of  truth  in  his  Confide raciones 
filosoficas  sobre  la  Verdad  y  la  Certidumbre  (1870). 

Jose  M.  de  Jesus  Portugal,  bishop  of  Aguascalientes,  wrote, 
with  the  titles  of  El  Amable  Jesus  and  La  Santa  voluntad  de 
Dios,  excellent  commentaries  on  the  works  of  St.  Thomas.  El 
Amable  Jesus  is  a  commentary  on  the  third  part  of  the  Summa 
Theologica,  whereas  La  Santa  Voluntad  de  Dios  deals  with  the 
Summa  contra  Gentiles. 

Agustin  F.  Villa  greatly  facilitated  the  study  of  Scholastic 
philosophy  by  the  publication  of  a  Vocabulary  of  Scholastic 
Terms  (1879). 

Nicanor  Lozada  published  in  1880  his  Apuntes  de  Logica, 
Cosmologia  y  Psicologia.  This  work  is  not  a  course  of  Scholas- 
tic philosophy.  As  its  title  indicates,  it  simply  consists  of  notes 
and  observations  destined  to  give  to  the  students  a  clear  intelli- 
gence of  some  obscure  points  of  the  text-book  they  were  using. 
This  text-book  was  Grandclaude's  Breviarium  Philosophies 
Scholastics. 

Rafael  Cagigas  (1861-1890),  whose  premature  death  has 
been  a  great  loss  to  Mexican  philosophical  literature,  manifests 
an  enthusiastic  admiration  for  the  Thomistic  doctrine,  in  his 
volume  of  works  published  in  1890.  With  the  soul  of  a  poet, 
the  young  writer  studies  the  most  abstruse  philosophical  doc- 


188 

trine?.  The  theory  of  Matter  and  Form  is  for  him  a  boundless 
harmony,  which  he  sees  reflected  in  the  human  mind.  Cagigas 
is  perhaps  too  severe  for  modern  philosophy,  as  may  be  gathered 
from  the  following  fragment  of  a  speech  he  pronounced  in  the 
Catholic  Circle  of  Mexico,  on  January  19,  1890: 

••  Modern  philosophy,  from  Descartes  to  this  day,  is  in  a  state 
of  evident  decay.  She  declares  it  herself  with  furious  cries, 
appearing  to  the  eyes  of  the  crowd  as  a  collection  of  all  errors, 
as  a  sink  of  all  filth,  as  the  ruin  of  all  spirits,  as  a  labyrinth 
where  the  wisest  man  himself  is  suddenly  confounded.  What  is 
morality  in  the  cathedras,  in  the  societies  such  a  philosophy  cor- 
rupts ?     The  negative  morality  of  the  mule  and  of  the  ass."14 

Secundino  Briceho,  besides  an  opuscule  on  the  syllogism  and 
a  dissertation  dealing  with  St.  Thomas's  doctrine  about  the 
Immaculate  Conception,  has  written  a  comparative  study  of  the 
Spencerian  and  Scholastic  philosophy.  The  title  of  this  work 
is  Ligeros  Apunles  sobre  la  Filosofia  de  Spencer  comparada  con 
la  Filosofia  Escoldstica.  Its  aim  is  to  oppose  the  powerful  cur- 
rent of  positivism  which,  due  to  the  influence  of  Barreda  and 
Porfirio  Parra,  has  been  for  a  long  time  the  official  philosophy 
in  Mexico.  Briceho  limits  his  considerations  to  Spencer's  First 
Principles,  and  skilfully  points  out  the  contradictions  contained 
in  the  doctrine  of  the  English  philosopher. 

An  able  representative  of  neo-Scholasticism  in  Mexico  is  the 
Dominican  Guillermo  Garcia.  A  Spaniard  by  birth,  now  pro- 
fessor of  dogmatic  theology  in  the  seminary  of  San  Luis  Potosi, 
Fr.  Garcia  has  written,  besides  a  pamphlet  on  St.  Bonaventure, 
a  historical  study  entitled  Tomismo  y  Neotomismo.  The  aim 
of  this  treatise  is  to  give  a  full  account  of  the  works  and  the 
philosophical  doctrines  of  Thomas  Aquinas,  to  compare  his 
philosophy  with  the  modern  currents  of  thought,  to  give  a  his- 
torical survey  of  the  Thomistic  philosophy  throughout  the  ages. 
The  part  of  the  work  dealing  with  modern  philosophical  systems 
has  not  much  value.     It  is  easy  to  see  that  Fr.  Garcia  is  not 

14  In   Ohras   de   R.    Cagigas,    pp.    I7(iir.     Also   given    in    Valverde'a 

Apuntacioncs,  p.  402  IT. 


189 

precisely  at  home  when  he  deals  with  Locke,  Kant,  Fichte  and 
Hegel.  His  knowledge  of  St.  Thomas,  on  the  other  hand,  is 
certainly  thorough.  His  admiration  for  the  Angelic  Doctor  is 
even  exaggerated.  He  feels  proud  of  the  rule  of  the  Dominican 
order,  which  commands  to  follow  St.  Thomas  in  every  point, 
in  omnibus,  omnino,  under  the  most  severe  penalties,  obliges  to 
a  vow  of  fidelity  to  his  doctrines,  and  regards  as  impious  the 
slightest  deviation  from  them.13 

Now,  such  a  rule  is  not  only  unphilosophical,  but  anti- 
Thomistic.  There  is  nothing  more  opposed  to  the  spirit  of  a 
philosopher  than  a  systematic  and  uncritical  adherence  to  each 
proposition  he  has  maintained.  Philosophy  is  essentially  a 
thinking  study  of  things.  We  must  carefully  meditate  the 
works  of  our  predecessors,  we  must  try  to  understand  their 
meaning,  to  grasp  their  train  of  thought,  but  we  are  philoso- 
phers only  in  so  far  as  we  think  with  our  own  head.  All  great 
thinkers  have  studied  the  various  philosophical  systems,  but 
they  have  not  servilely  adhered  to  them.  They  have  marked 
their  works  with  the  seal  of  their  own  individuality.  St. 
Thomas  is  no  exception  to  this  rule. 

Happily  for  philosophy,  the  Dominicans  do  not  seem  to  ob- 
serve very  strictly  the  rule  of  which  Fr.  Garcia  is  so  proud. 
Strange  to  say,  Garcia  himself  furnishes  us  ample  proofs  of  this 
assertion.  A  section  of  Tomismo  y  Neotomismo  is  devoted  to 
a  defence  of  the  Dominican  order  against  the  charge  of  intoler- 
ance. The  author  gives  the  names  of  notable  members  of  the 
order  who  have  more  or  less  departed  from  St.  Thomas's  teach- 
ing without  being  molested.  He  speaks  of  Thomas  do  Vio 
Cajetanus,  of  Ambroso  Catarino,  of  Thomas  Campanella,  and 
more  especially  of  Durandus  of  St.  Pourcain,  a  "  powerful 
opponent  of  the  philosophy  of  the  Angelic  Doctor,"  who  lived 
and  died  in  the  Dominican  order  without  ever  suffering  the 
slightest  persecution.16 

15  Cf.  Tomismo  y  Neotominno,  p.  421. 
"Garcia,  Tomismo  y  Neotomismo,  pp.   148  IT. 


190 

This  is  not  the  only  contradiction  which  Tom  is  mo  y  Neoto- 
mismo  contains.  Fr.  Garcia's  position  as  regards  neo-Scholasti- 
cism  is  far  from  being  clear.  He  declares  that  his  view  of  the 
Thomistic  movement  is  in  harmony  with  the  view  of  the  Louvain 
school,  and  he  gives  an  excellent  program  of  neo-Scholastieism 
to  which  every  professor  of  Louvain  would  subscribe.  On  the 
other  hand,  he  quotes  with  approval  Cornoldi's  famous  phrase 
describing  modern  philosophy  as  the  pathology  of  human  reason, 
and  cannot  blame  Orti  y  Lara  for  regarding  modern  thought  as 
resting  upon  error  and  sin. 

In  spite  of  these  defects,  Tomismo  y  Neotomismo  is  a  valuable 
little  work.  It  contains  important  historical  data  about  the 
Thomistic  movement.  The  five  chapters  dealing  with  the  phi- 
losophy of  St.  Thomas  in  the  Dominican  order  are  particularly 
interesting.  Fr.  Garcia  is  actually  preparing  a  treatise  on  St. 
Thomas's  sociology.  We  sincerely  hope  that  this  new  work  will 
be,  like  Tomismo  y  Neotomismo,  a  precious  contribution  to  neo- 
Scholastic  literature. 

No  Mexican,  however,  deserves  the  thanks  of  all  lovers  of 
Scholastic  philosophy  so  greatly  as  Mr.  Valverde  Tellez. 

Emeterio  Valverde  Tellez,  a  canon  of  the  cathedral  of  Mexico, 
has  written,  besides  a  treatise  on  truth,  three  historical  works 
of  great  importance:  the  Apuntaciones  historicas  sobre  la  Filoso- 
fia  en  Mexico  (1896);  the  Critica  Filosofica  (1904);  and  the 
Bibliografia  Filosofica  Mexicana  (1907). 

In  the  Apuntaciones  historicas,  Mr.  Valverde,  after  general 
considerations  on  the  nature  of  philosophy  and  a  weak  defense 
of  Metaphysics  against  the  attacks  of  Positivism,  traces  the 
great  lines  of  Mexican  speculation,  gives  valuable  informations 
about  the  libraries  and  the  centers  of  learning  in  Mexico,  leads 
us  through  the  vicissitudes  of  the  Mexican  University  since  its 
foundation  in  1521  to  its  final  suppression  in  1868,  and  the 
foundation  of  the  new  Pontifical  University  in  1896.  He  then 
passes  t<>  ;i  detailed  and  critical  study  of  the  various  philosoph- 


191 

ical  systems  in  his  country.  He  analyzes  the  works  and  the 
doctrines  of  all  great  Mexican  thinkers. 

In  spite  of  his  enthusiastic  admiration  for  St.  Thomas,  Mr. 
Valverde  does  full  justice  to  the  philosophers  of  other  schools. 
His  study  of  the  recent  positivistic  movement  in  Mexico  and  of 
the  violent  discussions  to  which  it  has  given  rise  is  excellent.17 

The  Critica  Filosofica  completes  the  Apuntaciones  by  furnish- 
ing new  data,  by  making  us  know  philosophical  works  completely 
unknown,  and  unearthed  by  the  patient  labor  of  the  author. 

The  Bibliografia  Filosofica  Mexicana  gives  us,  with  the  great- 
est exactitude,  the  list  of  all  philosophical  productions  written 
in  Mexico.  Each  work  is  preceded  by  a  biographical  sketch  of 
its  author  and  followed  by  a  critical  analysis,  so  that  the  Biblio- 
grafia is  indispensable  to  all  who  are  interested  in  the  march 
of  philosophical  speculation  among  the  Spanish  race. 

Section   4. — The  Neo-Scholastic   Eevival  in   South 
America 

Among  the  countries  which  have  eagerly  embraced  the  cause 
of  the  Scholastic  revival,  Colombia  deserves  a  special  attention. 
Thomism  has  become,  as  it  were,  its  official  philosophy,  and, 
more  than  anywhere  else  perhaps,  has  identified  itself  with  the 
spirit  of  the  nation. 

When,  in  the  middle  of  the  last  century,  Bentham's  utilitarian 
ethical  system  was  introduced  into  Colombia,  it  was  opposed  by 
some  of  the  most  eminent  Colombian  writers.  Margallo,  M.M. 
Mallarino,  Ricardo  de  la  Parra,  Joaquin  Mosquera,  Mario 
Valenzuela,  and  more  especially  Jose  Eusebio  Caro  (1817-1853) 
and  his  illustrious  son,  Miguel  Antonio  Caro,  defended  the 
Thomistic  moral  system  with  much  ability  and  success. 

Miguel  Antonio  Caro,  born  in  Bogota  on  November  10,  L843, 
is  chiefly  known  as  a  politician  and  a  man  of  letters.  As  a 
politician,  he  has  exercised  an  immense  influence  upon  the  gov- 

11  The  greatest  supporter  of  Positivism  in  Mexico  is  Mr.  Porflrio 
Parra.     Its  most  irreducible  adversary  has  been  Mr.  J.  M.  Vigil. 


192 

ernmenl  of  his  country,  and  has  been  intrusted  with  the  high 
oflice  of  president.  Among  his  literary  achievements,  which 
have  given  him  a  conspicuous  place  in  the  history  of  Spanish 
literature,  let  us  mention  his  admirable  translation  of  Virgil 
into  Spanish  verse.  His  most  lasting  title  to  the  gratitude  of 
Philosophy  is  his  Estudio  sobre  el  UtilUarismo,  which  has  been 
proclaimed  worthy  of  Joseph  de  Maistre.18 

The  most  important  center  of  Thomism  in  Colombia  is  actu- 
ally the  College  of  the  Rosary  (Colegio  Mayor  de  Xuestra 
Sefiora  del  Rosario)  in  Bogota. 

As  early  as  1881,  Rafael  Maria  Carrasquilla  (born  in  Bogota 
on  December  18,  1857,  and  president  of  the  College  of  the 
Rosary  since  1891)  proclaimed  his  adherence  to  the  philosophy 
imposed  by  Pope  Leo  XIII  on  the  Catholic  world.  "  To  the 
modern  errors,"  said  he,  "  we  must  oppose  the  entire  truth,  even 
if  we  offend  the  pride  of  our  century  of  progress,  by  exhibiting 
a  monk  of  the  thirteenth  century  as  a  model  of  wisdom."19 

The  program  thus  sketched  by  Mr.  Carrasquilla  has  been 
faithfully  carried  out.  All  the  works  and  essays  the  College 
has  produced  have  been  inspired  by  the  purest  Thomistic  prin- 
ciples, so  that  the  history  of  the  College  of  the  Rosary  during 
the  last  fifteen  years  forms  one  of  the  most  interesting  pages 
of  a  history  of  neo-Scholasticism. 

The  adherence  of  the  college  to  the  principles  of  the  Angelic 
Doctor  does  not,  however,  degenerate  into  servility.  It  is  essen- 
tially eclectic  and  progressive.  The  new  constitutions  of  the 
college  strongly  insist  upon  the  fact  that  we  must  follow  the 
Scholastics  wherever  their  philosophy  is  acceptable  in  the  light 
of  modern  criticism,  and  reject  their  doctrines  if  they  have 
proved  erroneous  or  inadequate.20 

The  most  important  work  of  Mr.  Carrasquilla  is  the  volume 
entitled,   Ensayo  sobre  la  doctrina  liberal,  which   has  obtained 

'Mf.  Ramirez,  Filosofia  Positivista,  p.  95. 

"Carrasquilla,  Sobre  el  estudio  do  la  filosofia;  Repert.  Colomb., 
Aug.,  1881. 

=°Cf.  Revista  del  Colegio  del  Rosario,  .Tune.  190G,  p.  316. 


193 

him  the  honor  of  being  described  as  a  "  republican  Balmes." 

By  its  title,  the  Ensayo  sobre  la  Doctrina  Liberal  seems  to 
belong  to  political  science  rather  than  to  philosophy.  It  is  as 
a  philosophical  system,  however,  that  Mr.  Carrasquilla  studies 
liberalism,  which  he  refutes  by  the  Thomistic  social  principles. 
"  Liberalism,"  says  he,  "  is  above  all  a  philosophical  school, 
which  a  priest  may  study  and  refute  with  the  same  right  where- 
with he  would  combat  Descartes,  Hegel  or  Rosmini."21 

Among  the  men  who  have  contributed  to  give  to  the  College 
of  the  Eosary  the  Thomistic  direction  it  has  to-day,  none  is  more 
conspicuous  than  Mr.  Julian  Restrepo  Hernandez,  professor  of 
logic  and  anthropology  in  the  college  since  1892. 

Born  in  Bogota  on  July  23,  1871,  Julian  Eestrepo  Hernandez 
studied  in  the  College  of  the  Rosary  and  showed  such  philosoph- 
ical acumen  that  he  was  placed  in  the  chair  of  logic  in  1890, 
while  still  a  student  in  the  college.  Later  on,  he  studied  law 
and  wrote  for  the  Colombian  government  the  Codification  Cun- 
dinamarquesa,  which  contains  the  entire  legislation  of  Colombia, 
and  forms  a  volume  of  1208  pages  folio. 

Mr.  Restrepo,  however,  has  not  neglected  philosophy  and  has 
recently  (1907)  published  a  volume  on  logic  {Lection es  de 
Logica,  in  which  he  has  embodied  the  lectures  given  to  the  stu- 
dents of  the  College  of  the  Rosary. 

The  qualities  which  distinguish  this  work  have  been  very  skil- 
fully pointed  out  by  the  distinguished  literary  critic  Rufino  Jose 
Cuervo,  in  a  personal  letter  to  the  author :  "  The  pleasure  I 
experienced  at  the  reading  of  your  volume  on  Logic,  says  Mr. 
Cuervo,  comes  chiefly  from  the  clearness,  precision  and  rigorous 
method  of  the  work,  in  which  ancient  and  modern  learning  are 
combined,  so  that  truth  may  appear  more  luminous  and 
attractive."22 

Mr.  Restrepo's  Logic,  besides  its  intrinsic  value  as  an  exposi- 

21  Carrasquilla,  Ensayo  sobre  la  Doctrina  Liberal,  p.  xiii. 

22  Quoted  in  article  by  Pedro  M.  CarrefiO,  in  La  Prensa,  Bogota, 
Dec.  14,  1907. 

14 


194 

tion  of  the  Scholastic  logical  principles,  is  worthy  of  attention 
for  a  theory  of  the  modes  of  the  hypothetical  syllogism,  which 
constitutes  a  direct  contribution  of  the  author  to  the  field  of 
logic. 

Since  1905,  the  College  of  the  Rosary  also  publishes  an  im- 
portant review  (Revista  del  Colegio  Mayor  de  Nuestra  Scnora 
del  Rosario)  which  is  undoubtedly  one  of  the  most  excellent 
South  American  periodical  publications.  Its  field  is  not  con- 
fined to  philosophy.  It  treats  likewise  of  literature,  education, 
history,  and  seldom  fails  to  give  a  delightful  piece  of  poetry. 

From  a  philosophical  point  of  view,  the  most  important  con- 
tribution of  the  review  is  the  essay  entitled  Santo  Tom  as  ante 
la  ciencia  moderna.  of  Francisco  Maria  Rengifo,  now  professor 
in  the  college. 

M  p.  Rengifo  studies  the  modern  theories  defended  by  mathe- 
matics and  science  and  shows  that  they  are  in  perfect  harmony 
with  the  essential  principles  of  Thomism. 

Lei  us  not  leave  the  College  of  the  Rosary  without  mentioning 
the  interesting  work  entitled  La  Filosofia  Positivista,  written  by 
Samuel  Ramirez  (1875-1908),  as  a  dissertation  for  the  degree 
of  Doctor  of  Philosophy.  After  giving  a  detailed  history  of 
the  various  positivistic  schools,  Mr.  Ramirez  demonstrates  the 
superiority  of  the  Thomistic  principles  over  the  doctrines  of 
Comte  and  his  disciples. 

The  Rev.  Luis  Ortiz,  S.J.,  professor  in  the  College  of  San 
Bartolome,  has  contributed  to  Colombian  neo-Scholastic  litera- 
ture a  little  work  entitled  La  Vida  (Life).  The  thesis  de- 
fended by  the  author  is  the  following :  "  The  doctrine  of  the 
Angelic  Doctor  and  of  Fr.  Suarez,  defending  the  existence  of  a 
vital  principle,  which  informs  living  beings  and  is  essentially 
distinct  from  the  physico-chemical  forces  of  brute  matter,  is 
confirmed  by  the  observations  of  modern  science;  or.  more 
briefly,  the  physical  and  chemical  forces  are  inadequate  to  ex- 
plain life." 

The  proofs  adduced  by  Fr.  Ortiz  in  defence  of  this  thesis  are 


195 

a  development  of  the  following  argument :  The  essences  of 
things  are  known  from  the  operations  and  properties  of  these 
things.  The  operations  and  properties  of  inorganic  matter  are 
essentially  different  from  those  which  characterize  living  beings. 
Therefore,  the  nature  of  living  beings  is  essentially  different 
from  that  of  inorganic  matter. 

Colombia  is  not  the  only  South  American  republic  in  which 
the  spirit  of  the  Thomistic  revival  has  penetrated.  The  most 
important  contribution  of  South  America  to  the  cause  of  neo- 
Scholasticism  came  from  Chile  and  was  due  to  Francisco  Gine- 
bra,  of  the  Society  of  Jesus. 

Ginebra's  Elementos  de  Filosofia,  published  in  1887  in  San- 
tiago (Chile),  has  deservedly  run  into  several  editions.  It  is 
one  of  the  most  valuable  text-books  on  Scholastic  philosophy 
which  the  neo- Scholastic  revival  has  produced.  The  author  has 
been  chiefly  inspired  by  St.  Thomas,  Suarez,  Liberatore,  Kleut- 
gen,  Cornoldi  and  Balmes. 

The  Elementos  de  Filosofia  is  completed  by  a  treatise  on 
Natural  Law  (Elementos  de  Derecho  Natural),  which  is  also  a 
very  important  work,  and  has  been  adopted  as  a  text-book  in 
several  of  the  South  American  schools  of  law. 


CHAPTER    XI 

THE   NEO-SCHOLASTIC   REVIVAL   IN   GERMANY.   AUSTRIA 
AND    SWITZERLAND 

The  philosophical  systems  of  Kant  and  Hegel  exercised  a 
powerful  influence  upon  Catholic  philosophy  in  Germany. 
Georg  Hermes  (1775-1831)  and  Anton  Giinther  (1783-1863) 
defended  the  omnipotence  of  human  reason,  and,  following 
Hegel,  rejected  the  distinction  between  natural  and  supernatural 
truths — one  of  the  fundamental  tenets  of  the  Catholic  Church. 
Rome  condemned  their  doctrines  and  placed  their  writings  on 
the  Index,  so  that  their  efforts,  from  a  Catholic  point  of  view, 
were  a  failure. 

A  movement  of  return  towards  Thomistic  philosophy  then 
took  place  among  German  Catholic  thinkers;  so  that,  when  Leo 
XIII  published  his  encyclical,  Catholic  Germany  eagerly  es- 
poused the  views  of  the  Pontiff. 

Among  the  men  who  prepared  this  return  to  Scholasticism 
must  be  mentioned: 

Friedrich  Schlegel,  who,  in  his  History  of  Ancient  and  Mod- 
ern Literature,  showed  the  real  merit  of  Mediaeval  philosophy. 

Mohler  and  his  disciple  Staudenmaicr,  who  condemned  all 
forms  of  rationalism. 

Clemens,  whose  aim  was  the  refutation  of  Giinther. 

Rothenfiue,  who,  in  spite  of  some  ontologistic  and  Rosminian 
ideas,  agreed  in  the  main  with  the  philosophy  of  the  School. 

But  the  two  philosophers  who  most  actively  contributed  to  the 
revival  of  Scholasticism  in  Germany  were  Kleutgen  and  Stockl. 

Joseph  Kleutgen,  S.J.  (1811-1883),  published  in  1860  his 
Philoso/iliir  der  Yorzeil.  which  has  become  one  of  the  classical 
works  of  neo-Scholastic  literature.     The  Philosophic  der  Vorzeit 

19G 


197 

is  not,  like  Sanseverino's  Philosophia  Christiana  or  Urraburu's 
Institutiones,  a  detailed  course  of  Scholastic  philosophy.  It  is 
rather  a  work  of  defense.  Kleutgen  is  not  the  peaceful  states- 
man who  organizes  his  country;  he  is  the  general  on  the  battle- 
field. His  chief  purpose  is  to  purge  German  Catholic  philoso- 
phy of  all  traces  of  Hegelianism.  He  vigorously  attacks 
Hermes  and  Giinther.  He  defends  the  Scholastic  conceptions 
against  the  erroneous  interpretations  of  Frohschammer,  Male- 
branche  and  others. 

He  also  expounds  the  fundamental  principles  of  Thomism, 
and  shows  that  they  are  the  only  principles  capable  of  giving 
entire  satisfaction  to  human  reason. 

Among  Kleutgen's  contributions  to  the  body  of  Scholastic 
doctrines,  let  us  mention  his  famous  principles  of  knowledge, 
which  have  been  generally  accepted  by  subsequent  neo-Thomists : 

1.  Knowledge  results  of  the  fact  that  an  image  of  the  knowu 
object  is  produced  in  the  knower  by  the  concourse  of  the  known 
object  and  of  the  knower. 

2.  The  known  object  is  in  the  knower  according  to  the  mode 
of  the  knower. 

3.  Knowledge  becomes  more  perfect  in  proportion  as  the 
knower  is  more  remote,  by  the  nature  of  his  being,  from  mate- 
rial conditions.1 

Not  long  after  the  publication  of  the  Philosophie  der  Vorzeit, 
Albert  Stockl  (1823-1895)  wrote  his  two  most  important  works: 
Geschichte  der  Philosophie  des  Mittelalters  (1864—66),  and 
Lehrbuch  der  Philosophic.  The  latter  is  a  clear  and  valuable 
exposition  of  the  Thomistic  philosophy;  the  former,  one  of  the 
works  which  initiated  those  historical  investigations  about  Scho- 
lasticism, of  which  the  nineteenth  century  is  bo  Legitimately 
proud. 

The  most  important  contribution  of  Germany  to  Scholastic 
philosophy  since  the  days  of  Kleutgen  and  Stockl  is  the  scries 

1  Kloutgen,  La  Philosophie  scola.stiquo,  Siorp's  ed.,  Vol.  1,  Dissert.  1. 
Chnp.  1. 


198 

published  under  the  name  of  PhUosophia  Lacensia  by  the  Jes- 
uits of  Maria-Laach.     This  series  comprises  the  following  works : 

Institulioncs  logicales  (3  vol.)  ;  Institutioncs  philosophic 
natural  is :  and  I  nstilutiones  psychological,  by  Tilmann  Pesch; 
Inslituliancs  tltrudiccece  sive  thcologicB  naturalis,  by  J.  Hontheim; 
Institutioncs  juris  naturalis,  by  Th.  Meyer;  eleven  volumes  in 
all,  forming  a  complete  course  of  Scholastic  philosophy. 

The  PhUosophia  Lacensis  is  more  decidedly  Scholastic  in  its 
method  than  any  other  work  neo-Thomism  has  produced.  Fr. 
Pesch  follows  in  his  exposition  the  same  plan  St.  Thomas  fol- 
lowed. Like  St.  Thomas,  he  begins  with  an  exposition  of  ad- 
verse doctrines,  passes  to  the  thesis  containing  his  own  views, 
ends  with  an  answer  to  the  objections  given  in  the  first  part. 

Such  a  method  must  not,  however,  lead  us  to  believe  that  the 
eminent  authors  of  the  PhUosophia  Lacensis  are  servile  follow- 
ers of  the  Middle  Ages  and  ignore  modern  ideas.  Their  ac- 
quaintance with  the  current  of  modern  philosophy  is  remarkable. 
Fr.  Pesch  discusses  all  recent  scientific  hypotheses  in  his  Insti- 
tutioncs Philosophic  Naturalis,  and  tries  to  establish  upon  these 
hypotheses  the  foundation  of  Thomistic  cosmology.  A  like 
knowledge  of  modern  psychology  appears  in  the  1 nstilutiones 
Psychological. 

Fathers  Meyer  and  Hontheim  follow  the  same  method  and 
display  the  same  erudition.  The  latter  has  recently  applied 
mathematics  to  logic  in  his  work:  Dcr  logische  Algoritmus 
(1895). 

Besides  Meyer,  neo-Scholastic  Germany  possesses  two  moral- 
ists of  a  great  merit,  Costa-Rosetti  (1841-1900)  and  Cathrein. 

Victor  Cathrein,  S.J.  (died  1899),  published  his  Moralphi- 
losophie  in  1890,  and  gave  it  anew  in  a  more  concise  form  a  few 
years  afterwards,  as  one  of  the  volumes  of  the  series  Cursus 
philosophicus,  of  which  more  in  the  sequel.  One  of  the  most 
importanl  studies  contained  in  Cathrein's  work  is  the  chapter 
dealing  with  Socialism.     Published  separately  in  German,  and 


199 

honored  by  five  editions  in  less  than  two  years,  it  has  been  trans- 
lated into  English,  French,  Italian,  Polish  and  Flemish.  Al- 
though the  author's  conclusions  are  opposed  to  the  socialistic 
theories,  Socialists  themselves  have  been  compelled  to  admit  that 
he  had  grasped  the  essential  principles  of  their  system  more 
adequately  than  some  of  their  own  followers. 

One  of  the  greatest  German  neo-Scholastics  of  the  present 
time  is  Mr.  Constantin  Gutberlet,  professor  in  Fulda  Seminary. 
As  may  be  seen  in  our  Bibliography,  Mr.  Gutberlet  has  studied 
the  thought  of  the  Angelic  Doctor  under  nil  its  aspects.  Be- 
sides numerous  shorter  treatises,  he  published,  between  the 
years  1878  and  1884,  the  volumes  of  his  Lehrbuch  der  Philoso- 
phic. This  important  work,  in  which  the  author  generally  fol- 
lows Suarez,  has  been  the  first  great  successful  attempt  to  har- 
monize modern  science  with  Thomistic  principles.  Gutberlet's 
greatest  service  to  the  cause  he  defends  has  perhaps  been  the 
foundation  of  the  review  Philosophisches  Jahrbuch,  which,  since 
1888,  has  been  read  with  avidity  by  all  who  are  interested  in  the 
Scholastic  revival.  According  to  Mr.  Picavet,  the  Philosoph- 
isches Jahrbuch  is  the  most  eclectic  and  the  best  informed  of  all 
neo-Scholastic  periodical  publications. 

German  neo-Scholastic  literature  possesses  another  review  of 
great  value,  the  Jahrbuch  fur  Philosophic  und  speculative 
Theologie.  This  review  was  founded  in  Paderborn  in  1887  by 
Ernst  Commer,  professor  in  the  University  of  Vienna.  As  its 
title  indicates,  it  does  not  confine  itself  to  philosophical  ques- 
tions. It  often  contains  interesting  theological  discussions,  and 
especially  comparative  studies  of  Catholic  and  Protestant 
theology. 

Besides  the  Jahrbuch.  Mr.  Commer  has  published  some  im- 
portant works,  viz..  System  der  PhUosophie,  Logik,  Die  immer- 
wdhrende  Philosophic,  etc.,  which  have  given  him  the  first  rank 
among  neo-Scholastics  in  Austria. 

A  third  review,  the  Saint-Thomasblatter,  published  for  some 


200 

years  in  Begensburg  by  Mr.  C.  M.  Schneider,  was  more  strictly 
Thomistic  than  the  two  other  publications  wc  have  mentioned. 
Thomism,  according  to  Mr.  Schneider,  must  be  accepted  in  its 
entirety  or  not  be  accepted  at  all.  This  principle  inspired  the 
Sainl-Thomasblatter,  and  recurs  in  all  the  works  Mr.  Schneider 
has  published. 

Germany  has  distinguished  itself,  more  than  any  other  nation, 
by  important  works  concerning  the  history  of  philosophy  in  the 
Middle  Ages.  We  have  already  spoken  of  Albert  Stockl.  Not 
long  afterwards,  Carl  Werner  published  important  monographs 
dealing  with  the  doctrine  of  all  the  great  Mediaeval  thinkers. 
Alcuin,  Albert  the  Great,  William  of  Auvergne,  Roger  Bacon, 
St.  Bonaventure,  St.  Thomas  Aquinas,  Duns  Scotus,  Suarez, 
were  studied  with  untiring  zeal  and  incredible  erudition. 

Some  years  later,  Ehrle  and  Henry  Deniflc,  O.P.  (died  1'905), 
published  the  Archiv  fur  Literatur  und  Kirchengeschichte  des 
MittelaJters,  which  made  known  many  an  unknown  text,  and 
enriched  neo-Scholastic  literature  with  numerous  learned  studies. 
Denifle  also  wrote  a  History  of  the  Universities  iti  the  Middle 
Ages,  which  is  the  most  precious  work  we  possess  on  the  subject. 
This  History  gave  its  author  such  a  fame  that  the  French  Acad- 
emy invited  him  to  write  a  Chartularium  Universitatis  Parisien- 
sis,  which  he  completed  (1891)  with  the  cooperation  of  A. 
Chatelain. 

More  directly  concerned  with  philosophy  than  Denifle's  con- 
tributions are  the  important  works  of  Clemens  Baeumker  and 
Baron  G.  V.  von  Hertling,  published,  since  1891,  under  the 
title  of  Beitrdge  zur  Geschichte  der  Philosophic  des  Mittclalters. 
The  collection  consists  of  works  heretofore  unpublished,  critical 
edit  inns  of  works  already  known,  monographs,  etc.  Among  the 
works  it  already  contains  let  us  mention :  the  De  Unitate  of 
Dominicus  Gonzalez,  falsely  attributed  to  Boethius,  the  Pons 
Vitce  of  the  Jewish  philosopher  Ibn  Gebirol,  the  Theory  of 
Knowledge  of  William  of  Auvergne,  the  Impossibilia  of  Siger 


201 

de  Brabant,  Mr.  Grabman's  learned  study  on  Cardinal  Matthew 
of  Aquasparta,  etc.2 

Besides  this  most  important  contribution  to  neo-Scholastic 
literature,  Mr.  Baeumker  has  published :  Das  Problem  der 
Materie  in  der  griechischen  Philosophic  (1890). 

In  German  Switzerland,  the  most  important  center  of  neo- 
Thomism  is  the  Catholic  University  of  Friburg,  in  which  the 
classes  of  philosophy  and  theology  have  been  confided  to  the 
Dominican  Fathers.  Among  the  eminent  men  who  have  taught 
in  the  university  may  be  mentioned  Coconnier,  Berthier  and 
Mandonnet. 

The  most  distinguished  neo-Scholastic  in  Switzerland  is  not, 
however,  connected  with  Friburg  University.  It  is  the  Kev. 
Nicolas  Kaufmann,  president  of  the  Academy  of  St.  Thomas 
of  Lucern.  Mr.  Kaufmann  has  contributed  numerous  articles 
to  the  Revue  Neo-Scolastique,  the  Philosophisches  Jahrbuch,  and 
several  Swiss  periodicals,  and  has  published  many  valuable 
works  dealing  with  particular  aspects  of  the  philosophy  of 
Aristotle  and  Thomas  Aquinas  (cf.  Bibliography).  One  of  the 
best  known  is  his  study  on  Final  Cause,  which  has  been  trans- 
lated into  French.  In  articles  published  in  the  Schweizerische 
Kirchenzeitung,  especially  in  the  article  entitled:  Das  Pontifical 
Leos  XIII  und  der  Neuthomismus,  Kaufmann  has  shown  that 
his  view  of  the  neo-Thomistic  movement  is  identical  with  the 
view  of  Leo  XIII,  and  may  be  expressed  by  the  famous  formula: 
vetera  novis  augere. 

A  complete  history  of  neo-Scholasticism  in  German-speaking 
countries  would  be  very  extensive.  Our  rapid  survey,  incom- 
plete though  it  be,  must  not  omit  the  names  of  the  following 
distinguished  men : 

Mathias  Schneid  (1840-1895)  who,  besides  a  work  on  the 
influence  of  Aristotle  upon  the  Scholastics,  Aristoteles  in  der 
Scholastik,  published  in  1875,  and  inspired  by  Talamo's  work 

2  The  works  belonging  to  this  collection  are  indicated  in  onr  Bibliog- 
raphy by  the  word  Beitriige. 


202 

on  the  same  BUbject,  has  written  valuable  studies  on  the  cosmo- 
logieal  theories  of  Thomas  Aquinas  and  Duns  Scotus. 

Ludwig  Schiitz  (1838-1901),  whose  most  important  contri- 
bution to  aeo-Scholastic  literature  is  a  vocabulary  known  as 
Thomas-Lexicon,  in  which  all  scientific  terms  contained  in  the 
Sum  ma  Theologica  and  the  Sunt  ma  contra  Gentiles  are  thor- 
oughly explained. 

Francis  Xavier  Pfeifer  (1829-1902),  who  has  tried  to  har- 
monize the  Thomistic  philosophy  with  the  recent  scientific 
hypotheses  in  his  work  Ilarmonische  Beziehung  zwisclien  Scho- 
lasfflc  und  moderner  Naturwissenschaft. 

Otto  Willmann,  professor  in  the  University  of  Prague,  and 
author  of  a  remarkable  History  of  Idealism. 

Joseph  Jungmann,  S.J.,  the  author  of  one  of  the  best  works 
dealing  with  esthetics  {JEstlietik,  Freiburg,  1884),  in  which  he 
finds  in  Scholastic  psychology  the  foundation  of  the  notion  of 
the  beautiful. 

Francis  Schaub,  the  author  of  a  comparative  study  of  the 
Thomistic  and  socialistic  theories. 

Eugene  Rolfes,  who  has  compared  the  theistic  conceptions  of 
St.  Thomas  and  Aristotle,  and  has  tried  to  discover  in  the  Greek- 
philosopher  some  traces  of  the  Christian  dogmas. 

Gundisalv.  Feldner,  who  has  published  a  study  about  St. 
Thomas's  teaching  concerning  free  will. 

Michael  Glossner,  canon  of  Munich,  one  of  the  best  known 
contributors  to  the  Jahrbuch  fur  Philosophie  und  speculative 
Theologie. 

Martin  Grabmann,  who,  besides  the  learned  study  on  Matthew 
of  Aquasparta  we  have  already  mentioned,  has  published  an 
excellent  treatise  on  the  idea  of  God  in  St.  Thomas's  philosophy. 


CHAPTER    XII 
THE    NEO-SCHOLASTIC    REVIVAL    IN    FRANCE 

Although  France  contributed  perhaps  more  than  any  other 
nation  to  turn  the  attention  of  the  world  to  the  Middle  Ages, 
the  direct  current  of  the  Thomistic  revival  had  at  first  little  or 
no  influence  upon  French  speculation.  The  philosophical  sys- 
tems of  Descartes  and  Cousin  were  deeply  rooted  upon  the 
French  soil.  Even  in  Catholic  seminaries,  the  doctrines  of  the 
two  great  French  philosophers  were  officially  taught.  The  text- 
book most  in  use  at  the  time,  and  whose  pages  breathe  a  strong 
Cartesian  spirit,  had  been  written  by  Father  Valla  in  the  last 
years  of  the  preceding  century,  and  was  generally  known  as 
Philosophie  de  Lyon.  The  full  title  of  the  work  is:  Institu- 
tiones  pliilosopliicce,  auctoritate  D.D.  Archiepiscopi  Lugdunensis, 
1192.  Even  after  the  promulgation  of  the  encyclical  Mterni 
Patris,  eclecticism  and  Cartesianism  kept  their  ground  for  a 
long  time  among  French  Catholics.  This  easily  explains  how 
France  had  not  a  single  great  representative  of  neo-Scholasticism 
at  the  time  Germany  could  mention  with  pride  the  works  of 
Kleutgen;  Spain,  those  of  Cardinal  Gonzalez;  Italy,  those  of 
Sanseverino,  Liberatore  and  Talamo. 

The  works  published  in  France  in  defense  of  Scholasticism 
previous  to  the  encyclical  fflterni  Patris  are  few  and  of  little 
importance.  Let  us  mention  the  Prima  Principia  Scientiaruw 
of  Michael  Rosset  (1866)  ;  the  Brcviarium  Philosophiw  Scholas- 
tic® of  Grandclaude  (1868);  the  short  treatise  entitled,  De 
V union  substantielle  de  Vdme  et  du  corps,  published  in  1S70  by 
Henri  Sauve,  president  of  the  Catholic  University  of  Angers; 
the  Doctrine  de  la  Connwssance,  <>f  Mgr.  Bourquard,  of  the 
same  university,  published  BeveD  years  Later;  and  the  treatise 

203 


204 

De  inteUectualismo  of  the  Sulpieian  P.M.  Brin  (1843-1894), 
which  has  served  as  a  basis  to  Farges  and  Barbedette  for  the 
Manual  of  Scholastic  philosophy  they  have  recently  written 
(Philosophia  scliolastica  ad  mentcm  Sancti  Thomce  Aquinatis 
exposita). 

These  modest  efforts  did  not  fall  upon  a  barren  ground.  The 
work  of  the  first  pioneers  was  completed  by  eminent  followers, 
eo  that  to-day  France  is  second  to  no  other  nation  in  the  number 
and  worth  of  the  productions  wherewith  neo-Scholastic  literature 
has  been  enriched. 

As  early  as  1875,  Count  Domet  de  Vorges  wrote  his  Meta- 
physique en  presence  des  sciences,  a  small  work  in  which  the 
eminent  author  already  evinces  a  tendency  which  characterizes 
his  subsequent  writings,  namely  the  attempt  to  show  the  har- 
mony existing  between  Aristotelian  metaphysics  and  scientific 
results. 

Mr.  Domet  de  Vorges  is  one  of  the  most  distinguished  repre- 
sentatives of  neo-Scholasticism  in  France.  For  more  than 
thirty  years  he  has  defended,  with  unflagging  energy,  the  great 
cause  of  which,  so  early  in  life,  he  proclaimed  himself  a  cham- 
pion. In  union  with  Mgr.  d'Hulst,  he  founded  the  Parisian 
Society  of  St.  Thomas.  He  has  published  many  important 
works,  and  has  been  one  of  the  most  assiduous  collaborators  of 
some  Catholic  reviews,  especially  of  the  Annales  de  Philosophic 
chretienne  and  the  Revue  de  Philosophic.  His  most  valuable 
productions  are  his  Essai  de  Metaphysique  positive  (1883),  in 
which  he  professes  that  Aristotelian  metaphysics  is  a  true  sci- 
ence, and,  like  all  other  sciences,  is  founded  upon  the  facts  of 
experience;  and  his  Abrege  de  Metaphysique  (190G),  especially 
interesting  for  the  method  it  follows.  For  each  problem,  Mr. 
de  Vorges  brings  all  solutions  proposed  by  Mediaeval  philoso- 
phers. After  a  learned  comparison  and  discussion,  he  gives  his 
preference  to  one  of  them  or  proposes  a  solution  of  his  own. 
This  historical  method  cannot  be  too  much  praised.     It  brings 


205 

before  our  eyes  the  whole  body  of  Scholastic  philosophy.  It 
makes  us  enter  into  the  very  spirit  of  the  Middle  Ages. 

Among  the  early  defenders  of  neo-Thomism  in  France,  we 
must  also  mention  the  Sulpician  F.  Vallet.  His  Prcelectiones 
Philosophic  ad  mentem  S.  Thomas,  Aquinatis,  published  in  1879, 
has  been  translated  into  several  languages  and  honored  by 
numerous  editions.  Mr.  Vallet  has  also  written  numerous 
shorter  treatises  (cf.  Bibliography),  which  have  assured  him  a 
conspicuous  rank  among  French  neo-Scholastics.  As  a  philoso- 
pher he  is,  however,  greatly  surpassed  by  another  Sulpician, 
Mr.  Albert  Farges. 

Farges's  greatest  contribution  to  neo-Scholastic  literature 
consists  of  a  series  of  works  published  under  the  title  of  Etudes 
Philosophiques.  The  series  comprises  the  following  treatises: 
I,  Theorie  fondamentale  de  facte  et  de  la  puissance,  du  moteur 
et  du  mobile;  II,  Matiere  et  Forme  en  presence  des  sciences  mod- 
ernes;  III,  La  vie  et  V evolution  des  especes;  IV,  he  cerveau, 
Vame  et  les  facultes;  V,  L'objectivite  de  la  perception  des  sens 
externes  et  les  theories  modernes;  VI,  L'idee  de  continu  dans 
Vespace  et  dans  le  temps;  VII,  L'idee  de  Dieu  d'apres  la  raison 
et  la  science;  VIII,  La  liberie  et  le  devoir;  IX,  La  crise  de  la 
certitude. 

In  these  works  Mr.  Farges  expounds  and  defends  the  funda- 
mental principles  of  Scholastic  philosophy.  He  does  not  fear 
to  put  Mediaeval  theories  in  close  contact  with  the  most  recent 
scientific  discoveries.  He  finds  in  natural  science  the  proof  of 
the  doctrine  of  Matter  and  Form.  His  conclusions  as  regards 
the  constitution  of  bodies  have  been  discussed  in  our  chapter  on 
Cosmology.  Although  some  of  them  are  evidently  inadmissible, 
Mr.  Farges  cannot  be  denied  a  high  rank  among  neo-Scholastics. 
One  of  his  admirers,  William  Garcia,  goes  so  far  as  to  give  bird 
the  very  first  place. 

A  third  Sulpician,  0.  Bulliat,  less  known  than  Vallet  and 
Farges,  has  lately  published  a  Thesaurus  PQiUosophicB  Thotnis- 
tica?   (1899),  in  which  all  philosophical  doctrines  scattered   in 


20G 

the  works  of  St.  Thomas  arc  brought  together.  The  work  ex- 
clusively consists  of  extracts  from  the  writings  of  the  Angelic 
I  >octor. 

Tin-  man  who  could  dispute  with  Farges  the  first  place  among 
French  neo-Scholastics  is  Mr.  Elie  Blanc,  professor  of  philoso- 
phy in  the  Catholic  University  of  Lyon. 

Elie  Blanc  is  a  writer  of  remarkable  fecundity.  Having  com- 
pleted a  few  years  ago  his  Dictionnaire  universel  de  la  pcnsee, 
a  masterly  work,  which  may  be  described  as  a  natural  and  philo- 
sophical classification  of  words,  ideas  and  things,  he  undertook 
an  immense  Encyclopedia,  which,  when  completed,  will  be  one 
of  the  most  imposing  monuments  of  the  French  language.  This 
work,  whose  title  is:  Systemes  des  connaissances  humaines. 
Encyclopedic  chretiennc  et  frangaise  du  XX.  siecle,  will  consist 
of  one  hundred  volumes  octavo.  The  first  fifty  will  treat  of  the 
different  branches  of  human  knowledge;  the  next  twenty  will  be 
devoted  to  geography;  the  last  thirty  to  history. 

Among  Mr.  Blanc's  numerous  productions  the  following  are 
most  especially  devoted  to  philosophy : 

Traitc  de  la  Philosophic  scolastique,  published  in  1889,  and 
recently  translated  into  Latin  with  the  title.  Manual 'c  Philo- 
sophice  Scholasticcc. 

Histoire  dc  la  Philosophic  et  particulieremcnt  de  la  Philoso- 
phic contemporainc,  very  valuable  for  the  indications  it  contains 
about  contemporary  philosophers. 

Dictionnaire  dc  Philosophic  ancienne,  modernc  et  contempo- 
rainc (1906). 

O/niscules  philosophiqucs,  containing  studies  about  the  phi- 
losophy of  Vacherot,  the  Fthies  of  Spencer,  the  question  of  free 
will.  etc. 

Melanges  philosophiques,  essays  first  published  in  I'L'nivcrs 
Catholique  between  the  years  1897  and  1900,  and  in  which  the 
author  clearly  follows  the  movement  of  modern  thought. 

Mr.  Blanc  also  wrote  with  the  collaboration  of  Mr.  Vaganaw 
a  Bibliography  of  the  works  recently  published  in   French  and 


207 

Latin.  Finally,  he  founded  in  1903  an  important  review,  la 
Pensee  contemporaine,  which  has  already  given  many  interesting 
articles  in  defense  of  the  principles  of  Scholasticism. 

Blanc,  Farges  and  Domet  de  Vorges,  with  the  Jesuits  Delmas 
and  De  Kegnon,  of  whom  more  in  the  sequel,  are  the  most  dis- 
tinguished representatives  of  nco-Scholasticism  in  France.  Of 
equal  or  scarcely  inferior  merit  are  Gardair,  the  Marist  Peil- 
laube,  and  the  Dominicans  Coconnier,  Sertillanges,  Ma  inn  us  and 
Mandonnet. 

Mr.  J.  Gardair  opened  in  the  Sorbonne  in  1890  a  free  course 
on  the  philosophy  of  St.  Thomas.  His  lectures  have  been  sub- 
sequently published  with  the  following  titles:  Corps  et  Atne 
(1892)  ;  Les  Passions  et  la  Yolonte  (1892)  ;  La  Connaissance 
(1895)  ;  La  Nature  humaine  (1896)  ;  and  form  a  complete 
course  of  Scholastic  philosophy.  The  author  closely  follows  the 
teaching  of  St.  Thomas  Aquinas,  and  adheres  to  the  doctrine  of 
the  Angelic  Doctor  even  in  some  points  in  which  this  doctrine 
has  been  commonly  abandoned.  He  defends,  for  example,  the 
Thomistic  view  that  the  human  fetus  passes  through  a  series 
of  stages  in  which  it  is  successively  informed  by  the  vegetative, 
the  sensitive  and  the  intellectual  soul.1  Like  Mr.  Farges,  Mr. 
Gardair  has  purposely  neglected  many  unimportant  points,  and 
devoted  his  attention  to  the  most  essential  Scholastic  doctrines. 

The  Marist  Peillaube  is  a  Thomist  of  the  new  school,  and, 
like  Farges  and  the  professors  of  Louvain,  does  not  hesitate  to 
study  the  Thomistic  principles  side  by  side  with  the  most  recent 
philosophical  theories.  This  position  was  already  taken  in  his 
Theorie  des  concepts,  a  thesis  he  defended  before  the  Catholic 
University  of  Toulouse  in  1895  for  the  degree  of  Doctor  of 
Philosophy.  It  has  been  adhered  to  in  the  Revue  de  Philoso- 
phic, published  by  Mr.  Peillaube  since  1900,  and  justly  regarded 
as  one  of  the  best  philosophical  reviews  we  possess  to-day. 

Two  other  M arista  of  great  merit  are  Bulliot,  of  whom  Peil- 

1  Cf.  Gardair,  La  Nature  humaine,  pp.  345  ff. 


208 

laubc  has  been  the  disciple,  and  Ragey,  the  author  of  remarkable 
works  on  St.  Anselm. 

The  Dominican  order  has  furnished  to  the  cause  of  neo- 
Scholasticism  some  of  its  most  valiant  defenders.  St.  Thomas 
Aquinas  was  a  Dominican  and  has  always  been  a  favorite  author 
in  Dominican  studies.  The  Dominicans  are  proud  of  their  great 
saint,  and  regard  themselves — probably  with  justice — as  his  most 
faithful  interpreters.  We  have  already  studied  the  works  of 
Zigliara  in  Italy  and  of  Gonzalez  in  Spain. 

In  France  the  Dominicans  have  done  immense  service  to  the 
cause  of  neo-Scholasticism  by  the  publication  of  the  Revve 
thomiste,  founded  in  Paris  in  1893.  The  Revue  thomiste  stud- 
ies theology  side  by  side  with  philosophy,  and  contains  interest- 
ing dissertations  about  the  true  meaning  of  the  Angelic  Doctor. 
It  is  regarded  by  Mr.  Picavet  as  the  most  important  periodical 
publication  of  neo-Scholastic  literature. 

The  Dominican  Coconnier  is  chiefly  known  for  his  work 
V Hypnotisms  franc  (1897),  in  which  he  attacks  the  ideas  ex- 
pressed by  the  Italian  Jesuit  Franco  in  another  work  written 
on  the  same  subject  some  years  before  (Vlpnotismo  tomato  di 
modo,  1886).  Fr.  Coconnier  excludes  from  "frank  hypno- 
tism" all  facts  of  immediate  transmission  of  ideas,  telepathy, 
intuition  of  the  thoughts  of  other  people,  vision  of  the  future, 
etc.  He  then  teaches  that  hypnotism  thus  understood  is  not 
necessarily  supernatural. 

Besides  this  work,  with  which  Scholastic  philosophy  is  not 
directly  concerned,  Coconnier  has  published  a  treatise  on  the 
human  soul  (1890),  in  which  he  studies  modern  psychological 
theories. 

A.  I).  Sertillanges  has  chiefly  discussed  the  problem  of  God. 
For  many  years  he  has  been  as  assiduous  collaborator  of  several 
philosophical  reviews,  such  as  the  Revue  thomiste  and  the  Revve 
des  sciences  philosophiques  ct  tlieologiqucs,  and  has  proved  him- 
self to  be  one  of  the  most  profound  interpreters  of  the  Angelic 
Doctor. 


209 

V.  Maumus,  in  Saint  Thomas  d'Aquin  et  la  Philosophie  car- 
tesienne,  has  made  a  comparative  study  of  the  Cartesian  and 
Thomistic  philosophy,  in  which  he  naturally  prefers  St.  Thomas. 
One  year  later,  in  Les  Philosophes  contemporains,  he  has  judged 
very  severely  Vacherot,  Taine,  Janet,  Caro  and  Schopenhauer. 
He  is  especially  antipathetic  to  Schopenhauer,  whom  he  charges 
with  having  dishonored  the  history  of  philosophy. 

Pierre  Mandonnet  owes  a  well-deserved  reputation  to  the 
work,  Sigcr  de  Brabant  et  VAverroisme  latin  au  XIII.  siecle, 
which  contains  very  important  data  about  the  great  currents  of 
thought  of  the  thirteenth  century,  and  has  been  greatly  praised 
by  Delacroix,  in  the  Revue  de  Synthese  historique  (August, 
1902),  and  by  Gomez  Izquierdo,  in  his  History  of  Philosophy  in 
the  XIX.  century.  Mandonnet  has  made  on  Mediaeval  topics 
other  important  studies,  which  have  appeared  in  the  Revue 
thomiste.  Let  us  mention  the  essay  entitled,  Jean  Scot  Erigene 
et  Jean  le  Sourd,  published  in  1897. 

Other  Dominicans  worthy  of  notice  are:  Hugon,  who  has 
recently  (1906-7)  published  the  first  two  volumes  of  a  course 
of  Scholastic  philosophy;  De  Munnynck,  who  has  refuted  the 
objections  raised  against  moral  liberty  from  the  theory  of  the 
conservation  of  energy;  Gardeil,  who  has  written  interesting 
articles  on  neo-Scotism;  Berthier,  Montagne,  Folghera,  etc. 

The  two  greatest  works  with  which  the  French  Jesuits  have 
enriched  neo-Scholastic  literature  are:  the  Metaphysique  des 
Causes  of  Fr.  de  Regnon  and  the  Ontologia  of  Fr.  Delmas. 

Born  in  Saint-Herblain  (Loire  Inferieure)  on  October  11, 
1832,  Theodore  de  Regnon  entered  the  Society  of  Jesus  in  1852. 
He  taught  mathematics  and  physical  science  in  the  College  of 
the  Immaculate  Conception  and  in  the  school  of  Sainte-Gene- 
vieve  (Paris),  and  died  in  Vaugirard  on  December  2(5,  1893. 

During  the  time  he  \v;is  engaged  in  teaching,  he  carefully 
studied  the  great  Scholastic  doctors,  so  that,  when  the  laws  of 
1880  separated  him  from  bis  chair,  he  was  in  possession  of 
15 


210 

important  materials  which  allowed  him  to  complete  in  a  short 
time  considerable  philosophical  and  theological  works. 

The  most  important  of  De  Regnon's  philosophical  productions 
is  his  Metaphysique  des  Causes. 

The  aim  of  the  author  is  very  modest.  He  simply  wishes  to 
lay  before  the  students  of  St.  Thomas  the  philosophical  notions 
without  which  a  thorough  understanding  of  the  Angelic  Doctor 
cannot  be  attained:  "To  make  clear  the  nation  of  cause  by 
separating  it  from  adjacent  notions,  to  show  how  the  influence 
of  the  cause  expands  into  distinct  causalities,  to  explain  the 
nature  of  these  different  causalities  and  their  correlation;  finally, 
to  show  unity  and  harmony  in  the  action  of  these  different 
causes:  such  is  my  aim.  It  is  a  rational  plan  to  contain  the 
great  maxims  concerning  causes,  which  constantly  recur  in  the 
treatises  of  our  doctors.  It  is  a  preparatory  study  which  may 
be  useful  to  those  who  wish  to  understand  St.  Thomas  in  St. 
Thomas  himself."2 

With  what  perfection  Fr.  de  Regnon  has  carried  out  the  plan 
thus  sketched  in  his  Introduction  may  be  gathered  from  the 
eulogistic  testimonials  of  several  eminent  philosophers.  01  le- 
Laprune,  while  teaching  at  the  Ecole  Normale  Superieure,  would 
often  direct  his  students  to  the  Metaphysique  des  Causes  as  to  a 
masterpiece.  Georges  Fonsegrive,  in  his  Cours  de  Philosophie, 
pronounces  De  Regnon's  wTork  learned  and  profound.3  Bishop 
Maurice  d'Hulst  calls  the  distinguished  Jesuit  "  un  metaphysi- 
cien  de  premier  ordre."4 

Charles  Delmas  published  in  1896  an  extensive  treatise  on 
Scholastic  metaphysics,  entitled  Ontologia  Metaphysica  gener- 
alis.  All  questions  concerning  ontology  are  treated  with  the 
greatest  minuteness.  The  author  follows  St.  Thomas,  Suarez 
and  modern  Scholastics,  especially  those  belonging  to  the  Society 

"Metaphysique  des  Causes,  Introduction,  pp.   14-15. 

*  Cf.  Fonsegrive,  Elements  de  Philosophic,  vol.  2,  p.  247,  note   I. 

*  Cf.  Mgr.  d'Hulst,  Conferences  de  Notre-Dame,  p.  370;  Paris,  Pous- 
sielgue,  1891, 


211 

of  Jesus.  Fr.  Delmas  sides  with  Suarez  rather  than  with  St. 
Thomas  whenever  a  divergence  exists  between  the  two  great  doc- 
tors. He  thus  maintains  with  Suarez  that  the  distinction  be- 
tween the  essence  and  the  existence  of  created  beings  is  not  real, 
but  virtual.5  It  is  perhaps  on  account  of  this  preference  that 
the  Ontologia  has  been  described  as  a  summula  Suarezii.  Fr. 
Delmas's  work  is  not,  however,  a  mere  compendium  of  Suarez's 
Metaphysial.  It  studies  the  doctrines  of  Kant,  Locke,  Hume, 
and  other  modern  philosophers.  These  considerations  about 
modern  systems  are  probably  the  weakest  part  of  Delmas's  work. 
I  doubt  whether  any  student  of  Kant  would  recognize  the  phi- 
losophy of  the  Critique  as  portrayed  in  the  pages  19-22  of  the 
Ontologia. 

Among  other  writers  who  have  served  with  distinction  the 
cause  of  neo-Scholasticism  in  France  let  us  mention: 

Jules  Didiot  (1840-1903),  who  has  taught  for  twenty- five 
years  in  the  Catholic  University  of  Lille.  His  most  important 
contribution  to  philosophy  is:  Contribution  philosophique  a 
V etude  des  sciences  (1902).  He  has  also  made,  in  the  volume 
entitled  Un  Steele,  a  rapid  survey  of  the  philosophical  movement 
of  the  world  during  the  nineteenth  century. 

J.  M.  A.  Vacant  (1851-1901),  professor  in  the  seminary  of 
Nancy.  Vacant,  although  primarily  a  theologian,  has  written 
numerous  works  or  essays  concerning  philosophy  (cf.  Bibliog- 
raphy). Most  important  among  them  are  his  comparative 
studies  of  the  philosophy  of  Thomas  Aquinas  and  Duns  Scotus. 

Prosper  de  Martigne,  a  member  of  the  Franciscan  order, 
famous  by  a  work  entitled,  La  Scolastique  et  les  traditions  fran- 
ciscaines,  in  which  lie  studies  Alexander  of  Bales,  St.  Bona- 
venture,  Richard  of  Middletown  and  Duns  Scot  us. 

A.  Clerval,  of  the  diocesis  of  Chartrcs,  author  of  remarkable 
researches  about  the  school  of  Chartres  in  the  Middle  Ages. 

Clement  Besse,  professor  in  the  Institut  Catholique  de  Paris, 
who,   besides   valuable   articles   published    in    tin-    Revue    Neo- 

8Cf.  Delmas,  Ontologia,  pp.   183  ff. 


212 

Scolastique  and  dealing  with  morality  in  Franco,  and  the  vol- 
ume, Philosophic  et  Philosophes,  has  recently  written  a  historical 
study  entitled:  Deux  centres  du  mouvement  thomiste,  Rome  et 
Louvain  (1902).  Mr.  Besse  has  been  reproached  with  having 
been  unduly  severe  for  Roman  neo-Thomism.  The  character- 
istic traits  of  the  two  great  neo-Scholastic  schools  are,  however, 
faithfully  delineated  in  his  work.  The  chief  merit  of  Deux 
centres  du  mouvement  thomiste  is  the  historical  data  it  contains 
about  early  Roman  Thomism,  which  have  been  of  great  service 
to  all  subsequent  historians  of  the  neo-Scholastic  movement. 

Carra  de  Vaux,  professor  at  the  Institut  Catholique  de  Paris, 
who  has  published  interesting  studies  about  Arabian  philoso- 
phers. 

Victor  Bernies,  author  of  the  work,  Spiritualite  et  Immorta- 
lite  (1901),  which  has  met  with  great  success,  and  of  a  series 
of  articles  on  the  "  active  intellect,"  whose  existence  he  has 
denied. 

P.  Mielle,  professor  of  philosophy  in  the  seminary  of  Langres, 
who  published  in  1894  a  dissertation  entitled,  De  substantia 
corporalis  vi  et  ratione,  greatly  praised  by  Picavet;6  and,  more 
recently  (1898),  the  treatise,  La  Matiere  premiere  et  Vetendue, 
in  which  he  expounds  and  discusses  the  opinions  of  the  great 
Scholastic  philosophers  about  primordial  matter,  and  agrees  with 
Thomas  Aquinas  in  regarding  it  as  the  principle  of  individua- 
tion of  the  bodily  substance. 

Some  French  writers  of  great  merit,  although  less  strictly 
Scholastic  than  those  we  have  studied,  have  defended  the  essen- 
tial principles  of  Thomistic  philosophy.  Most  distinguished 
among  them  are  Mgr.  d'Hulst,  Clodius  Piat  and  Georges 
Fonsegrive. 

Maurice  d'Hulst  (1841-1896),  successor  of  Monsabre  in 
Notre-Dame  and  first  rector  of  the  Catholic  University  of  Paris, 
is  primarily  as  orator.  Tie  has  served  the  cause  of  neo-Scholas- 
ticism  by  a  series  of  articles  which  he  lias  later  collected  and 

•Cf.  Rev.  Philos.,  .Jan.,   18!)0,  p.  61. 


213 

published  in  the  volume  Melanges  philosophiqv.es.  The  volume 
contains:  three  opening  lessons  of  a  free  course  of  philosophy 
given  from  1880  to  1883,  three  series  of  lectures  given  to  the 
public,  and  articles  published  in  the  Correspondant  and  the 
Annates  de  Philosophic  chretienne. 

Clodius  Piat,  professor  at  the  Institut  Catholique  of  Paris, 
was  first  known  for  a  memoir  on  the  active  intellect,  written  in 
1891,  which  he  published,  with  greater  development,  in  1896, 
and  entitled  I'Idee.  In  this  work  Mr.  Piat  examines  and  criti- 
cizes empiricism,  ontologism,  and  the  theory  of  innate  ideas,  and 
insists  upon  the  essential  distinction  between  the  idea  and  the 
phantasm.  In  La  Liberie  (1894-95)  he  discusses  all  modern 
theories  about  freedom,  and  defends  the  freedom  of  the  will  on 
the  grounds  of  the  direct  testimony  of  consciousness  and  of  the 
moral  law.  Besides  these  two  great  works  and  two  others  of  no 
less  interest:  la  Personne  humaine  (1897)  and  Destinee  de 
Vhomme  (1898),  Mr.  Piat  has  contributed  numerous  articles  to 
several  philosophical  reviews,  and  the  volume  Socrate  (1900)  to 
the  collection  Serie  des  grands  philosophes.  He  is  one  of  the 
most  distinguished  Catholic  philosophers  of  the  present  day. 

Georges  Fonsegrive  is  one  of  the  most  conspicuous  among 
French  publicists.  He  founded  in  1896  the  review  La  Quin- 
zaine,  which  has  actively  served  for  eleven  years  (till  March, 
1907)  the  cause  of  Catholicism.  Mr.  Fonsegrive  has  defended 
the  fundamental  Scholastic  principles  in  his  Essai  sur  le  libre 
arbitrc  (1887),  crowned  by  the  Academy  of  Moral  and  Political 
Science,  and  in  a  second  treatise,  La  Causal  it  e  efficients  (1893), 
in  which  he  exposes  the  origin  of  the  idea  of  efficient  cause  and 
defends  its  validity. 

It  would  be  unjust  not  to  mention  here  Mr.  Francois  Picavet, 
born  in  Petit- Fay t  (Xord)  in  1851,  and  actually  professor  in 
the  department  of  Havtes-Etudcs  at  the  Sorbonne.  A  primary 
school  teacher  at  first,  Mr.  Picavet  has  risen,  through  his  own 
merit,  to  the  high  place  lie  now  occupies  in  the  educational  field. 
His  contributions  to  philosophy  are  numerous  and  display  the 


214 

greatest  erudition.  Of  special  interest  are  his  studies  on  Scho- 
lasticism. They  consist  of  articles  published  in  the  Revue  Phi- 
losophique,  of  learned  monographs  on  Gerbert,  Abelard,  and 
other  Mediaeval  writers,  and  of  a  more  extensive  work,  the 
Esquisse  d'une  histoire  generate  et  comparee  des  philosophies 
medievales,  which  has  met  with  a  great  success,  and  of  which 
we  have  already  spoken.  Mr.  Picavet  does  not  study  Scholastic 
philosophy  with  the  spirit  which  has  inspired  the  neo-Thomistic 
revival.  He  is  not,  and  does  not  pretend  to  be  a  Scholastic. 
He  has  nevertheless  contributed  more  than  any  other  writer  to 
impose  the  neo-Scholastic  revival  upon  the  attention  of  French 
philosophers. 

We  have  mentioned  the  reviews  Revue  thomiste,  Revue  de 
Philosophic  and  La  Pensee  contemporaine.  Neo-Scholasticism 
owes  also  some  gratitude  to  the  Annates  de  Philosophic  chre- 
tienne,  which  was  the  first  organ  of  the  Thomistic  revival.  The 
Annates  has  recently  modified  its  direction  and  manifested  a 
marked  sympathy  for  the  Kantian  philosophy. 


CHAPTER    XIII 
THE    NEO-SCHOLASTIC    REVIVAL    IN    BELGIUM 

Ontologism,  or  the  doctrine  of  the  direct  intuition  of  the 
Deity,  was  the  system  in  vogue  in  Belgian  philosophic  circles  by 
the  middle  of  the  nineteenth  century.  Ubaghs's  philosophy,  as 
is  well  known,  is  directly  inspired  by  Malebranche,  whose  prin- 
ciples it  faithfully  reproduces.  Similar  beliefs  were  professed 
by  Ubaghs's  co-workers  at  the  University  of  Lou  vain:  Laforet, 
Claessens  and  Moeller. 

This  tendency  of  Belgian  thought  did  not,  however,  preserve 
for  a  long  time  its  original  force.  After  ontologism  had  been 
condemned  by  the  Church  in  1861,  Ubaghs's  philosophy  was 
gradually  abandoned,  and  a  return  to  St.  Thomas  began  to  take 
place.  Among  the  professors  of  the  University  of  Louvain  who 
contributed  to  bring  about  this  return  let  us  mention  Dupont, 
Bossu,  and  Lefebvre. 

No  man,  however,  worked  more  bravely  for  the  final  victory 
of  Scholasticism  than  the  Dominican  Lepidi,  then  prefect  of 
studies  in  the  College  of  the  Immaculate  Conception  of  Louvain, 
later  professor  at  the  Minerva  in  Rome. 

An  Italian  by  birth,  Lepidi  belongs  to  Belgium  by  his  phi- 
losophy, not  only  because  he  wrote  there  his  most  important 
works,  but  chiefly  for  the  immense  influence  he  exercised  upon 
Belgian  thought  by  bringing  about  the  downfall  of  Ontologism. 

A  solid  refutation  of  ontologism  is  indeed  the  work  entitled 
Exameti  philosophico-theologicum  de  ontologismo.  The  author 
not  only  shows  that  the  theory  of  the  Divine  Vision  is  ground- 
less, but  he  proves  that  the  passages  from  St.  Augustine  and 
St.  Thomas  generally  adduced  by  ontologists  in  support  of  their 
views  are  not,  when  properly  understood,  favorable  to  ontologism. 

215 


21 G 

No  less  recommendable  is  Lepidi's  Elementa  Philosophies 
Christiana  ( L875— 79).  It  contains  a  dear  and  methodic  exposi- 
tion of  Scholastic  logic  and  metaphysics,  and  may  be  regarded 
as  one  of  the  best  contributions  to  neo-Scholastic  literature  writ- 
ten previous  to  the  encyclical  /Eterni  Pairis. 

A  distinguished  worker  of  the  first  hour  was  also  Van 
Weddingen,  chaplain  of  the  court.  His  first  work,  Essai  cri- 
tique sur  hi  philosophic  de  saint  Anselme  (1875),  was  crowned 
by  the  Eoyal  Academy  of  Brussels.  Proposed  by  Leo  XIII  to 
teach  philosophy  in  the  University  of  Louvain,  he  declined  the 
offer,  preferring  to  keep  his  functions  at  the  court,  but  he  power- 
fully contributed  by  his  writings  to  give  to  the  Thomistic  revival 
a  sure  footing  in  Belgium.  Besides  a  commentary  on  the  en- 
cyclical JEterni  Patris,  in  which  he  splendidly  sets  down  the 
program  of  neo-Thomism,  and  important  treatises  on  St. 
Anselm,  Albert  the  Great  and  St.  Thomas  (cf.  Bibliography), 
Van  Weddingen  has  given  to  neo-Scholastic  literature  an  exten- 
sive work,  his  Essai  d' introduction  a  V etude  de  la  philosophic, 
which  consists  of  no  less  than  900  pages  quarto,  and  studies  the 
question  of  the  objectivity  of  knowledge,  a  question  to  which 
the  Critique  of  Pure  Reason  has  given  a  capital  importance. 

The  neo-Scholastic  revival  in  Belgium  has  been  chiefly  fos- 
tered by  two  great  centers  of  learning:  the  College  of  the  Jesuits 
of  Louvain  and  the  Institut  Superieur  de  Philosophic. 

The  most  celebrated  among  Belgian  Jesuits  are  De  San, 
Lahousse,  Castelein,  Van  der  Aa,  and  Carbonelle. 

Louis  de  San  (1832-1904)  is  reputed  as  one  of  the  most  pro- 
found thinkers  the  Society  of  Jesus  has  produced.  For  more 
than  thirty  years  he  taught  philosophy  and  theology  at  Louvain. 
His  theological  productions  are  numerous.  Unhappily,  he  has 
contributed  to  philosophy  a  single  volume  on  cosmology,  one  of 
the  four  volumes  of  a  work  entitled:  Institutiones  metaphysical 
specialis,  which  the  learned  Jesuit  had  in  view,  but  never 
completed. 

De  San  is  thoroughly  acquainted  with   modern   philosophy. 


217 

lie  has  mastered  Spinoza  and  the  German  idealists.  He  pos- 
sesses a  remarkable  knowledge  of  natural  science,  studies  the 
Scholastic  cosmological  theories  in  connection  with  the  laws  of 
chemistry,  and  finds  in  chemistry  itself  the  proof  of  the  Thom- 
istic  principles. 

Gustave  Lahousse  (born  1846)  is  less  profound  than  De  San 
and  less  acquainted  with  modern  philosophy.  His  Pnelectiones 
at  times  even  display  a  lack  of  logical  method.  In  his  Cosmol- 
ogy, for  example,  he  first  demonstrates  the  existence  of  bodies, 
and  next  the  objectivity  of  sensation. 

John  Van  der  Aa  (born  1843)  is  strictly  Scholastic  and 
ignores  many  modern  problems.  In  his  Logic  he  reduces  induc- 
tion to  syllogism. 

Much  more  modern  in  his  method,  much  more  familiar  with 
the  spirit  of  our  time,  is  Aug.  Castelein  (born  1840),  whose 
Cours  de  Philosophie  (1887),  and  Institidiones  philosophic 
moralis  et  socialis  (1889)  have  been  valuable  contributions  to 
neo-Scholastic  literature.  Unlike  Van  der  Aa,  he  does  not  limit 
himself  to  the  classical  Scholastic  logic,  but  studies  the  induc- 
tive process,  and  discusses  the  value  of  hypothesis  and  of  experi- 
mental methods.  In  his  Psychology,  Fr.  Castelein  examines  the 
Scholastic  teaching  about  the  soul  in  connection  with  modern 
physiological  data. 

Ignatius  Carbonelle  (died  1889)  is  primarily  a  scientist. 
Like  Fr.  Castelein,  he  tries  to  harmonize  scientific  discoveries 
with  the  Scholastic  principles.  His  work  Les  confins  de  la  sci- 
ence et  de  la  philosophie  has  been  honored  by  several  editions. 
Carbonelle  has  directed  the  Revue  des  Questions  scientifHjues, 
one  of  the  most  important  Belgian  publications. 

Although  the  Jesuit  College  is  thus  an  important  center  of 
neo-Thomism,  the  city  of  Louvain  is  justly  proud  of  another 
center  incomparably  more  important,  of  a  center  which  has 
raised  neo-Thomism  to  an  immense  height,  has  transformed  its 
character  and  method,  giving  it  a  new  life,  bringing  it  into  con- 


218 

tact  with  modern  progress  and  modern  ideals.  It  is  the  Institui 
SupSrietur  de  Philosophic  of  the  University. 

The  peculiar  character  which  distinguishes  the  Institute  of 
Louvain  from  earlier  centers  of  Thomism  is  chiefly  due  to  the 
initiative  of  its  first  president,  Desire  Merrier. 

Born  in  Braine  l'Alleud  (Belgium)  in  1851,  Desire  Mercier 
began  his  studies  in  the  seminary  of  Malines,  and  completed 
them  in  the  University  of  Louvain.  He  was  subsequently  given 
the  chair  of  philosophy  in  the  seminary  of  Malines.  This  was 
precisely  the  time  in  which  Leo  XIII,  having  been  elected  pope, 
was  promoting  in  Italy  the  revival  of  Scholasticism.  Cornoldi 
was  then  giving  his  famous  course,  silencing  all  opponents  with 
the  authority  of  St.  Thomas,  resolving  all  scientific  doubts  by 
the  Summa  Theologica. 

Leo  XIII  who,  when  a  young  man,  had  inhabited  Belgium  as 
a  papal  nuncio,  and  had  kept  of  that  country  the  most  delightful 
remembrance,  was  trying  to  make  the  neo-Thomistic  revival  step 
beyond  the  limits  of  Italy,  to  create  in  some  other  country  an 
institution  similar  to  the  Roman  College,  to  the  Cornoldi  school. 
Nowhere  could  he  find  a  more  favorable  ground  than  in  Bel- 
gium. By  the  brief  of  the  twenty-fifth  of  December,  1880, 
addressed  to  Cardinal  Deschamps,  archbishop  of  Malines,  the 
pope  urgently  recommended  the  foundation  of  a  chair  of  Thom- 
istic  philosophy  in  the  University  of  Louvain.  So  great  was 
then  the  renown  of  the  young  professor  Mercier,  so  successfully 
had  he  fulfilled  in  Malines  his  professorial  duties,  that  he  was 
chosen  to  carry  the  papal  designs  into  effect. 

The  success  was  great.  It  did  not,  however,  satisfy  the  pope, 
who  understood  that  something  still  greater  could  be  done.  A 
few  years  later — the  eleventh  of  July,  1888 — Leo  XIII  sent  a 
second  brief  to  the  archbishop  of  Malines,  Cardinal  Goossens, 
recommending  the  foundation  of  an  institute  of  Thomistic  phi- 
losophy, endowed  with  its  own  independeni  life.  Having 
learned  thai  the  greatesl  difficulty  was  the  lack  of  funds,  he  Ben1 
to  Cardinal  Goossens  (he  sum  of  150,000  francs.     Great,  was  the 


219 

energy  displayed  by  the  Belgian  Catholics  to  realize  the  papal 
ideals.  Their  efforts  were  finally  crowned  with  success,  and  in 
1891  the  Institute  of  Philosophy  of  Lou  vain,  the  glory  of  neo- 
Thomism,  was  officially  created. 

In  a  memoir  read  before  the  Congress  of  Catholics  held  in 
Valines  in  September,  1891,  Mercier  traced  the  program  he  had 
in  view  to  insure  the  success  of  the  new  foundation.  After  rep- 
resenting and  deploring  the  isolation  from  the  rest  of  the  scien- 
tific world  to  which  Catholics  had  condemned  themselves,  he  out- 
lined the  reforms  he  contemplated,  the  new  road  he  intended  to 
open  to  neo-Scholasticism. 

The  reforms  which  characterized  the  school  of  Louvain  may 
be  classified  under  two  heads: 

1.  Philosophy  was  not  to  be  regarded  as  a  mere  ancilla  theo- 
logice,  but  to  be  studied  for  philosophy's  sake.  Catholic  philoso- 
phers would  thus  frankly  enter  into  the  spirit  of  our  time,  and 
cease  to  be  looked  upon  as  mere  apologists  of  their  Creed. 

2.  Just  as  philosophy  was  to  be  studied  for  its  own  sake,  so 
also  was  science.  Neo-Thomists  had  to  become  true  scientists, 
to  construct  laboratories,  to  make  experiments,  and — this  was 
the  point  which  at  first  savored  of  paradox — to  find  in  St. 
Thomas  himself  the  reconciliation  of  science  and  philosophy. 

This  last  ambition  was  not  novel.  It  was  the  very  aim  Cor- 
noldi  had  cherished  many  years  before,  the  very  spirit  which  had 
inspired  the  encyclical  Mt&rni  Patris,  but  thus  far  nothing 
serious  had  been  done. 

Mercier  proposed:  first  of  all,  to  study  St.  Thomas  in  his 
original  works,  to  open  the  Summa  Theologica,  the  Summa  an- 
tra Gentiles,  the  Opuscula  Philosophica,  the  Commcntaria  in 
Aristoteles.  It  was  thus  found  that  a  great  many  opinions 
which,  for  centuries,  had  been  ridiculed  under  the  name  of 
Thomism,  were  not  from  St.  Thomas,  but  from  writers  of  the 
time  of  the  Renaissance,  from  Newton  or  Gassendi.  It  was 
found  that  Aristotle  and  St.  Thomas  were  not  dogmatic  idealists 
constructing  the  world  a  priori,  but  true  scientists,  who  based 


220 

their  philosophy  upon  the  facts  of  experience;  that  their  doc- 
trine's were  not  antiquated  and  useless  theories,  but  possessed  a 
character  of  modernness  which  many  recent  systems  might  envy. 

Modern  philosophers  were  likewise  to  be  studied  in  their  orig- 
inal works.  Descartes  and  Kant  were  not  to  be  reached  any 
longer  via  Sanseverino.  The  Discourse  on  Method  and  the 
Critique  of  Pure  Reason  were  to  be  read  and  understood.  Thus 
and  thus  only  could  the  spirit  of  modern  philosophy  be  grasped; 
thus  only  could  neo-Thomism  keep  abreast  with  the  rest  of  the 
learned  world. 

The  success  of  the  Institute  of  Louvain  has  been  prodigious. 
Mgr.  Mercier  has  found  at  first  many  opponents  among  Catho- 
lics,1 but  he  has  always  answered  victoriously.  The  numerous 
articles  on  neo-Thomism  which,  since  the  foundation  of  the 
Institute,  have  appeared  in  the  Kantstudien,  the  Zcitschrift  fur 
Psychologie  und  Physiologie,  the  Revue  Philosophique,  the 
Rivista  Filosofica,  and  many  other  publications,  show  how  well 
he  has  succeeded  in  breaking  the  studied  silence  with  which  the 
Thomistic  revival  had  been  previously  received. 

The  Institute  of  Louvain,  so  successful  in  point  of  philosophy, 
has  also  obtained  significant  results  in  the  field  of  science.  At 
the  head  of  the  department  of  science  is  Mr.  Thiery,  a  former 
pupil  of  the  famous  Wundt,  of  Leipzig.  About  the  laboratory 
he  has  founded  in  Louvain,  Mr.  Binet  could  write  in  the  Annee 
Psychologique  of  1896:  "For  the  course  of  Mr.  Thiery  there 
is  a  laboratory  and  complete  equipment  for  physiological  psy- 
chology such  as  does  not  exist  at  present  in  all  France."  A  sim- 
ilar laboratory  has  been  subsequently  founded  at  the  Sorbonne 
(Hautes-Etudes). 

Under  the  direction  of  Mgr.  Mercier,  a  Course  of  Philosophy 
has  been  published  to  which  Mercier  himself  has  contributed  the 
volumes  on  Logic,  Criteriology,  General  Metaphysics,  and  Psy- 
chology. Less  extensive  than  the  Institu  Hones  of  Urraburu, 
Mercier s  Course  is  much  more  modern.     It  discards  questions 

1  Cf.   Billia,   LYsijjlio  <li   San  Afjostino,  Torino.   1S99. 


221 

which  in  our  day  may  be  dismissed  as  useless,  and  studies  scien- 
tific results  in  themselves,  without  giving,  at  the  head  of  each 
chapter,  a  decision  of  the  Councils  or  a  passage  from  the  Sacred 
Scriptures,  with  which  the  data  of  science  must  be  forced  into 
harmony. 

The  success  of  the  "  Cows  dc  Philosophic  "  of  the  Institute 
is  eloquently  testified  by  the  numerous  editions  which  have  been 
made  in  a  few  years,  and  the  translations  into  German,  Italian, 
Spanish,  Portuguese  and  Polish  by  which  it  has  been  honored. 

The  Catholic  Church  has  not  been  indifferent  to  the  great 
service  done  by  Mercier  to  the  cause  of  neo-Thomism.  The 
illustrious  founder  of  the  Institute  of  Louvain  has  been  offered 
in  1906  the  archiepiscopal  see  of  Malines.  Quite  recently 
(April  18,  1907)  he  has  been  made  a  cardinal. 

The  arduous  task  that  lay  before  Mercier  in  1891  has  been 
greatly  facilitated  by  the  action  of  distinguished  collaborators 
who  at  once  grasped  the  program  of  their  master  and  imbibed 
his  spirit.  Conspicuous  among  them  is  the  illustrious  historian 
of  Mediaeval  philosophy,  Mr.  de  Wulf. 

Maurice  de  Wulf  (born  1867)  was  already  known  before  hit' 
appointment  at  Louvain  by  a  historical  work:  Histoire  de  la 
philosophic  scolastique  dans  les  Pays-Bas  et  la  Principaute  de 
Liege,  which  had  been  crowned  by  the  Royal  Academy  of  Bel- 
gium. Since  then  he  has  written  numerous  works  or  essays,  of 
which  the  most  important  are:  a  History  of  Mediaeval  Philoso- 
phy (1900),  which  is  perhaps  the  most  valuable  book  we  possess 
on  the  subject,  and  an  Introduction  a  la  Philosojihie  nco-scolas- 
tique,  published  in  1904. 

In  his  Histoire  de  la  Philosophic  Medieval  <\  Mr.  de  Wulf 
departs  from  the  common  view  which  identifies  Scholasticism 
with  Mediaeval  philosophy,  and  discovers  in  the  Middle  Ages 
two  antithetical  currents:  Scholasticism  proper,  represented  by 
Thomas  Aquinas,  Duns  Scotus,  Albert  the  Great,  etc.;  and  anti- 
Scholasticism,  of  which  Scotus  Erigena  is  the  father,  and  which 
is  continued  by  the  Catharists,  the  Albigenses  and  the  Pantheis- 


tic  schools.  ^Ir.  de  Wulfs  view  on  this  point  has  not  met  with 
a  ready  acceptance.  It  lias  been  rejected,  among  others,  by  Elie 
Blanc  and  Picavet.  Mr.  de  Wulf,  however,  still  holds  the  same 
opinion,  and  has  defended  it  again  in  his  Introduction  a  la 
I'h  ilosoph  ic  Neo-Scolastique. 

The  aim  of  this  last  work  is  to  remove  current  misconceptions 
about  the  nature  of  Scholastic  philosophy;  to  give,  as  in  a  nut- 
shell, the  essential  traits  of  Thomism,  and  to  show  to  what  extent 
neo-Scholasticism  agrees  with  the  Scholasticism  of  the  Middle 
Ages,  and  to  what  extent  the  old  philosophy  has  been  modified. 
In  no  other  work  is  the  program  of  neo-Scholasticism  so  defi- 
nitely outlined.  The  study  of  Mr.  de  Wulf's  Introduction  is 
indispensable  to  those  who  want  to  enter  the  field  of  neo-Scho- 
lastic  literature. 

With  the  collaboration  of  Mr.  A.  Pelzer,  Mr.  de  Wulf  has 
lately  undertaken  the  publication  of  unedited  works  of  Mediaeval 
Belgian  philosophers.  Among  the  volumes  already  published 
let  us  mention :  Le  Traite  De  Unitate  Forma  de  Gilles  de  Les- 
sines  (1901),  Les  Quatres  Premiers  Quoliiets  de  Godefroid  de 
Fontaines  (1904). 

Mr.  D.  Nys  is  the  cosmologist  of  the  Institute.  Besides  two 
volumes  dealing  with  St.  Thomas's  conception  of  time  and  space, 
and  many  articles  published  in  the  Revue  Neo-Scolastique,  he 
has  contributed  to  the  Cours  de  Philosophic  of  the  Institute  the 
volume  on  Cosmology. 

In  no  other  work — sa/e  perhaps  in  Farges's  essays — are  the 
Scholastic  theories  about  the  world  so  satisfactorily  expounded. 
Nys's  Cosmology  is  even  more  scientific  than  Farges's  works  on 
the  subject.  All  modern  discoveries,  all  recent  scientific  results 
are  discussed  in  connection  with  the  Scholastic  system.  We  may 
fail  to  agree  with  Mr.  Nys's  conclusions — and  I  confess  that  this 
is  my  case — but  we  cannot  entertain  for  a  single  instant  the 
idea  that  his  conclusions  are  not  the  result  of  a  serious  study 
of  the  matter. 


223 

Among  the  men  who  have  honored  the  Institute  of  Louvain 
by  their  philosophical  productions  we  must  also  mention: 

L.  Noel,  who  has  written  valuable  works  on  the  question  of 
determinism  and  free  will. 

Simon  Deploige,  professor  of  economics  and  political  science, 
who  has  published  a  treatise  on  the  Thomistic  theory  of  property 
and  a  most  interesting  essay  entitled,  St.  Thomas  et  la  question 
juive;  and  E.  Crahay,  author  of  a  work  dealing  with  St. 
Thomas's  political  doctrines. 

Finally,  the  Institute  of  Louvain  deserves  the  gratitude  of 
all  lovers  of  philosophy  by  the  publication  of  one  of  the  most 
interesting  and  learned  reviews  actually  existing,  the  Revue 
Neo-Scolastique,  whose  pages  are  of  immense  service,  not  only 
to  those  interested  in  neo-Scholasticism,  but  to  all  students  of 
philosophy. 


CHAPTER    XIV 

THE   NEO-SCHOLASTIC  REVIVAL   IN   OTHER   EUROPEAN 
COUNTRIES 

Section  1. — The  Neo-Scholastic  Revival  in   Hungary, 
Bohemia  and  the  Netherlands 

The  countries  we  have  studied  thus  far  are  those  in  which 
neo-Scholastic  philosophy  has  especially  flourished.  The  Catho- 
lics of  the  rest  of  Europe  have  not  failed,  however,  to  espouse 
the  views  of  Leo  XIII,  so  that  the  Thomistic  literature  of  the 
present  century  is  proud  of  many  productions  with  which  the 
foregoing  chapters  have  not  dealt. 

Among  the  countries  in  which  Thomism  has  found  able  repre- 
sentatives, Hungary  holds  a  prominent  place.  As  early  as  the 
sixteenth  century,  Scholastic  philosophy  flourished  in  the  sem- 
inaries erected,  according  to  the  spirit  of  the  Council  of  Trent, 
by  Nicholas  Olah  and  Cardinal  Peter  Pazmany,  S.J.,  archbishop 
of  Esztergom.  The  control  thus  exercised  by  Scholastic  prin- 
ciples upon  Hungarian  thought  became  stronger  still  through 
the  liberation  of  Hungary  from  the  Turkish  rule.  And  it  thus 
happened  that,  in  the  eighteenth  century,  while  Scholastic  phi- 
losophy was  rapidly  losing  ground  in  the  rest  of  Europe,  it  was 
regarded  in  Hungary  as  a  necessary  complement  of  a  liberal 
education. 

In  the  nineteenth  century,  however,  the  influence  of  the 
French  revolution  and  of  German  rationalism  produced  a  nota- 
ble change  in  the  attitude  of  Hungarian  thinkers.  As  was  to  be 
expected,  this  change  was  unfavorable  to  the  traditional  Chris- 
tian philosophy.  Scholasticism  soon  lost  its  former  prestige  and 
was  finally  rejected  from  the  gymnasia,  even  from  the  seminaries. 

Such  w;i-  the  state  of  things  when   the  encyclical   MternA 

224 


225 

Patris,  like  an  electric  spark,  produced  a  sudden  change  in  the 
attitude  of  Hungarian  Catholics.  Scholastic  philosophy  became 
an  essential  element  of  ecclesiastical  studies.  In  this  remark- 
able movement  the  Central  Seminary  of  Budapest  and  the  Sem- 
inary of  Esztergom  took  the  lead.  They  were  soon  followed  by 
others,  so  that  nowadays  very  few  ecclesiastical  institutions  are 
still  lacking  a  chair  of  philosophy. 

Not  long  afterwards  a  Society  of  St.  Thomas  was  founded  in 
Budapest  (1893)  and  an  important  periodical  publication,  the 
Bolcseleti  Folyoirat,  was  created  by  John  Kiss,  professor  of  phi- 
losophy in  the  Seminary  of  Temesvar  (1886).  Since  its 
foundation,  the  Bolcseleti  Folyoirat  has  served  the  cause  of  neo- 
Thomism  with  zeal  and  success.  Among  its  most  distinguished 
contributors,  let  us  mention  J.  Kozary,  St.  Szekely,  0.  Pro- 
haszka,  L.  Szilvek  and  J.  Ochaba  (cf.  Bibliography). 

Hungarian  Catholics  have  not  limited  themselves  to  the  arti- 
cles and  discussions  contained  in  the  Bolcseleti  Folyoirat.  They 
have  also  enriched  neo-Scholastic  literature  with  many  separate 
works  which,  unhappily — on  account  of  the  very  language  in 
which  they  are  written — are  not  known  outside  of  Hungary  as 
well  as  they  deserve.  Most  important  among  them  is  the  work 
entitled  Instinct  and  Intellect  (1898),  written  by  St.  Szekely, 
which  is  probably  one  of  the  most  important  studies  ever  made 
about  animal  instinct;  and  the  two  remarkable  volumes  of 
Bishop  Ottokarus  Prohaszka.  The  first  of  these,  God  and  the 
World  (1891),  deals  with  the  arguments  for  the  existence  of  a 
Supreme  Being,  whereas  the  second,  Heaven  and  Earth  (1901), 
is  a  cosmogony. 

Among  the  defenders  of  neo-Scholasticism  in  Hungary,  the 
best  known  is  Gustave  Pecsi,  professor  in  the  Seminary  of  Esz- 
tergom. This  is  due,  in  the  first  place,  to  the  originality  of 
some  of  his  theories,  and  also  to  the  fact  thai  la  is  most  important 
works  have  been  written  in  Latin. 

Gustave  Pecsi,  born  in  1874,  studied  in  Rome  from  1893  to 
1900,  and  received  the  degrees  of  Doctor  of  Philosophy  and 
16 


1220 

Theology.  Since  1902  he  has  taught  philosophy  in  the  Sem- 
inary of  Esztergom. 

His  chief  work  is  entitled  Cursus  Brevis  Philosophies,  and 
consists  of  three  volumes.  The  first,  dealing  with  logic  and 
metaphysics,  appeared  in  1906;  the  second,  dealing  with  cos- 
mology and  psychology,  appeared  in  1907;  the  third,  dealing 
with  natural  theology  and  ethics,  has  not  appeared  yet. 

The  importance  of  Mr.  Pecsi's  philosophy  is  chiefly  due  to 
his  section  on  Cosmology,  which  marks  a  most  significant  phase 
in  the  evolution  of  neo-Scholasticism.  Two  doctrines  of  his 
deserve  a  special  mention:  his  theory  of  Matter  and  Form  and 
his  chapter  on  Energetics. 

To  many  sympathizers  of  neo-Scholasticism  the  endeavor  to 
revive  the  theory  of  Matter  of  Form  had  appeared  a  fruitless 
attempt.  In  view  of  the  actual  condition  of  physical  science, 
the  defenders  of  hylemorphism  left  the  impression  of  men  who 
would  cover  a  dead  body  with  a  new  garb.  For  Aristotle,  pri- 
mordial matter  was  an  indeterminate  abstraction,  something 
which  was,  and  yet  was  not,  "  materia  neque  quid,  neque  <juan- 
tum,  neque  quale,  neque  aliud  quidquam  est."1  This  mysterious 
entity  had  been  accepted  by  the  great  doctors  of  the  thirteenth 
century,  and  still  lingered  in  all  treatises  of  Scholastic  philoso- 
phy. Those  men  themselves  who  were  defending  Scholasticism 
from  a  scientific  point  of  view  had  not  dared  part  with  the 
fetich.  Mr.  Albert  Farges  had  clung  with  all  his  might  to  the 
old  idol.  Mr.  N'ys  had  proved  himself  to  be  less  reluctant  to 
concessions;  he  had  not  yet,  however,  been  bold  enough.  First 
among  neo-Scholastics,  Mr.  Pecsi  has  formulated  the  theory  of 
Primordial  Matter  in  a  form  which  men  of  science  may  accept. 

He  identifies  Primordial  Matter  with  the  ultimate  ground  of 
all  material  reality,  the  ether.2  The  materia  prima  thus  ceases 
to  be  an  empty  abstraction:  it  becomes  something  concrete,  a 

'  Metaph.,  Bk.  VI,  c.  3. 

2  Cf .  Pecsi,  Cursus  Brevis  Philosophise,  Vol.  2.  pp.  34  fT. 


227 

reality  whose  existence  is  testified  by  natural  science  itself.3  As 
for  the  substantial  form,  Mr.  Pecsi  identifies  it  with  the  inter- 
atomic energy.4 

In  the  section  of  his  Cosmology  entitled  "  Energetics,"  Mr. 
Pecsi  calls  in  question  the  accepted  axioms  of  physical  science. 
He  refutes  the  principle  of  the  conservation  of  energy,  which 
he  regards  as  the  foundation  of  materialism.  He  also  refutes 
or  corrects  the  law  of  entropy  and  the  laws  of  Xewton  on  iner- 
tia and  action  and  reaction.  To  the  traditional  laws  of  motion 
he  opposes  the  following  Laws: 

1.  All  physical  bodies  persevere  in  the  state  of  rest  unless 
impelled  by  an  external  force.  But  the  body  impelled  by  an 
external  force  moves  only  proportionally  to  the  impression  re- 
ceived from  the  external  force  and  always  in  the  direction  of 
the  impression. 

2.  The  intensity — or  velocity — of  the  motion  depends  upon 
the  difference  between  the  action  and  the  reaction,  i.  e.,  is  in 
direct  mathematical  proportion  to  the  action,  and  in  inverse 
mathematical  proportion  to  the  reaction. 

3.  If  the  mutual  relation  of  the  action  and  the  reaction  in 
subsequent  moments  is  constant,  motion  will  be  uniform ;  if  the 
mutual  relation  of  the  action  and  the  reaction  is  modified,  the 
motion  will  cease  to  be  uniform  and  acceleration  or  retardation 
will  follow.'"' 

Mr.  Pecsi's  theory  on  this  point  has  not  been  unanimously 
accepted  by  neo-Scholastics.  It  has  been  severely  criticized  by 
Chr.   Schreiber  in  the  Philosophisches  Jahrbuch.     Mr.   Pecsi, 

3  It  is  easy  to  notice  the  resemblance  of  Mr.  Pecsi's  view  with  the 
view  we  have  defended  in  our  section  on  Cosmology.  This  section,  how- 
ever, has  not  been  influenced  in  the  slightest  degree  by  Mr.  Pecsi's 
theory.  It  was  written  in  190(5,  as  a  dissertation  for  the  degree  of  M.A., 
under  the  title  of  "The  Scholastic  Doctrine  of  Matter  and  Form  in  the 
Face  of  Modern  Scientific  Discoveries,"  and  has  not  been  modified  since 
the  publication  of  Mr.  Pecsi's  work. 

*  (f.   IVcsi,  Cursus  Previa  IMiilosopliiie.  pp.  29,  39  IT. 

5 Cf .  Pecsi,  Crisis  axiomatum  moderns  Phisice,  pp.  .">i  ir. ;  also  Cursus 

Brevis,  Vol.  2,  pp.  89  90. 


228 

however,  has  developed  it  anew  in  a  separate  treatise,  written  at 
first  in  Hungarian  and  translated  into  Latin  by  the  author  him- 
self, under  the  title  of  Crisis  axiomatum  modernce  Phisica?. 

In  Bohemia  the  Thomistic  movement  is  represented  by  Vycho- 
dil,  who,  in  1889,  published  a  work  dealing  with  the  proofs  of 
God's  existence;  Eugene  Kaderavek,  the  author  of  several  works 
inspired  by  the  purest  Scholastic  principles  and  of  important 
articles  published  in  the  Philosophisches  Jahrbuch  and  the  Jahr- 
buch  fur  Philosophic  und  speculative  Theologie;  Ilavaty,  Pos- 
pisil,  etc. 

In  the  Netherlands,  a  chair  of  Thomistic  philosophy  was 
founded  in  1894  at  the  University  of  Amsterdam  and  confided 
to  the  Dominican  Van  de  Groot.  A  better  choice  could  hardly 
have  been  made.  Fr.  Van  de  Groot  is  one  of  the  most  learned 
and  enthusiastic  admirers  of  the  philosophy  of  the  Angelic  Doc- 
tor. In  many  remarkable  works,  written  in  Dutch  or  in  Latin, 
as  well  as  in  articles  published  in  the  Divus  Thomas  and  the 
Revue  Thomiste,  he  has  proved  himself  to  be  one  of  the  most 
worthy  champions  of  the  Scholastic  cause. 

Let  us  mention  also  the  Jesuit  Vogels,  who  published  in 
Amsterdam,  in  1900,  a  treatise  on  Free  Will,  the  first  con- 
tribution to  neo-Scholastic  literature  written  in  the  Flemish 
language. 

Section  2. — The  Neo-Scholastic  Revival  in  England 
In  the  general  return  of  the  Catholic  philosophical  world  to 
the  principles  of  St.  Thomas,  England  has  not  remained  a  lag- 
gard. A  few  years  after  the  promulgation  of  the  encyclical 
zEtcrni  Patris,  Thomas  Harper,  S.J.,  published  his  Metaphysics 
of  the  Schools,  still  considered  as  one  of  the  most  important 
works  inspired  by  Scholastic  principles  during  the  nineteenth 
century. 

Born  in  London  in  1821,  Thomas  Harper  abjured  Methodism 
and  entered  the  Society  of  Jesus  in  1852.  For  several  years  he 
taught  philosophy  at  the  famous  college  of  Stonyhurst.  He 
died  in  1893. 


229 

His  Metaphysics  of  the  Schools  is  an  endeavor  to  present  the 
metaphysical  principles  of  the  schoolmen  in  a  form  accessible 
to  English  readers.  By  the  thoroughness  of  the  exposition  and 
its  depth  of  thought  the  Metaphysics  of  the  Schools  must  be 
reckoned  as  one  of  the  most  valuable  neo-Scholastic  productions. 
"  In  England,  wrote  Domet  de  Vorges  in  1888,  we  find  only 
one  neo-Scholastic  writer  worthy  of  mention.  But  what  an 
author!  What  a  monument!  Like  a  pyramid  bathed  in  the 
dew  of  fifty  centuries,  it  rears  its  massive  form  aloft  in  the 
midst  of  a  desert.  The  Metaphysics  of  Fr.  Harper  is  certainly 
the  greatest  work  thus  far  produced  by  the  Thomistic  movement. 
It  is  also  perhaps  the  most  profound,  a  work  that  shows  the 
eminent  dialectical  faculties  of  its  author  in  all  their  brilliancy."6 

More  recently,  the  English  Jesuits  have  acquired  a  new  title 
to  the  gratitude  of  all  lovers  of  Scholastic  speculation  by  the 
publication  of  the  Stonyhurst  Philosophical  Series,  which  is  the 
most  valuable  exposition  of  Scholastic  philosophy  written  in  the 
English  language. 

The  series,  of  which  several  editions  have  been  made  in  a  few 
years,  comprises  the  following  works:  Logic,  by  Richard  F. 
Clarke,  S.J. ;  First  Principles  of  Knowledge,  by  John  Rickaby, 
S.J. ;  Moral  Philosophy,  by  Joseph  Rickaby,  S.J. ;  Xatural  The- 
ology, by  Bernard  Boedder,  S.J. ;  Psychology,  by  Michael  Maher, 
S.J. ;  General  Metaphysics,  by  John  Rickaby,  S.J. ;  Political 
Economy,  by  C.  S.  Devas. 

Particularly  worthy  of  attention  are  Maher's  Psychology  and 
Boedder's  Natural  Theology. 

Fr.  Maher's  Psychology  exposes,  in  a  clear  and  attractive 
style,  the  Scholastic  theory  of  the  soul.  The  essential  differ- 
ence between  sense  and  intellect,  the  spirituality  of  the  soul,  the 
freedom  of  the  will,  are  demonstrated  according  to  the  best 
Scholastic  arguments.  The  Avork  also  contains  a  lucid  exposi- 
tion and  valuable  criticisms  of  the  philosophical  systems  of 
Kant,  Locke,  Hume,  Mill,  Bain,  Spencer  and  other  Britisli  asso- 

8  Cf.  Donu't  de  Vorges,  in  Ann,  dc  Philos.  Chrfy.,  vol.  wiii,  pp,  .">!>.")  596. 


230 

ciationists.  It  studies  the  recent  hypotheses  about  the  relations 
of  body  and  soul  and  pronounces  the  double-aspect  theory  con- 
tradictory to  experience  and  to  reason. 

Boedder's  Natural  Theology,  in  addition  to  the  chapters  deal- 
ing with  the  existence  and  the  attributes  of  God,  in  which  the 
Scholastic  doctrine  of  the  Divine  Being  is  clearly  and  faithfully 
expounded,  contains  a  dissertation  about  the  much-disputed 
question  of  physical  premotion.  After  a  fair  exposition  of  both 
views,  Fr.  Boedder  declares  himself  in  favor  of  Molinism  and 
gives  serious  reasons  to  show  that  the  so-called  Thomistic  theory 
does  not  really  belong  to  St.  Thomas. 

A  few  years  after  the  publication  of  his  Natural  Theology, 
Fr.  Boedder  enriched  neo-Scholastic  literature  with  two  Latin 
treatises  dealing,  the  one  with  Natural  Theology,  the  other  with 
Psychology.  These  treatises  form  two  volumes  of  a  new  course 
of  Scholastic  philosophy,  published  in  Friburg  by  the  Stonyhurst 
professors,  and  known  as  Cursus  Philosophical  (cf.  Bibliog- 
raphy). 

Joseph  Bickaby  (born  1845),  besides  the  volume  on  Moral 
Philosophy  of  the  Stonyhurst  Series,  has  contributed  several 
important  publications  to  English  neo-Scholastic  literature.  In 
1906  he  gave  an  annotated  translation  of  the  Summa  contra 
Gentiles.  In  the  same  year  he  published  the  work,  Free  Will 
and  Four  English  Philosophers  {Hoboes,  Locke,  Hume  and 
Mill),  in  which  he  defends  the  freedom  of  the  will  against  the 
determinist  theories  of  these  philosophers.  His  method  is  to 
quote  a  passage  from  the  philosopher  under  examination  and 
then  to  discuss  it. 

Bichard  F.  Clarke,  the  author  of  the  treatise  on  Logic,  has 
contributed  several  important  articles  to  the  American  Catholic 
Quarterly.  lie  has  also  published  a  dialogue  on  the  existence 
of  God,  which  is  one  of  the  most  charming  philosophical  dia- 
logues ever  penned. 

Among  the  actual  defenders  of  neo-Scholasticism  in  England, 
the  most  prolific  is  probably  Francis  Aveling  (born  1875).     In 


231 

quite  a  number  of  review  articles  and  short  treatises  he  has 
proved  himself  a  valiant  champion  of  the  Thomistic  cause.  One 
of  his  best  productions  is  the  volume  entitled,  The  God  of  Phi- 
losophy. In  this  charming  treatise  the  learned  writer  educes 
the  natural  proofs  for  the  existence  of  God.  His  style  is  sim- 
ple, clear  and  concise.  The  philosophical  arguments  are  shorn 
of  their  rigidity  and  presented  in  a  most  fascinating  aspect. 


CHAPTER    XV 

THE    NEO-SCHOLASTIC    REVIVAL    IN    THE    UNITED    STATES 
AND    CANADA 

Section  1. — Tin:  Xeo-Scholastic  Revival  in  the  United 

States 

Stanley  Hall's  half-serious,  half-jocose  words,  that  "philoso- 
phers are  as  scarce  in  America  as  snakes  in  Norway,"  could  not, 
without  injustice,  be  repeated  to-day.  During  these  last  years 
the  European  philosophical  publications  have  so  frequently 
studied  the  works  and  opinions  of  our  writers  that  we  may,  with- 
out too  much  presumption,  entertain  the  belief  that  philosophy 
has  at  last  established  a  permanent  settlement  among  us. 

In  this  phase  of  our  intellectual  growth,  our  Catholic  writers 
have  naturally  turned  their  attention  to  the  official  philosophy 
of  the  Church,  so  that  neo-Thomism,  although  it  has  produced 
in  our  country  no  work  which  may  compare  with  the  great 
European  contributions,  has  nevertheless  given  rise  to  excellent 
treatises  which  no  student  of  the  recent  Thomistic  movement 
should  neglect. 

Jn  the  middle  of  the  last  century  the  greatest  Catholic  writer 
in  America  was  Orestea  A.  Brownson  (1803-1876).  His  phi- 
losophy, which  may  be  described  as  a  form  of  ontologism,  exer- 
cised a  great  influence  upon  American  Catholics.  Gioberti 
became  the  man  in  whose  works  the  only  true  philosophy  was 
rappoa  (I  to  be  found. 

Among  the  writers  who  were  thus  controlled  by  ontologistic 
principles,  one  of  the  best  known  is  Henry  A.  Brann  (born  in 
1839).  In  his  "  Curious  Questions,"  published  in  18GG,  he  does 
not  hesitate  to  call  Gioberti  the  greatest  philosopher  of  the  nine- 

232 


233 

teenth  century.1  According  to  Mr.  Brann,  God  is  an  object  of 
direct  intuition  :  "  From  the  mere  fact  of  intuition,"  says  he, "  we 
prove  the  existence  of  God.  We  intue  God  existing,  and  there- 
fore we  say  He  exists.  This  argument  is  the  strongest  on  ac- 
count of  its  clearness."2 

In  some  of  his  works,  however,  Mr.  Brann  is  in  perfect  agree- 
ment with  the  principles  of  the  Scholastics,  and  even  follows 
their  line  of  reasoning.  The  small  work,  The  Spirituality  and 
Immortality  of  the  Human  Soul,  were  it  not  for  its  preface, 
might  well  be  regarded  as  a  production  of  the  most  orthodox 
neo-Thomist. 

To  the  Jesuits  belongs  the  honor  not  only  of  having  been  the 
first  defenders  of  Thomism  in  the  United  States,  but  of  having 
furnished  the  larger  and  more  valuable  part  of  our  neo-Scholas- 
tic  literature. 

The  first  works  written  in  defense  of  Scholastic  principles  in 
this  country  were  due  to  Louis  Jouin,  S.J.  (1818-1899),  pro- 
fessor of  philosophy  in  St.  John's  College,  now  Fordham  Uni- 
versity. Father  Jouin's  works  comprise  two  volumes  in  Latin: 
Elementa  Philosophic  M oralis  (1865),  and  Compendium  Logica?. 
et  Metaphysical  (1869),  and  a  shorter  manual  in  English:  Logic 
and  Metaphysics.  They  have  been  honored  by  numerous  edi- 
tions and  are  still  used  as  text-books  in  several  institutions. 

Not  long  afterwards,  another  series  of  text-books  on  Scholastic 
philosophy  was  written  by  Walter  H.  Hill  (1825-1907).  His 
"Elements  of  Philosophy/'  of  which  numerous  editions  have 
been  made,  was  published  in  1873,  for  the  use  of  the  students 
of  St.  Louis  University,  in  which  he  was  professor  of  philoso- 
phy. The  Elements  of  Philosophy  was  soon  followed  by  the 
volume,  Ethics,  or  Moral  Philosophy  (1878).  Besides  these 
two  works,  Father  Hill  has  written,  in  defence  of  the  Scholastic 
principles,  numerous  articles  in  the  American  Catholic  Quar- 
terly  (cf.  Bibliography). 

'Brann,  Curious   Questions,    Newark,    lKCti,  \i.    107. 
■Ibid.,  p.   159. 


234 

The  year  1873  was  also  ihe  date  of  the  publication  of  Schif- 
lini's  Logiccr  generalis  Tnstitutiones.  An  Italian  by  birth,  pro- 
fessor in  the  house  of  studies  of  the  Jesuits  in  Woodstock  (Mary- 
land), Biagio  A.  Schiliini  embodied  in  his  work  the  lessons  he 
had  given  to  the  scholastics.  He  subsequently  published  some 
of  St.  Thomas's  treatises:  the  De  Ilomine,  in  1882,  and  the  De 
Motu  Hominis  in  Deum,  in  1883. 

Among  the  courses  of  Scholastic  philosophy  written  by  the 
Jesuits  in  the  United  States,  the  most  valuable  are  probably  the 
two  volumes  of  Nicholas  Russo  (bom  April  24,  1845;  died 
April  1,  1902).  His  Summa  Philosophica  (Boston,  1885),  in 
which  he  generally  follows  Liberatore,  more  complete  than 
Jouin's  works,  is  generally  regarded  as  the  most  satisfactory 
exposition  of  Scholastic  philosophy  published  in  this  country. 
In  his  De  Philosophia  Morali  (1890),  Fr.  Russo  published  the 
lectures  he  had  delivered  to  the  students,  when  professor  of 
moral  philosophy  in  Georgetown  University. 

Among  the  courses  of  Scholastic  philosophy  thus  written  with 
special  regard  to  the  needs  of  the  students,  we  must  also  men- 
tion the  works  of  Charles  Coppens  and  William  Poland. 

William  Poland,  born  in  Cincinnati  in  1848,  and  professor  of 
philosophy  in  St.  Louis  University,  is  the  author  of  several 
treatises  in  which  the  fundamental  principles  of  Scholasticism 
are  expounded  and  defended  in  the  clearest  and  most  attractive 
style.  His  "Truth  of  Thought"  (189f>)  is  an  excellent  text- 
hook  on  criteriology.  Like  all  Scholastics,  Father  Poland  holds 
a  middle  position  between  the  idealist  and  the  materialist.  He 
skilfully  points  out  the  inconsistency  of  subjectivism,8  and 
proves  the  objective  character  of  reality  by  means  of  the  evi- 
dence whereby  it  is  presented  to  us  as  objective: 

"Just  as  in  the  perception  or  knowing  of  self,  I  aflirm  self, 
so  also,  for  the  same  reason,  evidence,  I  aflirm,  with  inevitable 
conviction,  the  objective  value  of  non-self.  I  have  a  thought  or 
a  headache.     The  thought  or  the  headache  presents  itself  to  me 

■Cf.  Truth  of  Thought,  pp.   1!>7.  til. 


235 

as  mine.  I  thereupon  have  a  conviction  that  it  is  mine.  Of 
this  conviction,  certified  in  the  perception  of  what  is  evident,  I 
cannot  rid  myself,  and  I  hold  to  it.  The  midnight  glory  of  the 
stars  presents  itself  to  me  as  a  something  which  excludes  the 
element  of  myself.  I  have,  thereupon,  a  conviction  of  that 
something,  as  strong  as  the  conviction  of  my  own  thought ;  and 
simultaneously  I  have  a  conviction  that  that  something  is  dis- 
tinct from  me.  Of  this  conviction,  certified  in  the  perception 
of  what  is  evident,  I  cannot  rid  myself ;  and  I  hold  to  it."4 

The  doctrine  contained  in  this  quotation  is  not,  however,  per- 
fectly clear.  We  believe  a  thought  to  be  subjective  and  the 
starred  sky  objective,  because  the  former  depends  upon  our  will, 
while  the  latter  does  not ;  because  we  can  have  or  reject  a  thought 
at  pleasure,  whereas,  if  our  eyes  are  open,  we  are  compelled  to 
see  the  sky.  But,  why  should  a  headache  be  any  less  objective 
than  the  starred  sky?  Does  it  depend  upon  a  fiat  of  our  will? 
Can  it  be  rejected  as  readily  as  we  please?  It  is  an  affection 
of  our  body,  it  will  perhaps  be  replied,  and  our  body  belongs 
to  our  own  self.  But  our  vision  of  the  starred  sky  is  a  sensation 
of  color  which  belongs  to  our  body  just  as  well.  Why,  then, 
should  the  sky  be  objective  and  the  headache  subjective?  This 
is  a  question  which  Fr.  Poland  does  not  face. 

Charles  Coppens  expounded  the  fundamental  principles  of 
Scholastic  philosophy  in  two  small  volumes:  A  Brief  Text-booh 
of  Logic  and  Mental  Philosophy  (1892),  and  A  Brief  Text-book 
of  Moral  Philosophy  (189G).  He  also  published,  in  1897,  a 
remarkable  work  upon  which  his  fame  chiefly  rests :  Moral  Prin- 
ciples and  Medical  Practice.  In  the  light  of  the  Christian  prin- 
ciples about  the  human  soul,  Fr.  Coppens  closely  examines  some 
subjects,  such  as  craniotomy  and  abortion,  which  are  of  burning 
interest  in  the  field  of  medicine.  Ue  also  studies  the  questions 
of  insanity  and  hypnotism,  and  lays  down,  in  the  most  able 
manner,  the  professional  rights  and  duties  of  the  physician. 

The  American  Jesuits  have  not  thus  limited  themselves  to 
the  writing  of  Scholastic  text-books.     Such  works,  however  ser- 

•  Poland,  Truth  of  Thought,  p.  54. 


236 

viooable  they  may  bo,  exist  now  in  so  great  a  number  that  new 
ones  cannot  but  repeat  what  others  have  already  said.  Fr.  Cop- 
pens's  work  is  one  of  those  studies  on  particular  questions  to 
which  neo-Scholastics  should  now  direct  their  attention.  An- 
other study  in  the  same  direction  has  been  made  by  Rene  I. 
Holaind  in  his  Natural  Law  and  Legal  Practice  (1899),  which 
contains  the  lectures  he  delivered  at  the  Law  School  of  George- 
town University.  Fr.  Holaind  carefully  studies  the  capital 
questions  of  taxation,  capital  and  labor  organizations,  strikes 
and  boycotts,  etc.  The  solutions  he  gives  are  inspired  by  the 
principles  of  Christian  philosophy,  and  perfectly  adapted  to  the 
actual  conditions  of  society.  Not  only  all  students  of  law,  but 
all  American  citizens  should  read  and  meditate  this  work. 

John  J.  Ming,  professor  of  Moral  Philosophy  in  Canisius 
College  (Buffalo),  besides  numerous  articles  in  the  American 
Catholic  Quarterly,  has  contributed  to  American  neo- Scholastic 
ethics  a  precious  work,  entitled  The  Data  of  Modern  Ethics 
Examined. 

The  aim  of  the  author,  as  set  forth  in  his  preface,  is  to  defend 
Christian  ethics  against  the  recent  moral  systems  advanced  by 
the  modern  schools  of  Positivists  and  Agnostics. 

The  several  forms  assumed  by  hedonism  are  faithfully  ex- 
posed and  examined  at  great  length.  The  author  is  fully  con- 
versant with  the  theories  of  Spencer,  J.  S.  Mill,  and  other  Eng- 
lish empiricists.  His  criticisms  are  often  excellent,  always  in- 
teresting, and  display  a  remarkable  power  of  analysis. 

The  hedonistic  system  of  ethics  is  not,  however,  as  Fr.  Ming 
seems  to  imply,  essentially  connected  with  positivism  and  agnos- 
ticism.  The  strongest  believer  in  the  spirituality  of  the  soul 
might  be  as  frankly  and  as  consistently  a  hedonist  as  Mill  or 
Spencer.  A  refutation  of  materialism  or  agnosticism  will  not 
therefore  be,  at  the  same  time,  a  refutation  of  hedonism.  This 
is  a  truth  which  Fr.  Ming  seems  to  have  overlooked.  As  his 
work  is  a  treatise  on  ethics,  it  ought  to  attack  frankly  hedonism 


237 

itself,  and  to  lay  less  emphasis  upon  the  philosophical  systems 
with  which  hedonism  is  but  accidentally  connected. 

It  is  true  that  the  characteristic  fallacy  of  hedonism — its  con- 
fusing the  result  of  a  moral  act  with  the  nature  of  the  act — has 
been  perfectly  grasped  by  Fr.  Ming: 

"  Delight  is  necessary  to  happiness,"  says  he.  "  Every  perfect 
action  is  followed  by  delight;  for  it  lies  in  the  nature  of  a  fac- 
ulty that,  having  discharged  the  function  for  which  it  was  made, 
perfectly  and  normally,  it  comes  to  rest  and  is  satisfied.  But 
for  the  very  reason  that  delight  is  not  the  action  itself,  but 
merely  its  result  or  concomitant,  it  cannot  be  an  essential  con- 
stituent of  happiness:  it  is  but  one  of  its  necessary  attributes 
that  adheres  to  it  as  beauty  does  to  youth."5 

This  capital  flaw  of  hedonism  might  have  been,  however,  more 
strongly  insisted  upon. 

On  the  whole,  Fr.  Ming's  work  is  one  of  the  best  productions 
of  neo-Scholastic  literature  in  the  field  of  ethics,  and  deserves 
the  careful  study  of  all  interested  in  moral  philosophy. 

In  the  field  of  Natural  Theology,  an  important  contribution 
has  been  made  by  Maurice  Ronayne  (1828-1003).  His  work, 
God  knowable  and  known,  published  in  1888,  has  been  deserv- 
edly honored  by  several  editions.  Departing  from  the  usual 
form  in  which  philosophical  treatises  are  cast,  Fr.  Ronayne  has 
made  use  of  the  dialogue  with  the  greatest  skill.  The  interlocu- 
tors meet,  now  in  Fifth  Avenue  Hotel,  now  in  Central  Park 
amid  the  scenes  of  nature,  and  discuss,  in  the  most  attractive 
language,  all  questions  connected  with  natural  theology. 

Other  fields  of  philosophy  are  incidentally  touched  upon. 
The  second  chapter  of  the  work,  entitled:  The  Data  of  Natural 
Knowledge,  contains  a  fair  exposition  of  the  Scholastic  theory 
of  knowledge,  as  well  as  an  able  refutation  of  idealism. 

Fr.  Ronayne  also  studies  the  Scholastic  doctrines  of  causation 
and  substance.  He  unmistakably  regards  substance  as  an  un- 
known something  lying  behind  the  accidents.      Speaking  of  the 

'■  Ming.  Data  of  Modern  Ethics,  p.  89. 


238 

phenomenalists,  lie  Bays:  "  They  do  not  take  gold  for  silver,  nor 
silver  for  copper,  because  these  metals  differ  in  the  phenomenon 
of  color,  but  because  of  something  beneath  that  color  and  par- 
tially manifested  by  it."6 

Mention  must  also  be  made  of  yEmilius  de  Augustinis,  for 
his  work,  De  Deo  Uno  secundum  naturam  (1884),  and  James 
Conway  (1849-1905),  professor  in  St.  Louis  University,  and 
author  of  a  small  volume  entitled,  The  Fundamental  Principles 
of  Christian  Ethics,  which  belongs  to  the  series,  Catholic  Sum- 
mer and  Winter  School  Library. 

Thomism  has  also  found  distinguished  representatives  in 
other  religious  orders.  A  name  that  readily  comes  to  one's 
mind  at  the  consideration  of  Scholasticism  outside  of  the  Society 
of  Jesus  is  that  of  Brother  Azarias,  of  the  Christian  Schools. 

Brother  Azarias,  born  Patrick  Francis  Mullany  (1847-1893), 
is  one  of  the  most  distinguished — the  most  distinguished  per- 
haps — of  our  Catholic  writers.  Although  known  chiefly  as  a 
literary  critic,  he  is  the  author  of  several  philosophical  works 
well  worthy  of  attention.  Whether  he  is  a  great  philosopher 
or  not,  I  will  not  here  decide.  About  his  originality  as  a 
thinker,  no  doubt  can  be  entertained.  In  his  Essays  philosoph- 
ifil.  he  gives  the  following  principle  as  the  first  principle  of 
philosophy:  "God  actualizes  Cosmos  by  the  Word,  and  com- 
pletes its  end  in  the  Word."  Which  he  unriddles  in  the  follow- 
ing manner: 

"In  the  term  God,  we  have  the  subject  of  Theodicy  and  Nat- 
ural Theology. 

"  In  the  term  Cosmos,  we  have  the  idea  that  gives  us  the  ideas 
of  space  and  time,  with  all  their  concomitant  ideas  of  number, 
extension,  mathematics,  natural  history  and  physics. 

"  In  the  term  the  Word  is  contained  the  type  of  creation — 
the  basis  of  history — the  ideal  of  literature  and  art. 

"  In  the  term  completes  its  destiny  in  the  Word,  we  have  the 
whole  supernatural  order — a  Church,  the  means  of  sanetificalion. 

"  In  the  term  actualizes,  we  have  the  idea  of  pure  and  supreme 

*Ronayne,  God  Bjuowable  and  Known,  p.  32. 


239 

cause  expressed,  and  the  real  relations  of  the  Creator  to  his 

creation."*7 

Brother  Azarias  thus  regards  philosophy  as  embracing  all 
human  knowledge,  natural  and  supernatural.  This  view  un- 
equivocally separates  him  from  the  neo-Scholastics,  to  whose 
school,  it  is  true,  he  does  not  profess  to  belong: 

"  To  belong  exclusively  to  any  school  of  thought,"  says  he,  "  is 
to  shut  out  from  one's  soul  all  truth  but  that  which  presents 
itself  under  a  given  aspect.  It  is  to  be  continually  asking  the 
question,  Can  any  good  come  out  of  Nazareth?  And  yet  good 
can  come  out  of  Nazareth;  every  Nazareth  of  thought  has  its 
own  lesson  to  teach  us  if  we  willingly  learn  it  and  put  it  to 
profit."8 

Although  Brother  Azarias  is  not,  strictly  speaking,  a  Scho- 
lastic, he  has  done  good  service  to  the  cause  of  neo-Scholasticism 
in  this  country  by  his  learned  treatises  on  Mediaeval  philosophy. 
The  essay,  Aristotle  and  the  Christian  Church,  contains  excel- 
lent pages  dealing  with  the  spirit  of  the  schoolmen.  Albert 
the  Great,  St.  Thomas  and  Boger  Bacon  are  chiefly  dealt  with. 
The  author  clearly  shows  that  the  Mediaeval  writers  were  not  ser- 
vile followers  of  Aristotle,  but  that  they  thought  and  wrote  in 
the  spirit  of  real  philosophers.  How  Brother  Azarias  regards 
the  Scholastic  revival  is  clearly  indicated  in  the  following 
statement : 

"  Finally,  there  is  the  intellectual  atmosphere  of  the  day  in 
which  thought  lives  and  moves.  It  cannot  exist  without  breath- 
ing this  air.  If  the  past  is  revived,  it  lives  only  in  proportion 
as  it  is  brought  to  bear  upon  the  present."9 

Brother  Chrysostom,  born  Joseph  J.  Conlan,  in  New  Haven 
(Connecticut),  in  18G3,  and  actually  professor  of  philosophy  in 
"Manhattan  College  (New  York),  is  more  strictly  a  Scholastic 
than  Brother  Azarias.     He  is  the  author  of  two  brief  courses  of 

7  Brother  Azarias,  Essays  Philosophical,  pp.   158-159. 
"Ibid.,  p.  85. 
•Ibid.,  p.  85. 


240 

Scholastic  philosophy.  One  of  them,  the  Elementary  Course  of 
Christian  Philosophy,  is  an  adaptation  of  a  French  work  written 
by  Brother  Louis  of  Poissy,  and,  in  spite  of  its  concise  form,  is 
one  of  the  most  instructive  manuals  published  in  this  country. 
The  other  course,  written  in  Latin,  was  published  in  1897,  under 
the  title,  Elemenla  Philosophic?  Scholasti-cce.  It  deals  with 
logic,  ontology  or  general  metaphysics,  and  cosmology,  and  is 
chiefly  inspired  by  the  works  of  Zigliara,  Liberatore  and  Farges. 

Brother  Chrysostom  has  also  defended  the  cause  of  Scholastic 
philosophy  in  several  review  articles.  The  most  important  of 
them  appeared  in  the  Philosophical  Review  in  L894,  and  was 
devoted  to  the  study  of  the  theistic  argument  of  St.  Thomas. 

In  the  Dominican  order,  we  find  a  single  work  worthy  of 
mention;  but  this  work  is  one  of  the  best  studies  written  by 
American  neo-Scholastics.  La  Philosophic  en  Amerique  depuM 
les  origines  jusqu'a  nos  jours  of  Father  Edward  Gregory 
Laurence  Van  Becelaere  (born  1872),  was  published  in  1904, 
after  having  appeared  in  the  form  of  articles  in  the  Revue 
Thomiste.  As  a  study  of  the  various  currents  of  thought  which 
have  dominated  our  country,  Fr.  Van  Becelaere's  work,  despite 
its  brevity,  is  the  best  work  we  possess.  Some  aspects  of  Amer- 
ican thought  have  been,  however,  entirely  overlooked  or  too 
briefly  treated.  A  history  of  American  philosophy  ought  cer- 
tainly to  contain  a  chapter  on  Pragmatism. 

Fr.  Van  Becelaere's  volume  is  completed  by  an  appendix  deal- 
ing with  Catholic  philosophy  in  the  United  States.  This  part 
of  the  work  of  the  learned  Dominican  contains  interesting  de- 
tails on  the  neo-Scholastic  revival  in  this  country. 

Scholastic  principles  have  also  found  able  defenders  in  our 
secular  clergy. 

Gennaro  Luigi  Vincenzo  de  Concilio,  born  at  Naples  (Italy), 
in  1835,  and  for  a  short  time  professor  of  dogma  lie  theology, 
logic  and  metaphysics  in  Seton  Hall  College,  South  Orange, 
New  Jersey,  published,  besides  a  text-book  on  Scholastic  phi- 
losophy   (Elcmoils  of  1  iiteUr,l wil  1  'li ilosoph //.    1878),   a   theo- 


241 

logico-philosophical  work,  entitled  Catholicity  and  Pantheism 
(1874),  in  which  he  regards  Pantheism  as  the  necessary  result 
of  Protestantism,10  as  the  universal  error  in  time  and  space.11 
"  Every  particular  error,  says  he,  has  either  fallen  into  Panthe- 
ism, or  disappeared  altogether."12 

John  Gmeiner,  born  in  Baernau  (Bavaria),  on  December  5, 
1847,  and,  for  seven  years,  professor  at  St.  Francis  Seminary 
(Milwaukee),  and  at  St.  Thomas  Seminary  (St.  Paul),  has 
published  several  philosophical  works,  in  which,  in  harmony 
with  Leo  XIII's  formula:  vetera  ?iovk  augere,  he  endeavors  to 
harmonize  the  Scholastic  teachings  with  modern  science,  and 
mercilessly  discards  all  tenets  which  cannot  be  easily  harmon- 
ized. In  a  remarkable  little  work,  entitled  Mediaeval  and  Mod- 
ern Cosmology  (1891),  he  denounces  some  theories,  usually 
defended  in  Catholic  text-books,  and  which,  in  his  opinion, 
reflect  but  little  credit  upon  Catholic  thinking.  Among  the 
doctrines  thus  stigmatized  is  the  theory  of  Matter  and  Form. 

John  T.  Driscoll,  born  in  Albany  (New  York),  after  study- 
ing in  Manhattan  College  and  Troy  Theological  Seminary,  com- 
pleted his  studies  in  the  Catholic  University.  He  has  taught 
philosophy  for  several  years  in  the  Theological  Seminary  at 
Brighton  (Massachusetts)  and  has  enriched  American  neo- 
Scholastic  literature  with  two  excellent  works:  A  Treatise  on 
the  Human  Soul,  published  in  1898,  and  God,  which  appeared 
two  years  later. 

The  method  followed  in  these  two  works  may  be  characterized 
as  experimental  and  comparative.  In  the  Treatise  on  the 
Human  Soul,  the  author  starts  from  the  facts  of  our  conscious- 
ness: sensations,  sentiments,  ideas,  memories,  judgments,  rea- 
sonings, etc.,  which  are  "  as  true  and  real  as  the  circulation  of 
the  blood,  or  the  existence  of   physical   or   chemical    forces." 

10 Cf.  Catholicity  and  Pantheism,  p.  21. 
"  Ibid.,  p.   14. 
"Ibid.,  p.  20. 
17 


242 

From  Buch  facta  of  experience  he  derives,  by  a  process  of  reason- 
ing, his  Bystem  as  to  the  nature  of  the  soul. 

In  agreemenl  with  the  Scholastic  teaching,  he  proves  the 
principle  of  our  bodily  and  mental  energies  to  be  one  and  sim- 
ple, spiritual  and  immortal. 

Scholastic  psychology  is  studied  in  connection  with  all  adverse 
teachings.  All  ancient  and  modern  systems  concerning  the 
principle  of  life  in  man  are  discussed  with  a  remarkable  erudi- 
tion and  brought  face  to  face  with  the  Scholastic  theories. 

The  inadequacy  of  Materialism  and  Positivism  is  very  ably 
pointed  out.  The  work  also  contains  valuable  chapters  on  the 
diverse  forms  of  Pantheism  and  Monism.  Some  conclusions  of 
the  author  do  not  seem,  however,  perfectly  justifiable.  He  re- 
jects, for  example,  Kant's  opinion  that  we  know  phenomena 
only,  and  not  the  thing-in-itself,  on  the  ground  that  such  an 
opinion  is  opposed  to  the  data  and  methods  of  physical  science: 

"  Science,"  says  he,  "deals  with  real  things.  The  axioms  and 
rules  of  mathematical  science  must  be  verified  in  concrete  ob- 
jects in  order  that  the  calculations  founded  upon  them  may  have 
any  validity.     The  same  is  true  of  chemistry  and  of  physics."13 

This  objection  would  be  perfectly  valid  if  Kant  failed  to  rec- 
ognize in  the  phenomena  an  objective  element.  But  this  is  not 
the  case.  The  phenomenon  is  subjective  in  so  far  as  the  outside 
reality,  the  object,  is  clothed  with  the  conditions  of  our  sensi- 
bility and  of  our  understanding;  but  it  is  also  objective,  inas- 
much as  it  is  caused  by  the  thing-in-itself. 

We  are,  with  regard  to  the  thing-in-itself,  in  the  same  posi- 
tion as  a  person  with  a  pair  of  colored  glasses  would  be  with 
regard  to  the  color  of  a  landscape.  Although  such  a  person 
would  never  know  the  color  of  the  landscape  as  it  is  in  itself. 
he  would  nevertheless  be  able  to  possess  a  real  science  of  color, 
to  formulate;  laws,  which  would  be  conditioned  by  the  object  and 
in  harmony  with  its  manifestations. 

"Driscoll,  The  Soul,  p.  40. 


243 

The  aim  of  the  treatise  on  God  is  thus  set  forth  in  the  preface: 

"  The  considerations  adduced  are  the  heritage  of  Christian 
Philosophy  handed  down  by  the  pens  of  St.  Augustine  and  St. 
Thomas.  The  marvelous  advance  in  the  sciences  furnishes  in- 
creased data  for  argument  and  illustration.  The  question  is 
considered  under  all  aspects.  All  sources  of  knowledge  are  in- 
vestigated. History,  Language,  Psychology,  Ethics,  the  Phys- 
ical sciences,  each  comes  with  its  special  testimony.  The  aim  is 
simply  to  collect  the  data  and  show  their  bearing  on  the  idea  of 
God;  to  answer  the  question:  What  is  meant  by  God,  and  has 
the  idea  of  God  an  objective  validity  ?  "14 

Like  all  modern  Scholastics,  Mr.  Driscoll  rejects  the  ontolog- 
ical  argument,  in  its  original  shape  as  well  as  in  the  form  it  has 
assumed  in  the  hands  of  the  neo-Hegelian  school.  He  also 
rejects  the  theory  of  direct  intuition  of  the  Divine  Being,  advo- 
cated by  Harris,  Wilson,  Caird,  and  other  non-Catholic  writers 
of  the  present  day.  He  regards  as  valid  the  arguments  from 
universal  consent,  from  the  moral  life,  from  the  contingency  of 
living  beings,  from  a  first  cause,  from  motion,  from  the  order 
of  the  universe.  He  also  accepts  the  old  argument  drawn  from 
the  nature  of  truth,  first  proposed  by  St.  Augustine,  and  recently 
revived  by  Josiah  Royce.  He  clearly  points  out,  however,  that, 
in  the  hands  of  Mr.  Royce,  the  argument  loses  its  value  and 
involves  a  petitio  principii: 

"  What  is  (for  Royce)  the  test  of  subjective  truth?  Not  con- 
formity with  external  reality.  This  he  expressly  rejects.  But 
conformity  with  a  higher  intelligence.  Hence  he  is  a  disciple 
of  Berkeley.  Hence  he  falls  into  a  petitio  principii.  He  sets 
forth  with  the  data  of  consciousness  to  reason  God's  existence  as 
absolute  Truth.  Yet  he  postulates  the  existence  of  the  All- 
Knower  or  All-Enfolder  to  justify  the  veracity  of  the  data. 
This  was  the  mistake  of  Descartes."16 

Mr.  Driscoll,  as  we  have  seen,  has  been  a  student  in  the  Catho- 
lic University.     This  university,   the   first   stone  of  which    was 

14  Driscoll,  Cod,  |>.  .'}. 
"Ibid.,  p.   7!>. 


244 

laid  on  May  24,  L888,  in  the  presence  of  Cardinal  Gibbons,  four 
archbishops,  twenty-one  bishops  and  numerous  eminent  men, 
among  whom  President  Cleveland,  has  contributed  to  neo- 
Scholastic  literature  numerous  articles  in  a  periodical  publica- 
tion, the  Catholic  University  Bulletin.  The  most  eminent  con- 
tributors have  been  Edward  A.  Pace,  Edmund  T.  Shanahan  and 
William  Turner  (cf.  Bibliography). 

Mr.  Turner  has  also  published  valuable  articles  about  the 
Middle  Ages  in  other  reviews,  such  as  the  American  Catholic 
Quarterly,  the  Philosophical  Review  and  the  New  York  Review. 
His  greatest  title  to  the  gratitude  of  all  students  of  philosophy 
is,  however,  his  History  of  Philosophy,  published  in  1903.  This 
work  has  been  greatly  praised,  and  with  justice.  It  exposes  with 
a  remarkable  erudition  the  philosophical  systems  of  ancient  and 
modern  times.  More  perfectly  than  any  other  similar  work,  it 
condenses,  in  a  few  pages,  the  spirit  and  the  doctrines  of  each 
philosopher  it  studies.  Mr.  Turner  devotes  a  special  attention 
to  the  study  of  the  Middle  Ages.  Of  the  674  pages,  which  the 
work  contains,  185  are  devoted  to  Scholastic  philosophy. 

Mention  must  be  made  also  of  two  important  works  written 
as  dissertations  for  the  Doctor's  degree.  The  first  of  them  is 
Religion  and  Morality,  written  in  1899,  at  the  Catholic  Univer- 
sity, by  James  J.  Fox.  The  work,  inspired  by  the  purest  Thom- 
istic  ethical  principles,  strives  to  base  upon  history  and  reason 
the  thesis  that  religion  and  morality  are  necessarily  connected. 
The  other  work,  The  Knoicahleness  of  God  (190")).  written  at 
Notre  Dame  University  by  Matthew  Schumacher,  is  one  of  the 
most  important  contributions  of  neo-Scholasticism  to  the  field 
of  Natural  Theology. 

Section  2. — The  Neo-Scholastio  Revival  in  Canada 

The  philosophy  of  St.  Thomas  Aquinas  forms  the  basis  of  all 
philosophical  teaching  in  the  Catholic  institutions  of  Canada. 

A  long  time  before  the  promulgation  of  the  encyclical  /Eterni 
Patris,  Thomism  was  already  taught  in  the  College  of  St.  Uya- 


245 

einth.  One  of  the  professors  of  this  college,  Mgr.  Desaulniers, 
wrote  a  complete  course  of  Scholastic  philosophy,  inspired  by 
St.  Thomas  and  Liberatore,  which  has  never  been  published. 

The  University  of  Ottawa,  directed  by  the  Oblate  Fathers, 
likewise  follows  the  teachings  of  the  Angelic  Doctor.  It  pos- 
sesses an  Academy  of  St.  Thomas  in  which  a  thesis,  in  harmony 
with  the  Scholastic  principles,  is  defended  ever}-  week. 

The  most  important  center  of  Thomism  in  Canada  is,  how- 
ever, the  University  Laval,  in  Quebec.  As  early  as  1879,  this 
university  adopted  Zigliara's  Sumnia  Philosophica  as  a  text- 
book in  philosophy.  In  1884,  the  Faculty  of  Theology  decided 
to  study  St.  Thomas  in  the  Summa  Theologica  itself,  which  has 
been,  since  that  time,  the  manual  of  theology. 

The  Thomistic  movement  in  Canada  has  also  given  rise  to  a 
few  interesting  works.  The  first  in  date  is  the  volume  entitled, 
Philosophy  of  the  Bible  Vindicated  (1876),  written  by  Corne- 
lius O'Brien. 

Cornelius  O'Brien,  born  on  May  4,  1843,  in  Xew  Glasgow 
(Prince  Edward  Island),  educated  at  St.  Dunstan's  College 
(Charlottetown),  and  at  the  Propaganda  (Rome),  ordained 
priest  in  1871,  professor  in  St.  Dunstan's  College,  orator,  theo- 
logian, novelist,  poet,  has  occupied  the  archiepiscopal  see  of 
Halifax  from  1883  till  his  death,  on  March  9,  1906. 

His  "  Philosophy  of  the  Bible  "  consists  of  three  parts.  In 
the  first  part,  entitled  Natural  Theology,  the  author  proves  the 
existence  of  a  Supreme  Being  by  the  well-known  Scholastic 
arguments  from  a  first  cause,  from  the  order  of  the  world,  and 
from  the  universal  consent  of  mankind.  He  demonstrates  that 
this  Supreme  Being,  or  God,  existing  by  necessity  of  nature,  is 
infinitely  perfect,  the  creator  and  ruler  of  the  physical  world. 

In  the  second  part,  entitled  Psychology,  lie  proves  the  soul 
to  be  simple,  spiritual,  immortal,  endowed  with  free  will,  and 
created  immediately  by  God  when  it  is  to  be  infused  into  the 
body. 

O'Brien  differs  from  most  modern  defenders  of  Thomism  with 


246 

regard  to  the  origin  of  our  ideas.  As  he  insists  more  than 
Scholastics  usually  do,  upon  the  activity  essential  to  substance,10 
and  maintains  not  only  that  substance  acts,  but  that  whatever 
acts  is  a  substance,17  he  is  led  to  the  assertion  that  the  soul  is 
'"  a  force  the  very  essence  of  which  is  that  it  should  think,  under- 
stand, know,  will,"18  that  it  must  therefore  necessarily  know  its 
own  existence  and  something  about  happiness,  and  possess,  by 
the  same  fact,  two  ideas  which  are,  if  not  innate,  at  least  coeval 
with  the  soul. 

The  third  part  of  the  Philosophy  of  the  Bible  is  devoted  to 
the  study  of  certain  questions  which  have  an  intimate  connec- 
tion with  ontology  and  have  not  been  studied  in  the  two  preced- 
ing parts:  space  and  time,  certitude,  religion,  revelation,  the 
relation  of  faith  and  reason,  etc. 

O'Brien  is  an  enthusiastic  admirer  of  Mediaeval  philosophy. 
He  is  convinced  that  many  "  professors  who  are  now  extolled  as 
prodigies  of  learning  would,  had  their  lot  been  cast  in  the  oft- 
reviled  middle  ages,  have  been  considered  noisy  school-boys."19 

In  harmony  with  the  Scholastic  principle  of  the  unity  of 
truth,  he  maintains  that  there  can  be  but  one  true  system  of 
philosophy,  and  goes  even  farther  than  most  of  the  early  neo- 
Scholastics  in  his  contemptuous  disrespect  for  modern  thinking. 

"  Let  it  be  understood  from  the  outset,"  says  he, "  that  we  deny 
the  title  of  Philosopher  to  the  founders  of  schools  of  error.  .  .  . 
The  man  who,  as  a  general  rule,  blunders  in  the  art  he  professes 
to  follow,  is  not  called  a  tradesman,  but  a  botcher;  why,  then, 
call  meaningless  scribblers  Philosophers?  They  are  literari 
fungi."20 

And  if  we  wish  to  know  more  definitely  who  those  "  meaning- 
Less  scribblers"  are,  we  shall  perhaps  be  astonished  to  find 
among  them: 

"Philosophy  of  the  Bible,  pp.  56,  57,  162. 
"  Tbid.,  pp.  81,  S3. 
"Ibid.,  p.  llo. 
"Ibid.,  p.  vi. 
Ibid.,  p.  ::. 


247 

"  Philosophic  quacks,  such  as  Hegel,  Kant,  Darwin,  and  id 
genus  omne;21 

"  Spinoza,  who  gave  such  a  proof  of  mental  aberration  that 
a  school-boy  who  would  be  guilty  of  similar  contradictions,  would 
most  surely  be  doomed  to  lose  Ms  first  holiday,  and  obliged  to 
write  five  hundred  times:  Idem  non  potest  simul  esse  et  non 
esse;22 t 

"  The  disciples  of  the  transcendental  German  school,  who, 
lulled  into  a  semi-somniferous  state,  by  lager  beer  and  strong 
cigars,  talk  misty  things  which  they  call  transcendental."23 

Louis  A.  Paquet,  actual  president  of  the  University  Laval, 
published,  in  1888,  in  the  review  Canada  francais,  of  Quebec, 
an  important  article,  entitled:  Eosmini  et  son  systeme,  in  which 
he  refutes  the  Rosminian  doctrines  by  the  principles  of  Scholas- 
tic philosophy. 

A  few  years  later,  Mgr.  Paquet  published  the  first  volumes 
of  the  work  upon  which  his  fame  chiefly  rests,  his  Dusputationes 
theological,  which  form  a  learned  commentary  on  St.  Thomas's 
Summa  Theologica.  The  first  edition  of  the  work  was  pub- 
lished in  Quebec  between  the  years  1893  and  1903.  A  second 
edition  is  now  being  made  at  Borne. 

Mention  must  also  be  made  of  Brother  Symphorien-Louis,  of 
the  Christian  Schools,  who  published  in  Montreal,  in  1905,  a 
text-book  on  Scholastic  metaphysics  (Precis  de  Mela-physique). 

Among  the  recent  defenders  of  Thomism  in  Canada,  no  one 
perhaps  has  served  the  Scholastic  cause  with  a  greater  distinc- 
tion than  Alexander  MacDonald,  actual  Vicar  General  of  Anti- 
gonish  and  rector  of  St.  Andrews  (Nova  Scotia). 

Born  in  S.  W.  Mabou,  Cape  Breton,  on  February  18,  1858, 
Mr.  MacDonald  studied  at  St.  Francis  Xavier  College  (Anti- 
gonish)  and  at  the  Propaganda,  in  Borne,  where  he  was  the 
disciple  of  the  famous  Cardinal  Satolli.  After  being  ordained, 
in  1881,  he  taught  philosophy  for  nineteen  years  in  St.  Francis 

21  Ibid.,  p.  84. 
-Ibid.,  p.  42. 
23  Ibid.,  p.  19. 


248 

Xavier  College.  During  this  time  he  showed  himself  a  valiant 
champion  of  the  Scholastic  principles  in  numerous  articles, 
which  appeared  in  the  Casket,  of  Antigonish,  or  in  other  period- 
ical publications  (cf.  Bibliography).  Mr.  MacDonald  is  also 
the  author  of  several  important  works  in  theology,  such  as  The 
Sacrifice  of  the  Mass  (New  York,  1905),  The  Sacraments  (New 
York,  1906),  with  which  this  essay  is  not  directly  concerned. 


249 


BIBLIOGRAPHY  OF  NEO-SCHOLASTIC  PHILOSOPHY 

1.    Periodical  Publications 
Annates  de  Philosophic  chretienne.     Paris,  since   1830. 
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Divus  Thomas.     Placentiae,   1879-1905. 
Jahrbuch  fiir  Philosophic  und  speculative  Theologie.     Paderborn,  since 

1887. 
New  York  Review.    New  York,  since  1905. 
La  Pense"e  Contemporaine.     Paris,  since  1903. 
Philosophisches  Jahrbuch.     Fulda,  since   1888. 
Revista  Luliana.     Barcelona,  since  1901. 
Revue  N  60S  cola  stique.     Louvain,  since   1894. 
Revue  de  Philosophic.     Paris,  since   1900. 

Revue  des  sciences  philosophiques  et  theologiques.     Kain,  since   1907. 
Revue  Thomiste.     Paris,  since  1893. 
Saint-Thomasblatter.     Regensburg,   1888  ff. 

2.    Separate  Works 
van   der   Aa,    S.J.,   J.     Praelectionum    Philosophise    Scholastics    brevis 

conspectus.     Lovanii,  Fonteyn,   1886,  2  ed.,  1888. 
Abelard.     Edition  Cousin.     Paris,  1836;  Paris,  1849-59;  Migne,  Patro- 

logia  latina,  vol.  178;  Sic  et  Non,  Marburgi,  1851. 
Abboell,  Ludw.     Anselm  Cant:    de  mutuo  fidei   ac  nationis  consortio. 

Wurzburg,  1864. 
Adamson,  Robert.     Roger  Bacon.     An  Address.     Manchester,   1876. 
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Philosophie  des  hi.  Thomas  von  Aquino.     Koeln,  1887. 
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Philos.  Jahrb.,  1895-97. 
Prsfationes   ad   artis   scholastics   inter   occidentales   fata.      Brume. 

1898. 
Zur  wissenschaftlichen   Erkliirung   des   Atlieismus.     Philos.  Jahrb., 

1905. 
Roscelin  und  Sanct  Anselm.     Philos.  Jahrb.,  L907. 
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1899. 
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2dain.      Parisiensem    adornata    ab    A.    Bringmann,    S..T.;    Paris. 

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INDEX 


Arelard,  Moderate  realism  of,  25; 
on  Roscelin's  nominalism,  20; 
identifies  philosophy  and  theol- 
ogy, 30 ;  condemned  by  the 
Church,  23. 

Abstraction,  Theory  of,  110  ff. ;  re- 
jected by  Berkeley.  111. 

Act  and  Potency,  Scholastic  theory 
of,  49  ff. 

Albert  the  Great,  on  the  uni- 
versal, 24:  on  induction,  44;  on 
chemical  combination,  90. 

Alexander  of  Hales's  theory  of 
universal  matter,  94. 

Alvarado,  176. 

A maury  of  Bene,  condemned  by 
the  Church,  23. 

Anaximander's  conception  of  phi- 
losophy, 28. 

Anaximenes's  conception  of  phi- 
losophy, 28. 

Anselm,  on  relation  of  faith  and 
reason,  30;  ontological  argu- 
ment of,   127. 

Aristotle,  ground  of  the  prefer- 
ence given  to  in  the  Middle 
Ages,  16G;  his  conception  of 
philosophy,  28;  his  logic,  41;  on 
motion,  50;  distinguishes  four 
kinds  of  causes,  69;  his  defini- 
tion of  the  soul,  110;  on  pure 
actuality,  132;  his  ethical  sy- 
tem,   138  IT. 

Arrillaga,  on  Scholasticism,  186. 

Atomism,  born  in  ancient  Greece, 
82;  modified  in  modern  times, 
S3;  revived  by  Dalton,  105;  dif- 
ficulties of,  102. 

Attributes    of    Cod,     131  If. ;    nega- 
tive and   positive.    133  IT. 
Augustine,    identifies    philosophy 


and  religion,  29;  on  matter  and 

form,  89. 
Aveling,  230-1,  251. 
Azarias,  Brother,  238  ff.,  251. 

Bacon  (Francis),  his  conception 
of  philosophy,  29. 

Bacon   (Roger),  on  induction,  44. 

Baeumker,  200-1,  251. 

Ballerini,  172,  252. 

Balmes,  philosophical  work  of, 
176  ff.,  252;  on  substance,  62. 

Barberis,  170,  253. 

van  Becelaere,  240,  254. 

Berkeley,  rejects  abstraction, 
111  ff. 

Bernard,  protects  mysticism,  23. 

Besse's  contribution  to  neo-Scho- 
lasticism,  211-2,  255;  on  Roman 
Thomism,   168  ff. 

Blanc's  contribution  to  neo-Scho- 
lasticism,  206-7,  256;  on  Scho- 
lastic philosophy,  17.  32. 

Boeddeb,  230,  256. 

Bonayenti're'n  theory  of  uni- 
versal matter,  94:  new  edition 
of  works  by  Franciscans  of 
Quaracchi,  36,  173. 

BoNNETTY,  condemned  by  the 
Church,    13. 

Boscovich's  theory  of  nature,  s:;. 
101. 

Bossikt,  Thomism  of.  154:  on  in- 
ternal change  in  system  of  doc 
trine.  8. 

Boi  raoi  x.  on  Aristotle's  philos 
ophy,  19. 

Brawn's  ontologism,  232-3. 

Bbicbno,   188,  268. 

Bbownson's  influence  upon  Amer 


337 


338 


ican  Catholic-.  232 ;  on  Balmes, 
176. 

okkb,    on    Aristotle's     philos- 
ophy, 19. 

Cagigas,  187-8,  259. 
Cabo,  on  utilitarianism,  19]  2. 
Cabba  de  V.ux,  on  Scholastic  phi- 
losophy, 32. 

C\KK\S(il   II.|,\.     l!H    I!.    201. 

Castelein,  217,  261. 

(  'atiihkiw  198,  261. 

Cause,  Scholastic  theory  of,  08  fT. : 
efficient,  69  fT. :  final,  78  ff. ;  ma- 
terial. 82  II'.:  formal,  82 ff.;  four 
kinds  according  to  Aristotle,  69; 
Malebranche's  criticism  on.  69- 
70;  Hume's  criticism  on,  70  fT. 

Chbysostom,  Brother,  239-40, 
263. 

Coconmer,  208.  264. 

(  omellas,  178-9,  264. 

Commer,  199,  264. 

Comte's  opposition  to  metaphys- 
ics, 47. 

Conceptualism  in  the  Middle  Ages. 
24;  resembles  Kantian  philos- 
ophy, 25. 

DE  Conciuo.  on  pantheism.  240-1. 

C'ONDlLLAC's  philosophy  introduced 
into  Spain,  175;  into  Portugal, 
183. 

OorPENS,  235,  264. 

COBNOLDl's  contribution  to  neo- 
Scholasticism,  160.  164.  265-6; 
his  opposition  to  modern  phi- 
losophy,  9.  13,  164. 

(  osmology,  Scholasl  ic  system  of. 
82  ff. 

(  oi  bin,  nn  Scholastic  philosophy, 
19.  27:  his  works  on  Mediaeval 
philosophy,  L66;  on  Ahelard, 
25;  his  philosophy  taught  in 
French  Catholic  seminaries,  203. 

<  'in  mi  s.  on  foundal  ion  of  7noral- 
ity.   137. 


(  i  kii:'s  scientific  achievements, 
106. 

Daxtoh      revives     hypothesis     of 

atoms.   105. 

Darwin's  natural  selection  and 
the  design-argument,    129-30. 

David  of  Dinant  condemned  by 
the   Church.   23. 

Delmas,   210-1,   268. 

Democuitis,  regarded  a-  founder 
of  atomistic  system.  82. 

Dfxifle's  works  on  Middle  Ages, 
200,    268. 

Descartes,  regarded  as  a  Scho- 
lastic by  Pica  vet,  2;  on  sub- 
-tance,  61,  65;  his  philosophy 
taught  in  French  Catholic  semi- 
naries, 203. 

Design-argument,    129  ff. 

DEWET,  on  Scholastic  philosophy, 
25,  28. 

Diderot,  on  Duns  Scot  us,  18. 

Didiot's  contribution  to  neo-Scho- 
lasticism,  211,  269;  on  Kantism 
and    llegelianisin,    12. 

Directivity,  Henslow's  theory  of, 
80. 

Domet  DE  Vorges.  204-5,  269. 

Driscoel,  contribution  of  to  neo- 
Scholasticism,  241  ff.,  270;  on 
Kant,  242;  on  Royce's  concep- 
tion of  God,  243. 

Duns  Sootus,  proves  existence  of 
primordial  matter,  88;  his  di- 
vi-ion  of  the  materia  prima,  94; 
judged  by  Diderot,  IS:  con- 
trasted with  Thomas  Aquinas, 
25. 

Dynamism,  its  theory  of  nature, 
83:  Tail's  objection  to.  101  ;  de- 
ficiency of,   101. 

Efficiency,  very  differenl  from  con- 
Btant     conjunction,     75  ff. ;      has 


339 


met  two  classes  of  opponents, 
69 ;  Hume's  view  on,  69,  70  ff . 

Eleatic  school,  denied  the  exist- 
ence of  motion,  50. 

Electrons,  existence  of  detected  by 
by  Thomson,  105;  ultimate  parts 
of  all  material  beings,  67,  68, 
105  ff. 

Encyclical  "  -Eterni  Patris,"  162. 

Eternity  explained,  133. 

Ether,  its  existence  unanimously 
affirmed  by  physicists,  83 ; 
theory  of  strengthened  by  ex- 
periments of  Maxwell,  102;  of 
Hertz,  102;  inherent  constitu- 
tion of,  103 ;  Spencer's  view  on, 
103;  Kelvin  on,  103  ;  Larmor  on, 
104;  Lodge  on,  104,  105;  Whet- 
ham  on,  103;  Veronnet  on,  103. 

Eudemonism  of  Scholastic  ethical 
system,  136. 

Farges's  contribution  to  neo- 
Scholasticism,  205,  273;  on  mo- 
tion, 50 ;  on  matter  and  form, 
86,  91;  on  chemical  combina- 
tion, 91,   109. 

Fichte,  subtlety  of,  26. 

Final  Cause,  78  ff. 

Fonskouivk,  213,  275. 

Form,  Substantial,  Scholastic 
theory  of,  84  ff.,  95  ff. ;  proper- 
ties of,  96;  educed  out  of  the 
potency  of  matter,  100;  modifi- 
cations on  the  theory  of,  108; 
plurality  of  forms  in  Henry  of 
Ghent,  98;  in  Duns  Scntu-*,  99j 
in  Lessius,  Conninck,  Mayr,  99. 

Forma   Corporeitatis,   98  '•». 

Free-Will,  doctrine  of  defined, 
i  !.")  tr. :  defended  by  Scholastics, 
l  in :  defined  by  Kant .  l  Mi. 

Fbohsohammeb,  condemned  by  the 
Church,    12. 

1'Yj.ij-hton.  on  locus  of  mind,  122; 


on    St.    Thomas's    determinism, 
147. 

GrABCfA's  contribution  to  neo- 
Scholasticism,  188  ff.,  276;  on 
Spanish  philosophy,   174-5. 

Gardair,  207,  276, 

Ghent,  Henry  of,  his  doctrine  of 
plurality  of  forms,  98. 

Ginebra's  contribution  to  neo- 
Scholasticism,  195,  278 ;  his  defi- 
nition of  matter  and  form,  86. 

Gioberti's  influence  upon  Amer- 
ican Catholics,  232. 

God,  proofs  of  existence  of,  127  ff. ; 
ontological  argument,  127;  ar- 
gument from  the  moral  law, 
127  ff. ;  argument  from  universal 
consent,  128;  argument  from  de- 
sign, 129;  metaphysical  argu- 
ment, 130;  attributes  of,  131  ff.; 
eternity  of,  133,  152;  immuta- 
bility of,  133;  infinity  of  131  ff.; 
unity  of,  132;  simplicity  of,  132. 
135;  immensity  of,  133;  knowl- 
edge of,  134;  will  of,  134;  om- 
nipotence of,  131:  prescience  of, 
150  ff. 

G6mez  Izquierdo's  contribution  to 
neo-Scholasticism,  181,  279;  on 
Cornelias,   179. 

GonzAlez  de  Arintero.  180.  270. 

GonzAlez  y  DfAZ-TiNox,  contri- 
bution of  to  neo-Scholasticism, 
IT'.'.  27'.);  on  Scholastic  philos- 
ophy, 32;  on  Father  Ventura, 
156 j  on  Sanseverino,  158. 

v  w   in:  <  rBOOT,  228,  280. 

Guabdia,  on  Spanish  philosophy, 
171. 

Grtfa  i  mi:,      condemned      by      the 

Church,    12.    1HC. 
GUTBEELET,    199,   281. 

Happiness,  nature  of  in  Aristotle, 
140. 


340 


llAiu-nt.  22fl  !i.  282-3. 

II  m  ki  \i  'a  definition  of  Beho 
lastic  philosophy,  14;  on  Scho- 
lastic philosophy,  19;  on  prob- 
lem of  universals,  20;  on  causes 
of  downfall  of  Scholastic  philos- 
ophy, 153 j  liis  works  on  Medi- 
ji'val   philosophy,    150. 

Hedonism,  contrasted  with  Scho- 
lastic ethical  system,  138;  criti- 
cized, 141  ft".;  criticized  by  Ming, 
230-7. 

I  In.  el,    on    Scholastic    philosophy, 

19,  27;  on  substance,  02;  on 
adequate  knowledge  of  God, 
120;  on  divine  nature  in  old 
metaphysics,  134;  readmits  on- 
tological  argument,  127;  com- 
pared to  St.  Thomas,  12;  in- 
fluence of  upon  Catholic  philos- 
ophy in  Germany,  19G. 

Hknslow's  theory  of  directivity, 
80. 

Hermes,  condemned  by  the  Church, 
12,  190. 

Hernandez  y  Fajarnes,  180,  283. 

Hertz,  scientific  experiments  of, 
102. 

II  hi..  233,  284. 

EOBBES,  on  foundation  of  moral- 
ity, 137. 

d'IIi  i.st,  212-3,  280. 

Hi  ICE,  on  substance,  55  ft*.,  04;  on 
efficiency,  69,  70ff.;  on  sim- 
plicity of  soul,  110. 

1k.\  Caiup.ol's  theory  of  universal 
tter,  94. 

[dea  and  Phantasm,  confused  by 
Locke,    111;    nature    of,    111-3. 

Immensity  of  God,  133. 

Immutability  of  Cod,  133. 

I  nduct  ion,  in  the  M  iddle  Ages,  44; 
regarded  as  fundamental  by 
Mill.  12;  in  aeo-Scholastic  logic, 


Infinity   of   God,    131  ff. 

Intellect  and  Sense,  essential  dif- 
ference of,   120. 

JANVIER,  on  neo-Scholasticism,  35. 
Jot  i\.  233,  287-8. 

Kant,  regarded  as  a  Scholastic  by 
Picavet,  2;  whether  his  philos- 
ophy can  be  interpreted  from  a 
Christian  standpoint,  11;  on 
metaphysics,  47;  on  substance, 
01,  05;  on  ontological  argument, 
127;  on  moral  character  of  our 
acts,  144  ft". ;  influence  of  in 
Spain,  175;  influence  of  upon 
Catholic  philosophy  in  Germany. 
196. 

Kaufmann,  201,  288-9. 

Kk.lvin,  on  ether,  103. 

Kleutgex's  contribution  of  to 
neo-Scholasticism,  196-7,  290: 
principles  of  knowledge  of,  197. 

Larmor,  on  ether,  104. 

Leibniz,  on  substance,  01,  65. 

Lemos,  181,  293. 

Leo  XIII.  Cf.  Pecci. 

Lepidi's  contribution  to  neo-  Scho- 
lasticism, 215,  293;  refutes  on- 
tologism,   215. 

Leucippus,  father  of  atomism,  82. 

Liberatore's  contribution  to  neo- 
Scholasticism,  107,  293-4;  on 
chemical  combination,  90. 

Locke,  regarded  as  a  Scholastic 
by  Picavet,  2;  on  formation  of 
names,  15;  on  substance,  53  ft". ; 
philosophy  of  introduced  into 
Spain,    175;    into    Portugal,    183. 

Lodge,  on  ether,  104,  105. 

Logic,  Scholastic  system  of,  41  ft".; 
a  complete   system    in    the   hands 

of   Aristotle,  41;   Mill's   contri- 
bution to,  42. 

I  OB)  \. '!  I. i.l,    165. 


341 


Louvain,  Institute  of  Philosophy 
of,  its  contribution  to  neo-Scho- 
lasticism,  217  fF . ;  its  scientific 
spirit,  40;  favorably  judged  by 
Besse,  168;  reforms  which  char- 
acterize the  Institute,  219;  its 
prodigious  success,  220. 

MacDonald,  247-8,  295-6. 

Madurkira,   188,  296. 

Maher's  contribution  to  neo- 
Scholasticism,  229,  296;  on  im- 
mortality of  the  soul,  120. 

Malebra]n-che,  on  efficient  cause, 
69. 

Mandonnet,  209,  297. 

de  Margerie,  influence  of  Leo 
XIII. 's  encyclical  on,  163. 

de  Maria,  171,  297. 

Mart!,  influence  of  on  Spanish 
thinking,  178. 

Matter,  constitution  of  according 
to  modern  science,   100  fF. 

Matter,  Primordial.  Scholastic 
theory  of,  84  fF. ;  properties  of, 
91;  divisions  of,  92;  modifica- 
tions on  the  theory  of,  108. 

Maxwell,  scientific  discoveries  of, 
102. 

Ma/.klla,  on  fossils,  39. 

Mendive,  180,  299. 

Menendez  t  Pelayo,  on  Spanish 
philosophy,   174. 

Mercier,  philosophical  work  of, 
218  fF.,  299;  on  historical  stud- 
ies, 38;  on  metaphysics,  46;  <»n 
final  (mum.  78, 

Metaphysical   argument,   130-1. 

Metaphysics,  existence  of,  46; 
origin  of  the  word,  46;  defined 
by  aeo-Scholastics,  4(i;  rejected 
l>v  positivism,  47:  by  Cant,  47: 
Scholar  ic  system  of,  46  Bf. 

Mii:i,ik.  212,  :!00. 

Mill,  si<mifiennce  of  his  "System 


of  Logic,"  42;  on  syllogism,  43; 
on  substance,  59  fF. ;  on  technical 
language  of   Scholastics,   111. 

Ming,  236-7,  301. 

Modern  Philosophy,  judged  very 
severely  by  Cornoldi,  9,  13,  164; 
by  de  Maria,  171;  by  Cagigas, 
188;  by  Lorenzelli,  165;  by 
Maumus,  209 ;  condemned  by 
Orti  y  Lara,  180;  despised  by 
O'Brien,  246-7. 

Mohleb,  156,  196. 

Moral  Philosophy,  Scholastic  sys- 
tem of,  136  fF.;  contrasted  with 
Kantian  system,   144  fF. 

Moral  proof  of  God's  existence, 
127  fF. 

Morality,  great  question  of,  137; 
based  on  external  principle, 
137  ff. 

Motion,  existence  of  denied  by 
Eleatics,  50;  Newtonian  laws 
of  rejected  by  Pgcsi,  227;  de- 
fined by  Farges.  50. 

MuNGufA,  186,  302. 

Mysticism  in  the  Middle  Ages,  23. 

Neo-Scholasticism,  forerunners  of, 
153  fF.;  opposition  to  the  word, 
34,  35;  universal  adherence  of 
to  Thomas  Aquinas.  34;  modifi- 
cations it  has  introduced  on  the 
philosophy  of  the  Middle  Ages, 
37:  important  contributions  of 
to  study  of  modern  philosoph- 
ical literature,  39;  and  scien- 
tific studies.  39;  its  system  of 
logic.  45;  <m  substance,  <>^;  on 
ontologica]  argument,  127;  on 
moral  argument,  128;  on  meta- 
physical  argument.    130. 

Newton's  laws  of  motion  rejected 

by  Pecsi,  -JJ7-8. 
Nominalism,  leads  to  materialism, 

21  :  also  to  mvsl  icism,  2 1 


342 


Nys's  contribution  to  neo-Scho- 
lasticism,  222,  304;  on  matter 
and  form,  85. 

(i'I'.kun's  contribution  to  neo- 
Bcholasticism,  245ff.,  304;  de- 
spises modern  philosophy,  246-7. 

Occasionalism,  considerations 
urged  against,  70. 

Omnipotence  of  God,  134. 

Ontological  argument  di-cu-^ril, 
127  IV.;  rejected  by  St.  Thomas, 
127. 

Ontologism  in  Belgium.  215;  in 
the  United  Slates.  232-3;  re- 
futed by  fjepidi,  215;  condemned 
by  the  Church,  215. 

ObtI  y  Lara's  contribution  to  neo- 
Scholasticism,  179-80,  304;  on 
historical  studies,  38;  con- 
demns  modern  philosophy,  180. 

Ortiz,  194-5,  305. 

Pantheism,  the  outcome  of  real- 
ism, 22;  in  the  Middle  Ages,  22; 
condemned  by  the  Church,  12, 
23 j   de  Concilio  on,  241. 

Paqi  i.i.  247,  306. 

Paulsen,  on  Thomistic  revival,  1. 

l'i  ( (  i  i  I.i  ci  X  1 1 1. 1 ,  sympathizes 
with  the  Thomistic  revival,  159; 
is  elected  pope,  ItiO;  imposes 
Scholastic  philosophy  on  Cath- 
olic world,  162 j  founds  [nstitute 
of   Louvain,  218. 

l'i'  csi's   cinii  rilml  ion   to   ueo  Scho 
lasl  icism,  225  IT..  307  ;    his  theory 
of  matter  and   form,  220-7;   re- 
jecte  Newtonian  laws  of  motion, 
227. 

l'i  ii  i  \i  BE,  207.  307. 

Pi  Bl  ii.    108,    .".n7. 

l'i  i  n  i  it.  202,  308. 

Phantasm  and  Idea,  confused  by 
Locke,   ill:   nature  of,   1 1 1  IV. 


Philosophy,  meaning  in  ancient 
times,  28;  its  essential  charac- 
ter, 189;  defined  by  Spencer,  29; 
identified  with  theology  by  St. 
Augustine,  29;  by  Scotus  Erig- 
ena,  30;  by  Abelard,  30;  dis- 
criminated from  theology  by 
Thomas  Aquinas,  31. 

Piat,  213,  309. 

Picavet's  philosophical  work. 
213-4,  309-10;  on  Thomistic 
revival,  2;  on  Scholastic  philos- 
ophy.   L9. 

Pidal  y  Mon,  180,  310. 

Plato,  realism  of,  22;  ethical  sys- 
tem of,  138. 

Poland,  234-5,  311. 

Positivism,  rejects  metaphysics, 
47. 

Potency,  Cf.  Act. 

Pragmatism,  welcomed  by  French 
Catholics,   6. 

Predestination,  doctrine  of  in  St. 
Thomas,   150  ff. 

Prescience  of  God,  150  ff. 

Prout,  on  atomism,  105. 

Psychology,    Scholastic,    110. 

Purpose,  what  old  Scholastics 
meant  by,  51. 

Radioactivity,  scientific  observa- 
tions on,  10(5  ff. 

Realism,  professed  by  Plato.  21; 
moderate  form  of,  23,  24. 

de  REgnon,  209-10.  314. 

I!i  \ns\T.  on  Mediaeval  philos- 
ophy.   156;   on   Abelard,  25. 

Restbepo,  193    I.  314. 

Rickaby's  contribution  to  neo- 
Scholasticism,  230,  315;  on 
Eume's   philosophy,   58. 

Rivera,  on  Spanish  philosophy, 
174. 

Robespierre,  regarded  as  a  Scho- 
la  -i  ic  by  Picavet,  2. 


343 


Roman  Thomists,  severely  judged 
by  Besse,  168  ff. ;  their  ignorance 
of  science,  39. 

Ronayne,  237-8,  316. 

Rondina,  184,  316. 

Roscelin,  on  the  universal,  20,  21 ; 
on  mystery  of  Holy  Trinity,  21; 
condemned  by  the  Church,  21. 

Rousseau,  regarded  as  a  Scho- 
lastic by  Picavet,  2. 

Royce,  on  mysticism,  21 ;  his  proof 
of  Cod's  existence  criticized  by 
Driscoll,  24:5. 

Russo,  234,  318. 

Rutherford,  scientific  achieve- 
ments of,  106. 

Saint-Hilaire,  on  matter  and 
form,  86. 

Saint-Lambert,  on  foundation  of 
morality,  137. 

Salis  See\yis,  172,  318. 

de  San,  216-7,  318. 

Sanseverino,  158,  318. 

Satolli,  165,  319. 

Sc'HIFFIM,   171,  320. 

Schlegel,  on  Mediaeval  philos- 
ophy, 156,  196. 

Schneider,  on  neo-Scholasticisni. 
35,  200. 

Scholastic  Philosophy,  origin  of 
the  word  scholastic,  14;  defined 
in  terms  of  its  language  meth- 
odflj  -•">:  defined  by  its  relation 
to  theology,  27;  identified  with 
theology,  27:  defined  by  Dewey. 
25.  28;  by  Baureau,  14 ;  by  de 
Wulf.  17:  by  Blanc,  17:  by 
Weber,  27;  by  Tyrrell,  28;  by 
Qeberweg,  32;  by  Turner.  32; 
is  primarily  and  essentially  the 
philosophy  of  the  Middle  Ages, 
33  :  i-  not  ;i  - i ii Lrlf  bj  stem,  20; 
it-  harmony  with  Catholic  theol- 
ogy, i :  it-  polil ical  influence, 
6;   causes  of  downfall   of,    153 ; 


cause  of  its  revival,  7 ;  forerun- 
ners of  its  revival,  153  ff. ;  its 
system  of  logic,  41  ff.;  its  meta- 
physics, 46  ff. ;  its  theory  of 
substance,  52  ff. ;  its  theory  of 
cause,  68  ff. ;  its  system  of  cos- 
mology, 82  ff. ;  its  theory  of 
matter  and  form,  82  ff. ;  its  psy- 
chology, 110  ff.;  its  natural  the- 
ology, 126  ff. ;  its  system  of 
morals,   136  ff. 

Scotus  Erigena,  on  God,  22; 
identifies  philosophy  and  theol- 
ogy, 30;  condemned  by  the 
Church,  22. 

Secretan,  on  Duns  Scotus's  phi- 
losophy. 5;  on  St.  Thomas's  de- 
terminism, 147. 

Selection,  Natural  and  the  design- 
argument,  129-30. 

Sense  and  Intellect,  essential  dif- 
ference of,  120. 

Sertillanges,  208,  322. 

Simplicity  of  God,  132,  135. 

Sinibaldi,  184,  324. 

Soixano,  186-/,  324. 

Soul,  defined  by  Aristotle,  110; 
nature  of,  115  ff.;  intrinsically 
independent  of  body,  115;  sim- 
plicity of,  115;  spirituality  of, 
1  IS  ff. ;  immortality  of,  120; 
locus  of,  121  ff. 

de  Sousa,  184,  325. 

Spencer's  conception  of  philos- 
ophy, 29;  opposition  of  to  meta- 
physics,  47:  on  ether,  103;  on 
sa\a^e's  concept  of  God,  128. 

Spinoza,  on  substance,  titi. 

Stai  -denmaier.   156-7,    196. 

STOCKL,    M'7.  .".2.">. 

Substance,  Scholastic  theory  of, 
52  tl'.:  Locke  on,  53  ff.j  Eume 
on.    55 ff.,    64;     Mill    on,    59  ff. : 

Descartes  on,  61,  <i">:    Leibniz  on. 
61,  (S.">:    Kant    on.  61,  65;    H 


;\U 


mi,  62;   Balmee  on,  62;. Spinoza 
on,  66. 
Syllogism,    nature    of,   42;    Medi- 
aeval philosophy  on,  2(i;  Mill  on, 
4'A:  ]<ra i-t>«l  by   Leibniz,  26. 

I'aim..  on  Scholastic  philosophy, 
lit. 

Tait,  on  dynamism,  101. 

Talamo.  lf>5ff..  327. 

Tapabelli,  172,  328. 

Tebtillian's  system  of  philos- 
ophy,  29. 

Thai.ks's  conception  of  philos- 
ophy, 28. 

Theology,  natural  and  revealed, 
12G:  its  relation  to  philosophy, 
10,  31  :  identified  with  philos- 
ophy by  St.  Augustine,  29;  by 
Scotus  Erigena,  30;  by  Abelard, 
30;  discriminated  from  philos- 
ophy by  Thomas  Aquinas,  31. 

Thomas  Aquinas's  doctrine  of 
unity  and  immutability  of  truth. 
8  :  on  relation  of  philosophy  and 
theology,  31;  on  primordial 
matter.  87;  on  locus  of  the  soul. 
124;  on  God's  ubiquity,  125;  on 
Anselm's  ontological  argument, 
127;  on  pure  actuality,  132;  on 
immensity  of  God,  133;  on  sim- 
plicity of  God,  135;  and  free 
will,  147  11'.:  on  predestination, 
150  17. ;  obsolete  doctrines  of, 
.'!.->:  contrasted  with  Duns  Sco- 
tus,  25;  Leonine  edition  of  his 
works,  36, 

Thomson,  discovers  electrons,  105. 

Traditionalism,  condemned  by  the 
Church,  L3. 

Truth,  its  unity  and  immutability 
according  tO   St.  Thomas,  8. 

Ti  km.ii's  contribution  to  neo  Scho- 
lasticism, 24  t.  329  ;  on  Bcholas- 
1  ic  philosophy,  32. 
I'viiKi  1. 1..  on  Scholasticism,  28. 


Ubaghs's  influence  in  Belgium, 
216. 

I  i  BERWEG,  on  Scholastic  philos- 
ophy, 32. 

Unity  of  God,  132. 

Universals,  conceptualists  on,  J  I  : 
Eaureau  on,  20;  de  Wulf  on, 
20;  Albert  the  Great's  solution 
of  the  problem  of,  24. 

Ubbabubu's  contribution  to  neo- 
Scholasticism,  181  fi\,  330;  his 
strictly  scholastic  method,  37 ; 
on  sense  and  intellect,  119;  on 
immortality  of  the  soul,  121. 

Vacant,  211,  330. 
Vachebot,  on  act  and  potency,  49. 
Vallet,  205,  331. 
Valverde  Tellez,  190-1,  331. 
Ventura,  155. 
Vebonnet,  on  ether,  103. 
Voltaibe,  regarded  as  a  Scholas- 
tic by  Picavet,  2. 

WEBBS,  on  Scholastic  philosophy, 
27. 

van  Weddixgen,  216,  333. 

WERNER,  200,  334. 

Whetiiam,  on  ether,  103. 

Will,  freedom   of,   145  ff. 

William  of  Champeaux,  con- 
nected with  Mediaeval  mysti- 
cism, 23. 

Woodbbiiige,  on  vital  problem  of 
metaphysics,  47. 

DE  YWlk's  contribution  to  nco- 
Scholasticism,  221-2,  335;  his 
definition  of  Scholastic  philos- 
ophy, 17;  on  problem  of  uni- 
versals, 20;  on  historical  stud- 
ies, 3S ;  on  Scholastic  system  of 
ethics,     136. 

Zkllkk,    on    Scholastic    philosophy, 

32. 
Zn  ii  IRA,  164  5,  330. 


345 


VITA 

The  author  of  this  dissertation,  Joseph  Louis  Perrier,  was 
born  at  La  Garde  Adhemar  (France),  on  March  12,  1874.  In 
1890,  he  received  his  Elementary  Teacher's  diploma  (Brevet 
elementaire)  at  the  Academy  of  Aix.  Two  years  later  (1892), 
the  University  of  Montpellier  conferred  upon  him  the  Higher 
Teacher's  diploma  (Brevet  superieur)  and  a  Bachelor's  degree 
(Baccalaureat  de  l'enseignement  secondaire  special).  In  1904- 
1905,  he  studied  at  the  College  of  St.  Francis  Xavier  (New 
York  City)  under  Fathers  O'Brien,  Shealy  and  Prendergast, 
S.J.,  and  was  given  the  degree  of  A.M.  in  1905.  From 
1905  to  1908,  he  studied  in  Columbia  University  under  Pro- 
fessors Woodbridge,  Dewey,  Fullerton,  Miller,  Montague  and 
Adolphe  ( John.  The  degree  of  A.M.  was  conferred  by  Colum- 
bia University  in  190G. 


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